fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill
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Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading
tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against
the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a
shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected
routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass
(documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows
when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads
(rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone.
Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now
honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres +
in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual
delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real
concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case.
Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly
invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own
compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating)
block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the
plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production
bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge
(X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never
checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any
environment enforcing auth.
Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres
containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way:
sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was
never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require",
making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev
container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies
cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts +
content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts,
SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back
correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding.
82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS +
55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Sonnet 5
parent
e7516697b3
commit
dc6aaa0e10
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/**
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* P014 regression: HTTP-level proof that every app/api/0pt/** route which
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* takes tenant_id from client-controlled input (query string or JSON body)
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* now rejects a request whose tenant_id disagrees with the tenant
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* middleware.ts already verified for the caller (forwarded as
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* `x-0pt-verified-tenant`). Before this pass, NONE of these routes checked
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* that header at all -- a valid token for tenant A could read or write
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* tenant B's sources, rate policies, quality rules, documents, or lakehouse
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* mappings simply by naming tenant_id=B in the request.
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*
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* These call the route handlers directly with a hand-built NextRequest that
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* carries `x-0pt-verified-tenant` -- exactly the shape middleware.ts hands
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* the route once a real Bearer token has been verified (see
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* tests/api/anonymous-routes-auth.test.ts for the same "call the handler
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* directly, simulate what upstream already established" pattern used for
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* the /api/orders and /api/admin/metrics fail-closed regressions).
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
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import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import { POST as sourcesPOST, GET as sourcesGET } from "@/app/api/0pt/sources/route";
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import { GET as sourceDescribeGET } from "@/app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/route";
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import { GET as ratePolicyGET } from "@/app/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/[sourceRatePolicyId]/route";
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import { GET as mappingsListGET, POST as mappingsPOST } from "@/app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/route";
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import { GET as mappingGetGET } from "@/app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/[mappingId]/route";
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import { POST as qualityRulesPOST } from "@/app/api/0pt/quality/rules/route";
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import { GET as documentsGET } from "@/app/api/0pt/documents/capture/route";
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const VERIFIED = "x-0pt-verified-tenant";
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function getReq(url: string, verifiedTenant = "t_a"): NextRequest {
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return new NextRequest(new URL(url, "http://localhost"), { headers: { [VERIFIED]: verifiedTenant } });
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}
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function postReq(url: string, body: unknown, verifiedTenant = "t_a"): NextRequest {
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return new NextRequest(new URL(url, "http://localhost"), {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", [VERIFIED]: verifiedTenant },
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body: JSON.stringify(body),
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});
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}
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describe("cross-tenant HTTP regression: /api/0pt/sources", () => {
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it("POST rejects registering a source under a foreign tenant_id (403, never reaches the service)", async () => {
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const res = await sourcesPOST(
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postReq("/api/0pt/sources", {
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source_id: "src_attack_1",
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tenant_id: "t_victim",
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project_id: "p1",
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source_type: "api",
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name: "attacker-named source",
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}),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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const body = await res.json();
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expect(body.error).toBe("OPT_ACCESS_DENIED");
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});
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it("POST succeeds when tenant_id matches the verified tenant", async () => {
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const res = await sourcesPOST(
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postReq("/api/0pt/sources", {
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source_id: "src_ok_1",
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tenant_id: "t_a",
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project_id: "p1",
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source_type: "api",
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name: "legit source",
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}),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(201);
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});
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it("GET (list) rejects a foreign tenant_id query param (403)", async () => {
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const res = await sourcesGET(getReq("/api/0pt/sources?tenant_id=t_victim", "t_a"));
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it("GET (list) succeeds when the query tenant_id matches", async () => {
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const res = await sourcesGET(getReq("/api/0pt/sources?tenant_id=t_a", "t_a"));
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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});
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describe("cross-tenant HTTP regression: /api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]", () => {
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it("GET describe rejects a foreign tenant_id (403, before any existence check)", async () => {
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const res = await sourceDescribeGET(getReq("/api/0pt/sources/src_whatever?tenant_id=t_victim", "t_a"), {
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params: Promise.resolve({ sourceId: "src_whatever" }),
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});
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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});
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describe("cross-tenant HTTP regression: /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/[id]", () => {
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it("GET rejects a foreign tenant_id (403) -- this route had NO tenant check of any kind before P014", async () => {
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const res = await ratePolicyGET(getReq("/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/srp_whatever?tenant_id=t_victim", "t_a"), {
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params: Promise.resolve({ sourceRatePolicyId: "srp_whatever" }),
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});
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it("GET without tenant_id at all is a 400, not an unscoped read", async () => {
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const res = await ratePolicyGET(getReq("/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/srp_whatever", "t_a"), {
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params: Promise.resolve({ sourceRatePolicyId: "srp_whatever" }),
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});
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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});
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});
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describe("cross-tenant HTTP regression: /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings", () => {
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it("POST rejects mapping a dataset under a foreign tenant_id (403)", async () => {
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const res = await mappingsPOST(
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postReq(
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"/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings",
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{
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tenant_id: "t_victim",
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project_id: "p1",
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dataset_id: "ds_1",
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dataset_iceberg_mapping_id: "dim_attack_1",
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namespace: "ns",
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table_name: "tbl",
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storage_uri: "s3://x/y",
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catalog_ref: "cat",
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actor_id: "actor1",
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correlation_id: "corr1",
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},
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"t_a",
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),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it("GET (list) requires tenant_id -- omitting it no longer returns every tenant's mappings (was: full leak)", async () => {
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const res = await mappingsListGET(getReq("/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings", "t_a"));
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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});
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it("GET (list) rejects a foreign tenant_id query param (403)", async () => {
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const res = await mappingsListGET(getReq("/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings?tenant_id=t_victim", "t_a"));
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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});
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describe("cross-tenant HTTP regression: /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/[mappingId]", () => {
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it("GET rejects a foreign tenant_id (403) -- this route had NO tenant check of any kind before P014", async () => {
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const res = await mappingGetGET(
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getReq("/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/dim_whatever?tenant_id=t_victim", "t_a"),
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{ params: Promise.resolve({ mappingId: "dim_whatever" }) },
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it("GET without tenant_id at all is a 400, not an unscoped read", async () => {
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const res = await mappingGetGET(getReq("/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/dim_whatever", "t_a"), {
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params: Promise.resolve({ mappingId: "dim_whatever" }),
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});
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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});
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});
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describe("cross-tenant HTTP regression: /api/0pt/quality/rules", () => {
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it("POST rejects creating a rule under a foreign tenant_id (403)", async () => {
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const res = await qualityRulesPOST(
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postReq(
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"/api/0pt/quality/rules",
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{
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rule_id: "rule_attack_1",
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tenant_id: "t_victim",
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project_id: "p1",
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dataset_id: "ds_1",
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name: "attacker rule",
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expectation: { expectation_type: "not_null", kwargs: { column: "name" } },
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},
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"t_a",
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),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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});
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describe("cross-tenant HTTP regression: /api/0pt/documents/capture (GET)", () => {
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it("requires tenant_id -- omitting it no longer returns every tenant's captured documents (was: full leak)", async () => {
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const res = await documentsGET(getReq("/api/0pt/documents/capture", "t_a"));
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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});
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it("rejects a foreign tenant_id query param (403)", async () => {
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const res = await documentsGET(getReq("/api/0pt/documents/capture?tenant_id=t_victim", "t_a"));
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it("succeeds when the query tenant_id matches the verified tenant", async () => {
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const res = await documentsGET(getReq("/api/0pt/documents/capture?tenant_id=t_a", "t_a"));
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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});
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@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
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/**
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* P014: HTTP-level proof that POST /api/orders honors the `Idempotency-Key`
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* header end to end (route -> lib/orders-store.ts), matching the pattern
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* used elsewhere in this suite (tests/api/anonymous-routes-auth.test.ts) of
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* calling the route handler directly with a hand-built NextRequest.
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
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import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import { POST as ordersPOST } from "@/app/api/orders/route";
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function postReq(body: unknown, headers: Record<string, string> = {}): NextRequest {
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return new NextRequest(new URL("/api/orders", "http://localhost"), {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", ...headers },
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body: JSON.stringify(body),
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});
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}
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const BODY = { flow: "custom", config: { markets: ["SE"], type: "Bolag", fieldIds: ["identity"], volume: 1000 } };
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const BODY_DIFFERENT = { flow: "custom", config: { markets: ["NO"], type: "Bolag", fieldIds: ["identity"], volume: 9000 } };
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describe("POST /api/orders — Idempotency-Key", () => {
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it("no header: two identical requests create two distinct orders (201, 201)", async () => {
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const r1 = await ordersPOST(postReq(BODY));
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const r2 = await ordersPOST(postReq(BODY));
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expect(r1.status).toBe(201);
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expect(r2.status).toBe(201);
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const b1 = await r1.json();
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const b2 = await r2.json();
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expect(b1.order_id).not.toBe(b2.order_id);
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});
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it("REGRESSION: same Idempotency-Key replays the original order (201 then 200, same order_id)", async () => {
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const key = `idem_${crypto.randomUUID()}`;
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const r1 = await ordersPOST(postReq(BODY, { "Idempotency-Key": key }));
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const r2 = await ordersPOST(postReq(BODY, { "Idempotency-Key": key }));
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expect(r1.status).toBe(201);
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expect(r2.status).toBe(200); // replayed, not created
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const b1 = await r1.json();
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const b2 = await r2.json();
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expect(b2.order_id).toBe(b1.order_id);
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expect(b2.total_ore).toBe(b1.total_ore);
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});
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it("reusing the same key for a materially different order is a 409, not a silent merge", async () => {
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const key = `idem_${crypto.randomUUID()}`;
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const r1 = await ordersPOST(postReq(BODY, { "Idempotency-Key": key }));
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expect(r1.status).toBe(201);
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const r2 = await ordersPOST(postReq(BODY_DIFFERENT, { "Idempotency-Key": key }));
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expect(r2.status).toBe(409);
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const b2 = await r2.json();
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expect(b2.error.code).toBe("idempotency_key_conflict");
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});
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it("header name is case-insensitive (Fetch/Next Headers normalize casing)", async () => {
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const key = `idem_${crypto.randomUUID()}`;
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const r1 = await ordersPOST(postReq(BODY, { "idempotency-key": key }));
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const r2 = await ordersPOST(postReq(BODY, { "IDEMPOTENCY-KEY": key }));
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expect(r1.status).toBe(201);
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expect(r2.status).toBe(200);
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});
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});
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