The eight-field AnalyticsQueryRequest BI-P016 names, verbatim, with the rule
that makes it safe enforced structurally rather than by convention: there is
no field that can carry SQL, and parseAnalyticsQueryRequest REJECTS unknown
keys instead of ignoring them. Ignoring an unsupported field is how it becomes
a supported one after the next refactor.
`tenant`, `tenant_id`, `project_id`, `database`, `catalog` and `table` are
rejected by name. INF0's Wave-2 cross-tenant hole was a tenant read out of a
request body; the fix that sticks is a request type in which the field does
not exist, and a parser that refuses it when a caller sends it anyway.
BI-P016's DoD ("same request compiles to ClickHouse/semantic engine without
consumer rewrite") is tested as an equality, not narrated: both targets are
projected onto a comparable shape and compared. The ClickHouse side of that
projection is obtained by PARSING the emitted SQL and its bound parameters in
the test — not by reading a field the compiler helpfully returned — so a
compiler that silently drops a filter fails the comparison instead of passing
it. The parser throws on any condition it does not recognise, which is what
would catch unbound caller text appearing in the statement.
BI-P011's forced tenant predicate is re-proven against this new path: five
request shapes are enumerated and each must have FORCED_TENANT_PREDICATE as
condition[0]; a blank tenant refuses to compile rather than emitting no
predicate; a hostile filter value appears only in params, never in sql.
45 tests, all failing-capable: every rejection assertion checks the SiaxError
code, and the DoD assertions compare reconstructed meaning rather than strings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
