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5137bf87a1 |
fix: distinguish failed sources from empty results
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ff11216813 |
feat(engine): fail-closed X-Internal-Token-gate + commit-kedja (GIT_SHA) i services/api
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- X-Internal-Token skickades av edgen men verifierades ALDRIG — gate som raw-ASGI-middleware: INTERNAL_TOKEN satt => alla routes utom /health kräver exakt token, 401 (constant-time) annars. Ospecificerad token = inert (dev). - Dockerfile: ARG GIT_SHA + OCI-label + /health.reporting revision - compose var redan skriven för INTERNAL_TOKEN — motorn hade bara aldrig deployats med den - tester: tests/test_internal_token_gate.py (3: off/public/401-pass) — hela services/api-sviten 62 passed, 2 skipped (dokumenterade known-gaps), 0 fail |
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b212a11870 |
Merge pull request 'chore: untrack committed __pycache__ and scraper output dumps (P4-4)' (#22) from chore/untrack-pycache-and-scraper-output into main
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dc6aaa0e10 |
fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill
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Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading
tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against
the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a
shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected
routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass
(documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows
when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads
(rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone.
Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now
honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres +
in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual
delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real
concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case.
Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly
invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own
compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating)
block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the
plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production
bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge
(X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never
checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any
environment enforcing auth.
Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres
containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way:
sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was
never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require",
making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev
container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies
cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts +
content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts,
SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back
correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding.
82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS +
55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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6c17f0a0d9 |
chore: untrack committed __pycache__ and scraper output dumps (P4-4)
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13 compiled .pyc files under services/{api,scrapers}/**/__pycache__/ and 50
scraped brreg.no JSON pages under services/scrapers/output/ were committed to
git despite __pycache__/*.pyc already being covered by .gitignore -- they
predate that rule and git does not retroactively drop already-tracked files
that start matching an ignore pattern.
Neither set is referenced by any source, test, or doc as a fixture (verified
via repo-wide grep); both are pure runtime artifacts regenerated on demand.
Untrack them with git rm --cached, delete the local copies, and add
services/scrapers/output/ to .gitignore so scraper runs stop reintroducing
this. No source or test file touched; pnpm test still 156 passed / 1 honestly
skipped (realinfra ST0RE check) after the change.
Matches docs/compliance/BACKLOG.md P4-4, explicitly flagged as hygiene doable
without a product decision. Picks up unfinished work from an earlier,
never-merged branch of the same name.
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e6d3101501 |
fix: 17 confirmed bugs from full-repo audit (edge + Python engine) (#5)
* docs: correct stale quality-check-service.ts comment references
Two source comments still cited src/services/quality-check-service.ts as an
existing precedent. It doesn't exist anywhere in this repo's history (git
log --all: zero commits, any branch, ever) -- confirmed during the earlier
full-doc-corpus accuracy pass. Points each comment at the real precedent
instead (document-extraction-service.ts / iceberg-write-service.ts).
Applied from task_05ec36aa, spun off during that pass.
* fix: 17 confirmed bugs from full-repo audit (edge + Python engine)
Found by an 8-finder bug hunt across app/api, src/services, src/clients,
frontend, the Python engine, the data layer, config/infra, and tests, then
independently adversarially verified per finding (32 raw findings -> 27
confirmed real bugs; 5 refuted). This commit applies the 17 confirmed as
safe, mechanical fixes -- no architecture/design decision required. The
other 10 need a decision and are reported separately, not touched here.
Most consequential, app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit/route.ts:
the client-supplied Origin request header was trusted unsanitized both as
a server-side fetch target (SSRF) and as Stripe Checkout success/cancel
redirect URLs (open redirect tied to a real payment flow), and a failed
order lookup silently fell through to a hardcoded deposit amount instead
of 404. Fixed by reading the order directly via lib/orders-store.ts
(mirroring the sibling release/route.ts, which already did this correctly)
instead of both trusting the Origin header and self-issuing an HTTP fetch.
Also fixed:
- 5 routes (orders, orders/[id], estimates, subscriptions, ai/parse) that
500'd instead of 400ing on a literal JSON `null` body, since req.json()
resolves (not rejects) for that input and bypasses the try/catch guard.
- app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/{,[mappingId]/{,writes/}}route.ts each
instantiated their own private service instances, so a mapping created
via POST was invisible to the sibling GET and writes routes even before
the separately-tracked dataset-registration gap. Extracted a shared
singleton module, src/services/lakehouse-mapping-registry.ts.
- app/api/0pt/documents/[documentId]/extraction/route.ts collapsed every
error (not-configured, policy-denied, policy-approval-required,
not-found) into a blanket 400; now status-mapped like the sibling
sources/[sourceId]/query route.
- app/api/vehicles/route.ts: plate query param wasn't URL-encoded before
being concatenated into the outbound RDW request, allowing extra query
parameters to be injected; added a strict allowlist + encodeURIComponent.
- app/api/uploads/route.ts: POST returned a fake 200 success with
put_url: null even when "configured", instead of continuing to report
501 until presign generation is actually implemented.
- src/adapters/document-intelligence-adapter.ts: the result-polling loop
never checked response.ok, so a non-2xx poll response (auth expiry,
429, 5xx) was silently retried until a generic timeout masked the real
error.
- app/order/[id]/page.tsx: finish() never cleared the production-simulation
setInterval, so it kept firing (and re-rendering) forever after delivery.
- app/admin/page.tsx: the metrics fetch had no response/shape validation
(unlike the adjacent orders fetch), rendering literal "undefined" stat
tiles on a malformed response instead of falling back to <ErrorState/>.
- services/api/workers/pipeline.py: `config.get("seeds") or DEMO_SEEDS`
used truthy-or, so an explicit empty seeds dict was silently replaced
with hardcoded demo org numbers instead of being respected as empty.
- services/api/workers/resolve.py: corroboration (confidence/agreed_sources
bump) no longer fires for two hits from the same source under fuzzy
match -- only a genuinely independent source now counts, per docs/06's
own ">=2 independent sources agree" definition -- and a merged record's
provenance array now actually includes the corroborating source's
fields instead of only a bare source-name string.
- services/api/orchestrator/main.py: create_order's int(...) on
unvalidated client volume/confidence fields raised on any
decimal-formatted input (int("92.5") -> ValueError); now coerced via
float() first with a safe default. /vehicles/{plate} and /screen also
now catch connector exceptions and degrade gracefully, matching
pipeline.py's existing pattern for the same connectors.
- lib/orders-store.ts: postgres.js (pinned v3.4.9) returns bigint/numeric
columns as strings by default; getOrder/listOrders/setStatus were
silently handing callers stringified money fields. Added a narrow
per-row coercion instead of touching the shared client's global type
map (which would affect unrelated tables' bigint/numeric columns too).
- lib/subscriptions-store.ts: the in-memory fallback returned
oldest-first while the Postgres branch explicitly orders newest-first;
now consistent, mirroring the identical fix already in orders-store.ts.
- app/api/auth/login/route.ts: DEV_LOGIN_KEY was compared with a plain
!==, a non-constant-time comparison; replaced with crypto.timingSafeEqual.
Verified before commit: tsc --noEmit clean; vitest run 88 passed, 1 todo,
0 failures (13 files, unchanged from before this commit -- no existing
test's assertions needed to change). services/api/workers/resolve.py's
source-novelty and provenance-merge logic additionally verified by direct
execution against synthetic same-source/cross-source inputs (no Python
test suite exists in this repo to add to). services/api/workers/pipeline.py
and services/api/orchestrator/main.py verified with python -m py_compile
(no httpx/fastapi installed in this environment to run them directly).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(engine): treat explicit seeds:null as missing to avoid 500 in run_job
Four-eyes follow-up to this PR's own seeds change. Switching from
`config.get('seeds') or DEMO_SEEDS` to `config['seeds'] if 'seeds' in config`
correctly stopped an explicit empty {} from being backfilled with DEMO_SEEDS,
but regressed on client-controlled `{"seeds": null}`: seeds became None and
the downstream `seeds.get(market, [])` raised AttributeError -> 500. That path
is reachable (POST /orders stores raw body.config; POST /orders/{id}/run passes
it straight to run_job). Using `config.get('seeds') is not None` keeps the
intended behaviour (explicit {} honoured, never silently seeded with demo data)
while restoring the None-tolerance the old idiom had.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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be6909bce2 |
feat(engine+edge): live vehicles + screening endpoints, entity-resolution + job-queue + financials modules
Edge /api/vehicles (RDW NL, live now) + /api/screen (OpenSanctions, live now), both defer to engine when ENGINE_URL set. Engine: /vehicles/{plate} + /screen endpoints; workers/resolve (blocking+fuzzy entity resolution, now used by pipeline); workers/queue (in-process job queue); sources/financials (Companies House accounts + XBRL path). py_compile + tsc + next build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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31128a71c8 |
feat(engine): import compliant data engine (services/api) + infra
FastAPI orchestrator (health/sources/estimates/orders/jobs per docs/04), adaptive router (compliant methods only, no bypass tiers), pipeline (sourcing->extraction->structuring/dedup->fusion->QA with per-field provenance, drops < confidence target), live connectors GLEIF/Brreg/Companies House (PRH/CVR/Bolagsverket gated to level-0 until terms verified). sources.yaml registry. infra/docker-compose + Caddyfile for the VPS. FlareSolverr/stealth/proxy/fake-account paths intentionally NOT carried over (CLAUDE.md §1). py_compile clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |