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Simon AxelssonandClaude Opus 5 9267576b7c feat(data-os): P060-P068 durable ingestion plane — source classification gate, connector contract, common envelope, schema evolution, quality enforcement, queryable lineage, idempotent backfill
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BEFORE_STATE (verified, with evidence):

* P060 PARTIAL/BROKEN. The registry persisted rights/provenance/health/
  freshness to Postgres, but carried no authorization, no schedule, no
  checkpoint, no schema and no owner distinct from created_by — and the
  activation DoD was inverted: postgres-source-repository.ts wrote
  `${input.status ?? "active"}`, so a source with no rights, no provenance
  and no authorization was ACTIVE the instant it was registered. No
  activation operation existed at all.
* P061 MISSING. services/api/sources/connectors.py had per-source fetch_*()
  functions only — no lifecycle, no cursor, no resume, no health, no
  conformance suite.
* P062 MISSING, already documented as such in
  services/api/tests/test_known_gaps.py:10-19 (no CDC pipeline anywhere;
  workers/pipeline.py has no persistence at all).
* P063 MISSING. schema_version existed as a free string; no comparison,
  no policy, no versioned source schema.
* P064 PARTIAL. Rules/runs/issues/scores existed, but a failing rule only
  opened an issue and the data flowed on. No quarantine anywhere.
* P065 DUPLICATE (confirmed). Two ER engines: src/er/entity-resolution-
  service.ts (canonical) and services/api/workers/resolve.py (simplified,
  still called by pipeline.py:110).
* P067 PARTIAL. Lineage was emitted to AUD0 but nothing here could ANSWER a
  lineage question — no store, no query, no route.
* P068 MISSING, documented in test_known_gaps.py:44-52 ("no delivery-store
  persistence layer exists to dedupe a backfill against").

BUILT (only what was PARTIAL/BROKEN/MISSING):

* P060 sql/007_ingestion_plane.sql adds authorization/schedule/schemas/
  checkpoints/ledger/quarantine/lineage tables, owner_id, and flips the
  opt_sources status DEFAULT to 'pending' so even a raw psql INSERT cannot
  produce an unclassified-but-active source. SourceRegistryService gains
  classifySource/activateSource/deactivateSource + authorization/schedule
  accessors; registration NEVER activates (asking for status:"active" goes
  through the gate, not around it); a service identity cannot authorize a
  source. Routes: activate (GET classification / POST activate),
  authorization, schedule.
* P061 src/connectors/connector.ts — all nine operations on one interface.
  src/connectors/conformance.ts — a runnable suite (15 checks, no "skip"
  verdict). HttpJsonConnector (real HTTP, opaque cursor) and
  JsonlFileConnector (real file, line offsets, CDC deletes) both pass it.
  The suite caught a real defect while being written: an API that drops
  next_cursor at the end left the connector unable to resume, which is why
  HttpJsonConnectorConfig has cursor_field.
* P062 src/types/ingestion.ts + src/ingestion/{envelope,ingestion-runner}.ts.
  One envelope for batch/stream/cdc; durable per-(source,partition)
  checkpoints; resume proven by killing a run inside the sink.
* P063 src/schema/{record-schema,compatibility,schema-registry}.ts. Two
  enforcement points, both upstream of any consumer write: a discovery gate
  before the first read, and per-record conformance before the page reaches
  the sink. A producer cannot widen its own policy retroactively.
* P064 src/quality/quality-policy.ts composes the EXISTING ExpectationEngine
  (not a second engine) and adds the missing consequence: block /
  quarantine / warn, with quarantine durable and recoverable. No policy is
  reported as "none_declared", never as a pass; an unexecutable expectation
  counts as a violation, never a silent pass.
* P067 src/lineage/{lineage-edge,lineage-store}.ts + GET /api/0pt/lineage.
  AUD0 stays the system of record; this is 0pt's own queryable projection.
* P068 opt_ingestion_ledger + IngestionRunner.backfill: bounded, idempotent
  on repeat, leaves the live checkpoint alone, still re-emits real changes.

A BUG THIS PASS WROTE AND CAUGHT: the first IngestionRepository draft
combined the idempotency check and its recording into one atomic call
BEFORE the sink. The crash/resume test then delivered 7 of 10 records — the
page in flight when the sink died was already marked delivered, so the
resumed run skipped it as a duplicate. Permanent, silent data loss. Fixed by
splitting peekDeliveries/commitDeliveries and committing both the ledger and
the checkpoint only after the sink resolves.

NOT DONE, stated rather than deferred quietly:

* P065 is NOT met. resolve.py is still a second simplified production
  engine. Closing it means rewriting it as an adapter over the canonical
  service, which cannot be verified from this repo today: services/api is
  not built by this repo's Dockerfile, api.0pt.app answers 404, and NO CI
  workflow runs its pytest suite. The duplication is now stated at both
  sites in code and the removal plan is in STATUS.md. The new ingestion
  plane performs no ER, so it adds no third engine.
* P066 (Iceberg) untouched — ST0RE is owned by another workflow. Contract
  read only.
* Delivery is AT-LEAST-ONCE, not exactly-once (no per-partition run lock).
* No CDC *source* exists; the contract is met, a CDC connector is not built.
* 0pt does not schedule itself — the schedule row is a declaration ACT0
  would read.

VERIFIED: pnpm typecheck clean; pnpm test 365 passed / 25 skipped (was
311/18); pnpm build clean with all four new routes in the route table; lint
unchanged at 12 pre-existing errors. Real Postgres 16
(tests/p0/ingestion-plane-postgres.realinfra.test.ts, 7 passed) plus a real
`docker restart` of that container with an identical read-back through the
production code path — that is P060's "a restart preserves all sources",
measured.

DEPLOYMENT REALITY (curl, 2026-09-04): 0pt.app/api/health returns 200 from
Vercel with db:not_configured; 0pt.app/api/0pt/sources returns 404;
api.0pt.app/health returns 404; cd.yml still guards on a placeholder Coolify
app id. None of the capability layer runs in production. Nothing here is
LIVE_VERIFIED and STATUS.md says so.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 17:03:14 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5 dc6aaa0e10 fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill
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Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading
tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against
the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a
shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected
routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass
(documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows
when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads
(rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone.

Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now
honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres +
in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual
delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real
concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case.

Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly
invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own
compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating)
block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the
plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production
bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge
(X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never
checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any
environment enforcing auth.

Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres
containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way:
sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was
never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require",
making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev
container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies
cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts +
content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts,
SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back
correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding.

82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS +
55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 12:00:43 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5 9740e20818 feat(data-os): TS/Python quality bridge + provenance fields + fault-injection tests
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Continues P010 (branch renamed from feat/p010-source-registry-persistence):
closes the three remaining BEFORE_STATE.md gaps (§2 TS/Python split-brain,
§3 missing provenance fields, §4 untested failure modes), all additive to
the production pipeline — the Python QA filter's delivery decision is
unchanged by any of this.

TS/Python bridge (§2):
  - New route surface app/api/0pt/quality/* (rules/runs/issues CRUD +
    POST /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run) over the shared QualityService
    singleton (src/services/quality.ts), fixing the same "no shared
    instance" defect the Source Registry had.
  - src/quality/quality-bridge.ts auto-provisions a deterministic,
    tenant-scoped baseline rule set on first use so the Python engine never
    pre-registers rules through the CRUD surface.
  - services/api/workers/quality_bridge.py: the Python-side HTTP client.
    Feature-flagged off by default (OPT_QUALITY_BRIDGE_ENABLED), fails open
    on any error (never raises into run_job, never changes `delivered`).
    Advisory only — real per-row gating against the TS engine isn't
    implementable yet (ExpectationEngine returns dataset-level pass/fail
    counts + samples, not a per-row boolean array); documented, not faked.
  - Live-verified end-to-end: `next dev` (AUTH_ENFORCE=false) + the real
    Python pipeline hitting the real brreg.no API, round-tripping through
    the real bridge route, receiving a real QualityService score.

Provenance (§3): sources/connectors.py's Provenance dataclass gains
retrieved_at, transform, connector_version, producer, quality,
entity_resolution, artifact_ref (all previously absent from the real
dataflow entirely) via a make_provenance() factory used by every connector.
resolve.py stamps entity_resolution on merged records' provenance (never on
unmerged ones). pipeline.py stamps artifact_ref at delivery and quality
once the bridge succeeds.

Failure tests (§4), real fault injection against real code (services/api,
new pytest + respx suite, not vitest mocks):
  - dedup-determinism + duplicate-input + out-of-order: resolve.py under
    shuffled/interleaved/exhaustive-permutation input, plus an explicit,
    verified test of the one case that IS legitimately order-sensitive
    (non-transitive similarity in a greedy clusterer) instead of hiding it.
  - schema-evolution: respx-mocked upstream responses with added/removed/
    alien-shaped fields through the real brreg connector + pipeline.
  - restart: connector exceptions mid-job (including one from respx itself)
    never crash run_job.
  - backfill: the real property that holds given no persistence layer
    exists (replay is compute-idempotent) — NOT a fabricated dedup-store
    test.
  - CDC-interruption and true backfill/delivery-store idempotency:
    explicitly documented as not implementable against this codebase
    (no CDC pipeline, no delivery store exist anywhere) via skip markers
    with reasons, in tests/test_known_gaps.py, rather than silently
    dropped or faked.

Testing: 256/256 vitest (249 pre-existing + 7 new bridge route/service
tests) and 28/28 pytest (2 documented skips) green locally. tsc -p
tsconfig.check.json has zero new errors (14 pre-existing errors, all in
the untracked/unaudited src/fleet, src/graph, src/metrics, src/projections
paths this pass does not touch, per BEFORE_STATE.md).

No PR opened, per instructions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 21:02:14 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5 07b13bd833 feat(data-os): Source Registry Postgres persistence + full HTTP route surface
Replaces the in-memory (per-instance, not even per-process-shared) Maps in
SourceService/SourceRegistryService with real Postgres persistence, and adds
the register/query/describe/health/rights/provenance/freshness HTTP routes
that never existed (grep for SourceRegistryService in app/ previously
returned nothing).

- sql/002_source_registry.sql: opt_sources, opt_source_rights,
  opt_source_provenance, opt_source_health_checks, opt_source_freshness.
  Numbered 002 (not 006) because 004's opt_source_rate_policies already
  forward-references opt_sources, which no sql/ file defined until now —
  fixes 004's pre-existing broken migration ordering (opt_datasets remains
  a separate, unrelated, still-open gap in 004, flagged not fixed).
- src/repositories/*: SourceRepository / SourceRegistryRepository seams,
  each with an in-memory implementation (business logic extracted verbatim)
  and a Postgres implementation, chosen via resolveStoreMode — production
  still fails hard with no DATABASE_URL (Master-DoD §3), but a configured
  production now actually works instead of always being blocked.
- SourceService / SourceRegistryService: storage moved behind the
  repository seam; getHealth/getFreshness are now async and tenant-scoped
  at the accessor itself (needed once they're reachable directly over HTTP,
  not only after an earlier caller's tenant check).
- src/services/source-registry.ts: shared singleton instances for the
  sources/* route group, fixing the "each route module owned its own
  private registry" defect (source-rate-policies and .../query previously
  couldn't see a source registered via POST /api/0pt/sources).
- New routes: POST/GET /api/0pt/sources, GET /api/0pt/sources/[id],
  GET+PUT .../rights, GET+PUT .../provenance, GET+POST .../health,
  GET .../freshness.
- Business logic unchanged: fail-closed purpose gate, cross-tenant
  NOT_FOUND (no existence oracle, §50), bounded 100-row health history.

Tested against a real Postgres container (not mocked) —
tests/p0/source-registry-postgres.realinfra.test.ts, env-gated on
SOURCE_REGISTRY_TEST_DATABASE_URL, skips honestly when unset. All 249
pre-existing P0 tests + 7 new realinfra tests pass; also smoke-tested the
full HTTP route surface end-to-end against next dev + live Postgres.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 20:42:41 +02:00
SIAX Foundation BotandClaude Opus 4.8 1d76d50f3d feat(auth,foundation): Wave 2 flag-gated Zitadel JWT verify + validation + eslint + tests
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 14:32:34 +02:00