3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5	dc6aaa0e10	fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill ... Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass (documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads (rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone. Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres + in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case. Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating) block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge (X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any environment enforcing auth. Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way: sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require", making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts + content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts, SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding. 82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS + 55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-03 12:00:43 +02:00
admin	a88ad04867	fix(health): report real per-dependency status instead of hardcoded ok:true ... BACKLOG P0-3: /api/health only ever checked *presence* of DATABASE_URL/ REDIS_URL and always returned ok:true regardless of whether anything was reachable -- ARCHITECTURE.md's own words, "an uptime monitor watching HTTP 200 would show green for a dying instance". lib/health-checks.ts adds real dependency probes: - db: a live `select 1` round trip (not just DATABASE_URL presence) - engine: a real HTTP call to the FastAPI engine's own GET /health - stripe: Stripe's documented lightweight balance.retrieve() liveness call - queue: honestly reports "not_integrated" when REDIS_URL is set but unused -- no Redis client is wired anywhere in this repo, so reporting "ok" would fabricate a check that doesn't exist /api/health stays a liveness check (always 200 while the process can respond; the body's `ok` field is the honest signal). New GET /api/ready fails closed with 503 when the load-bearing dependency (db) isn't both configured and reachable -- the "no /ready route" gap. contracts/openapi.yaml, docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md, and docs/slo.md updated to match. 17 new unit tests (dependency-injected fakes, no real network/DB) + 5 route-level tests.	2026-08-11 13:49:23 +02:00
adminandClaude Sonnet 5	15a0dbe3b1	fix(security): require auth on GET /api/orders and GET /api/admin/metrics ... A live compliance audit against 0pt.app confirmed both endpoints returned HTTP 200 with zero authentication -- the full order queue and financial pipeline aggregates (deposit/pipeline totals) were readable by anyone. Root cause: middleware.ts's matcher only covers /api/0pt/:path*, by design ("does NOT touch ... the unrelated payment/order APIs"), so nothing upstream of these two handlers ever verified the caller. Fix: both GET handlers now call the same fail-closed Zitadel verifier /api/0pt/* relies on (resolveAuthContext, src/auth/context.ts) directly, via a new thin wrapper (src/auth/require-route-auth.ts) that maps a rejected decision to the same 401/403 JSON shape middleware.ts already returns. The wrapper re-verifies the bearer token itself rather than trusting any x-0pt-verified-* header on the request, since middleware never runs in front of these routes to overwrite a client-supplied one. POST /api/orders (anonymous draft/quote creation before the deposit-payment step) is intentionally left as-is -- only the read paths that leaked data are gated. Tracked as part of docs/compliance/BACKLOG.md P0-3. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 04:06:13 +02:00