fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill
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Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading
tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against
the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a
shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected
routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass
(documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows
when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads
(rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone.
Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now
honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres +
in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual
delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real
concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case.
Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly
invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own
compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating)
block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the
plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production
bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge
(X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never
checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any
environment enforcing auth.
Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres
containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way:
sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was
never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require",
making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev
container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies
cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts +
content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts,
SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back
correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding.
82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS +
55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Sonnet 5
parent
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/**
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* src/http/tenant-guard.ts
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* ==========================
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* P014 fix: every route under `app/api/0pt/**` sits behind `middleware.ts`,
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* which performs real Zitadel Bearer verification and — only when a
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* principal was actually verified — forwards the result as the
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* `x-0pt-verified-tenant` request header (see middleware.ts, src/auth/context.ts).
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*
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* Independently of that, every one of these route handlers reads `tenant_id`
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* from CLIENT-CONTROLLED input (a `?tenant_id=` query param or a JSON body
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* field) to decide which tenant's rows to read or write. Until this pass,
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* NONE of them cross-checked that client-supplied value against the verified
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* header — so a caller holding a valid token for tenant A could read or
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* write tenant B's sources, rights, provenance, health, quality rules/runs,
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* documents, or lakehouse mappings simply by naming `tenant_id=t_b` in the
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* request. `SourceRegistryService.assertSourceTenant` (and friends) only
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* checks that the object being read *belongs* to the tenant_id it was asked
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* to check against — it has no way to know whether the CALLER is actually
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* entitled to assert that tenant_id in the first place. That entitlement
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* check belongs at the HTTP boundary, once, here.
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*
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* This mirrors the exact decision `src/auth/context.ts`'s `resolveAuthContext`
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* already makes for the enforced-Bearer path ("a disagreeing X-Tenant-Id
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* header is a 403"), applied uniformly to every 0pt capability route that
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* takes tenant_id as a body/query parameter rather than relying on
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* middleware to inject ctx.tenantId directly (most of these routes predate
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* that plumbing and read tenant_id straight from the request; fixing that
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* more deeply is a larger refactor than this pass — this closes the actual
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* authz hole without changing every route's request contract).
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*/
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import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from "next/server";
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export const VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER = "x-0pt-verified-tenant";
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/**
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* Returns a 403 NextResponse when `tenantId` (whatever the route read it
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* from — query string or body) disagrees with the tenant middleware.ts
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* already verified for this request. Returns `null` when the caller may
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* proceed — either because the tenant matches, or because no verified
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* tenant is present on the request at all.
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*
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* The header is absent only in the explicit local-development escape hatch
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* (`AUTH_ENFORCE=false` with no bearer token presented) — `assertAuthConfigSafe()`
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* refuses to boot that way in production, so an absent header here can only
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* happen in a mode that already accepts fully unauthenticated requests.
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* Rejecting in that mode would be strictly more restrictive than the
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* existing dev escape hatch intends, so this deliberately no-ops rather than
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* invents a tenant to compare against.
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*/
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export function assertTenantMatchesVerified(
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request: NextRequest,
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tenantId: string | null | undefined,
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): NextResponse | null {
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const verified = request.headers.get(VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER);
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if (!verified) return null;
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if (!tenantId) return null; // handlers already 400 on a missing tenant_id separately
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if (tenantId !== verified) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: "OPT_ACCESS_DENIED",
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message: "tenant_id disagrees with the authenticated token's tenant",
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details: { requested_tenant: tenantId, verified_tenant: verified },
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},
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{ status: 403 },
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);
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}
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return null;
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}
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