feat(auth): dual-accept CL0UD workload identity on the machine routes
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The internal machine routes (`quality/bridge-run`, `canonical/facts`, `internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch`, `internal/er/candidates`, `search/definitions`) trusted a shared `X-Internal-Token` with NO tenant authority: middleware let it through without setting any verified tenant, so `assertTenantMatchesVerified` was a no-op and a caller-chosen `tenant_id` in the body was authoritative. This closes that gap while keeping the engine working during the transition to CL0UD workload tokens: - `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts` — the server-configured `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` scope, a scope header that only middleware may set, and a parser that strips/ignores client values. - `src/auth/cl0ud-workload.ts` — a real `jose`/JWKS verifier for CL0UD workload JWTs (`iss`/`aud`/`exp`), deriving `tenant_id` and `capabilities` from verified claims only. Fail-closed when a token is presented but the issuer/JWKS/audience/tenant claim does not verify. - `middleware.ts` — strips every `x-0pt-verified-*` header on all forwarded paths. Legacy internal tokens get the single configured tenant as scope (an ambiguous multi-tenant list is refused with 401 instead of widened); a Bearer CL0UD workload token is verified and its claims become the verified tenant/subject/capabilities. - `src/http/tenant-guard.ts` — enforces the service scope on tenant-scoped writes (deny when the tenant is outside the scope) and adds `assertWorkloadCapabilities` for capability-scoped principals. - `quality/bridge-run` now calls `assertTenantMatchesVerified` like `canonical/facts` already did. Tests: `tests/auth/workload-identity-dual-accept.test.ts` (10 cases) covers forged-header stripping, ambiguous-scope refusal, wrong audience, missing tenant claim, cross-tenant denial and missing-capability denial. Real CL0UD provisioning (service accounts + published JWKS) is still required before a workload token exists in production; until then the legacy token path is the only one that authenticates, now tenant-scoped.
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@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
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/**
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* CL0UD workload-identity JWT verification for explicit machine routes.
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* Config-driven; fail-closed when a workload token is presented but invalid.
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* Tenant/capabilities come from verified claims only.
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*/
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import { createRemoteJWKSet, decodeJwt, jwtVerify, type JWTPayload } from 'jose';
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export type WorkloadPrincipal = {
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sub: string;
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tenantId: string;
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capabilities: string[];
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claims: JWTPayload;
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};
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export class WorkloadVerificationError extends Error {
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constructor(message: string) { super(message); this.name = 'WorkloadVerificationError'; }
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}
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const jwksCache = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>>();
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let resolverOverride: ((protectedHeader: unknown, token: unknown) => Promise<CryptoKey | Uint8Array>) | null = null;
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export function __setWorkloadKeyResolverForTests(fn: typeof resolverOverride) { resolverOverride = fn; }
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export function __resetWorkloadJwksCache() { jwksCache.clear(); resolverOverride = null; }
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function readEnv(name: string): string | undefined {
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const v = process.env[name];
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return v && v.trim() ? v.trim() : undefined;
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}
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export function cl0udWorkloadConfig() {
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const issuer = readEnv('CL0UD_WORKLOAD_ISSUER') ?? readEnv('CL0UD_ISSUER');
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const jwksUrl = readEnv('CL0UD_WORKLOAD_JWKS_URL');
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const audience = readEnv('CL0UD_WORKLOAD_AUDIENCE') ?? '0pt';
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const tenantClaim = readEnv('CL0UD_WORKLOAD_TENANT_CLAIM') ?? 'tenant_id';
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const capabilitiesClaim = readEnv('CL0UD_WORKLOAD_CAPABILITIES_CLAIM') ?? 'capabilities';
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return { issuer, jwksUrl, audience, tenantClaim, capabilitiesClaim };
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}
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export function isCl0udWorkloadConfigured(): boolean {
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const c = cl0udWorkloadConfig();
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return Boolean(c.issuer || c.jwksUrl);
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}
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async function getJwks(c: ReturnType<typeof cl0udWorkloadConfig>) {
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if (resolverOverride) return resolverOverride;
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const url = c.jwksUrl ?? (c.issuer ? `${c.issuer.replace(/\/$/, '')}/.well-known/jwks.json` : undefined);
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if (!url) throw new WorkloadVerificationError('CL0UD workload JWKS URL/issuer not configured');
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let jwks = jwksCache.get(url);
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if (!jwks) { jwks = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(url)); jwksCache.set(url, jwks); }
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return jwks;
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}
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function stringArray(v: unknown): string[] {
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if (Array.isArray(v)) return v.filter((x): x is string => typeof x === 'string' && x.length > 0);
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if (typeof v === 'string' && v.trim()) return v.split(/[\s,]+/).filter(Boolean);
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return [];
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}
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export async function verifyCl0udWorkloadToken(token: string): Promise<WorkloadPrincipal> {
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const c = cl0udWorkloadConfig();
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if (!isCl0udWorkloadConfigured()) throw new WorkloadVerificationError('CL0UD workload identity not configured');
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const jwks = await getJwks(c);
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, jwks as any, {
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...(c.issuer ? { issuer: c.issuer } : {}),
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audience: c.audience,
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});
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const tenantId = payload[c.tenantClaim];
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if (typeof tenantId !== 'string' || !tenantId) throw new WorkloadVerificationError(`missing ${c.tenantClaim} claim`);
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const sub = typeof payload.sub === 'string' && payload.sub ? payload.sub : `workload:${tenantId}`;
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const capabilities = stringArray(payload[c.capabilitiesClaim] ?? payload.scope);
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return { sub, tenantId, capabilities, claims: payload };
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}
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/** Best-effort check: does this bearer look like a configured CL0UD workload token? */
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export function looksLikeCl0udWorkloadToken(token: string): boolean {
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const c = cl0udWorkloadConfig();
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if (!c.issuer) return false;
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try { return decodeJwt(token).iss === c.issuer; } catch { return false; }
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}
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@@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ export const INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS_VAR = 'INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS';
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*/
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export const SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER = 'x-0pt-verified-service-tenants';
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/**
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* Request header installed by middleware.ts ONLY: the CL0UD workload token's
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* verified capability list, comma-separated. Stripped from every inbound
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* request like the tenant scope.
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*/
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export const SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_HEADER = 'x-0pt-verified-capabilities';
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/** Parse a comma-separated tenant allowlist (trimmed, de-duplicated, ordered). */
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export function parseServiceTenants(value: string | undefined | null): string[] {
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if (!value) return [];
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