3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
adminandClaude Opus 5	db868f4bdf	fix(prod): close legacy storage fallbacks in orders/subscriptions/blobs ... The `resolveStoreMode` kill switch (Master-DoD §3/§10) covered the newer `src/repositories/*` stores but not two older paths, both of which are live production execution paths today. 1. LEGACY NEXT.JS STORES. `lib/orders-store.ts` and `lib/subscriptions-store.ts` predate `src/platform/dependency-mode.ts` and called `getSql()` directly, silently falling back to module-global `Map`s when no database is configured. For orders, payments and subscriptions that is not a degraded mode, it is invisible loss of money-bearing state: the API returns 201 and the row evaporates on the next restart or on any other replica. The live 0pt deployment (Coolify app 54) runs NODE_ENV=production with DATABASE_URL, POSTGRES_URL and POSTGRES_PRISMA_URL all unset — so this is the behavior in production right now, across 7 API routes. These now go through `getSqlForDurableStore()`, which reuses the SAME `resolveStoreMode` decision every `src/repositories/*` store already uses rather than re-implementing a second production check. The reuse is load-bearing: `isProductionRuntime` deliberately exempts `NEXT_PHASE=phase-production-build`, because `next build` runs page-data collection under NODE_ENV=production while serving nothing. A naive `process.env.NODE_ENV === "production"` test here would have failed the BUILD instead of protecting a request path. 2. LOCALBLOBSTORE. It writes document bytes to a container-local disk while `document-capture-service` registers an artifact pointer claiming the bytes are stored — durable object storage silently swapped for ephemeral disk. It is the default blob store for both the capture and extraction services. In production it now raises DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE (capability blocked: no ST0RE bytes path exists yet) instead of fabricating success. Asserted per-operation, not in the constructor, so merely wiring the services is not fatal — only actually persisting or reading bytes is. Evidence: full suite 956 passed / 184 skipped, typecheck clean, dependency-cruiser 0 errors, lint identical to main's pre-existing baseline (17 problems, none in changed files). Both guards asserted in both directions and mutation-tested: bypassing resolveStoreMode -> 2 failed; dropping the write assert -> 2 failed; dropping the read assert -> 1 failed; all restored -> 8 passed. 7 non-test call sites. DEPLOYMENT NOTE: merging changes no runtime (no Gitea webhook exists on any repo; deploys are manual). Deploying this build REQUIRES provisioning DATABASE_URL for 0pt first, or the order/subscription routes will correctly return DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE instead of silently accepting orders into memory. That provisioning is a Simon action. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-09 17:38:51 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5	dc6aaa0e10	fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill ... Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass (documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads (rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone. Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres + in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case. Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating) block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge (X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any environment enforcing auth. Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way: sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require", making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts + content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts, SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding. 82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS + 55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-03 12:00:43 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 4.8	0b09ee5795	feat(api): order persistence (Postgres or in-memory fallback) + orders API ... lib/db (env-guarded postgres-js), lib/orders-store (createOrder/getOrder/listOrders/setStatus, DB-or-memory), /api/orders (POST create+estimate, GET list), /api/orders/[id] (GET, PATCH status with escrow-safe state machine). Activates fully on DATABASE_URL/POSTGRES_URL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-24 18:11:34 +02:00