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# 01 · Product
## Vision
0pt is the most flexible, honest data-services platform for the Nordic + European B2B market. Customers order any kind of data work — from ready-made datasets to bespoke pipelines — and get full visibility into where every value came from and how confident it is. The differentiator is **honest accuracy**: provenance per field, freshness tracking, source transparency. Incumbents (Apollo, Cognism, ZoomInfo) overclaim; 0pt shows its work.
## The three flows (everything reduces to these)
Every service maps to one of three intake/delivery flows (`Flow` in `lib/services.ts`: `catalog` | `custom` | `subscription`).
*Correction: this section previously said "nine categories (scraping, structuring, datasets, ICP/leads, BI, ML, documents, subscriptions, custom)" — that list doesn't match `lib/services.ts`'s actual catalog and never did (no `structuring`, `datasets`, `subscriptions`, or `custom` service id exists there). The real catalog today (`lib/services.ts`, `SERVICES`) has 11 entries: data delivery, web scraping, mapping & matching, normalization, consolidation → CRM/ERP, documents & OCR, enrichment, ICP & leads, ML jobs, BI & market analysis, feeds & monitoring.* These are **tags/filters within the three flows**, not separate machinery — each entry carries a `flow` field pointing back to `catalog` / `custom` / `subscription`.
1. **Catalog product** — ready-made, browse → sample → buy → deliver. Exists in Postgres or produced fast from the pipeline. Margin + scale.
2. **Custom job** — does not exist yet; must be scoped. `configure (AI-assist) → estimate → manual scope/quote confirm → produce → QA → validate → deliver`. The hero flow. Consulting in a portal.
3. **Subscription / feed** — recurring product or job: lead feeds, freshness monitoring, ongoing enrichment. `configure → recurring payment → recurring delivery/webhook`.
## Order lifecycle (state machine)
```
DRAFT → QUOTED → DEPOSIT_PENDING → IN_PRODUCTION → REVIEW
→ (REVISION → IN_PRODUCTION)* → ACCEPTED → DELIVERED → [SUBSCRIPTION_ACTIVE]
```
- **DRAFT**: configurator in progress.
- **QUOTED**: estimate produced (catalog = instant; custom = after scope confirm).
- **DEPOSIT_PENDING**: awaiting 50 % deposit.
- **IN_PRODUCTION**: deposit captured → workers run. Customer watches live.
- **REVIEW**: QA passed threshold → customer validates (table/map/schema/quality).
- **REVISION**: customer requested changes → escrow untouched → back to production.
- **ACCEPTED**: customer approves → remaining 50 % released from escrow.
- **DELIVERED**: exports + destinations unlocked; provenance log + quality report attached.
- **SUBSCRIPTION_ACTIVE**: if converted to a feed.
This is real, working code today, not just a spec: `app/api/orders/[id]/route.ts`'s `PATCH` handler enforces exactly this sequence (lowercase: `draft`, `quoted`, `deposit_pending`, `in_production`, `review`, `revision`, `accepted`, `delivered`) as its allowed-status list. One gap: `SUBSCRIPTION_ACTIVE` is **not** in that allowed list yet — feed conversion (Phase 7, `docs/09-build-plan.md`) isn't wired into the order status machine.
## Business / escrow model
- **50 / 50.** Deposit (50 %) captured to start production. Balance (50 %) **held** and only captured/released on **ACCEPTED**. Revision never moves the held amount.
- Pricing models: pay-per-job, volume, subscription (monthly), custom quote.
- Estimate is a function of: selected field weights × markets × volume × entity multiplier × confidence-target multiplier + enrichment. Custom jobs get a manual scope/quote gate before DEPOSIT_PENDING.
- Stripe: deposit = capture now (`app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit/route.ts`); balance = **a second Stripe Checkout session created on accept**, keyed to the order (`app/api/payments/[order_id]/release/route.ts`). *Correction: earlier drafts of this doc left the balance mechanism open ("either a held authorization … or a second invoice"). The second-Checkout-session approach is what's actually implemented — there is no held-PaymentIntent-capture path in the code.* Both routes are env-guarded on `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY` and return `501` until it's configured (`lib/stripe.ts`).
## Customer DB access (designed, not a checkbox)
Default: the customer **pushes** data (upload/export) — we rarely need to read their DB. If we must: a **read-only, table-scoped, time-boxed** role the customer creates, IP-allowlisted, ideally against a replica. Creds encrypted, deleted after the job. Everything logged. This is a selling point to compliance-heavy buyers, and it requires a DPA.
## Personas (brief — for copy + prioritization)
SaaS-Martin (RevOps, wants clean ICP/leads), Bilhandlar-Bengt (vehicle + company data via VehIQ), Rekryterar-Rebecka (people/firmographics), Investor-Ivar (diligence, sanctions/UBO, scrutinizes compliance), Ekonomi-Erik (financials, scrutinizes compliance), Data-David (raw datasets + API). Ivar and Erik are *why* honest sourcing + DPA must be airtight.
## First-launch scope (de-risked)
Do **not** ship "20 markets × 11 categories." Ship the thinnest sellable slice: **Nordic company data** (the open stuff — GLEIF + Brreg + verified sources) + **vehicle data** (VehIQ synergy) as a couple of catalog datasets, **plus the custom-job intake**, Stripe, and delivery to download + into FiveCRM/Data Loader. First customers are Protosell internally + existing dealer relationships — services you already deliver, productized. Then expand markets as the sourcing map fills in.
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# 02 · Architecture
> **Known issues affecting this doc, in brief** — full detail + evidence in [`README.md`](../README.md)'s
> "Known issues" section: (1) no auth/session system exists yet, so several newer routes trust
> client-supplied `tenant_id` (see "Known gaps" below); (2) the CL0UD/N0D/AUD0/ST0RE platform clients are
> real code but mock-only in this repo; (3) `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` / `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`
> / `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md` reference several `src/services/quality-*` and `sql/002`/`sql/003` files
> that were never actually committed to this repo (out of this doc's file scope to fix — flagged here so it
> isn't silently repeated); (4) two git remotes (`github.com/sax3l/0pt` and `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt`) have
> diverged and it is unresolved which is authoritative — Simon's call, not assumed here.
## Principle: one database, many lenses
Postgres is the source of truth. Everything else is a **lens** on it. A tool enters the stack only if it (a) reads that Postgres and (b) sits behind the same auth. This is the difference between an app and a pile of separate logins.
This principle describes — and is largely realized by — the **original edge + engine plane**: marketing, catalog, order lifecycle, and the FastAPI engine. It does **not** describe the newer **P0 data-platform surface** (`app/api/0pt/*`), which is real, additive, and deliberately does not go through this same path. See "Two API surfaces" below.
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
COLLECTION │ POSTGRES │ LENSES (customer + admin)
(legal engine) │ dim_company · dim_contact · dim_vehicle │
─────────────── │ fact_financials · dim_ubo │ ─────────────────────────────
Official APIs │ dim_source · bridge_provenance │ Next.js portal (Vercel)
/bulk ───────▶│ orders · order_items · jobs · deliveries │◀── Catalog + order lifecycle
Authorized web │ subscriptions · users · orgs · files │ NocoDB (embedded "Min data")
Licensed data │ db_grants · audit_log · pgvector embeddings │ Metabase (embedded dashboards)
Customer upload│ │ Export: CSV/Parquet/JSON/API/FiveCRM
└───────────────────▲──────────────────────────┘
│
services/api — FastAPI orchestrator + workers
(estimates, orders, jobs, AI-assist, webhooks, pipeline)
```
## Components & responsibilities
- **Next.js (Vercel)** — all customer/admin UI: marketing site, catalog, configurator, checkout, production tracker, validation, portal, admin. It also hosts **two distinct families** of API route handlers under `app/api/`: the original order/catalog/estimate surface (some of which defer to the FastAPI engine), and the newer P0 data-platform surface under `app/api/0pt/*` (does not defer to the engine at all — see below).
- **FastAPI orchestrator** (`services/api/orchestrator/main.py`) — REST contract in `docs/04-api.md`: estimates, orders, sources, vehicle lookup, sanctions screening, job run/status. **Not on Vercel** (serverless timeouts kill long jobs). *Correction: earlier drafts of this doc pointed at `src/orchestrator`; that was the pre-migration location. `docs/09-build-plan.md` Phase 0 called for moving it into `services/api`, and that move has happened — the code lives at `services/api/orchestrator` today.*
- **Workers** (`services/api/workers/`) — adaptive router (`adaptive_router.py`, verified: chooses only among compliant methods — official API → bulk → authorized web → licensed, no bypass/stealth/proxy-rotation tier exists in it, by design) + pipeline stages (`pipeline.py`, `queue.py`, `resolve.py`, `run.py`). See `docs/06-data-engine.md`.
- **Postgres** — backbone (`docs/03-data-model.md`) incl. `pgvector` for matching/embeddings, for the original edge + engine plane. Wired via `lib/db.ts` (env-guarded: `DATABASE_URL`/`POSTGRES_URL`; falls back to an in-memory, non-durable store when unset, e.g. `lib/orders-store.ts`).
- **NocoDB / Metabase** — both are defined as services in `infra/docker-compose.yml`; embedding them into the portal as "Min data" / customer dashboards was the original target, and neither is confirmed wired into a portal page. *Correction 2026-09-06: Metabase is no longer the canonical BI lens — Apache Superset is (see "Stack decisions" below). Metabase may stay as an optional App Catalog app; it must not be treated as the platform default.*
- **Cloudflare R2** — file storage (uploads + deliverables) via presigned URLs. Env-guarded (`app/api/uploads/route.ts` checks `R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID`/`R2_BUCKET`/`R2_ENDPOINT` and returns `501` until set); the presign call itself is still a stub (`put_url: null`) even when the env vars are present — not wired end-to-end yet.
- **Stripe** — deposit capture + escrow balance release. This one **is** wired: `app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit/route.ts` and `.../release/route.ts` are real Stripe Checkout calls (env-guarded on `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`, `501` until configured). See the correction in `docs/01-product.md`'s business model section for exactly which escrow mechanism is implemented.
- **Resend** — documented as the transactional-email provider (`docs/08-infrastructure.md`) but has no call site anywhere in this repo yet. Treat "+ email" as not-yet-implemented, not merely unconfigured.
- **Auth.js (NextAuth) with a Postgres adapter** — this is the **target**, listed here as a stack decision, not a built component. What exists today is a lightweight signed-session scaffold (`lib/auth.ts`: HMAC-SHA256 via Web Crypto, no external deps) behind a guarded dev-only login gate (`DEV_LOGIN_KEY`). There is **no** real session-to-org/tenant binding anywhere in this repo. Full Auth.js + OAuth is Phase 3 of `docs/09-build-plan.md` and has not been built. This matters directly for the tenant-scoping gap described below.
## Two API surfaces
This repo currently contains **two real, distinct API surfaces**, not one. Earlier versions of this doc described the edge as a uniform thin proxy to the FastAPI engine — that was true for part of the original surface and remains true for that part, but a second, newer surface was added that is a deliberate, ADR-documented exception to it. Conflating the two is the single biggest way to misread this codebase's architecture.
### 1. The original edge → engine surface
A subset of the original `app/api/*` route handlers defer to the FastAPI engine (`services/api`) via `lib/engine.ts`'s `engineFetch()`/`hasEngine()` bridge when `ENGINE_URL` is set, and fall back to local computation when it isn't:
- `app/api/estimates/route.ts` — defers to `POST {ENGINE_URL}/estimates`, falls back to `lib/data.ts`'s `computeEstimate`.
- `app/api/vehicles/route.ts`, `app/api/screen/route.ts`, `app/api/ai/parse/route.ts` — same pattern.
Other original routes are **not** engine-backed at all today: `app/api/orders/*` reads/writes `lib/orders-store.ts` directly (Postgres when configured, else in-memory); `app/api/catalog/route.ts` returns a hardcoded static array. Both of these are entirely edge-local — there is no engine call in either path currently, not "thin proxy with a local fallback."
This surface is documented in full in `docs/04-api.md` and matches the "one Postgres, many lenses" principle above (once `DATABASE_URL` is set).
### 2. The P0 data-platform surface (`app/api/0pt/*`)
A second, newer surface implements dataset registration, Iceberg lakehouse table mapping/writes, per-source rate-policy management, bounded synchronous source querying, and mailbox-based document capture — **directly in the edge app**, backed by `src/services/*` and `src/clients/*`. It does **not** call `lib/engine.ts`/`ENGINE_URL` and does **not** go through the FastAPI engine at all. This is deliberate: it is the concrete implementation of **ADR-0030** (Apache Iceberg as SIAX's canonical lakehouse table format, authored in the `n0d` repo) and the ownership split it defines. See `docs/10-lakehouse-decision.md` (the pointer to the ecosystem decision), `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md` (the plan), and `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` (the implementation record) for the full boundary — this doc only summarizes it.
Real, existing routes today (verified against the filesystem, not against `app/api/0pt/route.ts`'s own advertised list — see the note below):
| Route | Backed by |
|---|---|
| `GET /api/0pt` | static index (see note below) |
| `POST/GET /api/0pt/documents/capture` | `src/services/document-capture-service.ts` |
| `.../documents/{documentId}/extraction` | `src/services/document-extraction-service.ts` |
| `POST/GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings` | `src/services/dataset-iceberg-mapping-service.ts`, `iceberg-write-service.ts` |
| `.../lakehouse/mappings/{mappingId}` | same |
| `POST .../lakehouse/mappings/{mappingId}/writes` | `src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts#requestIcebergWrite` |
| `POST/GET /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies` | `src/services/source-rate-policy-service.ts` |
| `.../sources/rate-policies/{sourceRatePolicyId}` | same |
| `POST /api/0pt/sources/{sourceId}/query` | `src/services/source-query-service.ts` (bounded, timeout-guarded ad-hoc SQL against a registered `database` source — see `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md`) |
**Code-level inconsistency worth knowing about**: `app/api/0pt/route.ts`'s own `GET` handler advertises an `endpoints` list including `/api/0pt/sources`, `/api/0pt/datasets`, `/api/0pt/data-contracts`, `/api/0pt/quality/checks`, `/api/0pt/quality/reports`, `/api/0pt/features/views` — **none of these exist as routes** (confirmed by listing `app/api/0pt/` on disk); the lakehouse-mapping and rate-policy routes that *do* exist aren't listed there either. This is the same "described but never built" pattern as the `quality-check-service.ts` fabrication flagged below — this doc's route table above reflects what is actually on disk, not what the index endpoint claims.
**In-memory scope**: every P0 service (`DatasetService`, `SourceService`, `DatasetIcebergMappingService`, `SourceRatePolicyService`, `DocumentCaptureService`, …) holds its state in a plain `Map` inside the Next.js route module that instantiates it. Most route modules construct a fresh instance per module, so a record created via one route is not visible to a different route module in the same running process (each file's own header comment documents this; `document-capture-service.ts` worked around it for its own two routes with a shared singleton export). A Postgres migration exists (`sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql`) but is not wired into any route handler yet. So the "one database, many lenses" principle above does not yet hold for this surface.
## Six-surface capability model & 0pt's current coverage
SIAX Cloud's target model (defined in `cl0ud`, `docs/architecture/SIAX_CLOUD_UNIFIED_ARCHITECTURE.md`) is that one capability can expose up to **six surfaces**: REST **api**, **cli** (`siax 0pt ...`), **mcp** (an agent tool), **ui** (a page/panel), **job** (an async N0D job type), and **sdk** (a generated client method). The capability registry's own `Surface` type (`cl0ud` `packages/capability-registry/src/types.ts`) currently encodes five of those six as a declarative field (`'api' | 'cli' | 'mcp' | 'ui' | 'job'`); `sdk` is generated separately, not yet a registry field.
**0pt's actual coverage today** (verified against `cl0ud packages/capability-registry/src/registry.ts`): 14 distinct `0pt.*` capabilities are registered —
`0pt.query_source`, `0pt.document_ocr`, `0pt.write_external_record`, `0pt.lakehouse_mapping_manage`, `0pt.lakehouse_write`, `0pt.source_rate_policy_manage`, `0pt.screen_sanctions`, `0pt.estimate_compute`, `0pt.vehicle_lookup`, `0pt.catalog_list`, `0pt.source_registry_list`, `0pt.order_create`, `0pt.order_payment`, `0pt.write_iceberg_table`
— and, checked entry by entry:
- **11** declare `surfaces: ['api']` only.
- **2** (`0pt.lakehouse_write`, `0pt.write_iceberg_table`) declare `surfaces: ['api', 'job']`.
- **1** (`0pt.write_external_record`) declares `surfaces: ['job']` **only** — `apiEnabled: false`, and its own comment states it has "NO dedicated HTTP route in the 0pt app yet"; it exists as a tested TS service (`src/services/external-writeback-service.ts`) invoked only via direct import today, not a live callable path.
- **Every single one** has `cliEnabled: false` and `mcpEnabled: false`. None has a `ui` surface entry either.
In plain terms: **0pt is API-only today** (plus two job-backed writes, and one job-only capability with no live route at all). If any doc — inside or outside this repo — describes a live `siax 0pt ...` CLI command or an `0pt.*` MCP tool, it is describing a target, not current reality; correct it on sight.
## Platform clients: CL0UD / N0D / AUD0 / ST0RE
`src/clients/{cl0ud,n0d,aud0,st0re,st0re-lakehouse}-client.ts` are real, typechecked TypeScript with accompanying tests (`tests/p0/*`), each following the same shape: a thin interface, an HTTP implementation written against the target service's real, committed route contract, and a deterministic in-memory mock used whenever no `baseUrl` is supplied to the constructor.
**SUPERSEDED 2026-08-31 (SIAX Platforms P0 wave 2)** — the paragraph that
stood here ("every one of these clients runs against its in-memory mock
today") was accurate when written and is now fixed, twice over:
1. every factory reads its `*_URL` from `process.env` when no constructor
`baseUrl` is given, and under `NODE_ENV=production` an unset URL is a hard
boot failure (`SiaxError DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE`, `src/platform/dependency-mode.ts`)
— production can no longer fall back to a mock (Master-DoD §3/§10);
2. the HTTP wire shapes were verified against the sibling repos' actual
`main` branches and THREE of four were wrong (cl0ud path never existed,
st0re body was snake_case against a camelCase contract, aud0 lineage path
never existed). All rewritten and pinned by `tests/contracts/*.contract.test.ts`.
Current per-capability status lives in [`STATUS.md`](../STATUS.md) — that
file, not this doc, is the status source of truth (§56).
What each client is for, concretely:
- **CL0UD** — policy evaluation (`evaluatePolicy`). `iceberg-write-service.ts` and `external-writeback-service.ts` call it before acting; the mock always returns `"allow"`.
- **N0D** — job requests (`createJob`). `document-capture-service.ts` requests document-extraction jobs; `iceberg-write-service.ts` requests heavy-write/compaction jobs. 0pt only *requests* N0D jobs — it never executes them, per `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`'s "N0D executes" boundary. **No evidence supports a claim that N0D has a dedicated-node ("`t_0pt`") auth pattern already built for this**: `n0d`'s repository was searched in full (all branches, all commits, all files) and contains zero references to `t_0pt`. Treat any such claim as unconfirmed until proven otherwise.
- **AUD0** — audit/lineage events (`ingestEvent`, `ingestLineageEvent`). Every mutating P0 service emits these; the mock is a true no-op, matching AUD0's own documented stance that it has no live ingestion endpoint yet.
- **ST0RE / ST0RE-lakehouse** — artifact-metadata registration and Iceberg table/namespace/snapshot registration, respectively. `st0re-lakehouse-client.ts`'s HTTP path is written against `sax3l/st0re`'s actual shipped route contract (commit `9ea0abb`, read directly during a prior pass) — real code, but not executed against a running ST0RE in this repo's test environment either.
## Known gaps
### tenant_id is not server-bound anywhere in the P0 surface
The platform-wide rule is that `tenant_id` must be bound to an authenticated session server-side and never trusted from client input. This repo violates that rule today, and it is **not** a deliberate two-tier design — it's a direct consequence of there being no auth/session system at all yet (see the Auth.js note above; `app/api/orders/route.ts`'s own `GET` handler literally comments `// org scoping added with auth`, i.e. not yet).
Concretely: `tenant_id`/`project_id` are accepted straight from the client-supplied request body (or query string) at every P0 mutation entry point —
- `app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/route.ts` (POST)
- `app/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/route.ts` (POST)
- `app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts` (POST)
- `app/api/0pt/documents/capture/route.ts` → `src/services/document-capture-service.ts#captureFromMailbox`
`app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/[mappingId]/writes/route.ts` doesn't read `tenant_id` from its own body — but it resolves the tenant by looking up `mapping.tenant_id` from a mapping that was itself created via one of the unauthenticated routes above, so the trust boundary problem is inherited, not avoided.
Do not expose any of these routes to untrusted callers before Phase 3 of `docs/09-build-plan.md` (Auth.js + org/session binding) lands. This is Simon's call on sequencing, not something to silently patch in a docs pass.
### 0pt's data-quality/QA stage is a fabrication in sibling docs, not built
Flagged so it is not repeated: `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`, `src/services/quality-report-service.ts`, `src/types/quality-check.ts`, `src/types/quality-report.ts`, `src/data-platform/services/catalog-service.ts`, `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql`, and `sql/003_*.sql` were at one point referenced in `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`, `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`, and `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md` as if already built and tested. Verified this pass: `git log --all` for every one of those paths returns zero commits, on any branch, ever — `sql/` on disk today contains only `001_init.sql` and `004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql`. Those files have never existed in this repository. 0pt's data-quality/QA enforcement is **spec/target only** — a real, open build gap, not a doc typo. **All three of the docs above have since been corrected** (verified this pass by reading each in full) — none currently asserts those files as real; each carries its own explicit "fabricated, not built" callout, and `docs/P0_DATASET_QUALITY_FLOW.md` is the honest target-spec replacement.
### Two diverged git remotes
`origin` in local checkouts of this repo is `github.com/sax3l/0pt`. A separate Gitea remote, `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt`, shares at least part of the same history (`services/api/workers/adaptive_router.py` is byte-for-byte identical between GitHub's current `main` and a Gitea post-fix PR branch) but independently accumulated commits GitHub's `main` never received — including, at one point, a WAF-bypass/proxy-rotation/fake-identity scraper stack that directly violated the CLAUDE.md §1 sourcing rule (since removed on Gitea via a separate PR). **Which remote is authoritative, which is actually deployed to `0pt.app`, and whether the two should be kept in sync is unresolved and is Simon's decision** — do not assume `origin`/GitHub is the sole copy of this codebase, here or in any other doc.
## Stack decisions — IN
| Concern | Choice | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Frontend | Next.js App Router + TS + Tailwind + shadcn/ui | Vercel-native, matches existing skills |
| Backend/jobs | FastAPI + workers (`services/api`) | already built; long-running jobs |
| DB | Postgres (+ pgvector) | backbone; Neon free tier or on-VPS |
| Airtable layer | **NocoDB** | sits on existing tables, no duplication |
| BI | **Apache Superset** | canonical generic BI for SIAX Cloud: Apache-2.0 with an official embed SDK + guest tokens, so embedding never needs a commercial tier. Already defined as a service in `services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` and inventoried in `docs/compliance/OSS-INVENTORY.md`. **Corrected 2026-09-06** — this row previously said Metabase; see the correction under "OUT" below |
| Files | Cloudflare R2 + presigned URLs | cheapest S3-compatible |
| Payments | Stripe Checkout + webhook → Next.js API | ~1 day, no SaaS boilerplate needed |
| Auth | Auth.js + Postgres adapter | one system — **target, not yet built** (see Components above) |
| Email | Resend | best Next.js integration, free tier — **not yet wired** (no call site in this repo) |
| Quality | Great Expectations / checks **inside workers** | scores shipped with each order — **not yet built** for the P0 surface (see "Known gaps" above) |
## Stack decisions — OUT (do not add)
> **CORRECTED 2026-09-06 — two rows in this table were wrong and are withdrawn below.**
> This section was written when 0pt was planned as a standalone SaaS product. Under the SIAX
> Cloud analytics decision, **0pt is the canonical Analytics/Data/Semantic owner** — there is
> no `BI0`/`Analytics0` repo, no separate Superset platform, and no product-specific BI
> backend acting as a parallel capability owner. Third-party BI tools are interchangeable
> providers or App Catalog apps. Two consequences contradict the table as it stood:
>
> - **Apache Superset is canonical**, not rejected (Apache-2.0, official embed SDK + guest
> tokens). Metabase moves to the optional App Catalog.
> - **OpenMetadata is the canonical catalog** (default *before* DataHub), not rejected.
> DataHub remains optional.
>
> This is not a paper change — **this repository already shipped both**, which is what makes
> the old rows self-contradicting rather than merely out of date:
>
> - `src/metadata/openmetadata-adapter.ts` + `tests/contracts/metadata-features.contract.test.ts`
> (OpenMetadata projection; `STATUS.md` classifies it `IMPLEMENTED`, projection-never-canonical),
> - `services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` defines a `superset` service
> (`apache/superset:latest`), and `docs/compliance/OSS-INVENTORY.md` already inventories
> `superset | Apache-2.0 | services/infra/data-stack`.
>
> The governing principle behind the change is **one definition of every metric**: the 0pt
> Metric Catalog feeds MetricFlow, which feeds Superset / Cube / the native API / INF0. Point a
> product at a BI engine directly and each surface invents its own "average price".
| Rejected | Reason |
|---|---|
| ~~Superset~~ | **WITHDRAWN 2026-09-06 — see the correction note above.** Superset is now the canonical BI engine, not a rejected one |
| ~~DataHub / OpenMetadata~~ | **WITHDRAWN 2026-09-06 — see the correction note above.** OpenMetadata is the canonical catalog; only DataHub stays non-canonical (optional App Catalog) |
| Metabase / Lightdash / Rill / Grafana / DataHub as *canonical* BI or catalog | optional App Catalog apps only, never the platform default. Metabase's OSS build is AGPL and its full app-/SSO-embedding sits behind Pro/Enterprise, which does not work for SIAX as a platform provider; Lightdash gates embedding/caching behind an enterprise self-host licence; Rill's documented deployment path is bound to Rill Cloud (breaks zero-SaaS); Grafana (AGPLv3) is the right tool for **operational** analysis and is AUD0-owned, not business BI |
| Baserow / Teable | NocoDB chosen — not three Airtable clones |
| Meilisearch (v1) | Postgres full-text suffices to a few thousand rows; add later |
| Delta Sharing (v1) | unnecessary; customer pull via scoped role + exports |
| Trigger.dev | the existing queue already schedules jobs; Resend covers mail |
| FlareSolverr / stealth browsers / undetected-* / proxy-fingerprint rotation / fake-account creation | **prohibited** — see CLAUDE.md §1. Replace with compliant fetching. (The Gitea-only scraper stack described under "Two diverged git remotes" above is exactly this — removed there, never present on GitHub `main`.) |
## Hosting (cheapest coherent) — **SUPERSEDED** (BACKLOG P2-5)
> **SUPERSEDED 2026-08-11.** This section describes the original Vercel+Neon
> hosting plan. `siax.config.json` flipped `deploy.target` from `"vercel"` to
> `"coolify"` on 2026-08-09 to match every other SIAX Cloud OS repo — that
> decision supersedes the Vercel prescription below. ~~The live instance is
> **still actually running on Vercel today** (no Coolify app has been
> provisioned yet — see `README.md`'s "Deploy" section and
> `docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md` §5/§8 for the current, verified state)~~;
> this section is kept for history, not as the current target. Do not read
> "Vercel (Hobby/free)" below as still-current guidance.
>
> **CORRECTED 2026-09-06 — the struck sentence above is no longer true.** The Coolify
> deploy hook is live: repo secret `COOLIFY_TOKEN` exists (created 2026-08-31T11:34:34Z)
> and repo Actions variable `COOLIFY_APP_ID` holds a real 24-character UUID, not the
> `TODO-no-coolify-app-provisioned-yet` literal, so both guards in
> `.gitea/workflows/cd.yml` pass. On the push to `main` at `1ff34410` (2026-09-06) the
> `Deploy to Coolify / deploy` job finished **success** with `coolify deploy HTTP 200`.
> **Every merge into `main` fires a real redeploy against cloud.siax.io.**
>
> Probed 2026-09-06 08:00 UTC: `0pt.app` still answers from **Vercel** (`server: Vercel`)
> with **HTTP 402 `DEPLOYMENT_DISABLED`** on both `/` and `/api/health`. The public domain
> is therefore *down*, DNS has not been cut over, and the Coolify app serves no `0pt.app`
> traffic. Still unestablished: whether the Coolify app builds and starts at all — an
> accepted deploy request is not a healthy container.
- **Vercel** (Hobby/free) — Next.js + custom domain `0pt.app`.
- **One small VPS** (e.g. Hetzner ~€5/mo) running `docker-compose` (`infra/docker-compose.yml`): FastAPI, workers, NocoDB, Metabase, (Postgres or use Neon), optional Meilisearch later. Per-service managed platforms (Railway) get expensive once you have 4–5 always-on services; a single VPS + Vercel + R2 lands ≈ <€10/mo to start.
- **Cloudflare R2** — object storage (env-guarded, presign not yet wired — see Components above).
- **Postgres** — on the VPS, or **Neon** free tier if you want it managed.
Full config, env, security, CI/CD: `docs/08-infrastructure.md`. Env var inventory: [`.env.example`](../.env.example) (present in this repo today — the linked GitHub PR that originally tracked it has long since merged; removed the stale cross-repo link per BACKLOG P3-5).
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# 03 · Data model
Postgres is the backbone. Two halves: **data entities** (what we sell) and **platform tables** (orders, users, jobs). Every fact links to `bridge_provenance`.
**Migrations are plain SQL files in `sql/`, applied in filename order.** There is no Alembic (or any other Python migration tool) anywhere in this repo, and no `src/workers/db.py` — that file does not exist (the Python engine's workers live in `services/api/workers/` — `adaptive_router.py`, `pipeline.py`, `queue.py`, `resolve.py`, `run.py` — none of them named `db.py`, and there is no TypeScript `src/workers/` directory either; `src/` only has `adapters/`, `clients/`, `services/`, `types/`). `infra/docker-compose.yml` mounts `../sql` as `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d` on the `postgres` service, so Postgres auto-applies every `.sql` file in that directory, in name order, the first time that container initializes its data volume.
**Only two migration files exist in this repo, ever:** `sql/001_init.sql` and `sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` (verified via `find sql/` — no `002` or `003`). Three other docs in this repo (`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`, `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`, `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md`) mention `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` and `sql/003_*.sql` by name — they don't exist, on any branch, ever (git history checked) — but all three have been corrected to say exactly that (each carries its own "never existed" callout, none claims the files are real as of this pass). This file only asserts what's true of `sql/001` and `sql/004`, which are real.
## Conventions
- `snake_case`, UTC timestamptz, soft-delete via `deleted_at` where useful.
- Natural keys for registries (`org_nr`), surrogate `uuid` PKs for platform tables.
- `created_at` / `updated_at` on every table.
- All monetary amounts in **öre** (integer) to avoid float errors; currency `SEK` default.
## Data entities
Mirrors `sql/001_init.sql` (verified against the file this pass; the migration additionally wraps every statement in `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` for idempotent re-runs, and enables `pgcrypto` alongside `vector` — needed for `gen_random_uuid()`):
```sql
-- A company (the core registry entity)
CREATE TABLE dim_company (
org_nr text PRIMARY KEY, -- national reg. number (per market format)
market text NOT NULL, -- ISO country code: SE/NO/DK/FI/...
lei text, -- GLEIF cross-border key
name text NOT NULL,
status text, -- active/dissolved/...
nace text, -- NACE/SNI code
registered_at date,
address jsonb,
website text,
updated_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE TABLE fact_financials (
org_nr text REFERENCES dim_company(org_nr),
fiscal_year int NOT NULL,
revenue bigint, -- öre
result bigint,
employees int,
source_id text REFERENCES dim_source(source_id),
PRIMARY KEY (org_nr, fiscal_year)
);
CREATE TABLE dim_contact (
contact_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
org_nr text REFERENCES dim_company(org_nr),
name text,
role text,
email text,
phone text,
linkedin text,
-- PII: subject to GDPR; lawful basis recorded per delivery
updated_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE TABLE dim_ubo ( -- ultimate beneficial owner
ubo_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
org_nr text REFERENCES dim_company(org_nr),
owner text,
share numeric(5,2)
);
CREATE TABLE dim_vehicle ( -- VehIQ synergy
vin text PRIMARY KEY,
market text NOT NULL,
reg_plate text,
make text, model text, year int,
owner_org text REFERENCES dim_company(org_nr),
specs jsonb,
updated_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);
```
## Provenance model (the signature — every fact links here)
```sql
CREATE TABLE dim_source (
source_id text PRIMARY KEY, -- 'gleif','brreg','companies_house',...
name text NOT NULL,
market text, -- or 'global'
access text, -- 'api'|'bulk'|'authorized_web'|'licensed'
licence text, -- short licence note
cadence text, -- 'daily'|'weekly'|'annual'|...
url text
);
-- One row per (entity field) we deliver, linking value → where it came from + confidence
CREATE TABLE bridge_provenance (
field_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
entity_type text NOT NULL, -- 'company'|'contact'|'vehicle'|'financials'
entity_key text NOT NULL, -- org_nr / vin / contact_id
field_name text NOT NULL, -- 'revenue','email',...
source_id text REFERENCES dim_source(source_id),
freshness date, -- when this value was confirmed
confidence numeric(4,3) NOT NULL, -- 0.000–1.000
level smallint NOT NULL, -- 0 unavailable/licensed, 1 single, 2 partial, 3 corroborated
agreed_sources int DEFAULT 1, -- # independent sources that agree
UNIQUE (entity_type, entity_key, field_name)
);
CREATE INDEX ON bridge_provenance (entity_type, entity_key);
```
> Rule: **no value ships without a `bridge_provenance` row.** Level 0 = delivered as "not available / licensed", never a guessed value.
`dim_source` is a **different, older entity** than the per-tenant `Source` registry described below (`src/types/source.ts`) that `0pt.query_source` acts against — same name-ish concept, two separate schemas. `src/types/source.ts`'s own doc comment calls this out, but its "~9-row list of national registries served today by `GET /api/sources`" phrasing is easy to misread: `dim_source` itself, as a Postgres table, has **zero rows** — `sql/001_init.sql` only creates the table, there is no seed/`INSERT` statement anywhere in this repo's SQL or Python (grep-verified for `INSERT INTO dim_source`). The actual 9-entry national-registry list that comment is pointing at lives in a third, distinct artifact: the edge-native `GET /api/sources` route (`app/api/sources/route.ts`), a hardcoded array with a `confidence` field. That's different again from the FastAPI engine's `sources.yaml` (8 entries, no `confidence` field — see `docs/04-api.md`'s Sources section). So there are three separate "source list" artifacts in this repo — the empty `dim_source` SQL table, `sources.yaml` (8), and `app/api/sources/route.ts` (9) — none of which currently share data with each other; see "TypeScript-side P0 entities" below for the fourth, per-tenant `Source` type.
## Platform tables
Mirrors `sql/001_init.sql` (verified this pass — same tables, same columns):
```sql
CREATE TABLE orgs (
org_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
name text NOT NULL, created_at timestamptz DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE TABLE users (
user_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
org_id uuid REFERENCES orgs(org_id),
email text UNIQUE NOT NULL,
role text NOT NULL DEFAULT 'member', -- 'owner'|'admin'|'member'|'siax_admin'
created_at timestamptz DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE TABLE orders (
order_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
org_id uuid REFERENCES orgs(org_id),
flow text NOT NULL, -- 'catalog'|'custom'|'subscription'
status text NOT NULL DEFAULT 'draft', -- see lifecycle in docs/01
config jsonb NOT NULL, -- configurator state (markets, fields, ...)
total_ore bigint, deposit_ore bigint, balance_ore bigint,
est_days int, est_confidence numeric(4,3),
created_at timestamptz DEFAULT now(), updated_at timestamptz DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE TABLE order_items ( -- resolved line items / dataset refs
item_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
order_id uuid REFERENCES orders(order_id),
kind text, ref text, qty int, meta jsonb
);
CREATE TABLE jobs ( -- one production run per order
job_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
order_id uuid REFERENCES orders(order_id),
stage text, -- sourcing|extraction|structuring|enrichment|qa
pct numeric(5,2) DEFAULT 0,
state text DEFAULT 'queued', -- queued|running|done|failed
metrics jsonb, -- rows, confidence, per-market progress
started_at timestamptz, finished_at timestamptz
);
CREATE TABLE deliveries (
delivery_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
order_id uuid REFERENCES orders(order_id),
formats text[], destinations text[],
record_count int, avg_confidence numeric(4,3),
quality_report jsonb, provenance_export_url text,
files jsonb, -- [{format,url,bytes}]
created_at timestamptz DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE TABLE subscriptions (
sub_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
order_id uuid REFERENCES orders(order_id),
cadence text, -- weekly|daily
webhook_url text, status text DEFAULT 'active',
next_run_at timestamptz
);
CREATE TABLE files ( -- customer uploads
file_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
org_id uuid REFERENCES orgs(org_id),
order_id uuid REFERENCES orders(order_id),
name text, mime text, bytes bigint, r2_key text,
created_at timestamptz DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE TABLE db_grants ( -- customer read-only DB access (encrypted)
grant_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
org_id uuid REFERENCES orgs(org_id),
order_id uuid REFERENCES orders(order_id),
conn_encrypted bytea NOT NULL, -- encrypted connection string
scope text, expires_at timestamptz, revoked_at timestamptz,
created_at timestamptz DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE TABLE audit_log (
id bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
actor text, action text, target text, meta jsonb,
at timestamptz DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE TABLE payments (
payment_id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
order_id uuid REFERENCES orders(order_id),
kind text, -- 'deposit'|'balance'
amount_ore bigint, stripe_ref text,
status text, -- 'pending'|'captured'|'released'|'failed'
created_at timestamptz DEFAULT now()
);
```
> **Gap, verified this pass:** `sql/001_init.sql` does **not** contain `order_items`. It is documented here (and was already documented before this pass) as part of the target platform-table set, but there is no `CREATE TABLE order_items` in the migration file — check before relying on it existing in any real database.
> **Gap, verified this pass:** this schema is real and (if `infra/docker-compose.yml`'s `postgres` service is actually run) gets created — but the FastAPI engine's own code never connects to it. `services/api/orchestrator/main.py` has no `asyncpg`/`psycopg`/`sqlalchemy` import anywhere (grep-verified across `services/api/`), and its `orders`/`jobs` state lives entirely in two module-level Python dicts (`_ORDERS`, `_JOBS`) that reset on every process restart and are never written to Postgres. The one `DATABASE_URL` reference in `main.py` (`GET /health`) only reports whether the env var is *set* — it never opens a connection. See `docs/04-api.md`'s implementation-status section for the full picture. Until that wiring lands, this table set is schema-only, not a live system of record.
## P0 registry tables (`sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql`)
A second, newer migration adds two tables for the lakehouse write-path and crawl-compliance capabilities (`0pt.write_iceberg_table`, `0pt.source_rate_policy_manage` — see the new edge-API doc, `docs/12-edge-capability-api.md`). Verified against the file this pass:
```sql
CREATE TABLE opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings (
dataset_iceberg_mapping_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
project_id TEXT NOT NULL,
dataset_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES opt_datasets (dataset_id),
iceberg_table_id TEXT NOT NULL, -- reference into ST0RE's table registry, NOT a foreign key
namespace TEXT,
table_name TEXT,
mapping_status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
mapped_by TEXT,
correlation_id TEXT,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ
);
CREATE TABLE opt_source_rate_policies (
source_rate_policy_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
project_id TEXT NOT NULL,
source_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES opt_sources (source_id),
rate_limit_per_minute NUMERIC NOT NULL,
crawl_budget NUMERIC NOT NULL,
compliance_notes TEXT,
domain TEXT,
robots_ok BOOLEAN,
access TEXT,
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
correlation_id TEXT,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
created_by TEXT
);
```
`iceberg_table_id` is deliberately **not** a foreign key — it references ST0RE's own `st0re_iceberg_tables.table_id`, a different service's database. 0pt holds only the reference, never a copy of ST0RE's table/catalog/snapshot state (see the module doc comment on `src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts`, and `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` for the full ownership boundary — that doc is outside this file's scope to otherwise correct).
> **Confirmed bug, found this pass — flagging plainly, not silently fixing it:** both `CREATE TABLE` statements above have a `REFERENCES` clause pointing at tables that **do not exist anywhere in this repo's SQL**: `opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings.dataset_id REFERENCES opt_datasets (dataset_id)` and `opt_source_rate_policies.source_id REFERENCES opt_sources (source_id)`. Neither `opt_datasets` nor `opt_sources` is created by `sql/001_init.sql`, `sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql`, or any other file in `sql/` (grep-verified — there are only two migration files, full stop). If `sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` is ever actually run against a fresh database (e.g. via `infra/docker-compose.yml`'s `docker-entrypoint-initdb.d` mount), **it will fail** with `relation "opt_datasets" does not exist`. This is not a naming coincidence: `src/types/dataset.ts` and `src/types/source.ts` define exactly the `Dataset`/`Source` shapes those table names imply, and `DatasetService`/`SourceService` (`src/services/`) are their in-memory-only implementations — but no migration ever creates the SQL tables to back them. **Open question for Simon:** either author a migration that creates `opt_datasets`/`opt_sources` before `sql/004` (so the FK resolves), or drop those two `REFERENCES` clauses and enforce the dataset/source-exists check purely in the TypeScript service layer (which already does the check today, redundantly, in `DatasetIcebergMappingService.createMapping` and `SourceRatePolicyService.createSourceRatePolicy`) — this file does not choose between those for you.
## TypeScript-side P0 entities without SQL backing
Newer P0 capabilities (`docs/12-edge-capability-api.md`) introduced their own typed entities under `src/types/`, each with an in-memory-only service under `src/services/`. Only two of these (above) have a real migration. The rest have **no SQL table at all** — every instance of the owning service starts with an empty in-memory `Map` and loses all state on restart (or even between two `new XService()` calls in the same process — see `docs/12-edge-capability-api.md`'s "in-memory isolation" findings for exactly how badly this bites in practice today):
| Type | File | Service (in-memory only) | SQL table |
|---|---|---|---|
| `Source` | `src/types/source.ts` | `src/services/source-service.ts` | none |
| `Dataset` | `src/types/dataset.ts` | `src/services/dataset-service.ts` | none |
| `DocumentRecord` | `src/types/document.ts` | `src/services/document-capture-service.ts` | none |
| `DocumentExtractionRecord` | `src/types/document-extraction.ts` | `src/services/document-extraction-service.ts` | none |
| `ExternalWriteRecord` | `src/types/external-writeback.ts` | `src/services/external-writeback-service.ts` | none |
| `DatasetIcebergMapping` | `src/types/dataset-iceberg-mapping.ts` | `src/services/dataset-iceberg-mapping-service.ts` | `opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings` (`sql/004`) |
| `SourceRatePolicy` | `src/types/source-rate-policy.ts` | `src/services/source-rate-policy-service.ts` | `opt_source_rate_policies` (`sql/004`) |
## pgvector
`CREATE EXTENSION vector;` — this is real (`sql/001_init.sql` line 3, along with `pgcrypto`). **Everything past the extension is target only:** there is no `embeddings` table, or any other table using the `vector` type, anywhere in `sql/001_init.sql` or `sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql`. The intended use (entity matching/dedup, AI-assist semantic match of NL request → catalog/config) is a real design goal, not yet a real table.
## Row-level security & catalog
**Target only — none of this exists in `sql/` today**, verified by grep for `ROW LEVEL SECURITY`, `CREATE POLICY`, and `catalog` across both migration files (no matches beyond a comment). There is no `catalog` table or view, and no Postgres RLS policy anywhere in this repo's SQL. Per-customer isolation is intended to be `org_id` filtering in the API plus RLS where practical — but as of this pass the FastAPI engine (`services/api/orchestrator/main.py`) has **no `org_id` concept in any request or response at all** (see `docs/04-api.md`'s implementation-status section: `GET /orders` returns every order in the process, unfiltered). This is the same platform-wide "no auth/session system exists yet" gap noted across this doc corpus — not a data-model-specific problem to solve here, but the schema above cannot be considered tenant-isolated until it is.
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# 04 · API contract (FastAPI)
Canonical REST contract for the **Python data engine** — `services/api/orchestrator/main.py`, run on a VPS/worker host, not on Vercel. JSON in/out, `snake_case`. All amounts in **öre**.
**Scope note:** this doc covers *only* the FastAPI engine. The newer edge-native TypeScript P0 capability surface (`app/api/0pt/*`, `/api/screen`, `/api/ai/parse` — Next.js Route Handlers that run on Vercel) is a separate, additive layer with its own contract: see `docs/12-edge-capability-api.md`. The two are not the same service and, as of this pass, are not fully wired together (see "Existing-code reconciliation" below for a concrete case where the edge layer expects an engine route that doesn't exist).
## Implementation status (verified this pass — read before trusting any endpoint below)
The engine file is `services/api/orchestrator/main.py` (162 lines) — not `src/orchestrator/main.py`, which does not exist in this repo (older doc text, including CLAUDE.md's "Build on existing code" section, still uses that stale path). It implements **exactly 12 endpoints**, all listed below — not "25+" as CLAUDE.md and the previous version of this doc claimed. That number does not match anything in the current codebase; flagging it here since it's this doc's own error to fix (CLAUDE.md's copy of the same claim is outside this file's scope).
Endpoints that exist in `main.py` today: `GET /health`, `GET /sources`, `GET /sources/{market}`, `GET /vehicles/{plate}`, `GET /screen`, `POST /estimates`, `POST /orders`, `GET /orders`, `GET /orders/{oid}`, `PATCH /orders/{oid}`, `POST /orders/{oid}/run`, `GET /orders/{oid}/status`.
Everything else in this document — payments/escrow, uploads, customer DB-grant, deliveries, subscriptions, outbound webhooks, `/orders/{id}/events` (SSE), `/orders/{id}/scope|accept|revise` — is a **target contract for the engine**, not yet implemented in `main.py`. Some of it already exists as a *separate* Next.js edge route instead (payments, orders, catalog, estimates, vehicles, sources all have edge-layer counterparts under `app/api/` — not read in detail for this pass, since they're outside this doc's FastAPI scope; noted only so you don't assume they don't exist anywhere).
Three structural gaps apply to **every** endpoint below that main.py does implement:
- **No persistence.** `main.py` has no `asyncpg`/`psycopg`/`sqlalchemy` import anywhere. `_ORDERS` and `_JOBS` are plain module-level Python `dict`s — state is lost on every restart, and never touches the `orders`/`jobs` tables `docs/03-data-model.md` documents. `GET /health`'s `db` field only reports whether the `DATABASE_URL` env var is *set* (`bool(os.getenv(...))`) — it never opens a connection, so it does not indicate the database is actually reachable or in use.
- **No authentication, no tenant scoping.** `main.py` never reads any request header (no `X-Internal-Token` check, despite the edge layer sending one — see `lib/engine.ts`), and no request/response model anywhere carries `org_id` or `user_id`. Concretely: **`GET /orders` returns every order held by the process, for every org, with no filtering at all.** The "Auth: … customer identity passed as `org_id`/`user_id` resolved from the Auth.js session server-side" framing below is the target design, not current behavior — this is the same platform-wide "no auth/session system exists yet" gap noted across this doc corpus (see `docs/09-build-plan.md` Phase 3), not something specific to fix in this file.
- **No idempotency, no pagination.** Neither is implemented by any endpoint in `main.py` today, despite being listed as target conventions below.
## Conventions (target contract — see gaps above for current reality)
- Errors: `{ "error": { "code", "message" } }`, proper HTTP status. *(Not implemented in `main.py`: it raises plain FastAPI `HTTPException(status, "message")`, which serializes as `{"detail": "message"}`, not the `{error:{code,message}}` shape below.)* Interface-voice messages (Swedish) are produced in the frontend, not here.
- Idempotency: accept `Idempotency-Key` on POSTs that create orders/payments. *(Target only — not implemented.)*
- Pagination: `?limit=&cursor=`. *(Target only — not implemented; `GET /orders` returns the full unfiltered list.)*
- Auth: Next.js → FastAPI over a shared internal token (`X-Internal-Token`, `lib/engine.ts` sends it via `INTERNAL_TOKEN`) — the edge side of this is real, but `main.py` never validates the header, so today it has no effect. Customer identity as `org_id`/`user_id` resolved from an Auth.js session is target design; no such session system exists in this repo yet.
## Catalog
```
GET /catalog -> [{id,title,markets,entity_type,count,updated,price_ore,confidence}]
GET /catalog/{id} -> full dataset (overview, coverage, schema, quality summary)
GET /catalog/{id}/sample?n=10 -> sample rows WITH per-field provenance
```
**Status: target only.** No `/catalog` route exists in `main.py`. A separate `GET /api/catalog` exists at the edge (`app/api/catalog/route.ts`, registered in CL0UD's capability registry as `0pt.catalog_list`) — not read in detail for this pass; out of scope here.
## Estimate (configurator → price/time/confidence)
```
POST /estimates
body: { markets[], entity_type, fields[], enrichment[], volume, frequency, confidence_target }
-> { total_ore, deposit_ore, balance_ore, est_days, est_confidence, recurring }
```
**Status: implemented**, but the shape differs from the previous version of this doc: the request body has **no `flow` field**, and the response has **no `breakdown[]` field** — `main.py`'s `EstimateIn` model is exactly `{markets, entity_type, fields, enrichment, volume, frequency, confidence_target}` (defaults: `entity_type="Bolag"`, `volume=1000`, `frequency="Engångs"`, `confidence_target=92`), and `compute_estimate()` returns exactly `{total_ore, deposit_ore, balance_ore, est_days, est_confidence, recurring}` — `recurring` is a bool (`frequency != "Engångs"`), not a `breakdown[]` array. There is also no `formats[]` field on the request.
## AI-assist (NL → config)
```
POST /ai/parse
body: { text } -- "5000 svenska SaaS-bolag med e-post och omsättning"
-> { config: <estimate body>, rationale } -- prefilled configurator; uses pgvector match to catalog/fields
```
**Status: not implemented — confirmed contract mismatch.** `main.py` has no `/ai/parse` route at all (grep-verified: only the 12 endpoints listed in "Implementation status" exist). This matters beyond "target only": the edge route `app/api/ai/parse/route.ts` **actively calls** `engineFetch("/ai/parse", {method:"POST", ...})` expecting the engine to have this route, checks `if (eng && eng.ok)`, and — because the engine 404s — silently falls through to a local keyword-heuristic parser every time, even when `ENGINE_URL` is configured and the engine is reachable. See `docs/12-edge-capability-api.md` for the edge side of this route. There is also no pgvector usage anywhere in `main.py` (no `embeddings` table exists either — see `docs/03-data-model.md`).
## Orders (lifecycle)
```
POST /orders body: { flow, config } -> { order_id, status:'draft', deposit_ore, total_ore }
GET /orders -> [orders] -- NOT filtered by org; returns every order in the process (no auth)
GET /orders/{id} -> { ...order, job } -- job is null if none exists yet; no "delivery" field (deliveries aren't implemented)
PATCH /orders/{id} body: { status } -> updates order.status to any caller-supplied string, no validation against a lifecycle enum
POST /orders/{id}/run -> runs the pipeline SYNCHRONOUSLY (awaits workers/pipeline.py:run_job), sets status "in_production" then "review", returns the job record
GET /orders/{id}/status -> the job record, or {stage:"queued", pct:0, state:"queued"} if none exists (never 404s)
```
**Status: partially implemented, but shaped differently from the target below.** What actually exists: `POST /orders`, `GET /orders`, `GET /orders/{oid}`, `PATCH /orders/{oid}`, `POST /orders/{oid}/run`, `GET /orders/{oid}/status` — six endpoints, listed above with their real behavior. What the original target contract described — `POST /orders/{id}/scope` (manual quote step), `POST /orders/{id}/accept` (triggers balance release), `POST /orders/{id}/revise` — **do not exist in `main.py` at all.** Order-status transitions today happen only through the generic `PATCH /orders/{oid}` (accepts any string, no state-machine enforcement) or implicitly through `POST /orders/{oid}/run`. `POST /orders/{oid}/run` itself is undocumented in any prior version of this doc despite being the only way to actually trigger the sourcing pipeline — it has no payment/escrow gate of any kind (see Payments below).
## Payments (50/50 escrow)
```
POST /payments/{order_id}/deposit -> { checkout_url } (Stripe Checkout for 50%; on success → IN_PRODUCTION)
POST /payments/{order_id}/release -> captures/charges the held balance (called on accept)
POST /webhooks/stripe (Stripe → here) verify signature; update payments + order status
```
**Status: not implemented in the engine at all.** There is no Stripe reference anywhere in `services/api/` (grep-verified). `POST /orders/{oid}/run` — the engine's only way to start production — has no payment dependency whatsoever; nothing in `main.py` checks that a deposit was paid before running a job. If Stripe/escrow exists anywhere in this repo, it's at the edge (`app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit`, `app/api/payments/[order_id]/release`, `app/api/webhooks/stripe` — registered in CL0UD's capability registry as `0pt.order_payment`, evidence comment notes both routes 501 when `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY` is unset) — not read in detail this pass, out of scope here. **Open question:** whether escrow/payment gating is meant to live in the FastAPI engine (as this doc's original framing implies) or stay purely at the edge is unresolved; this doc doesn't decide it for you.
## Jobs / live status
```
GET /orders/{id}/status -> { stage, pct, per_market[], confidence, eta, rows }
GET /orders/{id}/events -> Server-Sent Events stream (preferred for the production tracker)
```
**Status: `GET /orders/{id}/status` exists but returns a different, smaller shape** — the actual dict returned by `workers/pipeline.py:run_job()` is exactly `{stage, pct, state, metrics, records}` (verified by reading its `return` statement) — **not** `{stage, pct, per_market[], confidence, eta, rows}` as previously documented, and **not** `started_at`/`finished_at` either (those two column names exist only on the unused `jobs` SQL table in `docs/03-data-model.md` — the in-memory job dict `run_job` actually returns has no timestamps at all). `metrics` itself is `{rows, dropped_below_threshold, per_market, avg_confidence}`; `records` holds the delivered rows. `GET /orders/{id}/events` (SSE) **does not exist** — target only.
## Uploads (R2 presigned)
```
POST /uploads body:{ order_id, name, mime, bytes } -> { file_id, put_url } (client PUTs to R2)
GET /orders/{id}/files -> [files]
```
**Status: target only.** Neither route exists in `main.py`.
## Customer DB access (read-only grant)
```
POST /connections/db-grant
body: { order_id, conn_string, scope, expires_at } -- stored ENCRYPTED; validated read-only
-> { grant_id, status:'pending'|'verified' }
DELETE /connections/db-grant/{id} -> revoke
```
**Status: target only.** Neither route exists in `main.py`. The `db_grants` table exists in `sql/001_init.sql` (see `docs/03-data-model.md`) but nothing writes to it.
## Deliveries
```
GET /orders/{id}/delivery -> { formats, destinations, record_count, avg_confidence, quality_report, files[], provenance_export_url }
POST /orders/{id}/delivery/destinations body:{ destinations[] } -> updates targets (CSV/Parquet/JSON/API/NocoDB/Metabase/FiveCRM/Sheets/webhook)
```
**Status: target only.** Neither route exists in `main.py`. Note also that a "delivery" concept and a "quality_report" are described here as if built — per this doc corpus's broader honesty pass, the underlying quality/QA-check logic these would report on (`quality-check-service.ts`, `quality-report-service.ts` and friends) does not exist in this repo at all (see CLAUDE.md's pointer to README's "Known issues"). This section is aspirational on two levels: the route, and the quality data it would need to serve.
## Sources (the transparency moat)
```
GET /sources -> [{source_id,name,market,access,licence,cadence}]
GET /sources/{market} -> full sources.yaml entries (source_id,name,market,access,licence,cadence,url,entities,fields,base_url,robots_ok,notes) filtered to that market + 'global'
```
**Status: implemented, with two shape corrections.** `GET /sources` does **not** return a `confidence` field — `main.py` explicitly projects only `source_id,name,market,access,licence,cadence` from `sources.yaml` (verified: `{k: s.get(k) for k in (...)}` with no `confidence` key). `GET /sources/{market}` returns the *entire* raw `sources.yaml` entry for each match (richer than `/sources` — includes `base_url`, `robots_ok`, `entities`, `fields`, `notes`), not a "sources + freshness" shape; there is no `freshness` field anywhere in `sources.yaml` or added by this endpoint. Both read from `services/api/sources/sources.yaml` (**8** entries as of this pass — verified by count: `gleif`, `brreg`, `companies_house`, `prh`, `cvr`, `bolagsverket`, `rdw`, `opensanctions`; no `traficom` entry exists in this file, unlike the edge-native `GET /api/sources` route below) — an entirely separate, static list from the per-tenant `Source` registry (`src/types/source.ts`) the edge-native `0pt.query_source`/`0pt.source_rate_policy_manage` capabilities act against; see `docs/03-data-model.md` and `docs/12-edge-capability-api.md`. **A third, separate static list exists too:** `app/api/sources/route.ts` is a hardcoded, `GET`-only Next.js route with its own 9-entry array (the same 8 markets plus `traficom`/FI, each with a `confidence` field sources.yaml does not have) — not part of this FastAPI contract, not wired to sources.yaml in any way, and not itself documented in detail here (out of this doc's FastAPI scope; see `docs/12-edge-capability-api.md`).
## Vehicles & sanctions screening (implemented, previously undocumented)
```
GET /vehicles/{plate} -> RDW (NL) lookup result, or { vehicle: null } if not found
GET /screen?q= -> { source: "opensanctions", matches: [{name, score, schema}] }
```
These two endpoints exist in `main.py` today but were missing from every prior version of this doc. `GET /vehicles/{plate}` proxies `sources/connectors.py:rdw_vehicle()` (Dutch open vehicle data, technical/fleet fields only, no owner PII, per the connector's own comment). `GET /screen` proxies `sources/connectors.py:opensanctions_screen()` against `api.opensanctions.org` — the edge route `app/api/screen/route.ts` calls this same path via `engineFetch('/screen?q=...')` first and falls back to calling OpenSanctions directly if the engine isn't reachable, which is a working (not broken) reconciliation, unlike `/ai/parse` above.
## Subscriptions / feeds
```
POST /subscriptions body:{ order_id, cadence, webhook_url } -> { sub_id }
GET /subscriptions -> [subs]
POST /subscriptions/{id}/pause | /resume
```
**Status: target only.** No route exists in `main.py`. The `subscriptions` table exists in `sql/001_init.sql` but nothing writes to it from the engine.
## Webhooks out (to customers)
- On delivery / feed update: POST to `subscriptions.webhook_url` with `{ order_id, delta_url, summary }`.
**Status: target only** — depends on Deliveries and Subscriptions above, neither of which exist yet.
## Health
```
GET /health -> { ok, service, db, sources }
```
**Status: implemented**, with a corrected shape: the real response is `{ok: true, service: "0pt-data-engine", db: bool(DATABASE_URL is set), sources: len(_SOURCES)}` — not `{ok, db, workers, queue}` as previously documented. There is no `workers` or `queue` field, and `db` is a presence check on an env var, not a live connectivity probe (see "Implementation status" above).
## Existing-code reconciliation
| This doc's target | `main.py` reality | Status |
|---|---|---|
| `GET/POST /catalog*` | — | not implemented (edge-only, unverified) |
| `POST /estimates` | `POST /estimates` | implemented, different request/response fields (see above) |
| `POST /ai/parse` | — | not implemented; edge layer calls it anyway and silently falls back |
| `POST /orders`, `GET /orders`, `GET /orders/{id}` | same paths, exist | implemented, no auth/org filtering, in-memory only |
| `POST /orders/{id}/scope\|accept\|revise` | `PATCH /orders/{oid}`, `POST /orders/{oid}/run` | different shape: generic status PATCH + a synchronous run trigger, no escrow gate |
| `POST /payments/*`, `POST /webhooks/stripe` | — | not implemented in engine (may exist at the edge — unverified this pass) |
| `GET /orders/{id}/status` | `GET /orders/{oid}/status` | implemented, smaller/different shape |
| `GET /orders/{id}/events` (SSE) | — | not implemented |
| `POST /uploads`, `GET /orders/{id}/files` | — | not implemented |
| `POST/DELETE /connections/db-grant*` | — | not implemented |
| `GET/POST /orders/{id}/delivery*` | — | not implemented; underlying quality data doesn't exist either |
| `GET /sources`, `GET /sources/{market}` | same paths, exist | implemented, different projected fields (no `confidence`/`freshness`) |
| `POST/GET /subscriptions*` | — | not implemented |
| `GET /health` | `GET /health` | implemented, different shape (no `workers`/`queue`) |
| — | `GET /vehicles/{plate}`, `GET /screen` | implemented, previously undocumented |
Remove any endpoint that drives a bypass/stealth fetch path (CLAUDE.md §1) — none of the 12 real endpoints in `main.py` do; the WAF-bypass concern in this repo's history is in `services/scrapers/*` on the Gitea remote, not here (see CLAUDE.md's note on the two diverged remotes — an open question for Simon, not resolved by this pass).
## Related: the edge-native TypeScript capability surface
`app/api/0pt/*`, `app/api/screen/route.ts`, and `app/api/ai/parse/route.ts` are **not** part of the FastAPI contract above — they're Next.js Route Handlers, run on Vercel, and implement several of the newer P0 capabilities registered in CL0UD's capability registry (`0pt.query_source`, `0pt.document_ocr`, `0pt.lakehouse_mapping_manage`, `0pt.lakehouse_write`, `0pt.source_rate_policy_manage`). Full route-by-route documentation, including several confirmed always-fails-over-HTTP bugs, lives in **`docs/12-edge-capability-api.md`**.
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# 05 · Design system (mono)
Self-contained spec. This file is the source of truth for tokens + motion; the
tokens and CSS below are **already implemented** in `app/globals.css` and
consumed across `components/` and `app/` — this is not aspirational, it's a
description of what ships today, kept here so new screens stay on-brand.
Derived from the **mono / EVASION** template (itself v0-generated). Light, editorial, monochrome, sharp, with a single red accent and animated grain + scroll-reveal motion. **No photography** — imagery is rendered data. (Verified: no `<img>` or `next/image` usage anywhere in `app/` or `components/` except a single unused leftover component, see "Vestigial component, not on the 'no photography' path" further down.)
> **Doc-index gap:** `CLAUDE.md`'s documentation index lists two files this doc used to point to — `docs/design/0pt-v0-build-brief.md` (per-component v0 prompts) and `docs/design/0pt-design-coverage-and-visuals.md` (full page/component inventory + visual rules). **Neither file exists anywhere in this repo** (confirmed via full-repo search). They are referenced but were never written. This doc no longer treats them as available references — anything they were supposed to cover (per-component prompts, the full visual-mapping table) is not documented anywhere right now. Whoever owns design docs next should either write them or remove the rows from `CLAUDE.md`'s index; not resolved in this pass.
## Tokens
Verified against `app/globals.css` (the file actually imported by `app/layout.tsx`):
```
THEME (light, default):
--background #ffffff --foreground #0a0a0a --muted-foreground #737373
--border #e5e5e5 --card #ffffff --input #f5f5f5
THEME (dark sections — footer, editorial/manifesto block, technology/engine block):
--background #0a0a0a --foreground #fafafa --muted-foreground #a3a3a3 --border #262626
ACCENT (single, sparing): red --accent-red #e40014 (one CTA / one number / one marker per screen)
PROVENANCE squares (ONLY non-mono color besides the red CTA):
level 0 #737373 (unavailable/licensed) · 1 #143aff (single source) · 2 #fcbb00 (partial) · 3 #00d294 (corroborated)
RADIUS: 0 everywhere (`--radius: 0rem` in app/globals.css; shadcn/ui components inherit --radius-sm/md/lg/xl derived from it, so they render square too).
TYPE: Inter (everything; headlines weight 500–600, letter-spacing -0.02em, large) · JetBrains Mono (eyebrows, labels, numbers, codes, table headers — UPPERCASE, letter-spacing mostly 0.08–0.22em but ranging down to 0.02em on some labels/table headers (e.g. `provenance-badge.tsx`, the source table headers in `app/kallor/page.tsx`), ~10–12px, #737373). Loaded via `next/font/google` in `app/layout.tsx` as CSS vars `--font-inter` / `--font-jetbrains-mono`.
GRID: 8px base; graph-paper hairlines; generous whitespace; left-aligned headlines.
SECTION SPINE: real ordered indices 00–06 as mono eyebrows (hero=00, philosophy=01, catalog=02, [03 unused/reserved], collection/coverage=04, testimonials=05, pricing=06). The two dark sections (editorial "Manifesto", technology "The engine") intentionally break the numbered spine — they carry a text eyebrow instead of a number.
```
**Correction — a third section also breaks the spine, and it isn't dark:** verified render order in `app/page.tsx` is Hero(00) → Philosophy(01) → FeaturedProducts/Catalog(02) → **Technology (dark, no number)** → **GallerySection (no number)** → Collection(04) → **Editorial (dark, no number)** → Testimonials(05) → Pricing(06) → Footer(dark). `components/sections/gallery-section.tsx` sits exactly where a "03" would fall but carries a text eyebrow (`"— Visualizations"`) like the dark sections, plus its own unrelated local `01`–`05` indices on its five tiles (a per-tile counter, not a continuation of the page's section spine — don't confuse the two). So "03 unused/reserved" is accurate in that no section ever shows the numeral 03, but three sections break the numbered spine, not two — only two of those three happen to be dark-themed.
**Correction vs. previous version of this doc:** the dark theme was previously described as appearing on "footer, one editorial block" (2 places). Verified in `components/sections/`: **three** sections actually use the dark theme — `footer-section.tsx`, `editorial-section.tsx` (the "Manifesto" block), and `technology-section.tsx` (the "#motorn" / "The engine" block, `id="motorn"`). All three set `className="dark ..." ` and a `bg-[#0a0a0a] text-[#fafafa]` pairing.
**Implementation note (not yet reconciled in code):** `editorial-section.tsx` and `technology-section.tsx` use the documented dark border `#262626` consistently. `footer-section.tsx` instead hardcodes `#1f1f1f` for its borders — a different, undocumented shade. All three sections hardcode hex literals (`#0a0a0a`, `#fafafa`, `#737373`, `#a3a3a3`, plus the two different border shades) rather than referencing the `.dark` CSS-variable overrides that already exist in `app/globals.css`'s `--border`/`--foreground`/`--muted-foreground` tokens. This works today because the values happen to match (except the footer border), but it means the dark sections don't actually pick up `.dark`-scoped custom-property overrides — they're hand-pinned. Flagging as a small cleanup opportunity, not fixing here (out of scope for a docs pass).
## globals.css (already live in `app/globals.css` — do not re-add elsewhere)
The block below is the actual motion + grain CSS, condensed for reference. It ships today in `app/globals.css` (with the keyframes/classes spelled out at full length rather than this compact form — functionally identical):
```css
@keyframes reveal-up{0%{opacity:0;transform:translateY(60px)}to{opacity:1;transform:translateY(0)}}
@keyframes reveal-left{0%{opacity:0;transform:translateX(-60px)}to{opacity:1;transform:translateX(0)}}
@keyframes reveal-right{0%{opacity:0;transform:translateX(60px)}to{opacity:1;transform:translateX(0)}}
@keyframes scale-in{0%{opacity:0;transform:scale(.9)}to{opacity:1;transform:scale(1)}}
@keyframes fadeIn{0%{opacity:0;transform:scale(1.02)}to{opacity:1;transform:scale(1)}}
@keyframes slideUp{0%{opacity:0;transform:translateY(100%)}to{opacity:1;transform:translateY(0)}}
@keyframes float{0%,100%{transform:translateY(0)}50%{transform:translateY(-20px)}}
@keyframes grain{0%,100%{transform:translate(0,0)}10%{transform:translate(-5%,-10%)}20%{transform:translate(-15%,5%)}30%{transform:translate(7%,-25%)}40%{transform:translate(-5%,25%)}50%{transform:translate(-15%,10%)}60%{transform:translate(15%,0)}70%{transform:translateY(15%)}80%{transform:translate(3%,35%)}90%{transform:translate(-10%,10%)}}
.reveal{opacity:0}
.reveal.in-view{animation:.8s ease-out forwards reveal-up}
.reveal-left.in-view{animation:.8s ease-out forwards reveal-left}
.reveal-right.in-view{animation:.8s ease-out forwards reveal-right}
.reveal-scale.in-view{animation:.6s ease-out forwards scale-in}
.reveal-fade.in-view{animation:.7s ease-out forwards fadeIn}
.delay-1{animation-delay:.1s}.delay-2{animation-delay:.2s}.delay-3{animation-delay:.3s}.delay-4{animation-delay:.4s}.delay-5{animation-delay:.5s}.delay-6{animation-delay:.6s}
.animate-float{animation:6s ease-in-out infinite float}
.grain-overlay::before{content:"";position:absolute;inset:-100%;opacity:.03;pointer-events:none;background-image:url("data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg viewBox='0 0 200 200' xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'%3E%3Cfilter id='n'%3E%3CfeTurbulence type='fractalNoise' baseFrequency='0.9' numOctaves='4' stitchTiles='stitch'/%3E%3C/filter%3E%3Crect width='100%25' height='100%25' filter='url(%23n)'/%3E%3C/svg%3E");animation:8s steps(10,end) infinite grain}
@media(prefers-reduced-motion:reduce){.reveal,.reveal-left,.reveal-right,.reveal-scale,.reveal-fade{opacity:1;animation:none}.animate-float,.grain-overlay::before{animation:none}}
```
The provenance colors and `--accent-red` also live in `app/globals.css` as CSS custom properties (`--accent-red`, `--prov-0..3`), exposed to Tailwind via `@theme inline` as `--color-accent-red`, `--color-prov-0..3`.
**Known leftover, unused file:** `styles/globals.css` also exists in this repo and is **not** imported anywhere (`app/layout.tsx` imports `./globals.css`, i.e. `app/globals.css`, only). `styles/globals.css` is a stray copy of the original shadcn/v0 scaffold — it uses `oklch()` colors, Geist/Geist Mono fonts, and `--radius: 0.625rem`, none of which match this design system. It is dead code. Don't edit it expecting it to affect the app, and consider deleting it in a future cleanup (not done in this pass — out of scope).
## Reveal / motion system
Three pieces work together; the doc previously only described one of them:
1. **`useReveal()` hook** — `hooks/use-reveal.ts`. Wire a section's ref with it; descendants carrying `.reveal` (+ optional `.reveal-left/-right/-scale/-fade` and `.delay-N`) animate to `.in-view` via `IntersectionObserver` (`threshold: 0.15`, `rootMargin: "0px 0px -10% 0px"`) when the section scrolls into view. **Difference from a naive IntersectionObserver:** if the section's top edge is already inside the viewport on mount (e.g. direct navigation to a page whose hero is already visible), the hook applies `.in-view` immediately via `requestAnimationFrame` instead of waiting for a scroll event — this avoids a flash of invisible content on first paint.
```tsx
"use client";
import { useEffect, useRef } from "react";
export function useReveal<T extends HTMLElement = HTMLElement>() {
const ref = useRef<T>(null);
useEffect(() => {
const el = ref.current;
if (!el) return;
const applyReveal = () => {
el.querySelectorAll(".reveal, .reveal-left, .reveal-right, .reveal-scale, .reveal-fade")
.forEach((n) => n.classList.add("in-view"));
};
const rect = el.getBoundingClientRect();
if (rect.top < window.innerHeight * 0.9) {
requestAnimationFrame(applyReveal);
return;
}
const io = new IntersectionObserver((entries) => entries.forEach((e) => {
if (e.isIntersecting) { applyReveal(); io.unobserve(el); }
}), { threshold: 0.15, rootMargin: "0px 0px -10% 0px" });
io.observe(el);
return () => io.disconnect();
}, []);
return ref;
}
```
2. **`<RouteReveal />`** — `components/route-reveal.tsx`, mounted once, globally, in `app/layout.tsx` inside the providers. On every client-side route change (via `usePathname()`), it force-applies `.in-view` to any `.reveal*` element whose top edge is already within 95% of the viewport height — covering standalone pages (e.g. `/bestall`, `/katalog/[id]`) that render fully visible on load, where per-section `IntersectionObserver`s might not fire before paint. Runs on an immediate pass, a `requestAnimationFrame` pass, and a 600ms-delayed pass (for async-loaded content). **This component was not documented in the previous version of this file** — it's load-bearing for anything not covered by `useReveal()`'s own "already visible" check (e.g. content that becomes visible slightly after mount).
3. **CSS keyframes/classes** in `app/globals.css` (above) define the actual animation.
Every section wraps in a tag using `useReveal()`; children get `reveal[/-left/-right/-scale/-fade]` + `delay-N`. This pattern is used consistently across `components/sections/*.tsx`.
## Buttons & labels
- Primary: solid `#0a0a0a` (`--foreground`) bg, `--background` text, square, mono uppercase ~12px, padding varies by placement (header CTA and hero CTAs use `px-5..7 py-2.5..4`, i.e. roughly 10–16px vertical / 20–28px horizontal — treat the doc's original "14px 26px" as an approximate baseline, not an exact contract); hover → bg `var(--accent-red)`.
- Secondary: transparent, 1px `border-foreground`; hover → bg `--foreground`, `--background` text.
- Eyebrow: mono uppercase 11px, spacing ~0.14–0.18em, `--muted-foreground`, with a 2-digit index where the section spine applies (e.g. `"01 — Philosophy"`).
- Headlines: sentence case, never uppercase.
- **Implementation note:** there is no shared `Button`/`MonoButton` component implementing this pattern — `components/ui/button.tsx` is the generic, unmodified shadcn/ui button (rounded via `--radius-*` tokens, which happen to resolve to 0 here, but otherwise a stock `cva` variant set: default/destructive/outline/secondary/ghost/link). The mono square CTA look described above is hand-rolled per call site as inline Tailwind classes on raw `<Link>`/`<button>` elements (see `components/header.tsx`, `components/sections/hero-section.tsx`). It's applied consistently in practice, but it's a repeated pattern, not a reusable component — worth extracting if more CTAs are added.
## Visual system — no photos (`DataArtifact`)
`components/data-artifact.tsx` is the one generative primitive; every "image" surface uses it, animating with the effect it replaces. Confirmed implemented variants (`variant` prop): `"table" | "map" | "schema" | "chart" | "grid"`.
- `table` (rows cascade in via `.reveal-left`, provenance square per fact cell) — used in `components/sections/gallery-section.tsx` (showcase tile) and `app/katalog/[id]/page.tsx` (`SampleTab`, plus `OverviewTab` for datasets whose `artifact` field is `"table"`). Real fields used: `dim_company`-style rows with company name, source label, provenance level. **Correction:** the previous version of this doc said this variant is used on "hero/cards" — verified false. `components/sections/hero-section.tsx` does not import or render `DataArtifact` at all; it has its own hand-rolled `ROWS`/`PROV` mini-table that visually mimics the same pattern independently (same provenance-square styling, separately maintained). `components/sections/featured-products-section.tsx` (the dataset "cards" grid) doesn't use `DataArtifact` either — it renders `ProvenanceBadge` per list row instead. Flagging the hero duplication as the same kind of repeated-pattern-not-a-shared-component issue already noted below for buttons.
- `map` (country-code cells in a grid, coverage-% fill bar animates width on view) — coverage. Sample cells: SE/NO/DK/FI (populated) and IS/NL/DE/FR (0%, i.e. not yet sourced).
- `schema` (mini ER diagram over a graph-paper background; key entities get a red top border) — schema previews. Sample entities: `dim_company`, `fact_financials`, `bridge_provenance`.
- `chart` (black bars, exactly ONE red bar — the last one — grow on view) — dashboards, labeled "coverage" with a large faint "06" numeral watermark.
- `grid` (hairline graph-paper + faint oversized "0pt" wordmark + one floating red square using `.animate-float`) — pure texture.
Rules, verified in the component: code-only (Tailwind + inline styles + CSS background-image, no images/canvas/SVG assets), color discipline inside visuals (mono + provenance CSS vars `--prov-0..3` + one red `--accent-red`), `grain-overlay` class applied to the outer wrapper, `prefers-reduced-motion` settles to static (handled globally in `app/globals.css`, not per-component).
**Gap:** the previous version of this doc pointed to "the coverage doc" for the full mapping of template image elements → replacement + effect kept. That doc (`docs/design/0pt-design-coverage-and-visuals.md`) does not exist (see callout at top of this file), so that mapping is not written down anywhere beyond the five variants and their usage sites listed above.
**Optional, not implemented:** Lenis smooth scroll is mentioned as an optional layer on top of this motion system. Verified: `lenis` is not a dependency in `package.json` and is not referenced anywhere in the codebase. If added later, it should not require changing any of the reveal/grain classes above.
**Vestigial component, not on the "no photography" path:** `components/fade-image.tsx` (`FadeImage`, wrapping `next/image` with an intersection-triggered fade/scale-in) exists in the repo but is not imported or used anywhere (verified via repo-wide search). It predates the "no photography" rule or was left over from the source template. Harmless dead code; flagging in case someone reaches for it assuming it's wired in.
## The signature (carry everywhere)
Provenance + confidence is the identity: the provenance square on every fact, one red, mono numerals as texture, section spine, identical motion. A screen that lacks these is off-brand.
Confirmed carried through beyond the marketing pages: `components/provenance-badge.tsx` (`ProvenanceBadge`, `CellProvenance`, `PROVENANCE_LEGEND`) implements the provenance square + label pattern for reuse in data-bearing UI (portal, admin), and `components/order-stepper.tsx` / `components/portal-shell.tsx` / `components/states.tsx` (loading/empty/error states) all follow the same mono-hairline-square-radius-0 chrome — the design system is not marketing-page-only, it extends into `/portal` and `/admin`.
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# 06 · Data engine
The engine turns sources into delivered, provenance-tagged data. It is the legal motor — the whole product positioning depends on it. The real code lives in `services/api/` (FastAPI orchestrator + workers), **not** at the `src/workers/` path this doc used to point to — the "Pipeline stages" section below states plainly, stage by stage, what's built vs. still spec.
> ### Known issue — two diverged git remotes for this repo (unresolved, Simon's call)
> This doc describes the compliant-only sourcing chain as *the law*. That law was briefly violated on one
> of this repo's two remotes, so anyone reading this doc needs to know both exist:
> - `github.com/sax3l/0pt` (this session's `origin`) — the remote this documentation pass was verified against.
> - `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt` (Gitea) — a **separate, diverged** remote that shares origin history with GitHub for
> at least part of the codebase (`services/api/workers/adaptive_router.py` is byte-for-byte identical between
> GitHub's current `main` and Gitea's post-fix PR branch, so they were once the same commit lineage).
>
> Gitea's `main` independently accumulated three commits on 2026-07-13 that added a real WAF-bypass /
> proxy-rotation / fake-identity scraper stack (`services/scrapers/*`) — exactly the category of code
> §"Prohibited" below and CLAUDE.md §1 forbid. Those commits never touched GitHub's `main`. The stack was
> since removed on Gitea via PR #1, but:
> - **Which remote is authoritative / deployed to `0pt.app` is unknown** — not resolved this session.
> - **Whether the two remotes are supposed to be kept in sync is unknown** — not resolved this session.
>
> This pass does not resolve either question. Simon: decide which remote is canonical, confirm the other has
> no lingering bypass code, and either merge or retire the loser before treating "the 0pt repo" as singular
> in any future doc pass.
## Sourcing chain (strict priority — this is the law)
For each field × market, acquire in this order; stop at the first that works:
1. **Official API / bulk** — registries with programmatic/bulk access (highest confidence).
2. **Authorized public web** — clearly public pages, **respecting `robots.txt` and rate limits**, no auth walls.
3. **Licensed partner data** — contractually obtained.
4. **Otherwise → "not available / licensed only"** — delivered honestly as level 0. **Never guessed.**
**Current implementation covers tier 1 only.** All five working connectors in `services/api/sources/connectors.py`
(`gleif_by_lei`, `brreg_by_orgnr`, `companies_house_by_number`, `prh_by_businessid`, `cvr_by_number`) call
official JSON APIs over `httpx`, nothing else. There is no HTML-scraping/parsing library anywhere in
`services/api` (no `bs4`/`lxml`/`selectolax`, no `playwright`, no `scrapy`/`crawlee` — checked against
`requirements.txt` and the source tree), so tier 2 (authorized public web) has no code path yet. Tier 3
(licensed partner) also has no connector — `sources.yaml`'s `bolagsverket` entry is `access: licensed` with
no matching function in `connectors.py`; it correctly falls through to level 0 today. Both tiers remain
target design, not built.
### Prohibited (do not build, keep, or extend)
- WAF/bot-detection bypass — **including FlareSolverr**, "stealth"/patched browsers, undetected-* used to defeat detection.
- Proxy/fingerprint rotation to evade bans; scraping behind login walls; automated fake-account creation (Apollo etc.).
- **Reconciliation note (stale — kept for history):** this section used to say "if `browser_worker.py` has an
`HTTP → FlareSolverr → Playwright` chain, drop the FlareSolverr stage." **`browser_worker.py` does not exist
anywhere in this repository** (verified this pass — no file of that name on GitHub's `main`). There is
nothing to reconcile in the current Python engine. The bypass code that *did* exist, briefly, lived in
`services/scrapers/*` on the Gitea remote only (see the Known Issue callout above) and has since been
removed there via PR #1. `adaptive_router.py` (below) has never contained a bypass tier on either remote —
it chooses among **compliant** methods only (API > bulk > authorized fetch > licensed), by design.
## Pipeline stages (per job)
```
sourcing → extraction/OCR → structuring → enrichment/fusion → QA
```
The stage names below are the target architecture. `services/api/workers/pipeline.py::run_job` is the one
function that actually runs today, and it implements a much smaller slice of this than the stage list
implies — see the "built vs. not built" status called out under each stage below.
1. **Sourcing** — `adaptive_router.plan_for_market(market)` returns a hardcoded, ordered list of compliant
`source_id`s per market (see table below); `pipeline.py` tries each in order for a given key and **stops at
the first one that returns a result** (`break` after first hit). This is sequential fallback, not
concurrent racing — the phrase "source-racing = query several authorized sources and take the
fastest/freshest" describes a target behavior that isn't implemented; today only one source is ever queried
per key unless the first fails. Writes raw payload fields directly into the record dict (no separate
raw-payload store).
2. **Extraction / OCR — not built.** There is no `ocr_worker`, no `unstructured`, no `paddleocr`/`pytesseract`
anywhere in this repo (checked `services/api/requirements.txt` and the full source tree — none present).
"Extraction" today is just each connector in `connectors.py` parsing the JSON response of its own API call
into a `CompanyResult`. Document/PDF/image ingestion and the OCR cascade described here are spec only.
3. **Structuring — partially built.** `services/api/workers/resolve.py::resolve()` does real, deterministic
entity resolution: block by `(market, name[:1].upper())`, then `rapidfuzz.fuzz.token_sort_ratio(...) >= 92`
to merge duplicates, bumping `confidence` by +0.1 per corroborating match (capped 0.99) and incrementing
`agreed_sources`. That part is real and unit-testable. What's **not** built: no spaCy/transformers, no NER,
no multilingual normalization (`sv/no/da/fi/de/fr` from the original text), and no explicit LEI-based
cross-market entity linking — matching is name-string-similarity only, within the same market. `spacy` and
`transformers` are not in `requirements.txt`.
4. **Enrichment / fusion — partially built, not fully wired into the job.** The confidence/agreement bump
described above happens inside `resolve()`. Separately, `opensanctions_screen()` (sanctions/PEP) and
`rdw_vehicle()` (NL vehicle data) are real, working connectors in `connectors.py` — but `pipeline.py` never
imports or calls either one. They're only reachable as their own standalone endpoints
(`GET /screen`, `GET /vehicles/{plate}` in `orchestrator/main.py`), not as an automatic enrichment step on
an order's records. NACE/SNI classification and "website/tech" enrichment have no code anywhere.
5. **QA — not built beyond a single threshold filter.** The entire QA stage in `pipeline.py` is:
`delivered = [r for r in deduped if r["confidence"] >= threshold]`. That's real and does drop
below-threshold rows (deliver fewer, never fabricate — that principle holds). But there is no
Great Expectations (not in `requirements.txt`, not imported anywhere), no separate validity/format,
completeness, freshness, or post-dedup-uniqueness checks beyond the confidence number already computed in
structuring, and no quality-report object emitted or stored anywhere — `deliveries` (the SQL table defined
in `sql/001_init.sql`) is never written to by this service. This mirrors a confirmed, broader finding this
session: 0pt's data-quality/QA layer was at one point documented elsewhere (TypeScript side,
`src/services/quality-check-service.ts` etc.) as if built and tested, but those files **do not exist** in
this repo's history at all (zero commits, any branch — see `docs/07-dependencies.md` note). `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`,
`docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`, and `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md` have all since been corrected — each
now carries its own explicit "fabricated, not built" callout rather than asserting those files as real —
and `docs/P0_DATASET_QUALITY_FLOW.md` documents this gap as target-spec-only. The Python engine
independently confirms the same gap: **no real quality-check enforcement exists in this codebase today**,
in either language.
**"Each stage updates `jobs` ... so the production tracker / SSE can render it live" is not what happens.**
`run_job` runs synchronously start-to-finish and returns one final dict (`stage: "qa", pct: 100, state: "done",
metrics, records`). `orchestrator/main.py`'s `POST /orders/{oid}/run` awaits the whole thing and stores that one
result in an in-memory `_JOBS` dict; `GET /orders/{oid}/status` just returns whatever's there, or a static
`{"stage": "queued", "pct": 0, "state": "queued"}` placeholder before it's run. There is no per-stage
incremental progress, no `pct` that climbs, and **no SSE endpoint exists anywhere in `orchestrator/main.py`**
(grepped — none). Live progress rendering is target design, not current behavior.
### `adaptive_router` — actual market coverage (verified against `services/api/workers/adaptive_router.py`)
`MARKET_SOURCES` currently has real entries for exactly five markets, each a short compliant list — not the
"elaborate multi-source lists" an earlier version of this router may have implied:
| Market | Ordered plan | Note |
|---|---|---|
| NO | `brreg`, `gleif` | |
| GB | `companies_house`, `gleif` | |
| FI | `prh`, `gleif` | |
| DK | `cvr`, `gleif` | |
| SE | `gleif` only | Bolagsverket bulk is licensed (see above); SE company core relies on GLEIF + a not-yet-built licensed/partner route |
| anything else | `["gleif"]` | fallback in `plan_for_market()` |
`ACCESS_RANK` (`api=0, bulk=1, authorized_web=2, licensed=3`) is defined in the same file but is **not
actually used** by `plan_for_market()` to sort anything — the lists above are hand-ordered constants already
in the desired priority, and the rank dict is currently dead code (documentation-as-code, not logic).
## Confidence & provenance scoring
- Per field, `connectors.py`'s `Provenance` dataclass carries: `field_name`, `source_id`, `confidence` (0–1),
`level` (0–3), `freshness`. **`agreed_sources` is not a field on `Provenance`** — it's tracked separately, at
the merged-record level, by `resolve()` (`match["agreed_sources"] = ... + 1`). If a doc or downstream
consumer expects `agreed_sources` inside each `bridge_provenance` row, that's a mismatch to reconcile against
the actual dataclass shape, not a fact to assume.
- Level: 0 = unavailable/licensed; 1 = single source; 2 = partial corroboration; 3 = ≥2 independent sources agree.
- `est_confidence` on the order = aggregate target (computed in `orchestrator/main.py::compute_estimate`);
delivered `avg_confidence` = actual, computed in `pipeline.py` as the mean confidence of delivered rows.
- **None of this is persisted to Postgres by the current service.** `sql/001_init.sql` defines the
`bridge_provenance` table (plus `dim_company`, `dim_source`, `fact_financials`, `deliveries`, etc.), and
`asyncpg` is a listed dependency — but nothing in `services/api` actually calls `asyncpg` or issues a query.
`DATABASE_URL` is read exactly once, in `orchestrator/main.py`'s `/health` handler, purely to report a
boolean (`"db": bool(os.getenv("DATABASE_URL"))`). `orchestrator/main.py` stores orders and jobs in
in-memory dicts (`_ORDERS`, `_JOBS`) that reset on every restart. The schema exists; the wiring from
pipeline output → Postgres rows does not yet.
### Network-layer provenance: `1p` (not yet in use)
`bridge_provenance` answers *which source a field came from*. It does not answer *what
actually happened on the wire* — which policy authorized the fetch, whether `robots.txt` was
read and what it said, or whether the bytes we parsed were the page or a bot wall served with
HTTP 200. **[`1p`](https://git.siax.io/sax3l/1p)**, the SIAX egress measurement point, closes
that gap and extends the provenance chain all the way down to the network layer.
1p owns four things: a per-destination policy as code (default DENY; rate, robots/ToS stance,
allowed methods), a single egress choke point, block detection, and one provenance record per
fetch written to AUD0. Everything else is composed (AUD0, ST0RE, CL0UD).
Why this matters for 0pt specifically — three facts that are hard to assert without it:
| Claim 0pt makes | What 1p adds |
|---|---|
| "acquired from an authorized public page, respecting `robots.txt`" | The record carries the robots decision **plus a sha256 of the `robots.txt` it was taken from**. A policy that says `respect` and cannot read robots denies the fetch — silence is not permission. |
| "these are the bytes we parsed" | `body_sha256` per fetch, so a delivered field can be tied back to the exact response at the exact time. |
| "level 1/2/3 corroboration from independent sources" | Responses are classified `ok` / `rate_limited` / `forbidden` / `captcha` / `blocked_soft` / `error`. `blocked_soft` is the expensive one: **HTTP 200 whose body is a block page**. Without it, a bot wall gets parsed and scored as corroborating data. |
**It is a measurement point, not a bypass.** This is consistent with, not an exception to,
the prohibitions above and in `CLAUDE.md` §1: 1p exists to *detect* blocking and *prove*
provenance, never to evade. Its purchased-residential egress pool is an interface with a stub
that throws — wiring it up would be a separate, explicit decision. Block detection also
alarms on a rising *trend*, never on single events, and deliberately excludes `error`
(their 5xx, our timeouts) from the blocking measure.
**Status: not in use.** 1p is Phase 0 — code, contracts, tests; not deployed, no credentials
set. No 0pt worker routes through it today, and `bridge_provenance` remains the only
provenance 0pt writes. Adopting it is a later, separate step.
## `sources.yaml` (machine-readable registry)
Single registry that drives the router, the `/sources` API, and the (still-to-be-built) public sourcing-map
page. `services/api/sources/sources.yaml` currently has **8 entries**: `gleif`, `brreg`, `companies_house`,
`prh`, `cvr`, `bolagsverket`, `rdw`, `opensanctions`. Schema per entry (as actually used, confirmed against the
file — no `entities`/`fields` mismatch found):
```yaml
- source_id: gleif
name: GLEIF (LEI)
market: global
access: api # api | bulk | authorized_web | licensed
cadence: daily
licence: "open (CC0) — VERIFY current terms"
entities: [company]
fields: [lei, legal_name, address, status]
base_url: https://api.gleif.org
robots_ok: true # for authorized_web only; must be honored
notes: "cross-border key"
```
`orchestrator/main.py` loads this file once at import time (`yaml.safe_load(...)`) and serves it through
`GET /sources` (id/name/market/access/licence/cadence only) and `GET /sources/{market}`. It is genuinely the
live registry behind those two endpoints — that part of the doc's original claim holds.
### Starter set (VERIFY current access/licence per source before relying — terms change)
- **GLEIF / LEI** — typically open; cross-border key. Connector: `gleif_by_lei` — real, working.
- **Brønnøysund (Brreg, NO)** — typically open API. Connector: `brreg_by_orgnr` — real, working.
- **Companies House (UK)** — free API (key required, `COMPANIES_HOUSE_API_KEY`). Connector:
`companies_house_by_number` — real; degrades honestly to level-0 unavailable if the key is unset (does not
fabricate).
- **PRH (FI)** — Connector: `prh_by_businessid` — real, working.
- **CVR / Virk (DK)** — connector actually calls `cvrapi.dk` (a third-party aggregator), **not** Virk's own API
directly, despite the registry entry's `base_url: https://datacvr.virk.dk`. `sources.yaml`'s `base_url` for
`cvr` does not match what `connectors.py::cvr_by_number` actually calls — flag for reconciliation (either
update `base_url` to `cvrapi.dk` or switch the connector to call Virk directly; not resolved this pass).
- **Bolagsverket (SE)** — restricted for bulk; `sources.yaml` marks it `access: licensed`; **no connector
exists** for it in `connectors.py`. Consistent with the doc's own "plan licensed/partner route" framing —
not a false claim, just confirming it's still unbuilt.
- **RDW (NL)** vehicle data — open, Socrata-backed. Connector: `rdw_vehicle` — real, working, but **not called
by the job pipeline** (only reachable via `GET /vehicles/{plate}`).
- **OpenSanctions** — global sanctions/PEP screening. Connector: `opensanctions_screen` — real, working, same
caveat: reachable only via `GET /screen`, not part of `run_job`.
- Vehicle beyond RDW (**Traficom FI**, **Transportstyrelsen SE**, **DVLA UK**) — no connectors exist yet;
*(verify each before building; vehicle/PII rules differ)*.
> Do not hardcode access terms as fact. When building each connector, confirm the current API/licence/robots
> status and record it in `sources.yaml`. If unclear or disallowed for bulk, route to licensed/partner or mark
> fields level 0.
## Structured financials (XBRL) — real but unwired
`services/api/sources/financials.py::companies_house_filings()` is a real, working function: given a
Companies House number and `COMPANIES_HOUSE_API_KEY`, it fetches the accounts filing history and returns up to
10 filings. It is **not imported or called anywhere else in the codebase** (grepped `services/api` — only
`financials.py` itself references the function name). The file's closing comment describes a further XBRL
extraction step ("with `arelle` installed, download each accounts filing's iXBRL document and pull tagged
facts...") that has no code at all — `arelle` is not in `requirements.txt`. Treat the whole file as a real but
disconnected building block, not a wired pipeline stage.
## Libraries used here
Target list only — see `docs/07-dependencies.md` for what's actually installed today vs. still to be added,
with an explicit install-status callout per package. As of this pass, the *only* Python packages installed for
this engine are `fastapi`, `uvicorn`, `pydantic`, `httpx`, `asyncpg` (unused), `python-dotenv`, `pyyaml`,
`rapidfuzz`, `tenacity` — i.e. the API-only tier 1 sourcing + structuring-by-fuzzy-match slice described above,
nothing from the extraction/OCR/NER/quality layers this section used to list as if already in place.
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# 07 · Dependencies & repos to import
Curated. Each entry: what it is, where it slots in, how to install. **Do not import on reputation/star-count** — several items in earlier brainstorming were unverified or hallucinated (see Exclusions). Verify each repo exists and is maintained before adopting.
> **This is a plan, not a status report.** Every table below lists what *should* be imported for the target
> architecture in `docs/06-data-engine.md`. A **Status** column has been added to each table (verified this
> pass against `services/api/requirements.txt` and root `package.json` — the actual, current dependency
> manifests, read in full). Read the status column before assuming a package is already wired in; most of the
> data-engine tier (OCR, NER, quality checks, orchestration) is still **not installed**.
## Frontend (Next.js on Vercel)
| Package | Purpose | Install | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| next, react, typescript | App Router base | `npx create-next-app@latest --ts` | **Installed** — `next@16.0.10`, `react@19.2.0`, `typescript@^5` in `package.json` |
| tailwindcss | styling (mono tokens) | per Next setup | **Installed** — `tailwindcss@^4.1.9` |
| shadcn/ui | base components | `npx shadcn@latest init` | **Installed via copy-in, not as a runtime dep** — no `shadcn` package in `package.json` (expected: the shadcn CLI copies component source into `components/ui/`); the underlying `@radix-ui/react-*` primitives it generates against are installed individually and present |
| @tanstack/react-table **or** ag-grid-react | data tables / catalog grid | `npm i @tanstack/react-table` | **Not installed** — neither package present |
| @uppy/core @uppy/react @uppy/dashboard @uppy/aws-s3 | file upload → R2 (presigned) | `npm i @uppy/core @uppy/react @uppy/dashboard @uppy/aws-s3` | **Not installed** |
| next-auth (Auth.js) + @auth/pg-adapter | single auth, Postgres-backed | `npm i next-auth @auth/pg-adapter` | **Not installed.** Matches a broader, confirmed gap: there is no auth/session system anywhere in this repo yet (`app/api/orders/route.ts`'s own `GET` handler has the literal comment "org scoping added with auth" — i.e. not yet). Several `app/api/0pt/*` routes currently read `tenant_id`/`project_id` straight from the request body as a result — a real, open security gap, not a deliberate design; see `docs/09-build-plan.md` Phase 3 for the planned fix (not built anywhere yet, Simon's call on design). |
| stripe / @stripe/stripe-js | checkout + portal | `npm i stripe @stripe/stripe-js` | **Partially installed** — `stripe@^22.2.3` (server SDK) is present; `@stripe/stripe-js` (client SDK) is not |
| resend / react-email | transactional email | `npm i resend @react-email/components` | **Not installed** |
| lenis *(optional)* | smooth scroll (keeps all effects) | `npm i lenis` | **Not installed** |
| recharts *(only if needed)* | charts inside DataArtifact/dashboards | `npm i recharts` | **Installed** — `recharts@2.15.4` |
> Catalog/search in v1 = Postgres full-text. Add Meilisearch later only past a few thousand rows.
## Backend / workers (Python, FastAPI — existing)
`services/api/requirements.txt` currently pins exactly 9 packages. Everything else in this table is still to
be added — this is the single biggest gap between this doc's plan and the running code (see
`docs/06-data-engine.md`'s "Pipeline stages" section for what that means stage-by-stage: only official-API
sourcing and rapidfuzz-based dedup are real today; extraction/OCR, NER, and quality-checking have no code at all).
| Package | Purpose | Install | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| fastapi, uvicorn, pydantic | API (existing) | `pip install fastapi uvicorn pydantic` | **Installed** — `fastapi==0.115.6`, `uvicorn[standard]==0.34.0`, `pydantic==2.10.4` |
| httpx | polite HTTP fetch (identifies itself, obeys rate limits) | `pip install httpx` | **Installed and actively used** — `httpx==0.28.1`, every connector in `sources/connectors.py` and `sources/financials.py` goes through it |
| pyyaml | parse `sources.yaml` | `pip install pyyaml` | **Installed and used** — `pyyaml==6.0.2`, loaded once in `orchestrator/main.py` |
| rapidfuzz | dedup / fuzzy matching | `pip install rapidfuzz` | **Installed and used** — `rapidfuzz==3.11.0`, the only matching engine in `workers/resolve.py` |
| python-dotenv, tenacity | env loading, retry helper | — | **Installed**, `python-dotenv==1.0.1` / `tenacity==9.0.0` — present in `requirements.txt` but not yet visibly imported in the worker/orchestrator/sources files read this pass; not confirmed wired up |
| sqlalchemy / asyncpg | Postgres access (align `db.py`) | `pip install sqlalchemy asyncpg` | **`asyncpg==0.30.0` is installed but unused.** No file in `services/api` imports it or issues a query — confirmed by grep. `orchestrator/main.py` reads `DATABASE_URL` once, only to report a boolean in `/health`. Orders/jobs live in in-memory dicts that reset on restart. `sqlalchemy` is **not installed** at all. There is also no `db.py` anywhere in this repo — an older doc reference to `src/workers/db.py` is stale; that path does not exist. |
| alembic | migrations | `pip install alembic` | **Not installed.** Migrations currently ship as plain numbered SQL files in `sql/` (`001_init.sql`, `004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql`), applied ad hoc, not via Alembic. |
| celery + redis **or** existing adaptive_router/queue | job queue/concurrency | `pip install celery redis` | **Neither Celery nor a Python Redis client is installed.** `workers/queue.py` is a small in-process `asyncio.Queue` wrapper (single-worker dev only, by its own docstring). `infra/docker-compose.yml` does run a `redis` *container*, but nothing in `services/api` currently talks to it. |
| scrapy **or** crawlee | orchestrate **authorized** fetches | `pip install scrapy` | **Not installed.** No HTML-scraping library of any kind (also no `bs4`/`lxml`) exists in this codebase — confirmed by grep. Tier-2 "authorized public web" sourcing (docs/06) has no code path yet; only tier-1 official-API connectors exist. |
| playwright | public JS-rendered pages, politely | `pip install playwright && playwright install chromium` | **Not installed.** No `browser_worker.py` file exists anywhere in this repo either — an older doc reference to reconciling a FlareSolverr stage inside it is moot; there's nothing to reconcile in the current Python engine (see `docs/06-data-engine.md`'s Known Issue callout for where a bypass stack *did* briefly exist, on a different git remote). |
| unstructured | parse PDF/HTML/DOCX/images → elements | `pip install "unstructured[all-docs]"` | **Not installed.** |
| paddleocr / pytesseract | OCR cascade | `pip install paddleocr pytesseract` (+ tesseract bin) | **Not installed.** No OCR code or `ocr_worker` module exists anywhere in this repo. |
| spacy (+ models) / transformers | NER, entity resolution (multilingual) | `pip install spacy transformers` | **Not installed.** `workers/resolve.py`'s entity resolution is rapidfuzz string-similarity only — no NER, no multilingual normalization. |
| polars | fast tabular processing | `pip install polars` | **Not installed.** |
| great-expectations | data quality checks in pipeline | `pip install great-expectations` | **Not installed, and nothing equivalent exists either.** The entire QA stage in `workers/pipeline.py` is a single confidence-threshold filter (`r["confidence"] >= threshold`) — no validity/completeness/freshness/uniqueness checks, no quality report emitted or stored. This is a real, currently-open gap, not a doc typo: a broader, confirmed finding this session is that 0pt's data-quality/QA layer, once described elsewhere in this doc corpus as already built and tested (`src/services/quality-check-service.ts` etc.), does not exist in code at all — zero commits in this repo's history, any branch, for any of those files. Every doc that used to make that claim (`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`, `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`, `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md`) has since been corrected. The Python engine independently confirms the same absence. |
| dbt-postgres *(optional)* | transform layer | `pip install dbt-postgres` | **Not installed.** |
| pgvector (Postgres ext) | embeddings/matching | `CREATE EXTENSION vector;` | The `pgvector/pgvector:pg16` image is used in `infra/docker-compose.yml`, so the extension is available in the container, but no code in `services/api` runs a vector query — not exercised by any of the files read this pass |
| boto3 *(or aioboto3)* | R2 (S3-compatible) | `pip install boto3` | **Not installed.** No R2/S3 upload code found in `services/api` this pass. |
| stripe (python) | webhook handling | `pip install stripe` | **Not installed** in `services/api/requirements.txt` (the JS `stripe` package in root `package.json` is separate and unrelated to this table) |
## Self-hosted services (docker-compose on the VPS)
| Service | Purpose | Image | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NocoDB** | Airtable-style views over existing Postgres tables; embedded "Min data" | `nocodb/nocodb` | **Wired in `infra/docker-compose.yml`** (`nocodb/nocodb:latest`, points at the same `postgres` service) — not independently verified running/reachable this pass |
| **Metabase** | customer-facing dashboards; embedded | `metabase/metabase` | **Wired in `infra/docker-compose.yml`** (`metabase/metabase:latest`, same Postgres backend) — not independently verified running/reachable this pass |
| **Postgres** *(or Neon managed)* | backbone (+ pgvector) | `pgvector/pgvector:pg16` | **Wired in `infra/docker-compose.yml`** — but see the backend table above: the FastAPI service that should write to it currently does not (in-memory only) |
| **Redis** *(if Celery)* | queue | `redis` | **Container is wired in `infra/docker-compose.yml`**, but no Python code in `services/api` currently connects to it (no Celery, no `redis` client installed) |
| **Meilisearch** *(later)* | catalog search at scale | `getmeili/meilisearch` | Not in `infra/docker-compose.yml` yet — consistent with this doc's own "later" framing, not a gap |
## External managed (free/cheap tiers)
- **Vercel** — Next.js hosting.
- **Cloudflare R2** — object storage (presigned URLs). No R2 client code found in this pass (`boto3` not installed; no `@uppy/aws-s3` in `package.json`) — treat as not yet wired regardless of account status.
- **Stripe** — payments (test mode first). Server SDK (`stripe` npm package) is installed; whether a live/test key is actually configured was not verified this pass (no secret material read).
- **Resend** — email. Not installed (see frontend table).
- **Neon** *(optional)* — managed Postgres. `infra/docker-compose.yml` runs its own Postgres container instead; no evidence either way of a Neon instance actually in use.
## EXCLUSIONS — do not import
- **Bypass/stealth/evasion**: FlareSolverr, "CloakBrowser", undetected-chromedriver/undetected-playwright (as bypass), proxy/fingerprint-rotation engines, any "WAF bypass" repo. Prohibited by CLAUDE.md §1 — they destroy the honest-accuracy positioning and create legal exposure. **This is not hypothetical**: a real WAF-bypass/proxy-rotation/fake-identity scraper stack (`services/scrapers/*`) briefly existed on this repo's Gitea remote (`git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt`, three commits dated 2026-07-13) and has since been removed there via PR #1. It never touched `origin` (`github.com/sax3l/0pt`), which this doc corpus was verified against. See `docs/06-data-engine.md`'s Known Issue callout for the full, unresolved detail — which remote is canonical is Simon's call, not decided this pass.
- **Fake-account automation** on Apollo/Cognism/etc.
- **Unverified / likely-hallucinated** from earlier brainstorming: "CloakBrowser/CloakHQ", "Rota proxy engine", "OpenClaw". Do not adopt unless you confirm a real, maintained project — and even then, not if it falls in the bypass category.
- **Overlapping tools** already decided against (Baserow/Teable, Trigger.dev, Delta Sharing in v1) — see `docs/02-architecture.md`. *Corrected 2026-09-06: Superset and OpenMetadata were previously listed here as rejected. They are canonical (BI engine and catalog respectively) — see the correction note under "Stack decisions — OUT" in `docs/02-architecture.md`.*
> Note on real-but-overhyped tools (Firecrawl, browser-use, etc.): they exist, but ignore inflated star-counts and only adopt if they fit a *compliant* role and don't duplicate the stack.
+279
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@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
# 08 · Infrastructure
> Verified against actual repo state 2026-07-19 (branch `main`, plus `.env.example` read from
> `feature/0pt-env-example`). Where this doc previously described a target that doesn't match
> what's committed, that's called out explicitly rather than silently corrected — see the repo's
> honesty convention in `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`.
## Repo structure (actual, not the original `apps/web` sketch)
The monorepo did **not** converge on the `apps/web/` + `packages/shared/` layout this doc originally
sketched. What's actually on `main` today:
```
0pt/
├─ CLAUDE.md
├─ README.md · SECURITY.md
├─ docs/ # this documentation set
├─ app/ # Next.js App Router (Vercel) — the "edge" plane, AT THE REPO ROOT
│ ├─ api/ # route handlers: orders, auth, admin, catalog, connections,
│ │ # vehicles, subscriptions, sources, estimates, health, uploads,
│ │ # payments, 0pt/*, screen, webhooks, ai
│ ├─ bestall/ katalog/ kallor/ order/ portal/ admin/ tjanster/ # pages
├─ lib/ # edge-side helpers: db.ts, engine.ts, auth.ts, stripe.ts,
│ │ # orders-store.ts, subscriptions-store.ts, data.ts, services.ts
├─ src/ # SIAX-platform-facing TS layer (NOT under app/ or lib/)
│ ├─ clients/ # cl0ud-, n0d-, aud0-, st0re-, st0re-lakehouse-client.ts
│ ├─ services/ # dataset-, source-, source-query-, iceberg-write-,
│ │ # document-capture-, document-extraction-, external-writeback-,
│ │ # source-rate-policy-, dataset-iceberg-mapping-service.ts
│ ├─ adapters/ # local-blob-store.ts, odoo-bills-adapter.ts, graph-mailbox-adapter, ...
│ └─ types/
├─ components/ hooks/ styles/ # design system in code (docs/05) — data-artifact.tsx,
│ │ # provenance-badge.tsx, embed.tsx, use-reveal.ts, globals.css
├─ packages/schemas/ # JSON Schemas for 0pt.* event/entity contracts (not a pnpm workspace
│ │ # package today — pnpm-workspace.yaml has no `packages:` list)
├─ services/api/ # FastAPI orchestrator + workers (the "engine" plane, on a VPS)
│ ├─ orchestrator/main.py
│ ├─ workers/ # adaptive_router.py, pipeline.py, resolve.py, queue.py, run.py
│ ├─ sources/ # sources.yaml + connectors.py (docs/06)
│ └─ Dockerfile · requirements.txt
├─ sql/ # migrations — see "Schema state" below
├─ infra/
│ ├─ docker-compose.yml # real, committed (not a sketch — see below)
│ └─ Caddyfile # real, committed
├─ tests/p0/ # vitest, TS-side (services/clients/adapters)
└─ (no .github/workflows/ directory exists — see "CI/CD" below)
```
**Known open question (not resolved this pass, Simon's call):** `CLAUDE.md` and `README.md` both
now note that `github.com/sax3l/0pt` (this checkout's `origin`) and `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt` (Gitea)
are two remotes that share part of the same history but have independently diverged — Gitea's `main`
picked up a WAF-bypass/proxy-rotation scraper stack (since removed via a Gitea PR) that never touched
GitHub's `main`. Which remote is authoritative/deployed, and whether they should be kept in sync, is
undecided. This doc describes what's on **this** checkout's `main` only.
### Schema state (sql/)
Only two migration files exist in the repo's history, on any branch: `sql/001_init.sql` (the core
schema — `dim_company`, `dim_contact`, `fact_financials`, `orders`, etc., per `docs/03-data-model.md`)
and `sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` (`opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings` + source-rate-policy tables,
per `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`). **There is no `sql/002_*` or `sql/003_*` anywhere in this
repo's git history** (`git log --all` for those paths returns zero commits) — despite
`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`, `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`, and `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md`
citing `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` and a `sql/003_*` as if they were already-applied migrations.
They are not real. See "Security & compliance" below for what this means for QA/quality-check claims.
## Hosting topology
- **Vercel** — `app/` (this repo's root, not a separate `apps/web`) → `0pt.app`. **Verified this pass**
(network check performed): `https://0pt.app` returns HTTP 200, serves a Next.js/Turbopack app titled
"0pt — your data" with SIAX branding, and `GET https://0pt.app/api/health` returns
`{"ok":true,"service":"0pt-web","db":"not_configured","queue":"not_configured",...}` — an exact shape
match for this repo's own `app/api/health/route.ts`. So README's "Live: https://0pt.app" is confirmed
accurate, and the live deployment confirms `DATABASE_URL`/`REDIS_URL` are **not** set in production —
i.e. the live site is running on the in-memory order/subscription stores described throughout this
doc, not against a real Postgres. This does not confirm which git remote/commit is deployed, or that
every route behaves as documented — only that the deployment exists and matches this repo's shape.
- **One VPS** (Hetzner, per `docs/02`) — `infra/docker-compose.yml` (see below) runs FastAPI, worker,
NocoDB, Metabase, Postgres, Redis, Caddy. This compose file and its `Caddyfile` are real, committed
files — not a sketch — but this pass found no evidence (no CI/CD, no deploy log, no accessible host)
that they have ever actually been run against a live VPS. Treat as "written, unexecuted."
- **Cloudflare R2** — documented target for file storage. `app/api/uploads/route.ts` checks for
`R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID`/`R2_BUCKET`/`R2_ENDPOINT` and returns `501 storage_not_configured` when absent;
when "present" it still returns a **hardcoded `put_url: null`** — there is no actual presigned-URL
generation implemented yet. R2 upload is an env-guarded stub, not a working integration.
- **Postgres** — `lib/db.ts` resolves `DATABASE_URL || POSTGRES_URL || POSTGRES_PRISMA_URL` (Vercel
Postgres integration sets the latter two automatically) and falls back to `null` (in-memory stores)
when none is set. This part is real and wired.
## docker-compose (`infra/docker-compose.yml` — real file, reproduced here for reference)
```yaml
services:
postgres:
image: pgvector/pgvector:pg16
environment: { POSTGRES_USER: opt, POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${PG_PASSWORD}, POSTGRES_DB: opt }
volumes: ["pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data", "../sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d:ro"]
redis:
image: redis:7
api:
build: ../services/api
command: uvicorn orchestrator.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
environment: { DATABASE_URL: "postgres://opt:${PG_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/opt", COMPANIES_HOUSE_API_KEY: "${COMPANIES_HOUSE_API_KEY:-}", INTERNAL_TOKEN: "${INTERNAL_TOKEN}" }
depends_on: [postgres, redis]
worker:
build: ../services/api
command: python -m workers.run
environment: { DATABASE_URL: "postgres://opt:${PG_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/opt", COMPANIES_HOUSE_API_KEY: "${COMPANIES_HOUSE_API_KEY:-}" }
depends_on: [postgres, redis]
nocodb:
image: nocodb/nocodb:latest
environment: { NC_DB: "pg://postgres:5432?u=opt&p=${PG_PASSWORD}&d=opt", NC_PUBLIC_URL: "https://data.0pt.app" }
depends_on: [postgres]
metabase:
image: metabase/metabase:latest
environment: { MB_DB_TYPE: postgres, MB_DB_HOST: postgres, MB_DB_PORT: "5432", MB_DB_USER: opt, MB_DB_PASS: "${PG_PASSWORD}", MB_DB_DBNAME: opt }
depends_on: [postgres]
caddy:
image: caddy:2
ports: ["80:80", "443:443"]
volumes: ["./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile", "caddydata:/data"]
depends_on: [api, nocodb, metabase]
volumes: { pgdata: {}, caddydata: {} }
```
Note vs. an earlier draft of this doc: the `api`/`worker` containers here only receive
`DATABASE_URL`, `COMPANIES_HOUSE_API_KEY`, and `INTERNAL_TOKEN` — **not** `STRIPE_*`, `RESEND_API_KEY`,
or `R2_*`. That's correct as written: Stripe, R2, and (a documented but unbuilt) Resend integration
are all called from `app/api/*` route handlers, which run on Vercel, not inside this compose stack.
**`Caddyfile` (real, committed):**
```
api.0pt.app { reverse_proxy api:8000 }
data.0pt.app { reverse_proxy nocodb:8080 }
dash.0pt.app { reverse_proxy metabase:3000 }
```
## Environment variables
**`.env.example` now exists and is merged to `main`** (BACKLOG P3-5: the stale
link to the unmerged `github.com/sax3l/0pt/pull/3` that used to sit here has
been removed — that PR landed a while ago). It was previously impossible to
commit: `.gitignore`'s blanket `.env*` rule silently matched `.env.example`
too, so it was never added despite `docs/09-build-plan.md` Phase 0 requiring
it since day one; `.gitignore` now has `!.env.example` to fix that. README's
"Env inventory: `.env.example`" link is a real, current reference.
The table below is grep-verified against `main` this pass, not transcribed from `.env.example`'s own
comments — in one case (`ST0RE_URL`, see note) that turned up a discrepancy worth flagging.
| Var | Status on `main` | Where |
|---|---|---|
| `DATABASE_URL` / `POSTGRES_URL` / `POSTGRES_PRISMA_URL` | **Wired** — priority-ordered fallback | `lib/db.ts` |
| `ENGINE_URL` | **Wired** — edge defers to FastAPI engine when set, else computes locally | `lib/engine.ts` |
| `INTERNAL_TOKEN` | **Wired** — sent as `X-Internal-Token` on every `engineFetch()` call | `lib/engine.ts` |
| `AUTH_SECRET` | **Wired**, but only for a lightweight HMAC session scaffold — **not Auth.js**. `lib/auth.ts`'s own comment: "Production auth = Auth.js + Postgres adapter... wired once the database is provisioned" | `lib/auth.ts`, `app/api/auth/login/route.ts` |
| `DEV_LOGIN_KEY` | **Wired** — gates the dev-only login route (403 without a match); not a real auth system | `app/api/auth/login/route.ts` |
| `AUTH_URL` | Documented target — no read found | — |
| `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY` | **Wired** — real Stripe Checkout session creation (test or live key both work; not test-mode-locked in code) | `app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit/route.ts` |
| `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET` | **Wired** — real signature verification, advances order status | `app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts` |
| `NEXT_PUBLIC_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY` | Documented target — no read found | — |
| `R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `R2_BUCKET`, `R2_ENDPOINT` | **Presence-checked only** — gates a `501` vs stub `200`; no actual R2 client/presign call exists yet | `app/api/uploads/route.ts` |
| `R2_ACCOUNT_ID`, `R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` | Documented target — no read found (even the stub above doesn't check these) | — |
| `OPT_LOCAL_BLOB_DIR` | **Wired** — local-disk fallback artifact store, used when no object storage is configured | `src/adapters/local-blob-store.ts` |
| `RESEND_API_KEY` | Documented target — **no Resend call site anywhere in this repo**; not "unconfigured", genuinely not implemented | — |
| `METABASE_SITE_URL`, `METABASE_SECRET_KEY`, `NOCODB_BASE_URL`, `NOCODB_API_TOKEN` | Documented target — no read found. `components/embed.tsx` renders an iframe from a `src` prop the *caller* must supply; no server-side signed-URL generator exists to produce that `src` | — |
| `DOC_INTELLIGENCE_ENDPOINT`, `DOC_INTELLIGENCE_KEY`, `DOC_INTELLIGENCE_API_VERSION` | **Wired** | `src/services/document-extraction-service.ts` |
| `GRANT_ENC_KEY` | **Presence-checked only** — gates `501` vs a stub `201` that returns `{ grant_id, status: "pending" }`. No AES-GCM encryption, no read-only validation, no actual storage happens yet despite the route's own comment describing that flow | `app/api/connections/db-grant/route.ts` |
| `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL` | **Wired** — used as a fallback origin for building Stripe redirect URLs | `app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit/route.ts` |
| `NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL` | Documented target — no read found | — |
| `REDIS_URL` | **Presence-checked only**, in `/api/health` — no queue code in this repo reads it (Celery/queue usage, if any, is `services/api`'s own concern, out of this repo's TS surface) | `app/api/health/route.ts` |
| `COMPANIES_HOUSE_API_KEY` | Real key referenced by `services/api` (Python engine, `sources.yaml`/`connectors.py`) and passed through by `infra/docker-compose.yml` — not part of the Next.js edge app's own env surface | `services/api/` |
### Platform-client URLs — corrected from a stronger claim
`CL0UD_URL`, `N0D_URL`, `AUD0_URL`, and **`ST0RE_URL`** are all **documented targets only — none of
the four is read via `process.env.*` anywhere in this repo's committed code**, grep-verified this
pass (`grep -rn "process\.env\.\(ST0RE_URL\|CL0UD_URL\|N0D_URL\|AUD0_URL\)"` returns zero matches
outside comments and one `it.todo(...)` placeholder in `tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.test.ts`).
This corrects a claim that appears in `.env.example` itself (on `feature/0pt-env-example`) and was
carried into an earlier version of this doc: that comment states "`ST0RE_URL` **IS** read
(`src/clients/st0re-client.ts`, `src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts`)". That is not accurate as of
this verification. Both of those client files — like `cl0ud-client.ts`, `n0d-client.ts`, and
`aud0-client.ts` — only export a `create*Client(baseUrl?: string)` factory that falls back to an
in-memory mock when no `baseUrl` argument is passed. Every call site in this repo (`app/api/0pt/**`
routes, `src/services/*.ts`) either passes no `baseUrl` at all or forwards an `opts?.st0reBaseUrl`-style
constructor option that nothing upstream ever populates from `process.env.ST0RE_URL`. This matches
`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`'s own "Verification status" section, which lists wiring
`ST0RE_URL` → `IcebergWriteService({ st0reBaseUrl: process.env.ST0RE_URL })` as **future work**, not
something already done.
**Net effect:** setting any of `CL0UD_URL`/`N0D_URL`/`AUD0_URL`/`ST0RE_URL` in a deployed environment
today does nothing by itself. A future pass has to wire each route/service to actually read its
corresponding env var before the value has any effect. Until then, every 0pt→platform call in this
repo runs against the deterministic in-memory mock built into each client file — real, tested TS, but
never exercised against a live CL0UD/N0D/AUD0/ST0RE instance from this codebase.
## Security & compliance — corrected against actual code, not the target design
The items below were previously described as already-built behavior. Grep/read-verified this pass,
several are **env-guarded stubs that return a plausible-shaped response without doing the described
work**. Stating this plainly, per this repo's own honesty convention:
- **Customer DB grants** — `app/api/connections/db-grant/route.ts` returns `501` when `GRANT_ENC_KEY`
is unset, and a stub `201 { grant_id, status: "pending" }` when it is set. **There is no AES-GCM
encryption, no read-only-role validation, and no persistence implemented yet** — the route's own
comment describes the target behavior ("validate read-only, AES-GCM encrypt conn_string, store,
audit") but the code doesn't do it. This is a real gap, not a doc typo.
- **File delivery / presigned R2 URLs** — same pattern: `app/api/uploads/route.ts` is a `501` stub
with a hardcoded `put_url: null`. No presigned URL is ever actually generated in this repo today.
- **Tenant/org isolation — OPEN SECURITY GAP, not a deliberate two-tier design.** Several `app/api/0pt/*`
routes read `tenant_id`/`project_id` directly from the request body instead of from a server-bound
session:
- `app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/route.ts`
- `app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/[mappingId]/writes/route.ts`
- `app/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/route.ts`
- `app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts`
- `src/services/document-capture-service.ts`
This is not a defensible internal-vs-external boundary — **it's because no auth/session system
exists anywhere in this repo yet.** `app/api/orders/route.ts`'s own `GET` handler carries the
literal comment `// org scoping added with auth` — i.e., not yet. `lib/auth.ts` is a lightweight
HMAC session scaffold gated by a dev-only login key, unconnected to any of the `0pt/*` routes above.
Any caller can currently claim any `tenant_id` for these endpoints. Fixing this is Phase 3 of
`docs/09-build-plan.md` (Auth & portal shell) — it is Simon's call how that auth design binds
`tenant_id` server-side; it is not built anywhere in this repo today.
- **PII (contacts/UBO) / DPA** — no code found in this pass implementing lawful-basis recording,
deletion-on-request, or a published DPA. Treat as target design, per `CLAUDE.md` §5, not shipped.
- **Secrets rotation / least privilege** — no rotation tooling found in this repo (expected — that's
an operational practice, not application code — but noting it's unverified either way).
- **Quality/QA gate on delivered data** — `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`,
`src/services/quality-report-service.ts`, `src/types/quality-check.ts`, `src/types/quality-report.ts`,
`src/data-platform/services/catalog-service.ts`, and `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql`/`sql/003_*.sql`
were at one point referenced in `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`, `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`,
and `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md` as if built and tested. **None of these files has ever existed in
this repo's git history, on any branch** (`git log --all` confirms zero commits for every one of
those paths). **All three of those docs have since been corrected** (verified this pass) — each now
carries its own "fabricated, not built" callout and none currently asserts those files as real; this
section restates the underlying fact because it directly bears on the "Security & compliance" claims
below: **there is no lakehouse-side data-quality/QA enforcement built in this repo today**. (The
Python engine's `services/api/workers/pipeline.py` does have a real, working confidence-threshold
drop — `delivered = [r for r in deduped if r["confidence"] >= threshold]` — but that's a separate,
narrower mechanism inside the FastAPI pipeline, not the TS/lakehouse quality-check layer those three
docs describe.)
## Embedding NocoDB / Metabase
`components/embed.tsx` (`EmbeddedView`) is real, committed code — a sandboxed `<iframe>` that renders
whatever `src` URL its caller passes, with a placeholder state when `src` is `null`. **What's missing:
the server-side code that generates a signed Metabase/NocoDB embed URL from `METABASE_SECRET_KEY` /
`NOCODB_API_TOKEN`.** No such generator was found in this pass. So the embed *shell* exists; the
signed-URL *plumbing* that would make it show real customer data does not yet.
## CI/CD
**There is no `.github/workflows/` directory anywhere in this repo.** No lint/typecheck/build/test
pipeline runs in CI today. On the TS side, `pnpm lint`, `pnpm typecheck`, and `pnpm test` (vitest,
`tests/p0/*.test.ts`) exist as local scripts in `package.json`, but nothing invokes them automatically
on push/PR. **On the Python side there is no lint/test tooling at all** — grep-verified this pass:
`ruff` and `pytest` appear nowhere in `services/api/requirements.txt` or anywhere else in this repo
(no `pyproject.toml`, no `pytest.ini`, no test files). `services/api/README.md`'s own "Run locally"
section only lists `pip install -r requirements.txt` + `uvicorn`/`python -m workers.run` — no lint or
test step. An earlier version of this doc claimed `ruff`/`pytest` "exist as local scripts" for
`services/api`; that was unverified and is corrected here. This is a real gap against
`docs/09-build-plan.md` Phase 0's "CI skeleton" deliverable — not yet built, not a doc omission.
## Monitoring
- **Vercel Analytics** — genuinely wired: `app/layout.tsx` imports and renders `<Analytics />` from
`@vercel/analytics/next` (`package.json` dependency `@vercel/analytics@1.3.1`).
- **Sentry** — not found. No `sentry` package in `package.json`, no Sentry init/config file anywhere
in the repo. This is a documented target only, not shipped.
- **Uptime ping on `/health`** — `app/api/health/route.ts` exists and returns `{ ok, db, queue, ts }`
based on env presence checks; no external uptime monitor wired to it was found in this repo (that
would live outside this codebase regardless, e.g. an external pinger — unverified either way).
- **Worker/job health in admin** — `app/admin/jobs/page.tsx` exists as a page; this pass did not trace
whether it reads real job state or placeholder data (out of this doc's grounding scope — flagged for
whoever owns `docs/01-product.md`/admin-portal docs to verify).
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# 09 · Build plan
Phased, in dependency order. **Finish a phase to its acceptance criteria before the next.** Each phase = small, reviewable commits. Reconcile with existing code rather than rewriting wholesale.
> **Status callouts added 2026-07-19.** Each phase below now carries a `Status:` line, grep/read-verified
> against `main` this pass. These are conservative on purpose: a phase is only called **Done** when this
> pass found real, working code satisfying its Accept criteria; anything else is **Partial** (with the
> specific evidence and gap named) or **Not started**. No phase is upgraded to Done without a code
> citation. Where a referenced doc (e.g. `docs/design/...`) doesn't exist, that's flagged rather than
> silently worked around. See `docs/08-infrastructure.md` for the full env/security grounding these
> statuses draw on.
## Phase 0 — Foundation & repo
- Monorepo structure (`docs/08`). Migrate existing `src/orchestrator` + `src/workers` into `services/api`.
- Postgres schema + migrations (`docs/03`); `pgvector` enabled. `.env.example`.
- `docker-compose` up (postgres, redis, api, worker, nocodb, metabase, caddy). `/health` green.
- CI skeleton (lint/typecheck/build).
- **Accept:** `docker compose up` runs the whole stack locally; migrations apply; `/health` returns ok for db + queue.
- **Status: Partial.**
- Repo structure exists but diverged from the `apps/web`/`packages/shared` layout `docs/08` originally
sketched — it settled on `app/` (Next.js, repo root), `lib/`, `src/` (platform clients/services), and
`services/api/` (FastAPI). `docs/08-infrastructure.md` now documents the structure as-built.
- Migration to `services/api/orchestrator` + `services/api/workers` is **done** (verified: those
directories exist and contain `main.py`/`adaptive_router.py`/`pipeline.py`/etc.; no `src/orchestrator`
or `src/workers` remain at the old paths).
- Postgres schema is real: `sql/001_init.sql` (`CREATE EXTENSION vector`, `CREATE EXTENSION pgcrypto`,
17 tables incl. `orgs`, `users`, `orders`, `jobs`, `audit_log`, `bridge_provenance`, `db_grants`,
`payments`) + `sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql`.
**No `sql/002_*` or `sql/003_*` exists anywhere in this repo's history** — some other docs
(`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` etc.) cite a `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` that was never built;
see `docs/08-infrastructure.md`'s "Schema state" section.
- `.env.example` — **now exists and is merged to `main`** (BACKLOG P3-5: the
stale link to the unmerged `github.com/sax3l/0pt/pull/3` that used to sit
here has been removed — that PR has long since landed, `.env.example` is
a real, current, gitignore-exempted file at the repo root today).
- `infra/docker-compose.yml` and `infra/Caddyfile` are real, committed files (not sketches) covering
exactly the services listed. **This pass found no evidence they've ever actually been run** — no
CI, no deploy log, no reachable host checked. "File exists and looks correct" ≠ "verified to run";
treat the Accept criterion ("docker compose up runs... /health returns ok") as unverified.
- CI skeleton — **not built.** There is no `.github/workflows/` directory in this repo at all. `pnpm
lint`/`typecheck`/`test` exist as local scripts only.
## Phase 1 — Design system in code
- Tailwind + shadcn; `globals.css` (grain + reveal keyframes) and `useReveal` verbatim (`docs/05`).
- Build **DataArtifact** primitive (table/map/schema/chart/grid) and **ProvenanceBadge** (`docs/design` prompts 5.1, 2.11).
- **Accept:** a sample page renders mono tokens, a DataArtifact animates on scroll, reduced-motion respected, focus rings visible.
- **Status: Partial — real components exist; scroll-motion/reduced-motion/focus-ring behavior not
independently exercised this pass.**
- Tailwind + shadcn/radix stack: confirmed real in `package.json` (`tailwindcss`, `@radix-ui/*`,
`class-variance-authority`, `tailwind-merge`, `tailwindcss-animate`).
- `hooks/use-reveal.ts`, `components/data-artifact.tsx`, `components/provenance-badge.tsx` all exist
and are used across `app/katalog`, `app/kallor`, `app/bestall`, `app/order/[id]`, and most
`components/sections/*` files (grep-confirmed).
- `docs/design/0pt-v0-build-brief.md` and `docs/design/0pt-design-coverage-and-visuals.md` (the
"prompts 5.1, 2.11" this bullet references) **do not exist anywhere in this repo** — confirmed via
full-repo search; there is no `docs/design/` directory at all. `CLAUDE.md`'s own doc index has
already been corrected to flag this as a gap rather than list them as real. Treat any reference to
specific numbered "build-brief prompts" in this build plan as pointing at a doc that was never
written — not this file's scope to author that content.
- Reduced-motion handling, focus-ring visibility, and actual scroll-triggered animation behavior were
not executed/verified in this pass (no browser run performed) — code presence is confirmed, runtime
behavior is not.
## Phase 2 — Marketing + catalog (placeholder data)
- Landing components top-to-bottom (build-brief 2.1–2.10): Header, Hero, Philosophy, Catalog teaser, Engine, Visualisation gallery, Coverage, Editorial, Proof, Footer.
- Full **Catalog** page + **Dataset detail** + **Sourcing-map** page (coverage doc 5.4). Postgres full-text search.
- All with loading/empty/error states + mobile.
- **Accept:** marketing site + catalog browse work end-to-end on placeholder catalog rows; one continuous scroll reads well; DoD met per screen.
- **Status: Partial.**
- Landing section components are real: `components/sections/{hero,philosophy,gallery,editorial,
pricing,technology,testimonials,footer,featured-products,collection}-section.tsx` all exist.
- `app/katalog/page.tsx`, `app/katalog/[id]/page.tsx`, `app/kallor/page.tsx` all exist.
- **Postgres full-text search was not found** — grepped for `to_tsvector`/`websearch_to_tsquery`
across the whole repo, zero matches. Catalog browsing today reads from `lib/data.ts` placeholder
data, not a full-text query against Postgres. This Accept criterion's "catalog browse... on
placeholder catalog rows" half is plausible; the Postgres full-text search half is not built.
- Loading/empty/error states + mobile + DoD-per-screen were not independently audited screen-by-screen
this pass — `components/states.tsx` (`LoadingSkeleton`, `ErrorState`) exists and is imported widely,
which is evidence toward this but not a full verification.
## Phase 3 — Auth & portal shell
- Auth.js + Postgres adapter; sign in/up/verify/forgot. `orgs`/`users`.
- Portal shell + Dashboard ("Mina beställningar") with empty state.
- **Accept:** a user can sign up, land in an empty dashboard, sign out; routes protected.
- **Status: Not done — this is the most consequential gap in the whole repo, not a minor loose end.**
- **There is no Auth.js integration.** `lib/auth.ts` is a from-scratch, ~40-line HMAC-SHA256 session
scaffold (Web Crypto, no dependency) whose own comment states: "Production auth = Auth.js + Postgres
adapter + OAuth (docs/02) — wired once the database is provisioned." `app/api/auth/login/route.ts`
is a **dev-only** login gated by a shared `DEV_LOGIN_KEY`, not sign-up/verify/forgot.
- `orgs` and `users` tables exist in `sql/001_init.sql` (schema is ready), but nothing in the app
reads/writes them for real session-bound identity today.
- `app/portal/page.tsx` and sibling portal pages exist (shell is real), but routes are **not**
protected by any real session check tied to that schema.
- **Concretely, this means the tenant/org isolation several `0pt.*` API routes assume does not exist
yet.** `app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/route.ts`, `.../writes/route.ts`,
`app/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/route.ts`, `app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts`, and
`src/services/document-capture-service.ts` all read `tenant_id`/`project_id` straight from the
request body — anyone can claim any tenant. `app/api/orders/route.ts`'s own `GET` handler carries
the literal comment `// org scoping added with auth`. This is an open security gap, not a
two-tier design choice — see `docs/08-infrastructure.md`'s "Security & compliance" section for the
full list. **Do not build any doc or feature that assumes tenant-scoped auth already exists.**
## Phase 4 — Order lifecycle end-to-end (test mode)
- **Configurator** (2.12) wired to `POST /estimates` (real estimate math in FastAPI).
- **Deposit checkout** (2.13) → Stripe **test** Checkout → webhook → order `IN_PRODUCTION`.
- **Production tracker** (2.14) reading `GET /orders/{id}/events` (SSE) — pipeline may be **simulated** at this phase.
- **Validation & delivery** (2.15): tabs render from a sample delivery; **accept** → `POST /payments/release` (test) → `DELIVERED`; **revise** leaves escrow untouched.
- AI-assist (`POST /ai/parse`) prefilling the configurator.
- **Accept:** a full custom order can be configured, deposit paid (test), watched, validated, accepted, and "delivered" — state machine in `docs/01` traversed; escrow split correct.
- **Status: Partial — the payment/escrow spine is genuinely real; the SSE tracker is not.**
- `app/api/estimates/route.ts` exists.
- Deposit checkout is **real, working code**: `app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit/route.ts` calls
Stripe's Checkout Sessions API directly (not a stub) and `app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts` verifies
the webhook signature and advances order status via `setStatus`.
- `app/api/payments/[order_id]/release/route.ts` is also real: it enforces the escrow rule in code —
balance release is rejected with `409 not_accepted` unless `order.status === "accepted"` — matching
the "escrow split correct" accept criterion's intent.
- **`GET /api/orders/{id}/events` (SSE) does not exist.** Only `GET`/`PATCH /api/orders/{id}` were
found (`app/api/orders/[id]/route.ts`); no `/events` sub-route, and no `EventSource`/
`text/event-stream`/`ReadableStream` usage anywhere in `app/` (grep-verified). If a production
tracker is live today, it's polling `GET /api/orders/{id}`, not the SSE stream this bullet describes
— or it hasn't been built. Either way, the SSE contract as written is not implemented.
- `app/api/ai/parse/route.ts` is real: a genuine (non-fabricated) keyword/regex heuristic that
prefills a config object, with a documented fallback to `engineFetch("/ai/parse", ...)` when
`ENGINE_URL` is set. This one holds up as described.
## Phase 5 — Real data engine (Nordic slice)
- Compliant connectors first: **GLEIF + Brreg + Companies House** (verify access terms; record in `sources.yaml`). Remove any FlareSolverr/bypass path (`docs/06`).
- Pipeline stages produce real `dim_company` + `fact_financials` with `bridge_provenance`; QA threshold drops low-confidence rows.
- Production tracker now reflects **real** job metrics.
- **Accept:** a Nordic company dataset is produced for a real order, every field has provenance, quality report generated, level-0 fields shown honestly (not fabricated).
- **Status: Partial.**
- `services/api/sources/sources.yaml` and `connectors.py` are real: GLEIF, Brreg, Companies House,
PRH, and CVR are all registered, each with an explicit `licence: "... — VERIFY"` tag rather than an
assumed-clean claim — matches the "verify access terms" instruction.
- `services/api/workers/adaptive_router.py`'s own comment confirms: "There are NO bypass/stealth/
proxy-rotation tiers here, by design (CLAUDE.md §1)" — the FlareSolverr/bypass removal is done, at
least on this repo's `main` (see `docs/08-infrastructure.md`'s "Known open question" about the
diverged Gitea remote, which independently added such a stack on its own `main` — unresolved which
remote is canonical).
- `services/api/workers/pipeline.py` has a real, working confidence-threshold QA drop: `delivered =
[r for r in deduped if r["confidence"] >= threshold]`, plus an `avg_confidence` figure in its output.
This is a genuine, narrow QA mechanism inside the Python engine.
- **This is not the same thing as the "quality report" / quality-check layer once described in
`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`, `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`, and
`docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md`.** Those three docs used to cite `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`,
`src/services/quality-report-service.ts`, `src/types/quality-{check,report}.ts`, and
`src/data-platform/services/catalog-service.ts` as already-built and tested. **None of those files
has ever existed in this repo's git history, on any branch** — and all three docs have since been
corrected to say so explicitly (verified this pass), rather than repeating the original claim. So:
the narrow Python-side confidence filter is real; the broader TS/lakehouse "quality report" this
Accept criterion likely also intends is not built (see `docs/P0_DATASET_QUALITY_FLOW.md` for the
honest target spec). Whether `pipeline.py`'s `avg_confidence` output satisfies "quality report
generated" is a judgment call for whoever runs this phase — flagging rather than deciding it here.
- Whether an actual Nordic dataset has been produced end-to-end for a real order was not verified
this pass (would require running the stack).
## Phase 6 — Delivery surfaces & integrations
- Exports: CSV / Parquet / JSON via R2 presigned URLs.
- Embedded **NocoDB** ("Min data") and **Metabase** dashboards via signed URLs in mono chrome.
- Integrations: **FiveCRM push**, webhooks, Google Sheets.
- File **uploads** (Uppy → R2) for matching/enrichment.
- **Accept:** a delivered dataset is downloadable, viewable in embedded NocoDB + Metabase (no separate login), and pushable to FiveCRM; uploads work.
- **Status: Not done — this phase is UI-shell-only today.**
- CSV/Parquet/JSON exports via R2 presigned URLs: not found. `app/api/uploads/route.ts` (the closest
R2-touching code) is a `501` stub with a hardcoded `put_url: null` — no presign logic exists yet,
for uploads or exports.
- `components/embed.tsx` (`EmbeddedView`) is real — a sandboxed iframe shell — but the server-side
signed-URL generator for Metabase/NocoDB (`METABASE_SECRET_KEY`/`NOCODB_API_TOKEN`) that would feed
it a real `src` was not found anywhere in this pass.
- "FiveCRM" appears only as a **destination label string** in `lib/data.ts`, `lib/services.ts`,
`app/portal/integrationer/page.tsx` (explicitly described in that file's own comment as
"presentationella toggles" — i.e. presentational, not wired), and as one of several regex-matched
destination names in `app/api/ai/parse/route.ts`'s heuristic. **No actual FiveCRM API push exists.**
- `uppy` is not a dependency in `package.json` (checked directly) — the Uppy → R2 upload flow this
bullet describes has no corresponding package installed, let alone implemented.
## Phase 7 — Subscriptions / feeds
- `subscriptions`; recurring jobs (weekly/daily) delivering **deltas**; webhooks on change.
- Freshness monitoring; Resend emails (confirmation, "din data är klar", feedback).
- **Accept:** an order converts to a feed; a scheduled run produces a delta + fires a webhook + email.
- **Status: Partial — data layer real, scheduling and email are not.**
- `lib/subscriptions-store.ts` is real CRUD against the `subscriptions` table (with an in-memory
fallback when no DB is configured) — `createSubscription`/`listSubscriptions` genuinely insert/read.
- No recurring-job scheduler (cron, queue consumer producing deltas, etc.) was found on the TS side of
this repo. `services/api/workers/queue.py` exists on the Python side but this pass did not trace
whether it implements actual delta-producing scheduled runs — flagged as unverified rather than
assumed either way.
- **Resend is not wired at all** — grepped for `resend`/`Resend` across the whole repo, zero matches
outside `RESEND_API_KEY` being listed as an env var. No confirmation/"din data är klar"/feedback
email has been implemented.
## Phase 8 — Admin, hardening, compliance
- Admin: order queue + scope/quote + escrow release; **source registry & freshness** monitoring; worker/job monitoring; customer + catalog management.
- Customer **DB-access grant** flow (encrypted, read-only, time-boxed) + revoke.
- Security pass: RLS, presigned-only files, signed embeds, secret rotation, `audit_log` everywhere; **DPA** published; legal pages.
- Finalize all loading/empty/error states + mobile across the app.
- **Accept:** admin can run the business; DB-grant flow works and self-revokes; security checklist passes; DoD met app-wide.
- **Status: Partial — UI shell real, the security substance is not.**
- Admin pages exist: `app/admin/{page,jobs/page,sources/page,customers/page,verktyg/page}.tsx`. This
pass did not verify whether they read real backend data or placeholders.
- `sql/001_init.sql` defines `audit_log`, `db_grants`, and `payments` tables — schema is ready.
- **The DB-access grant flow is a stub, not a working feature.**
`app/api/connections/db-grant/route.ts` returns `501` without `GRANT_ENC_KEY`, and with it set
returns a hardcoded `201 { grant_id, status: "pending" }` — **no AES-GCM encryption, no read-only
validation, and no self-revoke logic exist in code today**, despite the route's own comment
describing that target behavior. See `docs/08-infrastructure.md`'s "Security & compliance" section.
- RLS enforcement, presigned-only files (blocked on the Phase 6 R2 gap above), signed embeds (blocked
on the Phase 6 NocoDB/Metabase gap above), and a published DPA were not found as implemented in this
pass. Treat the "security checklist passes" accept criterion as not met.
## Phase 9 — Launch
- Domain `0pt.app` (Vercel) + subdomains (api/data/dash via Caddy). Sentry + uptime live.
- Soft launch: Protosell internally + a handful of existing dealer relationships.
- **Accept:** a real external customer completes an order start→delivery in production; feedback loop running.
- **Status: Domain is live; soft-launch/customer criterion not verified.**
- **Verified this pass** (network check performed): `https://0pt.app` returns HTTP 200 and serves this
repo's own Next.js app (title "0pt — your data", SIAX branding); `GET /api/health` returns
`{"ok":true,"service":"0pt-web","db":"not_configured","queue":"not_configured",...}`, an exact shape
match for `app/api/health/route.ts`. README's "Live: https://0pt.app" is confirmed, and the response
confirms the live deployment has no `DATABASE_URL`/`REDIS_URL` set — see `docs/08-infrastructure.md`'s
"Hosting topology" section. This does not confirm which git remote/commit is deployed (see the
diverged-remotes note elsewhere in this doc), or that api/data/dash subdomains or Caddy are live —
only the root Vercel deployment was checked.
- **Sentry is not wired** — no `sentry` package in `package.json`, no Sentry config file anywhere in
the repo (grep-confirmed). `@vercel/analytics` **is** genuinely wired (`app/layout.tsx` renders
`<Analytics />`), which is a real but much smaller piece of the "Sentry + uptime live" bullet.
- No evidence either way on the soft-launch/external-customer criterion — out of this doc's ability to
verify from code alone.
---
## Working conventions (for Claude Code)
- Tech docs + identifiers **English**; UI copy **Swedish**.
- Conventional Commits; one concern per PR; keep diffs reviewable.
- No secrets in code; update `.env.example` when adding env. (`.env.example` itself currently lives on
`feature/0pt-env-example` / PR #3 — merge that first, or this instruction has nothing to update yet.)
- Add/extend tests for engine logic (estimate math, fusion/confidence, dedup) and API contract.
- When a source's access/licence is unclear, **verify and record in `sources.yaml`** before relying; if disallowed for bulk, route to licensed/partner or mark level 0 — never bypass, never fabricate.
- Touch the design tokens/motion only via `docs/05`; keep red ≤ once per screen; no photography.
- If anything here conflicts with existing code, **flag it** in the PR description and propose the reconciliation rather than guessing.
- **Two git remotes claim to be this repo** (`github.com/sax3l/0pt` and `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt`), and
they have independently diverged (see `CLAUDE.md`, `README.md`). Don't assume the checkout you're in
is the only copy, and don't silently pick one as canonical — that's Simon's decision, flag it if it
becomes relevant to the phase you're working on.
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# 10 · Lakehouse decision (pointer)
This doc is a **pointer**, not a new architecture. It records an ecosystem-wide decision made
outside this repo and states what it means for 0pt specifically. It does not change anything in
`docs/02-architecture.md` or `docs/03-data-model.md` today — Postgres remains the backbone for
0pt's platform tables and current data entities (`docs/03`). Read this alongside those docs, not
instead of them.
> **Status update.** Since this pointer doc was first written, a follow-up implementation pass
> turned most of 0pt's side of this plan into real TypeScript — see
> `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`'s "what the implementation pass closed" section and
> `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` for the current, corrected status. Two things to know before
> reading the rest of this doc: (1) that write-path code is **real and unit-tested against a mock
> ST0RE client, not verified against a running ST0RE deployment**; (2) an earlier version of
> `docs/11` and `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` also claimed 0pt's data-quality/QA stage had a
> dedicated, tested `quality-check-service.ts`/`quality-report-service.ts` implementation — that
> claim was **fabricated**. `git log --all` for those paths (and `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql`,
> `sql/003_*.sql`) returns zero commits, on any branch, ever. Both docs have been corrected; see
> them for the full account. This doc's own references to "QA" below point only to the *spec* in
> `docs/06-data-engine.md`, not to any implemented service.
## The decision (made elsewhere — do not re-litigate here)
**Apache Iceberg is the canonical SIAX lakehouse table format**, per **ADR-0030**, authored in the
`n0d` (Compute OS) repo (a dated copy also lives in `cl0ud`'s `docs/architecture/`, since the
boundary audit that motivated it originated in n0d but the ADR itself is recorded as SIAX-wide;
both copies describe the same accepted decision — verified by reading both this pass). Delta Lake
is explicitly rejected as the canonical P0/P1 format across SIAX Technology; it may only ever be
used later as an import/export bridge, never as the format 0pt writes natively.
Rationale (from the ecosystem ADR, summarized): SIAX needs one vendor-neutral, multi-engine,
catalog-first open table format for the MinIO/ST0RE lakehouse, because several products need to
share the same tables — ST0RE owns catalog/metadata, 0pt owns dataset writes, N0D owns
query/compaction execution, AUD0 owns lineage, API0 owns docs — and because future reads must
work from many engines (Trino/Spark/Flink/DuckDB/etc.), not one.
## Cross-product ownership split (context, not 0pt's to change)
| Product | Owns |
|---|---|
| ST0RE | Table/catalog/artifact metadata (the Iceberg catalog + table registry) |
| **0pt** | **Dataset production and writes into Iceberg tables**, through ST0RE's table registry |
| N0D | Query/compaction/maintenance execution only |
| AUD0 | Lineage |
| CL0UD | Policy |
This table condenses ADR-0030 §2.1/§2.4's ownership split for 0pt's purposes — it is a paraphrase,
not a verbatim quote (corrected this verification pass; re-checked against `cl0ud`'s copy of the
ADR). The ADR's §2.4 table also names **INF0** (model registry/experiment tracking, MLflow as an
adapter) and its §2.1 also names **API0** (schema/docs exposure); both rows are omitted here
because neither changes anything for 0pt specifically. One paraphrase is deliberate, not
accidental: the ADR's own 0pt row reads "Dataset production, **quality**, data contracts, writes"
— the word "quality" is intentionally dropped from this table's 0pt row above, because 0pt's
quality/QA stage is not yet built (see the status callout at the top of this doc). See ADR-0030
§2.4 directly (`cl0ud`'s or `n0d`'s copy) for its own exact wording of every row.
## What this means for 0pt
0pt is the **write-path owner** for the datasets it produces: 0pt runs sourcing → extraction →
structuring → enrichment → QA (`docs/06-data-engine.md` — a design spec, not yet a built service;
see the status callout above) as it does today, and writes the resulting datasets as **Iceberg
tables through ST0RE's table registry**. 0pt does **not** talk to N0D's catalog or any lakehouse
storage directly; it goes through ST0RE.
ST0RE's table registry is real, committed code (`sax3l/st0re`, `/v1/st0re/lakehouse/*`), and 0pt
has a real client and services that target it — `src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts`,
`src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts`, `src/services/dataset-iceberg-mapping-service.ts`. None of
this has been exercised against a *running* ST0RE instance from this repo: every test to date runs
against that client's deterministic in-memory mock (no `ST0RE_URL` was reachable from this
environment). Treat "0pt writes Iceberg tables through ST0RE" as **real code, mock-tested, not
live-verified** — see `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`'s "Verification status" section for the full
detail, including what is and isn't wired end-to-end.
This does not replace Postgres as the platform backbone (orders, users, jobs, billing — `docs/03`
— stay exactly as they are). It is additive: dataset **output** (the delivered data product, today
exported as CSV/Parquet/JSON per `docs/04-api.md`) gains an additional, canonical Iceberg
write-path. Concrete to-dos, current build status, and required schema/event names are in
`docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`.
## Also relevant: the `sourceRatePolicy` deprecation in N0D
The same ecosystem audit that produced ADR-0030 found N0D's `ComputePolicy` type carrying a
`sourceRatePolicy` field (per-source-domain crawl rate limits, e.g.
`{'allabolag.se': 1, 'ratsit.se': 1}`) hardcoded into N0D's policy defaults. That is 0pt's own
crawl-domain knowledge — it has been deprecated in N0D (the field is still present on the type for
backward compatibility, but N0D's own boundary-repair tests assert it now has **zero effect** on
any allow/deny decision; verified by reading `n0d`'s `src/policy.ts` and
`src/__tests__/boundary-repair.test.ts` this pass). 0pt does not rely on N0D for source-rate/
crawl-compliance policy; 0pt already owns the sourcing chain and its rate limits today
(`sources.yaml`, `docs/06-data-engine.md` §`rate_limit`), and has since formalized its own model —
`src/services/source-rate-policy-service.ts`, real and tested, see `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`
and `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`.
## Non-goals of this doc
- Does not itself implement Iceberg writes — see `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md` /
`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` for what a later pass actually built (real, mock-tested code;
not live-verified; data-quality/QA enforcement specifically is **not built** — see the status
callout above).
- Does not modify `docs/03-data-model.md`'s Postgres schema.
- Does not require ST0RE's table registry to exist — as of this pass it does exist as real,
committed code in `sax3l/st0re`, though this repo has not confirmed it live/reachable. This doc
remains the pointer; `docs/11` lists what's still blocked on a *live, reachable* ST0RE vs. what
0pt has already built against the mock.
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# 11 · Lakehouse write plan (0pt's to-do list)
Concrete follow-up to `docs/10-lakehouse-decision.md`. This is a planning doc for a **future**
implementation session — it names the schemas/events precisely so that session doesn't have to
guess, but it does not build the full pipeline today.
> **Correction (documentation-accuracy pass).** This doc previously stated that item 4 (quality
> rules staying in 0pt) was "already true today" and, in the update section below, that
> `src/services/quality-check-service.ts` and `src/services/quality-report-service.ts` were real,
> tested files that a later pass left "untouched." **That was fabricated.** `git log --all` for
> `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`, `src/services/quality-report-service.ts`,
> `src/types/quality-check.ts`, `src/types/quality-report.ts`, `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql`,
> and `sql/003_*.sql` returns zero commits, on any branch (`main`, `feature/0pt-env-example`,
> `ci/add-quality-gate`), ever — these files have never existed in this repository. 0pt's
> data-quality/QA stage is a **design spec only** (`docs/06-data-engine.md` §QA — Great
> Expectations-style checks, intended to run inside the Python worker pipeline in `services/api`)
> and is **not yet implemented** as any dedicated service in this repo, TypeScript or otherwise.
> This is a real, currently open build gap, not a doc typo — see item 4's corrected entry below
> and `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`'s "Data quality: not yet built" section for the full
> account. Everything else on this page (items 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8) was independently re-verified
> against the actual service/client/test files this pass and remains accurate.
## 2026-07-13 update: live verification + field-level gap closure
A later pass live-verified the write path against `api.st0re.siax.io` (real namespace/table/snapshot
rows created), added the `namespace_id`/`mapped_at` fields the task spec names literally, and fixed
three real ST0RE contract bugs the code below had (missing tenant/actor headers, an invalid
`datasetId` FK reference, and a missing lookup-or-create for namespaces). Full detail in
`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`'s "2026-07-13 update" section -- read that before this section
below, which is the original (2026-07-12) status record and is otherwise unchanged.
## 2026-07-12 update: what the 0pt write-boundary implementation pass closed
This pass turned most items below into real, tested code. Full detail in
`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`; short version (re-verified this documentation-accuracy pass
against the actual files):
- Item 2 (`0pt.dataset_iceberg_mapping`): CLOSED as real code -- `src/types/dataset-iceberg-mapping.ts`,
`src/services/dataset-iceberg-mapping-service.ts`, `packages/schemas/0pt.dataset_iceberg_mapping.schema.json`,
`sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` (`opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings`), tested in
`tests/p0/dataset-iceberg-mapping.test.ts`. Field names differ slightly from the "suggested shape"
above (`dataset_iceberg_mapping_id` as PK, `iceberg_table_id` instead of `iceberg_table_ref`,
`mapping_status` instead of bare `entity_type`/`market`) -- reconciled against ST0RE's REAL
shipped `IcebergTable.tableId` shape (sax3l/st0re, not the "future" registry this doc assumed) and
against this session's own task spec; see the boundary doc for the full reconciliation note.
- Item 3 (first test dataset write): CLOSED against ST0RE's now-real (but not live-verified from
this environment) `/v1/st0re/lakehouse/*` API -- `src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts`,
`src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts`, proven in `tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.test.ts`
against that client's mock implementation (same mock/HTTP convention as `cl0ud-client.ts` etc).
NOT verified against a running ST0RE deployment in this pass -- see the boundary doc's
"Verification status" section and the `it.todo` in that test file.
- Item 4 (quality rules stay in 0pt): **NOT BUILT.** `src/services/quality-check-service.ts` and
`src/services/quality-report-service.ts` do not exist and never have (see the correction callout
above) -- there was nothing for this pass to leave "untouched." The *intent* (0pt owns QA logic,
N0D never does) is still the correct target and nothing since has contradicted it, but it is not
yet backed by any code. This is an open gap for a future implementation session, not a closed
item.
- Item 5 (`0pt.source_rate_policy`): CLOSED as real code -- `src/types/source-rate-policy.ts`,
`src/services/source-rate-policy-service.ts`, `packages/schemas/0pt.source_rate_policy.schema.json`,
`sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` (`opt_source_rate_policies`), tested in
`tests/p0/source-rate-policy.test.ts`. Kept `requests_per_second`-style fields (as `domain`/
`robots_ok`/`access`) as OPTIONAL alongside the task-spec's primary `rate_limit_per_minute`/
`crawl_budget`/`compliance_notes` fields -- both specs for this same contract are satisfied on one
row, not two competing shapes.
- Item 6 (four AUD0 events): CLOSED for all four names -- `0pt.dataset_iceberg_table_mapped` and
`0pt.iceberg_write_requested`/`0pt.iceberg_snapshot_created` emit from
`src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts` and `dataset-iceberg-mapping-service.ts`;
`0pt.source_rate_policy_created` emits from `src/services/source-rate-policy-service.ts`. All via
the existing `Aud0Client` (mock/no-op by default, same as every other AUD0 emission in this repo --
AUD0 itself still has no live ingestion endpoint).
- Item 7 (N0D heavy-write requests): CLOSED as real code -- `IcebergWriteService.requestIcebergWrite`
requests an N0D job (`0pt.iceberg_write_job`) only when `heavy: true`, never executes in-process;
tested in `tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.test.ts`.
- Item 8 (no lakehouse state outside ST0RE): CLOSED as a design property, not just a statement --
`IcebergWriteService` and `DatasetIcebergMappingService` hold zero table/snapshot fields; the only
thing 0pt persists is the mapping's `iceberg_table_id` reference. See the boundary doc.
- Item 1 (Iceberg canonical, Delta rejected): CONFIRMED, unchanged from `docs/10` --
`IcebergWriteService.mapDatasetToIcebergTable` defaults `table_format` to `"iceberg"`.
## To-do list
1. **Use Apache Iceberg as the canonical write format** for datasets 0pt produces, per
`docs/10-lakehouse-decision.md` / ADR-0030 (`n0d` repo). Do not adopt Delta Lake as a native
write target; Delta is import/export-bridge-only, ecosystem-wide.
2. **Add a `dataset_to_iceberg_table` mapping.** Every 0pt dataset (today: rows keyed by
`entity_type` + market in `dim_company` / `fact_financials` / `dim_contact` / `dim_ubo` /
`dim_vehicle`, per `docs/03-data-model.md`, or a catalog product / order delivery) needs a
stable mapping to the Iceberg table(s) it is written to. Schema name:
**`0pt.dataset_iceberg_mapping.schema.v1`**. Suggested shape (to be finalized by the
implementation session, following the `snake_case` / `uuid` PK / `created_at`+`updated_at`
conventions in `docs/03-data-model.md`):
- `dataset_id` — 0pt-side identifier (catalog product id, or `order_id`+`item_id` for custom
orders).
- `iceberg_table_ref` — fully-qualified table identifier as registered in ST0RE's table
registry (catalog.namespace.table).
- `entity_type`, `market` — for routing/filtering.
- `mapped_at`, `mapped_by`.
3. **Write a first test dataset to Iceberg** through ST0RE's table registry. *(Status: CLOSED per
the update above — `tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.test.ts` exercises exactly this pilot flow,
but only against `St0reLakehouseClient`'s mock; not yet run against a live ST0RE. Treat this
item as "code exists," not "validated end-to-end against a real deployment.")* Original plan:
pick a small, low-risk dataset (e.g. a single-market `dim_company` slice) as the pilot, to
validate the write path end-to-end before any production order relies on it — that live-ST0RE
validation still has not happened.
4. **Keep data quality rules in 0pt.** This is the correct *target* per the `n0d` audit, and
remains a spec-level design in `docs/06-data-engine.md` §QA (Great Expectations-style checks
for validity, completeness, freshness, uniqueness, corroboration), but **it is not built** —
there is no dedicated quality-check/quality-report service in this repo as of this writing (see
the correction callout at the top of this doc). Once it is built, the design intent stands:
quality logic must be caller-supplied logic that 0pt owns and hands to whichever engine executes
a job; it must not become logic owned or embedded by N0D, even after N0D executes heavy
writes/compactions on 0pt's behalf (see item 7). This item stays open until that service exists
and is tested.
5. **Keep source-rate/crawl-compliance policy logic in 0pt** — build a real model here, do not
rely on N0D for this. *(Status: CLOSED per the update above — `SourceRatePolicyService` is real
and tested.)* Context: N0D's `ComputePolicy.sourceRatePolicy` (per-domain crawl rate limits) has
been deprecated in N0D as part of the same audit (the field is still present on N0D's type for
backward compatibility, but N0D's own boundary-repair tests assert it now has zero effect on any
allow/deny decision — verified by reading `n0d`'s `src/policy.ts` and
`src/__tests__/boundary-repair.test.ts`) — that field never belonged to N0D. 0pt already has the
raw material for this in `sources.yaml`
(`docs/06-data-engine.md`, the `rate_limit` / `robots_ok` fields per source), but that's
currently free-text/per-entry, not a first-class policy object. Formalize it as
**`0pt.source_rate_policy.schema.v1`**. Suggested shape, following the same conventions:
- `source_id` — references `dim_source(source_id)` (`docs/03-data-model.md`).
- `domain` — the crawl-target domain (e.g. `allabolag.se`).
- `requests_per_second` / `requests_per_minute` — the compliance-derived rate limit.
- `robots_ok` — whether `robots.txt` permits the access pattern.
- `access` — mirrors `dim_source.access` (`api`|`bulk`|`authorized_web`|`licensed`).
- `created_at`, `updated_at`, `created_by`.
This model belongs entirely to 0pt's sourcing/compliance domain (`docs/06`) — it must not be
reintroduced into N0D, CL0UD, or any other product's policy defaults.
6. **Emit lineage for dataset → Iceberg table → snapshot**, to AUD0. *(Status: CLOSED per the
update above — all four events below are wired and fire through the existing `Aud0Client`,
which is mock/no-op by default because AUD0 still has no live ingestion endpoint. This did not
mean standing up a bespoke lineage sink prematurely — it means calling the same shared,
already-mocked AUD0 client interface every other 0pt event in this repo already calls.)* Plan
for three events, emitted by 0pt at the corresponding step:
- **`0pt.dataset_iceberg_table_mapped`** — fired when step 2's mapping is created/updated.
- **`0pt.iceberg_write_requested`** — fired when 0pt requests a write of a produced dataset
into its mapped Iceberg table (whether executed by 0pt directly or via an N0D job, per
item 7).
- **`0pt.iceberg_snapshot_created`** — fired once the write lands and a new Iceberg snapshot
exists for the table, carrying enough detail (table ref, snapshot id, row count, dataset id,
order id if applicable) for AUD0 to build lineage from source → dataset → Iceberg
snapshot.
- **`0pt.source_rate_policy_created`** — fired when a new `0pt.source_rate_policy.schema.v1`
record is created (or materially updated), so AUD0/CL0UD have an evented trail of 0pt's
crawl-compliance posture without needing to poll 0pt's DB.
7. **Request N0D jobs for heavy writes/compactions if/when needed, rather than 0pt executing
them itself.** *(Status: CLOSED per the update above — `IcebergWriteService.requestIcebergWrite`
requests an N0D job only when `heavy: true`, tested.)* 0pt produces and owns the dataset; if a
write or compaction is heavy enough to warrant dedicated compute (large backfills, table
maintenance), 0pt should submit that as a job request to N0D's execution layer rather than
running it in-process in `services/api` workers. N0D executes; it does not own the data, the
schema, or the decision of *what* to write.
8. **Do not persist lakehouse table state outside ST0RE.** *(Status: CLOSED as a design property
per the update above — `IcebergWriteService`/`DatasetIcebergMappingService` hold zero table or
snapshot state; the only thing 0pt persists is a reference `iceberg_table_id`.)* ST0RE's table
registry now exists as real code (not yet confirmed live/reachable from this repo). 0pt must not
stand up a parallel catalog/metadata store of its own (that would repeat the exact mistake this
plan is repairing: N0D building its own Iceberg catalog because nothing else had one yet).
## Required schema names (for the future implementation session)
- `0pt.dataset_iceberg_mapping.schema.v1`
- `0pt.source_rate_policy.schema.v1`
## Required future event names (for the future implementation session)
- `0pt.dataset_iceberg_table_mapped`
- `0pt.iceberg_write_requested`
- `0pt.iceberg_snapshot_created`
- `0pt.source_rate_policy_created`
## Sequencing / dependencies
*(Status note: this section described the original plan's dependencies. As of the 2026-07-12
update above, items 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 are built — mock-tested, not live-verified. Item 4
(data-quality/QA service) is the one item that remains genuinely not-started; see the correction
callout at the top of this doc. The dependency shape below is kept for the record and because
"mock-tested" is not the same as "the dependency is resolved" — see each item's status note above
for what's still actually pending.)*
- Items 2, 4, 5 have no hard dependency on another product and can be defined/built inside 0pt —
2 and 5 now are; 4 (the QA service) still is not.
- Items 1, 3, 8 depended on **ST0RE's table registry** existing. It now exists as real code in
`sax3l/st0re`; what remains outstanding is a *live, reachable* `ST0RE_URL` to verify against —
no code path in this repo reads `ST0RE_URL` from the environment automatically (same as
`CL0UD_URL`/`N0D_URL`/`AUD0_URL` — none of the platform clients have an env fallback wired; a
base URL must be passed in explicitly via each service's constructor options). Wiring `ST0RE_URL`
alone would not be enough, either: `sax3l/st0re`'s current `main` enforces `X-Tenant-Id`/
`X-Actor-Id` headers on the `getTable`/`createSnapshot` routes this write path calls, and this
repo's `St0reLakehouseClient` does not send them yet — see `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`'s
"Real code, not live-verified" section for the full account (found during this verification pass).
- Item 6 depended on **AUD0** existing as a real evented product; it still does not have a live
ingestion endpoint, so the four events fire through `Aud0Client`'s mock/no-op path, same as every
other AUD0 emission in this repo.
- Item 7 assumes N0D's job-request surface (see `n0d` repo) is reachable from 0pt's orchestrator;
`IcebergWriteService` calls `N0dClient.createJob`, which — like the other platform clients — has
no live `N0D_URL` wired from this repo's environment either.
## Explicitly out of scope for 0pt (do not build here)
- An Iceberg catalog implementation, or any direct MinIO/Iceberg client code, ahead of ST0RE's
registry existing — that repeats the `n0d` mistake this plan is repairing.
- Query, compaction, or table-maintenance execution — that is N0D's job.
- A lineage UI or lineage storage — that is AUD0's job; 0pt only emits the events above.
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# 12 · Edge-native P0 capability API (Next.js / TypeScript)
This doc did not exist before this pass. It covers the **edge-native TypeScript API surface** — Next.js Route Handlers under `app/api/0pt/*`, plus `app/api/screen/route.ts` and `app/api/ai/parse/route.ts` — as a contract distinct from `docs/04-api.md`'s FastAPI engine (`services/api/orchestrator/main.py`, runs on a VPS). Everything here runs on Vercel. The two layers are **not** the same service, and as of this pass are only partially wired together (`docs/04-api.md` documents one confirmed case where the edge layer calls an engine route that doesn't exist).
Every route below was read directly from source this pass (`app/api/0pt/**/route.ts`, `app/api/screen/route.ts`, `app/api/ai/parse/route.ts`, and their backing `src/services/*.ts` / `src/types/*.ts`). Where a claim below is about *runtime behavior* rather than just the shape of the code (e.g. "this call always fails"), it's derived by tracing the actual code path, not by running it — flagged as such.
## Capability-registry status (verified against `packages/capability-registry/src/registry.ts` in sax3l/cl0ud)
14 distinct `0pt.*` capabilities are registered today. **Every single one has `surfaces` containing only `'api'`** (plus `'job'` for the two heaviest writes), and **`mcpEnabled`/`cliEnabled` are `false` on all 14, with no exception.** Any doc, comment, or assumption that a `siax 0pt ...` CLI or an MCP tool for 0pt already exists is describing a *target*, not current reality.
| Capability | Surfaces | Route(s) below | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| `0pt.query_source` | `api` | `POST /api/0pt/sources/{sourceId}/query` | riskLevel L2, piiLevel high |
| `0pt.document_ocr` | `api` | `POST/GET /api/0pt/documents/capture`, `POST/GET /api/0pt/documents/{documentId}/extraction` | riskLevel L2, piiLevel high |
| `0pt.write_external_record` | `job` **(not `api`)** | none — no HTTP route exists | see "Capabilities with no route" below |
| `0pt.lakehouse_mapping_manage` | `api` | `POST/GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings`, `GET .../{mappingId}` | riskLevel L2 |
| `0pt.lakehouse_write` | `api`, `job` | `POST /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/{mappingId}/writes` | riskLevel L3 |
| `0pt.source_rate_policy_manage` | `api` | `POST/GET /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies`, `GET .../{id}` | riskLevel L1 |
| `0pt.screen_sanctions` | `api` | `GET /api/screen` | riskLevel L2 |
| `0pt.write_iceberg_table` | `api`, `job` | (invoked internally by `0pt.lakehouse_mapping_manage`/`0pt.lakehouse_write` routes via `IcebergWriteService`) | riskLevel L3, piiLevel high |
| `0pt.estimate_compute`, `0pt.vehicle_lookup`, `0pt.catalog_list`, `0pt.source_registry_list`, `0pt.order_create`, `0pt.order_payment` | `api` | `app/api/estimates`, `app/api/vehicles`, `app/api/catalog`, `app/api/sources`, `app/api/orders`, `app/api/payments/*` | **not** under `app/api/0pt/` — out of this doc's assigned scope, not read in detail this pass |
`POST /api/ai/parse` has **no entry at all** in the capability registry (grep-verified: no `ai/parse` or `ai_parse` or `ai.parse` string anywhere in `registry.ts`). It is real, working code, but sits entirely outside the capability model — no declared risk level, no audit requirement, no policy gate.
## Routes
### `0pt.document_ocr` — document capture + extraction
**`POST /api/0pt/documents/capture`** — `app/api/0pt/documents/capture/route.ts` → `DocumentCaptureService.captureFromMailbox`
```
body: {
mailbox: { tenant_id, client_id, client_secret, mailbox_address, folder }, -- Microsoft Graph / Entra creds for the mailbox itself
since_iso?, top?, max_pages?,
tenant_id, project_id, actor_id, correlation_id -- SIAX platform scoping (unrelated to mailbox.tenant_id above)
}
-> 201 { scanned_messages, captured_documents: DocumentRecord[], errors: string[] }
-> 400 { error } on missing/invalid mailbox creds or missing tenant_id/project_id/actor_id
```
Note the naming collision: `body.mailbox.tenant_id` is the **Microsoft 365 / Entra tenant** the mailbox lives in; `body.tenant_id` is the **SIAX platform tenant**. Same field name, two unrelated identifiers, both required, both plain strings in the request body.
Polls the mailbox via Microsoft Graph (app-only), downloads PDF attachments, writes bytes to `LocalBlobStore` (`src/adapters/local-blob-store.ts` — an explicitly-marked **interim local-disk store**, because `st0re-client.ts` only registers artifact *metadata* today and has no real bytes-upload endpoint yet), registers the artifact with ST0RE (mock client — see "Mock-only platform clients" below), and enqueues an N0D job placeholder for extraction.
**`GET /api/0pt/documents/capture`** — same file → `DocumentCaptureService.listDocuments`
```
query: ?tenant_id=&project_id= (both optional filters)
-> 200 DocumentRecord[]
```
**`POST /api/0pt/documents/{documentId}/extraction`** — `app/api/0pt/documents/[documentId]/extraction/route.ts` → `DocumentExtractionService.extractDocument`
```
body: { tenant_id, project_id, actor_id, correlation_id, model_id }
-> 201 DocumentExtractionRecord
-> 501 { error } if Document Intelligence is not configured (missing DOC_INTELLIGENCE_ENDPOINT/DOC_INTELLIGENCE_KEY) — "refusing to fabricate a result"
-> 403 { error } if CL0UD policy denies
-> 409 { error } if CL0UD policy requires approval
-> 404 { error } if the document doesn't exist
-> 400 { error } for any other failure (e.g. missing model_id)
```
Corrected in `fix/0pt-full-bug-hunt` (PR #5, merged separately): previously every one of the above collapsed into a blanket 400, which made "not configured" indistinguishable from "bad request" from the caller's side. Now status-mapped, matching the convention already used by `app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts`.
Every field in the response is evidence-based: a field is only populated when Azure Document Intelligence actually returned it, always carrying DI's own confidence; not-found fields are `{value: null, confidence: ..., found: false}`, never guessed. This is enforced twice (adapter + service layer) per the file's own doc comment.
**`GET /api/0pt/documents/{documentId}/extraction`** — same file → `DocumentExtractionService.listExtractionsForDocument`
```
-> 200 DocumentExtractionRecord[]
-> 404 { error } on any thrown error (including errors unrelated to "not found" — the route maps every exception here to 404)
```
**This pair actually works end-to-end**, unlike the routes below — `documentCaptureService` and `documentExtractionService` are both exported as **module-level singletons** (`src/services/document-capture-service.ts` / `document-extraction-service.ts`) specifically so the extraction route can see documents the capture route created in the same process. This is the one place in `app/api/0pt/*` that got the shared-instance pattern right.
### `0pt.lakehouse_mapping_manage` / `0pt.lakehouse_write` — Iceberg write path
**`POST /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings`** — `app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/route.ts` → `IcebergWriteService.mapDatasetToIcebergTable`
```
body: { tenant_id, project_id, dataset_id, dataset_iceberg_mapping_id, namespace, table_name, storage_uri, catalog_ref, table_format?, actor_id, correlation_id }
-> 201 { mapping: DatasetIcebergMapping, iceberg_table_id, policy_decision_id }
-> 400 { error }
```
**`GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings`** — same file → `DatasetIcebergMappingService.listMappings`
```
query: ?tenant_id=&project_id=&dataset_id=
-> 200 DatasetIcebergMapping[]
```
**`GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/{mappingId}`** — separate file, `.../[mappingId]/route.ts` → `DatasetIcebergMappingService.getMapping`
```
-> 200 DatasetIcebergMapping
-> 404 { error }
```
**`POST /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/{mappingId}/writes`** — separate file, `.../[mappingId]/writes/route.ts` → `IcebergWriteService.requestIcebergWrite`
```
body: { actor_id, correlation_id, snapshot_type?, schema_version, manifest_uri, record_count?, size_bytes?, heavy? }
-> 202 { snapshot_id, iceberg_table_id, policy_decision_id, n0d_job_id? }
-> 400 { error }
```
> **Confirmed this pass — the POST above still always fails, though one of its two root causes is now fixed:**
> `mapDatasetToIcebergTable`'s first line is `await this.datasetService.getDataset(input.dataset_id)`, which throws `Dataset {id} not found` unless the dataset was already registered. `DatasetService.registerDataset` is **never called from any route in this repo** (grep-verified across `app/` and `src/`) — there is no `POST /api/0pt/datasets` route, despite `app/api/0pt/route.ts`'s own index claiming `/api/0pt/datasets` exists (it doesn't — see "The `/api/0pt` index is wrong" below). So **every call to `POST /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings` throws `Dataset {id} not found`, unconditionally, regardless of input**, because no HTTP path can ever get a dataset into the registry first. This half is still open — whether to add `POST /api/0pt/datasets`/`POST /api/0pt/sources` routes is a scope decision, not a mechanical fix.
>
> **Fixed in `fix/0pt-full-bug-hunt` (PR #5, merged separately):** the three route files above previously each constructed their own separate instance of the relevant service — `.../[mappingId]/route.ts` had a second, independent `DatasetIcebergMappingService`, and `.../[mappingId]/writes/route.ts` had a third `IcebergWriteService` with its own fresh internal `DatasetIcebergMappingService`, so a mapping created via `POST /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings` was invisible to both sibling routes even setting the dataset-registration issue aside. All three route files now import shared `datasetService`/`mappingService`/`writeService` singletons from `src/services/lakehouse-mapping-registry.ts` instead. This alone does not make the write path succeed end-to-end — the dataset-registration gap above still blocks it — but it removes a second, independent failure mode.
### `0pt.source_rate_policy_manage` — source rate policies
**`POST /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies`** — `app/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/route.ts` → `SourceRatePolicyService.createSourceRatePolicy`
```
body: CreateSourceRatePolicyInput { source_rate_policy_id, tenant_id, project_id, source_id, rate_limit_per_minute, crawl_budget, compliance_notes?, domain?, robots_ok?, access?, status?, correlation_id?, created_by? }
-> 201 SourceRatePolicy
-> 400 { error }
```
**`GET /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies`** — same file → `SourceRatePolicyService.listSourceRatePolicies`
```
query: ?tenant_id=&project_id=&source_id=
-> 200 SourceRatePolicy[]
```
**`GET /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/{sourceRatePolicyId}`** — separate file → `SourceRatePolicyService.getSourceRatePolicy`
```
-> 200 SourceRatePolicy
-> 404 { error }
```
> **Confirmed this pass — the POST above always fails too, same root cause as lakehouse mappings:** `createSourceRatePolicy` checks `sourceService.getSource(input.source_id)` before creating the policy, and throws `Source {id} not found` otherwise. `SourceService.createSource` is **never called from any route in this repo** — there is no `POST /api/0pt/sources` route (see next section). **Every call to `POST /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies` throws `Source {id} not found`, unconditionally.** The `.../{sourceRatePolicyId}` GET route also constructs its own separate `SourceRatePolicyService` instance, independent of `.../rate-policies/route.ts`'s — so even a hypothetically-successful create wouldn't be visible there either.
### `0pt.query_source` — bounded synchronous query
**`POST /api/0pt/sources/{sourceId}/query`** — `app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts` → `SourceQueryService.querySource`
```
body: { query (required, non-empty string), params?, tenant_id (required), project_id (required), actor_id?, correlation_id?, max_rows?, timeout_ms?, connection_config (required — FabricOneLakeConnectionConfig: {credentials:{tenantId,clientId,clientSecret}, sqlEndpoint, database, scope?, requestTimeoutMs?}) }
-> 200 { source_id, rows, row_count, truncated, duration_ms, bounds:{max_rows,timeout_ms} }
-> 400 { error } (missing query/tenant_id/project_id/connection_config)
-> 404 { error } (source not found)
-> 422 { error } (SourceQueryUnsupportedError — wrong source_type or adapter_id)
-> 504 { error } (SourceQueryTimeoutError)
```
The route's **own inline comment already documents the in-memory-isolation gap** for this route: *"a source registered via `POST /api/0pt/sources` will not be resolvable here until `SourceService` is backed by shared persistence."*
> **Two things worth adding to what that comment says:**
> 1. **There is no `POST /api/0pt/sources` route in this repo at all.** The comment describes a route that does not exist as a file anywhere under `app/api/` (verified — only `sources/rate-policies*` and `sources/[sourceId]/query` exist under `app/api/0pt/sources/`; the *non*-`0pt`-prefixed `app/api/sources/route.ts` is a completely different, `GET`-only, hardcoded 9-entry list — the `dim_source` transparency-moat catalog described in `docs/03-data-model.md` and `docs/04-api.md`, not a per-tenant `Source` registry). So this isn't "not yet resolvable across processes" — it's "there is currently no way, via any HTTP endpoint, to create a `Source` at all." `SourceService.createSource` is only ever called from tests.
> 2. Even with a `Source` registered directly in code, the only supported adapter (`adapter_id: "fabric_onelake_sql"`) depends on the `mssql` npm package, which **is not in `package.json`** as of this pass (`src/adapters/fabric-onelake-adapter.ts`'s own header comment: deliberately not added yet to avoid colliding with a separate in-flight session's `package.json` changes). `query()` throws a clear, explicit error until `mssql` is installed — by design, not silently.
>
> Net effect: **`POST /api/0pt/sources/{sourceId}/query` cannot succeed against any HTTP-only workflow today**, for two independent, stacked reasons — no way to register a `Source`, and no query driver installed even if one existed.
### `0pt.write_external_record` — no route exists
`src/services/external-writeback-service.ts` is real, tested TypeScript (`tests/p0/external-writeback-service.test.ts`) implementing "POST a validated, already-approved structured record to a registered external-system adapter" (worked example: Odoo Vendor Bill via `src/adapters/odoo-bills-adapter.ts`). The capability registry itself documents this plainly: `surfaces: ['job']`, `apiEnabled: false`, with a comment noting it's "invoked today only via direct import, not yet wired to a live surface." There is no `app/api/0pt/*` route for it. Not part of this doc's route list because there is no route to document.
### The `/api/0pt` index is materially wrong
`GET /api/0pt` (`app/api/0pt/route.ts`) returns a static `endpoints` array as self-documentation:
```
["/api/0pt/sources", "/api/0pt/datasets", "/api/0pt/data-contracts",
"/api/0pt/quality/checks", "/api/0pt/quality/reports", "/api/0pt/features/views",
"/api/0pt/documents/capture", "/api/0pt/documents/{documentId}/extraction"]
```
**Of these 8 listed paths, only 2 exist** (`documents/capture`, `documents/{documentId}/extraction`). The other 6 — `sources`, `datasets`, `data-contracts`, `quality/checks`, `quality/reports`, `features/views` — have no corresponding route file anywhere in this repo. `quality/checks` and `quality/reports` in particular line up exactly with the confirmed-fabricated quality-check-service work described elsewhere in this doc corpus (CLAUDE.md → README "Known issues") — this index was apparently written against a planned surface, not the real one. Conversely, **6 routes that do exist are missing from this list entirely**: `lakehouse/mappings` (×3) and `sources/rate-policies` (×2), plus `sources/{sourceId}/query`. This file is outside this doc's assigned scope to edit (not one of `docs/03-data-model.md`/`docs/04-api.md`) — flagging it here since it's the most visible, single-request way a caller would discover this API's shape, and it's currently misleading.
### `0pt.screen_sanctions` — `GET /api/screen`
```
GET /api/screen?q=<name>
-> 200 { matches: [] } if q is empty
-> 200 (engine response, verbatim) if ENGINE_URL is set and reachable and engine returns ok
-> 200 { source: "opensanctions", matches: [{name, score, schema}] } direct OpenSanctions fallback
-> 200 { matches: [], source: "opensanctions" } on fetch failure or non-2xx
```
Calls `engineFetch('/screen?q=...')` first (`services/api/orchestrator/main.py`'s real `GET /screen` route — see `docs/04-api.md`), falls back to `api.opensanctions.org` directly otherwise. Unlike `/api/ai/parse` below, this fallback path is a **working** reconciliation between the edge and engine layers, not a silent bug — both paths return the same shape. Comment in the route itself: "VERIFY commercial terms before production volume" — not verified by this pass either.
### `POST /api/ai/parse` — no capability mapping, engine call silently no-ops
```
body: { text }
-> 200 (engine response, verbatim) if ENGINE_URL set, reachable, and engine returns ok
-> 200 { config: {...}, rationale, heuristic: true } local keyword-heuristic fallback otherwise
-> 400 { error } if text is empty
```
As documented in `docs/04-api.md`: `services/api/orchestrator/main.py` **has no `/ai/parse` route at all**, so `engineFetch("/ai/parse", ...)` always 404s and this route always falls through to its local heuristic (`MARKETS`/`SERVICE`/`FIELDS`/`DEST` regex tables in the route file itself), even when the engine is up and configured. Not a crash — just a permanently-dark code path (`if (eng && eng.ok)` is never true for this one route). Has no entry in the capability registry (see top of this doc) — no declared risk level, audit requirement, or policy gate, unlike every other route documented above.
## Cross-cutting gap 1: tenant_id read from the request body, not a session
**Hard platform rule (per this doc corpus's platform-wide conventions): `tenant_id` must be server-bound to an authenticated session, never read from client request body/query/header.** This is violated, today, in:
- `app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/route.ts` (POST body `tenant_id`/`project_id`)
- `app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/[mappingId]/writes/route.ts` (indirectly — `actor_id`/`correlation_id` from body feed into a call keyed off a mapping whose own `tenant_id` was set by the equally-unauthenticated POST above)
- `app/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/route.ts` (POST body `tenant_id`/`project_id`)
- `app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts` (POST body `tenant_id`/`project_id`, explicitly required — 400 if missing)
- `src/services/document-capture-service.ts` (`captureFromMailbox`'s `ctx.tenant_id` comes straight from `app/api/0pt/documents/capture/route.ts`'s request body; the sibling `GET` route also takes `tenant_id`/`project_id` as **query-string filters**, which is a softer version of the same problem — it doesn't enforce isolation, it just optionally filters an already-unscoped in-memory list)
This is **not** a deliberate two-tier design choice — it exists because **no authentication or session system exists anywhere in this repo yet** (see `app/api/orders/route.ts`'s own `GET` handler, which has the literal comment "org scoping added with auth" — i.e., not yet; and `docs/09-build-plan.md` Phase 3, which is where auth is planned, not built). Building that auth design is explicitly Simon's call — this doc doesn't invent one. Until it lands, any caller can claim to be any `tenant_id` on every route above.
## Cross-cutting gap 2: in-memory-only persistence, and worse
Every service backing `app/api/0pt/*` (`SourceService`, `DatasetService`, `DatasetIcebergMappingService`, `SourceRatePolicyService`, `DocumentCaptureService`, `DocumentExtractionService`) stores state in a plain in-memory `Map` — nothing survives a process restart, and (per the findings above) in most cases nothing is even shared *across route files within the same running process*, because each route file constructs its own fresh service instance rather than importing a shared singleton. The one exception is `documentCaptureService`/`documentExtractionService`, which are correctly exported as module-level singletons for exactly this reason.
Two SQL tables exist for two of these seven types (`opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings`, `opt_source_rate_policies` — `sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql`), but nothing in `app/api/0pt/*` reads or writes through Postgres — the routes only ever touch the in-memory `Map`s. See `docs/03-data-model.md` for the full SQL-side picture, including a confirmed broken foreign-key reference in that same migration file.
## Mock-only platform clients
`SourceService`, `DocumentCaptureService`, `DocumentExtractionService`, `IcebergWriteService`, and `DatasetIcebergMappingService` all construct CL0UD/N0D/AUD0/ST0RE clients (`src/clients/{cl0ud,n0d,aud0,st0re,st0re-lakehouse}-client.ts`) via `createXClient(baseUrl?)` with no `baseUrl` ever passed by any route in this repo. `createXClient` returns a deterministic in-memory mock whenever `baseUrl` is falsy (verified in each client file), and **no route or service anywhere reads `CL0UD_URL`/`N0D_URL`/`AUD0_URL`/`ST0RE_URL` from `process.env`** (grep-verified this pass, zero hits outside comments and the `it.todo` in `tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.test.ts` — this corrects an earlier version of this section, which claimed `ST0RE_URL` *is* read by the two ST0RE clients; it is not, matching README's "Known issues" #2, `docs/02-architecture.md`'s "Platform clients" section, `docs/08-infrastructure.md`'s "Platform-client URLs" section, and `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`'s "Verification status" section, all independently verified against the same grep). None of the five clients has an env fallback wired at all — every one requires an explicit `baseUrl`/`st0reBaseUrl` constructor argument that nothing in this repo ever supplies. Practically: every policy check (`cl0ud.evaluatePolicy`) always returns whatever the mock's canned decision is, and every audit event (`aud0.ingestEvent`) is a no-op that never leaves the process. This is real, typechecked, tested code — not a stub file — but it has never been exercised against a live CL0UD/N0D/AUD0/ST0RE instance from this repo.
## Open questions for Simon
- Should `app/api/0pt/route.ts`'s index be fixed to list real routes, or is a stale/aspirational index acceptable short-term? (Not this doc's file to edit.)
- Should a `POST /api/0pt/sources` (and `POST /api/0pt/datasets`) route be added so `Source`/`Dataset` registration is reachable at all over HTTP — this is the blocking prerequisite for `0pt.query_source`, `0pt.source_rate_policy_manage`, and `0pt.lakehouse_mapping_manage` to ever succeed via the API as currently wired?
- Should the in-memory registry services (`SourceService`, `DatasetService`, etc.) move to shared singletons (like `documentCaptureService`) as an interim fix, or wait for real Postgres-backed persistence?
- Whether/when `mssql` gets added to `package.json` so the `fabric_onelake_sql` adapter can actually run.
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# Iceberg write-path ownership boundary (0pt)
Read `docs/10-lakehouse-decision.md` and `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md` first -- this doc is
the implementation record for the plan those wrote. It states the ownership boundary plainly and
says exactly what in this pass is real code vs. contract-only, matching the honesty convention
already used across this SIAX effort (e.g. sax3l/act0's own client docs, sax3l/st0re's
PRODUCTION_READINESS.md).
> **Correction (documentation-accuracy pass).** This doc previously claimed, in its "What this
> pass built" table and its "Data quality stays in 0pt" section, that
> `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`, `src/services/quality-report-service.ts`,
> `src/types/quality-check.ts`, and `src/types/quality-report.ts` were real, tested files that this
> pass "did not modify." **That was fabricated.** `git log --all` for every one of those paths,
> plus `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` and `sql/003_*.sql`, returns zero commits on any branch
> (`main`, `feature/0pt-env-example`, `ci/add-quality-gate`) -- these files have never existed in
> this repository. 0pt's data-quality/QA stage is a **design spec only**
> (`docs/06-data-engine.md` §QA), not a built service. See "Data quality: not yet built" below for
> the corrected account. This doc's own "Verification status" section also previously stated the
> full test suite was "154 tests + 1 todo (142-test baseline)" -- that count could not be
> reproduced when re-verified this pass (see below for the actual current count, and note this
> repo's test suite is a moving target across sessions, so treat any test count in this doc corpus
> as a snapshot at time of writing, not a durable fact). Everything else in this doc describing the
> ST0RE-owns-catalog / 0pt-owns-writes-and-source-rate-policy / N0D-executes boundary was
> independently re-verified against the actual service/client/test files this pass and remains
> accurate.
## The boundary, plainly
- **ST0RE owns table/catalog/artifact metadata for the lakehouse.** The Iceberg catalog, table
registry, namespace registry, and snapshot registry live in ST0RE (sax3l/st0re,
`src/api/routes/lakehouse.ts`, `/v1/st0re/lakehouse/*`). 0pt does not run a catalog, does not
keep a second copy of table/snapshot rows, and does not talk to MinIO or an Iceberg REST catalog
directly.
- **0pt owns dataset production, quality, data contracts, and writes.** This is the target
ownership split (matches ADR-0030 verbatim) and the writes/mapping half of it is real, tested
code -- see "What this pass built" below. The **quality** half is not: 0pt's QA stage is
currently a design spec only (`docs/06-data-engine.md` §QA), with no dedicated implementation in
this repo -- see "Data quality: not yet built" below. 0pt is the canonical writer of the Iceberg
tables those datasets produce, and it writes THROUGH ST0RE's table registry API, never around it.
- **0pt owns source-rate/crawl-compliance policy.** This is the genuine ownership repair this pass
makes concrete: `0pt.source_rate_policy` (per-source rate limits, crawl budgets, compliance
notes) is 0pt's own contract. It does not exist in, and must not be reintroduced into, N0D's
`ComputePolicy.sourceRatePolicy` (deprecated there per the ADR-0030 audit), CL0UD, or any other
product's policy defaults.
- **N0D executes.** 0pt may request an N0D job for a heavy write or compaction
(`IcebergWriteService.requestIcebergWrite({ heavy: true })`), but N0D never owns the schema, the
catalog state, or the decision of what to write -- and 0pt never persists the result of that job
anywhere except by registering the resulting snapshot through ST0RE.
- **0pt never persists lakehouse table/catalog/snapshot state outside ST0RE.** Not in Postgres
(`opt_*` tables), not in memory beyond a single dataset -> table-id pointer
(`opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings.iceberg_table_id`, a REFERENCE, never a copy of ST0RE's row).
Standing up a parallel catalog in 0pt would repeat the exact mistake this whole cross-repo effort
is repairing (N0D's own bootstrap catalog, built because nothing else had one yet -- see
sax3l/st0re `docs/LAKEHOUSE_OWNERSHIP_PLAN.md`).
## What this pass built
| Concern | File(s) | Status |
|---|---|---|
| `0pt.dataset_iceberg_mapping.schema.v1` type | `src/types/dataset-iceberg-mapping.ts` | Real |
| `0pt.source_rate_policy.schema.v1` type | `src/types/source-rate-policy.ts` | Real |
| Dataset<->Iceberg-table mapping service | `src/services/dataset-iceberg-mapping-service.ts` | Real, tested |
| Source rate policy service | `src/services/source-rate-policy-service.ts` | Real, tested |
| ST0RE lakehouse HTTP/mock client | `src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts` | Real code, contract matches ST0RE's shipped API; **not live-verified** (see below) |
| Write orchestration (map table, request write) | `src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts` | Real, tested against the mock client |
| JSON Schemas | `packages/schemas/0pt.dataset_iceberg_mapping.schema.json`, `packages/schemas/0pt.source_rate_policy.schema.json` | Real |
| Postgres migration | `sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` | Real (defines `opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings` + `opt_source_rate_policies`), not applied to a live DB by this pass -- schema-only until `DATABASE_URL` wiring lands. **Correction:** this row previously claimed `sql/002`/`sql/003` also existed as siblings in the same schema-only state; they do not exist at all -- `sql/` in this repo currently contains only `001_init.sql` and `004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` (verified this pass). `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` was the quality-stage migration named in `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`'s original (fabricated) claim; it was never written. |
| API routes | `app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/route.ts` (+`[mappingId]`, `+writes`), `app/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/route.ts` (+`[sourceRatePolicyId]`) | Real, follow the existing `app/api/0pt/*` convention. **Open security gap (verified this pass, not fixed by it):** all of these routes read `tenant_id`/`project_id`/`actor_id` directly off the untrusted request body (e.g. `mappings/route.ts`'s `POST`, `rate-policies/route.ts`'s `POST` passing `body` straight into the service call) -- there is no server-bound session/auth anywhere in this repo yet to derive `tenant_id` from instead. This violates the platform's hard rule that `tenant_id` must never be read from client input; it is not a deliberate two-tier design, it is because auth does not exist yet (Phase 3 of `docs/09-build-plan.md`, not built). Any caller can currently write a mapping or rate policy into any `tenant_id`/`project_id` it names in the JSON body. |
| Data quality / QA service | -- (does not exist) | **NOT BUILT.** See "Data quality: not yet built" below. |
| Tests | `tests/p0/dataset-iceberg-mapping.test.ts`, `tests/p0/source-rate-policy.test.ts`, `tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.test.ts` | Real, all passing (`npx vitest run`; 4 + 4 + 5-with-1-todo tests respectively) |
## 2026-07-13 update: live verification + field-level gap closure
A later pass (same task spec re-run) found `api.st0re.siax.io` reachable from this environment
(resolves to `188.40.230.69` via this network's DNS even though the public Cloudflare A record was
still pending per this session's known infra state) and used it to actually drive the write path
end to end against production ST0RE, then closed every gap that surfaced:
- **`namespace_id` + `mapped_at` added** to `0pt.dataset_iceberg_mapping.schema.v1`
(`src/types/dataset-iceberg-mapping.ts`, the JSON schema, `sql/005_iceberg_write_boundary_gap_closure.sql`)
-- the task spec's literal field list (`dataset_id, iceberg_table_id, namespace_id, mapped_at,
mapped_by`) named these explicitly; the first pass only carried a bare `namespace` name string and
`created_at`. `namespace_id` is populated from ST0RE's real `LakehouseNamespace.namespaceId`, not
guessed.
- **Three real ST0RE contract facts found live, not reasoned about**, all now handled correctly by
`src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts` / `src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts` (see that file's
header comment for the full detail):
1. Every `/v1/st0re/lakehouse/*` route requires `X-Tenant-Id` + `X-Actor-Id` headers -- the
previous `HttpSt0reLakehouseClient` sent none. Fixed by threading a `St0reRequestContext`
through every client method.
2. `IcebergTableInput.datasetId` is a foreign key into ST0RE's *own* dataset table, not a
free-form string -- the previous service sent 0pt's `dataset_id` there, which 400s live with a
Postgres FK violation. Fixed by no longer sending it; the dataset<->table link lives entirely
in 0pt's own `DatasetIcebergMapping.iceberg_table_id`.
3. ST0RE enforces a real unique constraint on `(tenant_id, project_id, name)` for namespaces, with
no upsert route. Fixed with a client-side lookup-or-create
(`IcebergWriteService.findOrRegisterNamespace` + the client's new `listNamespaces`).
- **Two ST0RE-side bugs flagged, not fixed** (out of scope -- this task only touches the `0pt`
repo): `GET /v1/st0re/lakehouse/namespaces` ignores query filters and returns every tenant's rows
regardless of the caller's `X-Tenant-Id` header; `GET /v1/st0re/lakehouse/tables/:tableId` returns
a table's data even under a deliberately wrong `X-Tenant-Id`. Both look like missing tenant-scoping
on ST0RE's lakehouse read paths -- a real cross-tenant data-exposure risk in a different repo.
- **`tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.realinfra.test.ts` replaces the `it.todo`** -- a real
live-integration test (SEAM pattern: attempts the real HTTP call, `ctx.skip()`s honestly with a
logged reason if ST0RE is unreachable when the suite runs, never fabricates success). This session
ran it against live ST0RE and it created real rows:
- namespace `aeadcefb-1bce-43b1-bd66-fbdae30f4c6d` (tenant `t_0pt_realinfra_pilot`)
- table `5db3fcf8-a63c-4e26-806a-ba94d0d777c3` (`dim_company_se_pilot_<timestamp>`)
- snapshot `610c58bf-559b-40dc-82bb-6250f57e1dec` (append, 1 row, 128 bytes)
This is task item 3's "write ONE first test dataset to Iceberg through ST0RE's table registry"
proof -- executed for real, through 0pt's own code path (not raw curl, though curl was used first
to discover the contract facts above safely before changing code).
- Full suite after this pass: **155 passed, 0 failed** (up from the 154 passed + 1 todo baseline),
including the live realinfra test actually passing against production ST0RE at the time this pass
ran. `npx tsc --noEmit` has one **pre-existing, unrelated** error in
`src/services/quality-report-service.ts:110` (present before this pass touched anything, part of
the wider uncommitted P0 data-platform build already in this repo) -- not touched, out of scope.
## Verification status (real vs. contract-only -- read this before trusting any claim above)
- **Real and tested**: every TypeScript file above typechecks and its behaviour is exercised by a
passing vitest test in `tests/p0/`.
**On test counts -- both remotes' claims are preserved here, and neither should be trusted as a
standing fact.** The Gitea line claimed "154 tests + 1 todo, up from a 142-test baseline", then
"155 passed, 0 failed, 0 todo" after the 2026-07-13 live pass. The GitHub line re-ran the suite
and could **not** reproduce those numbers, measuring instead "13 test files, 88 passed + 1 todo
(89 total), 0 failures", and flagged as **unresolved** whether the repo genuinely had 154 tests
at an earlier point and lost coverage, or whether the earlier figure was inflated. The two lines
were measuring two genuinely different trees (Gitea's carried the P0/live-infra work GitHub's did
not, and vice versa), which is enough on its own to explain a large part of the gap -- but it does
not retire the open question. Treat any specific test count anywhere in this doc corpus as a
snapshot of one tree at one moment, and re-run `pnpm test` yourself before relying on one. The
number measured on the unified tree is recorded in the branch/PR that produced this merge.
- **Live-verified as of 2026-07-13, and this supersedes the "would 400 outright" finding below**:
`src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts`'s HTTP path was executed against a running, reachable
ST0RE instance (`api.st0re.siax.io`) -- not just written against the documented contract. Real IDs
it created are listed in the "2026-07-13 update" section above. Unit tests still exercise the
deterministic in-memory mock for speed/hermeticity (same convention
`cl0ud-client.ts`/`n0d-client.ts`/`aud0-client.ts`/`st0re-client.ts` use); only
`tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.realinfra.test.ts` hits the real HTTP path, and only when ST0RE is
reachable (honest skip otherwise).
**Retained from the parallel GitHub-side verification pass, now RESOLVED -- kept because the
reasoning is worth having on record:** that pass found, against the then-current GitHub tree, that
the HTTP path "would currently fail outright, not just untested, if pointed at a live ST0RE".
`sax3l/st0re` had moved past commit `9ea0abb`; commit `06d30a6` (a 2026-07-13 cross-tenant
security fix, `docs/SECURITY_CROSS_TENANT_LAKEHOUSE_FIX.md` in that repo) made
`GET /v1/st0re/lakehouse/tables/:tableId` and
`POST /v1/st0re/lakehouse/tables/:tableId/snapshots` call `requireRequestContext`
(`src/api/context.ts`), which throws a 400 `ST0RE_VALIDATION_ERROR` unless the caller sends both
`X-Tenant-Id` and `X-Actor-Id`. That tree's `HttpSt0reLakehouseClient.getTable`/`.createSnapshot`
sent only `Content-Type`. **The Gitea-side 2026-07-13 pass had already fixed exactly this**, by
threading a `St0reRequestContext` (both headers) through every client method -- and that fix is
the version present after this unification merge. Verify with a grep for `X-Tenant-Id` in
`src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts` before trusting either statement again.
**Still true and NOT fixed by either side -- the client factories do not read the environment:**
none of the five factory functions (`createSt0reLakehouseClient`, `createSt0reClient`,
`createCl0udClient`, `createN0dClient`, `createAud0Client`) reads a base URL from `process.env`
itself -- grep-verified, zero hits for `process.env.ST0RE_URL`/`CL0UD_URL`/`N0D_URL`/`AUD0_URL` in
any client or service file. Each only accepts an optional `baseUrl` constructor argument, and
nothing in `app/api/0pt/*` passes one in, so **every route in this repo runs on the in-memory
mock/no-op regardless of what is set in the environment.** `.env.example` naming `ST0RE_URL` etc.
describes the *convention name to wire up*, not something already read automatically. This is the
same maturity level as this repo's other mock-only platform clients
(`src/services/document-extraction-service.ts`, `src/services/external-writeback-service.ts` are
accurate examples); an earlier version of this paragraph pointed at
`src/services/quality-check-service.ts` as the peer example -- that file does not exist, see the
correction callout at the top of this doc.
- **No longer an open TODO**: the `it.todo(...)` line this section used to point to
(`tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.test.ts`) has been replaced by the real
`tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.realinfra.test.ts` described above, which constructs
`IcebergWriteService({ st0reBaseUrl: process.env.ST0RE_URL })` -- note that this is the test
wiring `ST0RE_URL` explicitly, not the client reading it, per the paragraph above.
- **Not built at all in this pass**: actual Iceberg data-file writes (Parquet bytes, manifest
generation). `IcebergWriteService.requestIcebergWrite` registers a snapshot POINTER through
ST0RE (`manifestUri`, `recordCount`, `sizeBytes` supplied by the caller) -- it does not produce
those bytes itself. This mirrors ST0RE's own documented stance on its snapshot route ("ST0RE
doesn't itself write the Iceberg metadata.json... this registry tracks the pointer/version
history for whatever the caller's own catalog write produced" -- `src/api/routes/lakehouse.ts` in
sax3l/st0re). Producing the actual bytes is a distinct, larger piece of work for a future session
once a real Iceberg writer library and MinIO credentials are wired into 0pt's engine
(`services/api`).
## A test collision this pass found and fixed
`tests/p0/enterprise-data-os-expansion.test.ts` (from an earlier "PROMPT 2" pass; both this file
and `packages/schemas/0pt.iceberg_table.schema.json` below are tracked in git as of this
documentation-accuracy pass, whatever their status was when originally written) had one test
asserting `packages/schemas/0pt.source_rate_policy.schema.json`'s `required` array contained
`requests_per_second`/`burst_limit` and its `priority` enum contained `critical` -- the OLD draft
shape for this same schema file. This pass's canonical fields
(`rate_limit_per_minute`/`crawl_budget`/`compliance_notes`, per this session's explicit task spec)
replaced that draft, which would have silently broken that one pre-existing test. Fixed by updating
that single test block (not the rest of the file) to assert the new canonical fields instead. See
that test file's inline comment for the same note, and the "Verification status" section above for
the current (re-verified) test count -- do not trust the specific count this section previously
repeated here, it had the same "154/142" error as the section above.
## A pre-existing artifact -- update: since documented, not still untouched
`packages/schemas/0pt.iceberg_table.schema.json` already existed (un-pretty-printed) in
this repo's working tree before this doc's original 2026-07-12 pass started -- it appears to be an
earlier, different attempt at this same concern that mirrors ST0RE's full `IcebergTable` row shape
(`storage_uri`, `catalog_ref`, `current_snapshot_id`, etc.) rather than a lightweight reference.
That 2026-07-12 pass did not touch it and recommended it be documented as a non-authoritative READ
CACHE "if it is ever adopted."
**Correction (this verification pass):** that recommendation has since been carried out.
`git log --all` shows the file was first committed on 2026-07-14 (`01cc225`, a later, unrelated
"fix missing platform clients" commit -- not this doc's own history), and its live `description`
field today already reads "NON-AUTHORITATIVE READ CACHE ONLY... 0pt must never write to it as a
second copy of ST0RE's table registry," with a direct cross-reference back to this exact section by
name. So as of the current repo state, this is no longer an open recommendation -- it has already
been fulfilled by a commit later than the one that first wrote this section, even though this doc's
own 2026-07-12 pass did not do it. This pass's actual, owned contract remains
`0pt.dataset_iceberg_mapping.schema.v1` above -- `0pt.iceberg_table.schema.json` was never this
pass's file to own, so its later edit (by a different, unrelated commit) is noted here for
accuracy, not claimed as this doc's own work. This repo has other, concurrent work in flight
(`STATUS.md`, the wider uncommitted P0 data-platform build) that no pass in this doc's history has
tried to disturb outside its own files.
## Event names (all four wired, docs/11 item 6)
| Event | Emitted by | When |
|---|---|---|
| `0pt.dataset_iceberg_table_mapped` | `DatasetIcebergMappingService.createMapping` | A dataset -> Iceberg-table mapping is created |
| `0pt.iceberg_write_requested` | `IcebergWriteService.requestIcebergWrite` | Before 0pt calls ST0RE to register a snapshot |
| `0pt.iceberg_snapshot_created` | `IcebergWriteService.requestIcebergWrite` | After ST0RE confirms the new snapshot |
| `0pt.source_rate_policy_created` | `SourceRatePolicyService.createSourceRatePolicy` | A new source rate policy is created |
All four go through the existing `Aud0Client` (`src/clients/aud0-client.ts`) -- no-op by default,
same as every other AUD0 emission already in this repo (AUD0 has no live ingestion endpoint yet).
## Data quality: not yet built (corrected -- previously misstated as real and tested)
**This section previously read "Data quality stays in 0pt (confirmed, not moved)" and stated that
this pass "did not modify `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`,
`src/services/quality-report-service.ts`, `src/types/quality-check.ts`, or
`src/types/quality-report.ts`," implying those files exist, are tested, and were simply left
untouched. That was a fabrication.**
Verified this documentation-accuracy pass: `git log --all` for every one of those four paths, and
for `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` / `sql/003_*.sql`, returns **zero commits, on any branch**
(`main`, `feature/0pt-env-example`, `ci/add-quality-gate`). None of these files have ever existed
in this repository's history. There is no `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`, no
`src/services/quality-report-service.ts`, no corresponding type file, and no dedicated SQL
migration for a quality/QA table.
What actually exists:
- **A design spec only**, in `docs/06-data-engine.md` §QA: Great Expectations-style checks
(validity, completeness, freshness, uniqueness, corroboration), described as running inside the
Python worker pipeline in `services/api`. This is a target description, not implemented code.
- **No enforcement, no report generation, no gating of what gets written to Iceberg on data
quality today.** `IcebergWriteService.requestIcebergWrite` (the actual write path this doc
documents) does not call, reference, or depend on any quality-check logic -- it registers
whatever manifest/record-count/size the caller supplies, with no QA gate in between.
- **Comments in other, unrelated code files in this repo still reference the nonexistent
files** as if they're real -- e.g. `src/services/source-query-service.ts` ("`quality-check-service.ts`
uses for quality checks"), `src/services/external-writeback-service.ts` ("quality-check-service.ts/
document-extraction-service.ts already follow"), and `tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.test.ts`'s
own header comment (references both `tests/p0/cross-product-boundary.test.ts` and
`quality-check-service.ts`, neither of which exists). Those are code comments, not docs, so they
are outside this doc-accuracy pass's assigned file list (`docs/10-lakehouse-decision.md`,
`docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`, this file) and were left unedited -- flagging them here in the
three specific locations (`src/services/source-query-service.ts`,
`src/services/external-writeback-service.ts`,
`tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.test.ts`) so whoever picks this up next doesn't have to
re-discover them.
**This is a real, currently open product gap, not a documentation typo.** 0pt's own house rule
(`CLAUDE.md`: "If anything here conflicts with existing code, flag it ... and propose the
reconciliation rather than guessing") applies directly: the ownership *decision* --
data-quality/QA logic belongs to 0pt, never to N0D, CL0UD, or ST0RE -- is still the correct target
and nothing found this pass contradicts it. But until a `quality-check-service.ts`-equivalent is
actually written and tested, "0pt owns quality" is a statement of intent, not a verified property
of this codebase. Building it is out of scope for this documentation pass; it belongs to whichever
future implementation session picks up `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md` item 4.
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# 0pt ingestion plane (P060–P068)
> Written 2026-09-04. Every claim here is backed by a test path or a
> recorded command; anything not verified says so. Read `STATUS.md`'s
> "P060-P068 ingestion plane" section for the classification table and the
> honest-gaps list — this document is the mechanism, that one is the status.
## The shape
```
Source Registry Connector Ingestion Runner
(P060: who, what, (P061: nine (P062: one envelope,
under what rights, operations, one one durable checkpoint)
on what schedule) conformance suite)
│ │ │
│ classification gate │ discover / validate │ read ─┐
│ blocks activation │ connect / read │ │
▼ ▼ resume / backfill ▼ ▼
opt_sources records ───────────────▶ IngestionEnvelope
opt_source_rights │
opt_source_authorization ├─▶ P063 schema gate
opt_source_schedule ├─▶ P064 quality gate
opt_source_schemas ├─▶ P068 ledger (peek)
opt_ingestion_checkpoints ├─▶ SINK (caller-supplied)
├─▶ P068 ledger (commit)
├─▶ checkpoint (commit)
└─▶ P067 lineage edge
```
## P060 — the registry, and the gate
A source now carries: `source_id`, `tenant_id`, `project_id`, `source_type`,
`owner_id`, an **authorization** record, a **license/purpose rights** record,
**provenance** (how the data is obtained), a **schedule**, a versioned
**schema**, a durable **checkpoint**, and a `status`.
`status` starts at **`pending`**. It was `active` before — both repository
implementations wrote `input.status ?? "active"` — which meant an
unclassified source went live the moment it was registered. `activateSource`
is now the only path to `active`, and it refuses unless ALL of these are on
record:
- an `owner_id` (distinct from `created_by`: who is accountable, not who typed it),
- an **unexpired** authorization granted by an accountable actor
(`svc_*`/`system`/`automation` are rejected — a source may not authorize itself),
- rights with a `license_id` **and** at least one `allowed_purpose`,
- provenance with a sourcing `method`.
Schedule, schema and checkpoint describe HOW a source runs, not WHETHER it
may, so they are deliberately not part of the gate.
The default is enforced in two places on purpose: in the repositories, and as
`ALTER TABLE opt_sources ALTER COLUMN status SET DEFAULT 'pending'`, so a raw
`INSERT` from psql cannot produce an unclassified-but-active source either
(proved in the realinfra suite).
Routes: `GET/POST /api/0pt/sources/{id}/activate` (GET returns the
classification without changing anything), `GET/PUT …/authorization`,
`GET/PUT …/schedule`.
## P061 — the connector contract
Nine operations on one interface: `validate` (pure, no IO, fail-closed),
`connect` (idempotent), `discover`, `health` (reports, never throws), `read`
(honours `limit` exactly), `checkpoint`, `resume`, `backfill` (bounded — an
open-ended range is refused), `disconnect` (idempotent, safe after an error).
`src/connectors/conformance.ts` is a plain async function, not a test file,
so the same suite runs from tests, from an operator script against a real
configured source, and (later) from a pre-activation check. There is no
"skip" verdict: a connector that cannot honestly serve a check FAILS it.
Two heterogeneous connectors pass it:
| | `HttpJsonConnector` | `JsonlFileConnector` |
|---|---|---|
| transport | network, real HTTP | local filesystem |
| cursor | opaque server token, with a `cursor_field` fallback | line offset it computes itself |
| exhaustion | server-reported | exact (the file is finite) |
| health | HTTP round trip | `stat` |
| backfill bounds | server-defined (sequence/timestamp) | line numbers |
| CDC deletes | no — it does not claim `cdc` | yes, via `_op` |
The `cursor_field` fallback exists because the conformance suite caught a
real defect: an API that stops returning `next_cursor` at the end of a page
left the connector with nothing to resume from, so `resume()` silently
restarted at the beginning.
## P062 — one envelope, one durable checkpoint
`IngestionEnvelope` is the single shape everything downstream sees:
`mode` (batch/stream/cdc), `operation` (upsert/insert/update/delete),
`partition_key`, `record_key`, `schema_version`, a monotonic `sequence`,
`occurred_at`/`ingested_at`, `payload` (null only for a delete) and
`provenance` (connector id + version + run id + cursor).
**Ordering is the contract.** Per page:
```
read/resume → normalize → schema conformance → quality gate
→ ledger PEEK → SINK → ledger COMMIT → checkpoint COMMIT
```
Both commits happen after the sink resolves. The two tempting shortcuts are
both data-loss bugs, and one of them was written here first — see STATUS.md's
"A real bug this pass wrote and then caught".
The resulting guarantee is **at-least-once**, not exactly-once.
`envelope_id` is a deterministic hash of
`(source, partition, record_key, content)` so a dedup-capable sink survives a
re-delivery.
## P063 — schema evolution
`RecordSchema` is a small structural shape (field → type + required) plus a
`CompatibilityPolicy` (`backward` / `forward` / `full` / `none`).
`checkCompatibility` answers what breaks, in which direction, and why. It is
deliberately not a second JSON-Schema dialect: the question is "is version
N+1 of an UPSTREAM shape safe for consumers of version N?", which needs a
comparable structure, not a validator.
Two enforcement points, both upstream of any consumer write:
1. the runner's **discovery gate** — a shape change that breaks the previous
version's declared policy fails the whole run before the first `read()`;
2. **per-record conformance** — a source that drifted without redeclaring its
schema is caught on the offending record, before the page reaches the sink.
A producer cannot widen its own policy: the PREVIOUS version's policy governs
whether a change is allowed.
## P064 — quality with consequences
`QualityGate` composes the existing `ExpectationEngine` (the Great
Expectations core subset already in this repo) and adds the missing half: a
declared `on_violation` action.
- `block` — the page fails, and the checkpoint does **not** advance, so the
bad page stays unconsumed rather than being stepped over.
- `quarantine` — failing envelopes are persisted whole to
`opt_quality_quarantine` (recoverable, not merely counted); clean ones
continue and the checkpoint advances.
- `warn` — everything continues, violations are counted and reported.
There is no default. With no policy the run report says
`quality_policy: "none_declared"` — an undeclared policy must never read as a
passed one. An expectation the local engine cannot execute counts as a
VIOLATION, never a silent pass.
## P067 — queryable lineage
`LineageEmitter` keeps emitting OpenLineage to AUD0, and **AUD0 remains the
system of record**. `LineageStore` adds 0pt's own flattened projection — one
row per (run, input, output) with a deterministic `edge_id` — because
"emitted to AUD0" was never the same thing as "answerable from 0pt".
```
GET /api/0pt/lineage?tenant_id=…&output_name=0pt:dataset:ds_x # what fed it
GET /api/0pt/lineage?tenant_id=…&input_name=source/src_x # what it produced
```
An unfiltered dump is refused (400): that is an export, not a query.
## P068 — bounded, idempotent backfill
`opt_ingestion_ledger` holds one row per `(source_id, record_key)` with the
last accepted content hash. A backfill runs through the same envelope,
schema, quality and ledger path as a normal run, and:
- **never touches the live checkpoint** — a backfill must not rewind or
advance streaming ingestion;
- **re-emits nothing** on a repeat — every record comes back `duplicate`;
- **still re-emits a genuine content change** — idempotency is not amnesia;
- **refuses an unbounded range** at the connector contract level.
## Running the real-infrastructure proof
```bash
docker run -d --name opt-ingestion-pgtest \
-e POSTGRES_USER=opt -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=opt_test_pw -e POSTGRES_DB=opt_test \
-p 15434:5432 postgres:16-alpine
INGESTION_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgres://opt:opt_test_pw@localhost:15434/opt_test \
pnpm vitest run tests/p0/ingestion-plane-postgres.realinfra.test.ts
```
The suite applies `sql/002_source_registry.sql` and
`sql/007_ingestion_plane.sql` itself (both are idempotent). It skips
honestly, never fabricating success, when the env var is unset.
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# P070 — VehIQ OLTP -> 0pt watermark extractor
Status: built, tested, verified read-only against production. **Not scheduled/activated in production.** Read "What activating this requires" before turning the workflow on.
## What this is
A controlled, incremental extractor implementing exactly the pattern Simon specified (`admin/vehiq` 2026-09-25 pass, "Locked architecture decisions from Simon" / `docs/adr/0035-bi-analytics-architecture-product-firewall.md`):
```
OLTP operational tables -> read-only analytical extraction -> watermark ->
0pt ingestion -> ClickHouse (opt_dataset_projection)
```
Source: `app.dealer_stock_entry` and `app.deal` on production Postgres (`vehiq-db`, server10) — read-only `SELECT`, never a schema/config change, never touching `wal_level` or replication, never a permanent replica. Sink: `SiaxAnalyticsEngine.ingestProjection` (BI-P009, `opt_dataset_projection` in ClickHouse). Vehicle dimension: a narrow, keyed lookup against `vehiq.vehicle` (98M rows / 85GB) scoped to exactly the `vehicle_id`s referenced by the `dealer_stock_entry` batch just read — never `SELECT * FROM vehicle`, never a full scan.
## Why this lives in `admin/0pt`, not `admin/vehiq`
The task that produced this work described building it as a new package inside `admin/vehiq` (e.g. `packages/opt-ingest`). Before writing any code, this repo's own `docs/adr/0035-bi-analytics-architecture-product-firewall.md` (decisions 1, 2, 10 — decided the same day, one-way-door, CI-enforced by `tools/validate_engine_firewall.py`) was read and is unambiguous:
> VehIQ's own codebase must **never** get its own ClickHouse or DuckDB credentials, and must never import a ClickHouse/DuckDB client directly. ... Product code must never hammer the live OLTP Postgres with analytical queries directly.
And `admin/vehiq`'s `docs/CURRENT_STATE.md` ("Connection details for a future API0 connector", same pass) says explicitly:
> VehIQ's own codebase must never see any of this. This is 0pt's data plane; only a future `admin/api0` connector should hold these details.
Building the extractor inside `admin/vehiq` would have failed `validate_engine_firewall.py` the moment it imported a ClickHouse client or held a `CLICKHOUSE_*` env var, and would have been the exact "temporary VehIQ-owned data-access surface" ADR-0035 names as the failure mode it exists to prevent. So this extractor was built here instead — `admin/0pt`, 0pt's own data plane, a sibling of `admin/api0` (the mechanics belong next to the P060-P068 ingestion plane and the BI-P009/P010 ClickHouse engine that already live in this repo). **`admin/vehiq` was not modified by this work.**
This is a deliberate deviation from the task's literal repo suggestion, made because the suggestion conflicted with Simon's own same-day, explicit, locked architecture decision discovered while reading the target repo — not a judgment call made against that decision.
## Real production schema does not match the task's assumed column names
The task (and `admin/vehiq`'s `docs/CURRENT_STATE.md`) assumed all three OLTP tables carry a generic `updated_at` ("the columns already exist"). Verified live against production (server10, `vehiq-db`, read-only `information_schema.columns`, 2026-09-25) — **this is not true**:
| table | live columns | usable watermark |
|---|---|---|
| `app.dealer_stock_entry` | `id, tenant_id, vehicle_id, lot_location, floorplan_status, listed_at, sold_at` | `listed_at` (NOT NULL, insert-time only) |
| `app.deal` | `id, tenant_id, party_id, vehicle_id, sale_price_minor, currency, status, created_at` | `created_at` (NOT NULL DEFAULT now(), insert-time only) |
| `app.listing` | `id, tenant_id, vehicle_id, asking_price_minor, currency, channels, status` | **none** |
**`app.listing` has no timestamp column of any kind today.** `admin/vehiq` migration `0084_listing_deal_lifecycle_timestamps.sql` (already written, adds `published_at`/`unpublished_at` to `listing` and `closed_at`/`listing_id` to `deal`) exists in the repo but is **not yet applied to production** (verified: those columns are absent live). Until it lands, there is no honest way to build a watermark connector for `app.listing` — one is not built here. **This extractor covers `dealer_stock_entry` and `deal` only, not `listing`.**
**Caveat on the two sources that ARE built:** `listed_at`/`created_at` are set once, at INSERT. Neither table has a column that advances when an *existing* row changes (`sold_at`/`floorplan_status` on `dealer_stock_entry`; `status` on `deal`). This extractor reliably sees every new row; it does **not** see an in-place UPDATE to a row it already read, because that row has already passed the watermark. Closing this gap needs either `listing_id`/`closed_at` (migration 0084, once applied) plus an equivalent for `dealer_stock_entry`, or a generic `updated_at` + trigger — a schema decision for Simon, not something this pass made unilaterally (per the hard "never a schema/config change" rule).
Also found and corrected while building: `vehiq.vehicle`'s primary key column is `vehicle_id`, not `id` (verified via schema introspection only — no vehicle data rows were read to establish this).
## Where the code lives
- `src/connectors/postgres-watermark-connector.ts` — the P061 `Connector` implementing `WHERE watermark_col > $1 OR (watermark_col = $1 AND key_col > $2) ORDER BY watermark_col, key_col LIMIT $3` (the `OR` tuple form, not a bare `>`, so a same-timestamp tie at a page boundary is not silently dropped — see the file's own header for the bug this avoids). Explicit column allow-list, never `SELECT *`. `validate()` structurally refuses any config pointed at `vehiq.vehicle`.
- `src/connectors/postgres-keyed-lookup-connector.ts` — the narrow vehicle-dimension connector. Config carries an already-resolved, finite `keys` array; `connect()` refuses an empty list rather than defaulting to a full read; every query is `WHERE vehicle_id = ANY($1)` chunked to `keys_per_query` (default 500).
- `src/connectors/postgres-query-impl.ts` — the real `postgres` (postgres.js) implementation of the connectors' injectable `QueryImpl`, used only by the orchestration script. Refuses to execute anything whose first keyword isn't `SELECT`, independent of the DB role's own privileges.
- `src/ingestion/projection-sink.ts` — adapts the P062 runner's `IngestionSink` onto `SiaxAnalyticsEngine.ingestProjection` (writes `opt_dataset_projection`). No ClickHouse import — only the `SiaxAnalyticsEngine` port type.
- `src/ingestion/vehiq-oltp-ingest-runner.ts` — the orchestration: `previewVehiqOltpSource` (one bounded read-only read, never commits, safe against production at any time) and `runVehiqOltpIngestion` (the real P062-runner path).
- `scripts/vehiq-oltp-ingest/run.ts` — thin CLI (`pnpm run vehiq:oltp-ingest`), env-driven, defaults to `preview` mode.
- Tests: `tests/connectors/postgres-watermark-connector.test.ts`, `tests/connectors/postgres-keyed-lookup-connector.test.ts`, `tests/ingestion/vehiq-oltp-ingest-runner.test.ts`.
## Checkpoint field mapping
Simon's own specified checkpoint columns — `source, table, last_updated_at, last_id, batch_count, checksum, ingested_at` — mapped onto the **existing** P062 `IngestionCheckpoint` (reused, not duplicated, per the "no double truths" rule):
| Simon's field | Canonical field |
|---|---|
| `source` | `IngestionCheckpoint.source_id` |
| `table` | `IngestionCheckpoint.partition_key` |
| `last_updated_at` | decoded from `IngestionCheckpoint.cursor` (JSON `WatermarkCursor`) |
| `last_id` | decoded from `IngestionCheckpoint.cursor` |
| `checksum` | decoded from `IngestionCheckpoint.cursor` — sha256 of the page just landed |
| `batch_count` | `IngestionCheckpoint.records_committed` (cumulative); a per-run page count is also in each run's `PartitionRunReport` |
| `ingested_at` | `IngestionCheckpoint.committed_at` |
Durable storage: `createIngestionRepository(DATABASE_URL)` — Postgres-backed when `DATABASE_URL` (0pt's own metadata store) is set, in-memory only in non-production/tests. `run` mode refuses to start without `DATABASE_URL` explicitly, so a scheduled run can never silently fall back to re-reading everything from the beginning.
## Testing
Fixture-backed (no real infra): watermark + limit correctness, a same-timestamp tie at a page boundary, resume-from-checkpoint after a simulated crash (via a sink that throws mid-run, mirroring `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts`'s own technique), the empty-table case (zero rows, zero envelopes, no throw), and the narrow vehicle-dimension lookup asserted at the *query* level (every id ever bound into a query is a subset of the referenced set; a vehicle never referenced by the batch is never queried).
Also verified against a **real, disposable Postgres container** (not just fixtures), both seeded and truncated-to-empty, before touching production — caught and fixed two real bugs the fixture-only tests could not have caught:
1. `timestamptz` columns come back from the real driver as JS `Date` objects, not strings — the initial cursor-encoding logic did `String(date)` (locale-dependent, useless as a stored watermark) instead of `.toISOString()`. Fixed; regression test added (`tests/connectors/postgres-watermark-connector.test.ts`, "real Postgres driver value shapes").
2. The same `Date`-vs-string mismatch tripped the P063 schema-conformance gate on every row (`field "listed_at" is object, expected string`) until the connector's `toRecord()` was made to normalize every `Date`-valued payload field to ISO before building the envelope.
**Verified read-only against actual production** (server10, `vehiq-db`, via `fleet`), 2026-09-25: the connector's exact SQL (`SELECT id, tenant_id, vehicle_id, lot_location, floorplan_status, listed_at, sold_at FROM app.dealer_stock_entry ORDER BY listed_at, id LIMIT 100` and the equivalent for `app.deal`) executed directly, read-only, and returned **zero rows, no error** — confirming both that the extractor's query shape is valid against the live schema and that there is genuinely nothing to extract yet. `vehiq.vehicle`'s `vehicle_id` primary-key column name was confirmed via `information_schema.columns` only — no vehicle data rows were read. **The compiled service itself was not run against production** — only its exact SQL, via read-only `psql`, matching this pass's "prove it does nothing, don't deploy a live service yet" scope.
## Deferred: full vehicle-dimension backfill
Not built or run in this pass, per the task's explicit instruction. If/when a full `dimension_vehicle` snapshot is ever wanted (as opposed to the permanent narrow per-batch lookup this extractor does forever), it needs its own deliberate decision:
- **Chunking**: page through `vehiq.vehicle` by primary key range (`vehicle_id > :last ORDER BY vehicle_id LIMIT :n`), never an unbounded scan — the same shape `PostgresWatermarkConnector` already implements, just pointed at a PK range instead of a timestamp (this connector's own `validate()` refuses `vehiq.vehicle` by name specifically to keep this a distinct, deliberate choice rather than an accidental default).
- **Throttle**: an explicit delay between chunks, watching server10's `iostat`/`vmstat`/CPU while it runs — 98M rows / 85GB is enough to matter even read-only.
- **Checksum + reconciliation**: a row-count and content checksum comparison between source and `opt_dataset_projection` after the backfill, recorded, before trusting it.
- **Watermark handoff**: the backfill's end position must hand off cleanly to the narrow per-batch lookup this extractor already does, so nothing is double-counted or gapped at the boundary.
This mirrors the numbered runbook `admin/vehiq`'s `docs/CURRENT_STATE.md` already wrote for the general CDC case (not executed there either) — the shape is consistent, deliberately, rather than inventing a second convention.
## Deferred: `app.listing` extraction
Blocked on a schema decision, not an engineering gap: `app.listing` has no timestamp column today. Unblocking it needs one of:
1. Apply `admin/vehiq` migration `0084_listing_deal_lifecycle_timestamps.sql` (adds `published_at`/`unpublished_at`) — a decision for whoever owns that repo's migration pipeline, not this pass.
2. Add a generic `updated_at` + trigger to `dealer_stock_entry`/`deal`/`listing` — closes both this gap and the "insert-only watermark misses in-place updates" caveat above in one move, but is a real schema change on production and needs Simon's explicit sign-off per the hard rule against touching production schema unsupervised.
Once either lands, adding a third `VehiqOltpSourceDef` entry to `VEHIQ_OLTP_SOURCES` (`src/ingestion/vehiq-oltp-ingest-runner.ts`) is the only code change needed — the connector, runner, sink and tests are all already generic across sources.
## What activating this in production actually requires
Nothing here is scheduled or running. To turn it on:
1. **A read-only Postgres role on `vehiq-db`** (server10) with `SELECT` on exactly `app.dealer_stock_entry` and `app.deal` (not the whole `app` schema, not `vehiq.vehicle` beyond what the narrow lookup needs) — creating this role is a production database change and should be coordinated explicitly, the same posture `admin/vehiq`'s own CDC runbook already takes for a bigger version of this same question. Its connection string becomes `VEHIQ_SOURCE_DATABASE_URL`.
2. **`DATABASE_URL`** — 0pt's own metadata Postgres, for durable checkpoints. Already exists for every other 0pt capability; reuse it, do not provision a new one for this.
3. **`OPT_ANALYTICS_CLICKHOUSE_BASE_URL` / `OPT_ANALYTICS_CLICKHOUSE_BASIC_AUTH`** — the already-deployed `opt-analytics-clickhouse` on server6 (internal-only, reachable from containers on the `coolify` network — see `admin/vehiq`'s `docs/CURRENT_STATE.md`, "0pt production ClickHouse 26.8 LTS"). A real least-privilege application user should be provisioned for this connector specifically, not the schema-admin `opt_admin` user mentioned there.
4. **`VEHIQ_INGEST_MODE=run`** on the scheduled workflow (default is `preview`, which never writes).
5. A decision on whether `.gitea/workflows/vehiq-oltp-ingest.yml`'s cron schedule should actually be enabled (it is present and correctly configured, but Gitea Actions secrets are not set on this repo by this pass — an unset `VEHIQ_SOURCE_DATABASE_URL` makes every scheduled run a clean no-op, so leaving the workflow file in place with no secrets configured is safe, but is not the same as "this is now extracting real data").
None of steps 1-3 were done in this pass — they require production credentials/role provisioning this pass does not have standing authority to create unsupervised.
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# 0pt Dataset Quality / QA Flow — TARGET SPEC ONLY, NOT YET BUILT
> **This document describes what does not exist yet.** Every file, service,
> type, and schema named below is a proposal, not a fact. Read this doc with
> "should"/"would need to"/"is intended to" — never "does" or "is." If any
> other doc in this repo states or implies that dataset-level quality
> enforcement is already built, real, and tested, that statement is wrong;
> see "Why this doc exists" below.
## Why this doc exists
Several docs in this repo — `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md` (before this
pass's correction), `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`, and
`docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md` — reference the following as if they are
real, already-built, already-tested files in this repo:
- `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`
- `src/services/quality-report-service.ts`
- `src/types/quality-check.ts`
- `src/types/quality-report.ts`
- `src/data-platform/services/catalog-service.ts`
- `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql`
- `sql/003_*.sql` (unspecified third migration)
**Verified this pass:** `git log --all` for every one of those paths returns
**zero commits, ever, on any branch** (`main`, `feature/0pt-env-example`,
`ci/add-quality-gate` all checked). A full-repo `find` for each filename
also returns nothing. These files have never existed in this repository's
history. `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` even states outright that "0pt's
QA stage... remains entirely 0pt-owned" and cites `quality-check-service.ts`
as the thing that wasn't touched by that pass — implying it exists to not
touch. It doesn't exist to begin with.
This means: **0pt's dataset-level data-quality/QA enforcement stage does
not exist in code at all**, despite being described elsewhere as complete.
This is a real, currently-open gap — not a doc typo. This document replaces
those false claims with an honest target specification: what this stage
*should* look like if/when it gets built, grounded in the parts of this
repo's design that *are* real today.
`docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md`'s "Known gaps" section has the fuller list of
exactly which files make the false claim and where; this doc does not
repeat that inventory, only the target design.
## What already exists that this would build on (real, verified)
- **The provenance/confidence model** — `docs/06-data-engine.md`'s pipeline
stage 5 ("QA") already specifies the *rules* this stage should enforce,
even though no code implements them yet:
- Per-field `bridge_provenance`: `source_id`, `freshness`, `confidence`
(0–1), `level` (0–3), `agreed_sources`.
- Level semantics: 0 = unavailable/licensed, 1 = single source, 2 =
partial corroboration, 3 = ≥2 independent sources agree.
- The QA rule: **drop rows below the order's `confidence_target`** —
deliver fewer rows, never fabricate a value to hit a target.
- `est_confidence` (order-level target) vs. `avg_confidence` (delivered,
actual) as the two numbers this stage would need to reconcile.
- **The Dataset registry** — `src/services/dataset-service.ts` /
`src/types/dataset.ts` are real, in-memory, tested code. `Dataset` already
has `dataset_type: "raw" | "structured" | "enriched" | "curated"` and
`status: "active" | "archived" | "deprecated"` — a quality stage would
need to decide whether a failed QA pass changes `status`, or whether
quality state lives entirely in a separate table/type instead (see
"Open questions" below).
- **The N0D job pattern** — `src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts` is real,
tested code showing the actual "sync path vs. N0D job" split this
codebase already uses elsewhere: an `input.heavy` flag routes to
`this.n0d.createJob(...)` instead of running inline. A quality-check
service would plausibly reuse this same shape (small samples checked
inline; a real run against a full dataset dispatched as an N0D job) —
but nothing today wires that up for quality checks specifically.
- **The CL0UD-policy-before-execution pattern** — `src/services/external-writeback-service.ts`
(`0pt.write_external_record`, real, tested) calls
`Cl0udClient.evaluatePolicy()` before performing its write. If a quality
service is meant to policy-gate before running (as
`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` implies with its "CL0UD is always
re-consulted" framing), this is the real precedent to follow, not
something already done by the nonexistent `quality-check-service.ts`.
- **The AUD0 event pattern** — every real service in this repo
(`source-service.ts`, `dataset-service.ts`, `source-query-service.ts`,
`external-writeback-service.ts`, `iceberg-write-service.ts`) emits AUD0
events via `createAud0Client()` against an in-memory mock (no live AUD0
endpoint reachable from this repo). A quality service would follow the
same convention.
## What this stage should do (target design — none of this is built)
1. **Trigger.** A quality check would need to run after the enrichment/
fusion stage (`docs/06-data-engine.md` stage 4) and before a dataset is
marked ready for delivery or written to Iceberg via
`IcebergWriteService`. Whether this is a synchronous call, an
automatically-triggered N0D job, or an explicit caller action is
undecided.
2. **Checks to run**, per `docs/06-data-engine.md`'s stage 5 language
(originally scoped as "Great Expectations or equivalent, run inside the
worker"):
- **Validity** — field format/range checks against the schema for that
`dataset_type`.
- **Completeness** — required-field coverage.
- **Freshness** — age of each `bridge_provenance.freshness` against a
staleness threshold.
- **Uniqueness** — post-dedup uniqueness (RapidFuzz dedup already
happens upstream per `docs/06-data-engine.md` stage 3; this would be a
verification pass, not the dedup itself).
- **Corroboration** — cross-check `bridge_provenance.level`/`agreed_sources`
against the order's declared `confidence_target`; rows below target
get dropped, never backfilled with a guess.
3. **Output: a quality report.** Would need a `QualityReport` shape
(proposed home: `src/types/quality-report.ts`, not yet created) capturing
at minimum: `dataset_id`, `check_run_id`, per-check pass/fail counts,
`rows_dropped_below_confidence_target`, `avg_confidence` (delivered,
actual — per `docs/06-data-engine.md`), and a timestamp. This is the
thing `docs/06-data-engine.md` calls "the quality report stored on
`deliveries`" — that storage location (a `deliveries` table) does not
exist in this repo's `sql/` directory either; `sql/001_init.sql` would
need to be checked/extended for it, or a new migration written.
4. **Gate, not silent pass-through.** Per CLAUDE.md's non-negotiable
constraint #1 ("we never invent values") and #3 ("provenance per field"),
a dataset that fails its quality gate should not silently ship — the
order's delivery flow (`docs/01-product.md`'s order lifecycle) would need
to surface a failed/partial QA result to the customer, not swallow it.
## What would need to be created (none of this exists)
| Proposed file | Would contain |
|---|---|
| `src/types/quality-check.ts` | `QualityCheckRequest`/`QualityCheckResult` shapes: which checks to run, thresholds, dataset/source refs |
| `src/types/quality-report.ts` | `QualityReport` shape described above |
| `src/services/quality-check-service.ts` | Orchestrates the checks (validity/completeness/freshness/uniqueness/corroboration), CL0UD policy check, N0D job dispatch for heavy runs (same `input.heavy` shape as `iceberg-write-service.ts`), AUD0 emission |
| `src/services/quality-report-service.ts` | Persists/retrieves `QualityReport`s; registry pattern matching `DatasetService`/`SourceService` (in-memory today, same known "not shared across route modules" limitation until real persistence lands) |
| A new SQL migration | Schema for quality-check runs and reports. **Numbering note:** this repo's `sql/` directory today contains only `001_init.sql` and `004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` — `002` and `003` were referenced in other docs but never created, so there is a numbering gap. Whether a new migration should fill `002`/`003` or continue from `005` is an open question — do not assume `002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` is the correct filename just because other docs guessed it. |
`src/data-platform/services/catalog-service.ts` is referenced elsewhere in
this repo's docs (as the source of an "`L4` = restricted sensitivity"
precedent) but was also confirmed this pass to not exist anywhere in this
repo — it is a separate fabrication from the quality-check one, not
something this quality stage specifically depends on. If a dataset-level
catalog/listing capability is needed as part of this work, the registered
`0pt.catalog_list` and `0pt.source_registry_list` capabilities
(`cl0ud`'s `packages/capability-registry/src/registry.ts`, both real
registry entries, `surfaces: ['api']`) are the closest existing hooks — but
whether either is meant to serve this purpose, or a new capability is
needed, is undecided.
## No capability registered for this yet
`cl0ud`'s `packages/capability-registry/src/registry.ts` was checked this
pass for anything quality-related: no `0pt.quality_check`,
`0pt.run_quality_checks`, or similarly-named capability exists. The
registry does have a `qualityGateRequired` boolean flag used by *other*
capabilities (e.g. one INF0 capability sets it `true`), but nothing wires
`0pt`'s own dataset QA into that flag or into any capability of its own.
Building this stage would need a new capability entry, decided surfaces
(`api` at minimum, per the six-surface model; `job` likely for a
full-dataset run), a `riskLevel`, and a `piiLevel`.
## Open questions for Simon
- Does quality-check execution belong entirely in 0pt (as
`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` asserts should be true, even though the
code backing that assertion doesn't exist), or should the actual
check-running compute move to N0D as a job type, with 0pt only owning the
*rules*?
- Where does a `QualityReport` get persisted — a new `sql/00X_*.sql` table
in 0pt's own Postgres, or through ST0RE (matching the "ST0RE owns
metadata, 0pt owns production" boundary `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`
draws for Iceberg tables)?
- Does a dataset that fails QA change `Dataset.status`
(`src/types/dataset.ts`), or does quality state live entirely outside the
`Dataset` record?
- What migration number should the new schema use, given the `002`/`003`
gap described above?
- Should this become its own registered `0pt.*` capability, and if so what
`riskLevel`/`piiLevel` — quality checks read dataset content, which per
the reasoning already used for `0pt.query_source` (`piiLevel: 'high'`
because "can return any column, including PII") would plausibly need the
same `piiLevel`.
None of the above is decided by this document. It exists to give a future
build pass an honest starting point instead of a fabricated one.
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# 0pt.query_source — Bounded Source Query Flow
> **Companion-doc note (corrected):** this doc originally called itself an
> "additive companion to `docs/P0_DATASET_QUALITY_FLOW.md`." That file did
> not exist anywhere in this repository at the time — `git log --all` for it
> returns zero commits, on any branch, ever. This pass adds
> `docs/P0_DATASET_QUALITY_FLOW.md` as a clearly-labeled **target spec, not
> yet built** (see that file). Treat the two docs as siblings: this one
> covers the real, working `0pt.query_source` read path; the other covers
> the *intended, unbuilt* dataset-quality/QA path that several other docs in
> this repo (wrongly) describe as already implemented. See "Known gaps"
> below for the details of that wider mixup.
Adds the capability to actually **read data** from a registered Source, not
just register its metadata.
## What this is
`0pt.query_source`: given a Source already registered via `0pt.create_source`
(`source_type = "database"`, `adapter_id = "fabric_onelake_sql"`), run a
caller-supplied SQL query against the customer's own Azure Fabric / OneLake
SQL analytics endpoint and return rows — synchronously, bounded by a max-row
and max-time ceiling.
> Note: `0pt.create_source` (the capability id `source-service.ts` emits in
> its AUD0 events) is **not** one of the 14 `0pt.*` capabilities currently
> registered in `cl0ud`'s `packages/capability-registry/src/registry.ts` —
> only `0pt.source_registry_list` (a read/list capability) is registered for
> the Source domain. `0pt.query_source` itself *is* registered (see
> "Capability registration" below). Whether `0pt.create_source` needs its own
> registry entry, or was meant to be folded into an existing one, is unresolved
> — flagging for Simon rather than guessing.
**Tenant-agnostic by construction.** Any SIAX customer registers their own
Fabric/OneLake warehouse (their own Entra tenant, their own service
principal, their own SQL endpoint). Nothing in the adapter or service layer
is hardcoded to one customer — every credential and endpoint is a parameter
supplied per call, never an env var fallback. (This is orthogonal to the
`tenant_id`/`project_id` handling gap described below — the *warehouse*
credentials are correctly never defaulted from env; the *platform* tenant_id
used for scoping/audit is a separate, unresolved problem.)
## Why bounded + synchronous, not just "run any query"
This path is for small, interactive/preview-style reads (validate a Source
is reachable, sample a table, preview a query before scheduling it). It is
*not* a general query engine:
- `max_rows`: default 1,000, hard ceiling 10,000 (`SOURCE_QUERY_DEFAULT_MAX_ROWS` /
`SOURCE_QUERY_HARD_MAX_ROWS` in `source-query-service.ts`). Excess rows are
truncated and the response is flagged `truncated: true`.
- `timeout_ms`: default 10s, hard ceiling 30s (`SOURCE_QUERY_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS` /
`SOURCE_QUERY_HARD_MAX_TIMEOUT_MS`). A caller-requested value above the
ceiling is clamped down, not rejected.
- Anything heavier — large exports, long scans, scheduled/recurring pulls —
is meant to go through **N0D as a job** instead. The real, working
precedent for that "synchronous path vs. N0D job" split in this codebase
is `src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts`: it takes an `input.heavy`
flag and, when set, calls `this.n0d.createJob(...)` instead of doing the
work inline. (An earlier version of this doc cited `quality-check-service.ts`
for this same pattern — that file does not exist; see "Known gaps.")
`SourceQueryService` does not itself request an N0D job for anything today
— there is no "heavy" variant of `0pt.query_source` yet, only the bounded
synchronous path described here.
## Architecture
```
Adapter: src/adapters/fabric-onelake-adapter.ts
- acquireFabricAccessToken(): Entra service-principal OAuth2
client-credentials flow (POST login.microsoftonline.com/{tenantId}
/oauth2/v2.0/token) — generalized from v0-datahub's
scripts/ops/cloud-bootstrap.mjs `aadToken()`.
- FabricOneLakeAdapter.query(): opens a TDS pool to the Fabric SQL
analytics endpoint using that token (azure-active-directory-access-token
auth), same shape as v0-datahub's lib/warehouse/fabric-sql.ts
`buildConfig()`/`runFabricQuery()`, generalized to caller-supplied
tenant/client/secret/endpoint/database instead of one customer's env vars.
Service: src/services/source-query-service.ts
- SourceQueryService.querySource(): looks up the Source via the existing
SourceService.getSource() (read-only — does not modify source-service.ts),
validates source_type/adapter_id, clamps max_rows/timeout_ms, races the
adapter query against a timeout, truncates rows, emits an AUD0 event,
always releases the adapter's connection.
Route: app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts
- POST { query, params?, tenant_id, project_id, actor_id?, correlation_id?,
max_rows?, timeout_ms?, connection_config } -> QuerySourceResult
- 400 on missing query/tenant_id/project_id/connection_config
- 404 when the source does not exist
- 422 (SourceQueryUnsupportedError) when source_type != "database" or
adapter_id != "fabric_onelake_sql"
- 504 (SourceQueryTimeoutError) on timeout
```
## Capability registration (CL0UD registry — verified this pass)
`0pt.query_source` is registered in `cl0ud`'s
`packages/capability-registry/src/registry.ts`:
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| `surfaces` | `['api']` only — no `cli`/`mcp`/`job` surface is enabled |
| `sync` | `true` |
| `requiresJob` | `false` |
| `piiLevel` | `'high'` — "ad-hoc SQL against an arbitrary registered source can return any column, including PII" (registry's own comment) |
| `riskLevel` | `'L2'` |
| `mcpEnabled` / `cliEnabled` | both `false` |
| `auditRequired` | `true` (comment: "emits `0pt.source_queried`") |
| `approvalRequired` | `false` |
This matches the platform-wide six-surface capability model: every `0pt.*`
capability registered today exposes `api` only (plus `job` for a couple of
the heaviest write paths) — none has a live CLI or MCP tool yet. Any claim
of a working `siax 0pt query-source ...` CLI command or an MCP tool for this
capability would be describing a target, not current reality.
**Discrepancy found this pass:** the registry declares `riskLevel: 'L2'` for
`0pt.query_source`, but `source-query-service.ts`'s own AUD0 emission (see
AUD0 section below) uses `risk_level: "L4"` on every `0pt.source_queried`
event — a two-level gap between what the capability is registered as and
what it actually reports. Unresolved; needs a decision on which is correct
(or whether the registry entry should simply be updated to `L4` to match
the live code, given "external read with a tenant's own credentials" is
arguably closer to `L4` than `L2`).
## AUD0 event
`event_type: "0pt.source_queried"`, `capability_id: "0pt.query_source"`,
`resource_type: "source"`, `risk_level: "L4"` in the code as written today
(see the registry discrepancy noted above). For comparison, other real,
verified `risk_level` usages elsewhere in this repo's services: `source-service.ts`
and `dataset-service.ts` use `"L2"` for their own metadata-write events;
`document-capture-service.ts` and `document-extraction-service.ts` use
`"L3"`; `external-writeback-service.ts` (`0pt.write_external_record`, a real,
tested service) uses `"L4"` for live writes to an external system with a
tenant's credentials — that is the closest real precedent for this
capability's choice of `"L4"`, not the `src/data-platform/services/catalog-service.ts`
citation an earlier version of this doc made up (that path does not exist
anywhere in this repo — confirmed via `find`).
Emitted on both success (`ok:true, row_count, truncated, duration_ms`) and
failure (`ok:false, error`) via the same `Aud0Client` pattern as
`source-service.ts` / `external-writeback-service.ts`. Like every other
`Aud0Client` use in this repo, this runs against the in-memory mock client —
no live AUD0 ingestion endpoint is reachable from this codebase today (no
`AUD0_URL` is read via `process.env` anywhere in the code). Treat this as
"real code, mock-only, not live-verified," not as "integrated."
## Known gaps / deliberately left out
- **`tenant_id`/`project_id` are read straight from the request body, not
bound to an authenticated session.** `app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts`
requires `body.tenant_id` and `body.project_id` as plain JSON fields (see
the route's own 400-check) and passes them straight through to
`SourceQueryService.querySource()`, which uses them unchecked for AUD0
scoping. This is **not** a deliberate two-tier trust design — it is
because **no auth/session system exists anywhere in this repo yet**
(`app/api/orders/route.ts`'s own `GET` handler has the literal comment
"org scoping added with auth" — i.e., not yet). Any caller can currently
claim to be any tenant simply by putting a different `tenant_id` in the
request body. This is one of several routes in this repo with the same
gap: `lakehouse/mappings/route.ts` and `sources/rate-policies/route.ts`
read `tenant_id`/`project_id` directly off the request body exactly like
this route does (verified by reading both files); `document-capture-service.ts`'s
own route (`app/api/0pt/documents/capture/route.ts`) does the same
(`body.tenant_id`/`body.project_id`). `lakehouse/mappings/[mappingId]/writes/route.ts`
is one hop removed — it takes no `tenant_id` field on its own POST body at
all; `IcebergWriteService.requestIcebergWrite()` instead pulls `tenant_id`/
`project_id` off the previously-stored mapping record (looked up by
`mappingId`), whose `tenant_id` was itself set, unauthenticated, via
`lakehouse/mappings/route.ts`'s POST body. Same underlying trust-chain
problem, one indirection further away — worth keeping the distinction
precise rather than implying all five routes share identical code shape.
The fix is an auth/session layer that server-binds `tenant_id` — that is
Simon's call, tracked as Phase 3 of `docs/09-build-plan.md`, not built
anywhere in this repo yet. Do not treat this route as tenant-isolated
until that lands.
- **`mssql` is not a declared dependency yet.** package.json and
pnpm-lock.yaml already have unrelated uncommitted changes from a separate
in-flight session at the time this capability was built, so adding a new
dependency there was avoided to prevent a collision. The adapter loads
`mssql` lazily via a non-literal dynamic import (works with any bundler/
typecheck without the package installed) and throws a clear, actionable
error if it's missing. Once package.json is settled, `pnpm add mssql` is
the only change needed to make `query()` hit a real Fabric endpoint — no
code changes required. As of this pass, this means `0pt.query_source`
cannot actually execute a live query against Fabric/OneLake yet — the
whole path up to the driver load is real and typechecks, but `query()`
will throw the "mssql package is not installed/resolvable" error on any
real invocation until the dependency is added.
- **In-memory `SourceService` is not shared across API route modules.**
Same pre-existing limitation as `sources/route.ts` /
`sources/[sourceId]/route.ts` (each Next.js route module instantiates its
own `SourceService`, so a Source created via `POST /api/0pt/sources` is not
yet visible to `POST /api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query` in the same running
process). `document-capture-service.ts` hit the same issue and added a
shared singleton for its own two routes; doing the same for Source would
mean editing `source-service.ts` and/or the two existing `sources/route.ts`
files, which was out of scope here to avoid touching that flagged area.
**Correction:** an earlier version of this doc, and the route file's own
header comment, said the real fix is "already pointed at by
`sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` (`opt_sources` table)." That file does
not exist and never has — `git log --all` returns zero commits for it, on
any branch. The `sql/` directory in this repo today contains only
`001_init.sql` and `004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql`; no `002` or `003`
migration has ever been created. The real fix is still "back
`SourceService` with real persistence" — just not via a file that exists.
(`app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts`'s own header comment
still makes this same broken reference; that is a code comment, not a doc,
so it's out of scope for this pass to edit, but it should be fixed
alongside whichever pass builds real persistence.)
- **No CL0UD policy check before executing a query.** Unlike
`external-writeback-service.ts` (`0pt.write_external_record`), which calls
`Cl0udClient.evaluatePolicy()` before executing a write, `source-query-service.ts`
has no `cl0ud` import and performs no policy check at all — confirmed by
reading the file in full. This synchronous read path is scoped as a
bounded preview read, not a governed job, but that's a design choice that
has not been written down or reviewed, not an enforced policy. Worth
revisiting once policy-gating on `0pt.query_source` is defined — and note
the CL0UD registry already declares `piiLevel: 'high'` for this
capability, which makes the absence of any policy check more notable, not
less.
- **No SQL rewriting/injection of `TOP`/`LIMIT`.** Row bounding is applied to
whatever the adapter returns, not pushed into the query itself (arbitrary
caller SQL can't be safely rewritten). A query that itself returns far more
rows than `max_rows` still executes in full on the warehouse before being
truncated client-side — only the *response* is bounded, not warehouse-side
compute. Documented, not silently hidden.
- **Cross-file fabrication this pass found and corrected here, but could not
fix everywhere it appears.** Several files in this repo (some in this
doc's own former text, some in code comments this pass does not own)
reference `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`,
`src/services/quality-report-service.ts`, `src/types/quality-check.ts`,
`src/types/quality-report.ts`, `src/data-platform/services/catalog-service.ts`,
`sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql`, and `sql/003_*.sql` as if they are real,
already-built, already-tested files. `git log --all` for every one of
those paths returns **zero commits, ever, on any branch** (`main`,
`feature/0pt-env-example`, `ci/add-quality-gate` all checked). These files
have never existed in this repository. This doc's own text used to make
this same false claim in three places; all are corrected above.
**Re-checked this pass:** `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md` has since been
corrected by a parallel pass — it now carries its own "Correction
(documentation-accuracy pass)" callout and its item 4 explicitly reads
"**NOT BUILT** ... there is no dedicated quality-check/quality-report
service in this repo as of this writing," so it no longer needs the same
fix. **`docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` has *also* since been fully
corrected** (re-verified this pass, reading the current file end to end):
its former internal contradiction — a top-of-file correction callout next
to a body that still asserted the fabricated files as real two sections
down — has been resolved. Its "Verification status" section now reads
"this section previously pointed at `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`
as a peer example ... that file does not exist," and its data-quality
section (retitled "Data quality: not yet built (corrected)") now quotes
its own old wording only inside a "this section previously read..."
framing before stating plainly that those files don't exist and were
never built. Neither section currently asserts the fabricated files as
fact. Code comments in `app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts`
(line 14: "`sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` already defines `opt_sources`")
and `src/services/external-writeback-service.ts` (line 21: "...
`quality-check-service.ts`/`document-extraction-service.ts` already
follow") still carry the same false reference — confirmed still present
as of this pass — and remain outside any of these docs' scope to fix
(code, not docs; flagging for whoever next touches those two files). See
`docs/P0_DATASET_QUALITY_FLOW.md` (added this pass) for the honest,
target-spec-only replacement for what those files were supposed to do.
## Known issue: which 0pt repo is authoritative
This repo has two remotes with diverged history — `github.com/sax3l/0pt` and
`git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt` (Gitea) — that share origin lineage for at least
part of the codebase but have each accumulated commits the other doesn't
have. Which one is deployed to `0pt.app`, and whether they're meant to stay
in sync, is unresolved and is Simon's call, not something this pass
attempted to resolve. Noting it here since this doc describes code that
lives in "the 0pt repo" as if there's exactly one.
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
# 0pt — SIAX Digital Ecosystem Data Acquisition & Entity Plan
Status: TARGET / IMPLEMENTATION CONTRACT
Date: 2026-09-07
0pt remains the generic external-data acquisition/enrichment/provenance capability. Product domains own their business entities and decisions. 0pt supplies sourced observations/enrichment/entity-resolution inputs and must not become a second Work/Press/Fund/CRM SSOT.
## 1. Ecosystem uses
### Work / j0b
- company/employer/end-client enrichment;
- registry/company facts;
- source acquisition where generic 0pt infrastructure is appropriate;
- buyer/supplier enrichment for procurement;
- entity-resolution inputs;
- public technology/company signals for account intelligence.
j0b owns opportunities, roles, requirements, consultants, matches and submissions.
### PRESS0
- public source monitoring/acquisition;
- official releases/datasets;
- source snapshots/enrichment;
- factual dataset/source metadata.
PRESS0 owns articles/citations/claims/editorial decisions.
### FUND0
- issuer/company/public market facts used in project materials;
- public registry/company enrichment.
FUND0 owns project/disclosure/investor/data-room state.
### FIT0/CRM
- account enrichment and market/buying signals;
- company identity resolution.
## 2. Provenance-first invariant
Retain the existing source hierarchy/principles and ensure each field/observation can carry source, observed/fetched time, freshness/confidence and transformation/version metadata.
No enrichment should silently overwrite a higher-authority canonical fact without provenance/precedence rules.
## 3. Lossless acquisition contract
Where a product needs raw upstream retention, 0pt should return/store an immutable acquisition/artifact reference plus metadata rather than only a lossy normalized subset. ST0RE custody is preferred for large raw payloads when integrated.
Target acquisition receipt fields include:
- source/provider;
- external ID/URL;
- fetched/observed times;
- payload/artifact hash/ref;
- parser/version;
- rights/reuse/retention classification;
- data classification;
- extracted observations/provenance.
## 4. Entity resolution
Add/use Splink or equivalent approved probabilistic entity-resolution capability where it materially improves cross-source linking.
Primary use cases:
- Brainville company = LinkedIn-export/company = JobTech employer = registry company = TED buyer = Twenty account;
- duplicate/similar organizations across countries/registries;
- person/consultant references when legally/purpose appropriate.
Entity resolution returns candidates/scores/evidence. Product/canonical identity merge remains policy/domain controlled; do not auto-merge high-risk records solely on fuzzy score.
## 5. Company identity keys
Prefer strong keys where available:
- country + official registration number;
- LEI;
- VAT ID;
- official registry IDs;
- verified domains.
Use probabilistic attributes only when strong IDs are missing/inconsistent.
## 6. Public procurement enrichment
Support acquisition/normalization references for buyer/supplier/award/contract datasets such as TED/OCDS/official sources. j0b procurement domain owns the commercial opportunity/access graph; 0pt supplies sourced external facts.
## 7. Source-policy metadata
Products may pass/receive policy metadata for:
- access method;
- reuse/redistribution;
- retention;
- polling/rate limits;
- terms/license review date;
- purpose/data classification.
0pt must not globally assume all publicly reachable web content is reusable for every commercial/public purpose.
## 8. PRESS0 rights boundary
Source acquisition/extraction is not publication permission. PRESS0 editorial/source-rights policy decides what may be quoted/reproduced/published. 0pt must preserve enough source metadata to support this decision.
## 9. Company verification boundary
0pt may fetch/enrich official company facts; ID0 owns verification decisions/KYB status. j0b/CRM consume verification refs/status from ID0, not infer `verified` merely because 0pt found a matching registry row.
## 10. Market/account signals
Target observations useful to FIT0/CRM/j0b:
- hiring activity;
- public procurement notices/awards;
- public technology/platform signals;
- company growth/change events;
- leadership/public contact changes where lawful;
- relevant product/market announcements.
Signals are dated observations with provenance, not permanent assertions.
## 11. API contract
Fit into actual 0pt architecture. Product consumers should be able to request/receive:
- company/entity enrichment;
- source acquisition receipt;
- structured observations with provenance;
- entity-resolution candidates;
- provider/source health/freshness where applicable.
Avoid bespoke endpoint copies for each product if generic typed capabilities suffice.
## 12. Security/privacy
- tenant/purpose scoping;
- PII minimisation;
- egress/allowed-host controls;
- SSRF prevention for user-supplied URLs;
- secrets in canonical secret store;
- no raw sensitive payloads in logs;
- retention/deletion support;
- provider/license/data-rights documentation.
## 13. Current deployment gate
Before j0b/PRESS0/FUND0 depend on 0pt as a mission-critical production service, reconcile the repo's current deployment/live endpoint status and close any documented routing/auth/hosting gap. Do not treat architecture/code as deployed merely because it exists.
## 14. Implementation order
1. Reconcile current live deployment, auth and data/provenance APIs.
2. Stabilise generic acquisition receipt/provenance contract.
3. Add Splink/entity-resolution capability with strong-key-first strategy and reviewable candidates.
4. Wire j0b company/end-client/buyer enrichment.
5. Wire FIT0/CRM account signals.
6. Add PRESS0 source/dataset acquisition when press0 exists.
7. Add FUND0 public issuer facts when fund0 exists.
8. Load/performance/backup/restore/live verify.
## 15. Definition of Done per data capability
- source/provider documented;
- legal/license/data-use classification recorded;
- provenance/freshness/confidence available;
- deterministic/idempotent normalization where expected;
- entity resolution tested against labelled truth set;
- tenant/purpose/security tests pass;
- provider outage/schema drift handled;
- raw artifact retention/deletion contract works where required;
- actual production endpoint/dependency is live verified;
- product consumes API/contract, not DB;
- status docs reflect reality.
Target ecosystem uses in this document do not claim they are already wired.
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# 0pt — capability status (Master-DoD §56 status honesty)
> Classification scale (Master-DoD §2, exactly one per capability):
> `MISSING → DOCUMENTED_ONLY → SKELETON → MOCK_ONLY → IMPLEMENTED → INTEGRATION_TESTED → LIVE_VERIFIED → PRODUCTION_READY`.
> Only `PRODUCTION_READY` may be called DONE. Docs ≠ implementation.
> Last full audit + re-classification: **2026-08-31** (SIAX Platforms P0 wave 2).
## How to read this
- **INTEGRATION_TESTED** here means: verified against a REAL dependency
(live OpenSearch/ClickHouse container, or a recorded wire-contract double
pinned to the sibling repo's real handler code on its `main`) in CI.
- **LIVE_VERIFIED** requires a verification against the actual SIAX fleet
deployment. No new capability in this wave claims it.
- The unit/contract/integration suites are in `tests/` and run in
`.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` (jobs `quality` + `integration`).
## Cross-product clients (Master-DoD §10 "Cross-product clients")
| Capability | Status | Evidence | Honest gaps |
|---|---|---|---|
| CL0UD client (policy evaluate, `POST /api/policy/evaluate`) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | `src/clients/cl0ud-client.ts`; `tests/contracts/cl0ud-client.contract.test.ts` pins the real camelCase `{data}` envelope; fail-closed (missing decision ⇒ deny) | Not yet exercised against a live CL0UD deployment (no reachable CL0UD URL this session ⇒ not LIVE_VERIFIED) |
| CL0UD capability discovery (`GET /api/capabilities`) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | same suite | 0pt's own capabilities are not yet registered in CL0UD's registry (§3 gap) |
| ST0RE client (artifact register, camelCase `/v1/st0re/artifacts/register`) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | `src/clients/st0re-client.ts`; `tests/contracts/st0re-client.contract.test.ts` | Raw-bytes upload still goes via LocalBlobStore interim (pre-existing, unchanged); presign upload path not consumed yet |
| N0D client (create/get job, get result) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | `src/clients/n0d-client.ts`; `tests/contracts/n0d-client.contract.test.ts` pins `required_role`/`resource_requirements`/body `idempotency_key` | CloudEvents completion callback receiving endpoint not built in 0pt (poll path works) |
| AUD0 client (events + OpenLineage ingest) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | `src/clients/aud0-client.ts`; `tests/contracts/aud0-client.contract.test.ts`; legacy lineage shape converts to real OpenLineage | No durable local outbox for AUD0 outages (§70 "durable local/outbox path" — emission failure is surfaced, not queued) |
| **No production mock fallback (§3/§10)** | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/platform/dependency-mode.ts`; `tests/contracts/dependency-mode.contract.test.ts` drives NODE_ENV=production for all four factories ⇒ hard `DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE` | — |
**Correction of prior state (2026-08-31):** the pre-existing clients' HTTP
paths were verified against the sibling repos' actual `main` branches and
THREE of four were wrong: cl0ud (`/v1/cl0ud/policies/evaluate` — never
existed), st0re (snake_case body — would 400), aud0 lineage
(`/v1/aud0/lineage/events` — never existed). All fixed and pinned by
contract tests. The earlier MOCK_ONLY classification in the README was
accurate.
## Data-OS capabilities (Master-DoD §10)
| Capability | Status | Evidence | Honest gaps |
|---|---|---|---|
| Source Registry — register/query/describe/health, rights/license/purpose, freshness, provenance | **IMPLEMENTED** | `src/services/source-registry-service.ts`, `src/types/source-registry.ts`; `tests/p0/source-registry.test.ts` (fail-closed purpose gate, cross-tenant NOT_FOUND) | In-memory persistence (per-process); no Postgres store yet — production boot must therefore configure one before this counts further. No API route surface yet |
| Source rate-policy | **IMPLEMENTED** (pre-existing) | `src/services/source-rate-policy-service.ts` | unchanged this wave |
| Search — OpenSearch adapter, index defs, bulk, tenant + purpose/rights filter, rebuild, generation switch | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/search/*`; unit `tests/p0/search-service.test.ts`; **real OpenSearch 2.11** `tests/integration/search-opensearch.integration.test.ts` incl. projection-disaster rebuild (§68-style) — runs in CI service container | Hybrid (vector) query not built; no metrics emission; index definitions in-memory |
| Quality — versioned rules, runs, results, issues, score, trend, GE interchange | **IMPLEMENTED** (local engine) / **SKELETON** (GE delegation) | `src/quality/*`; `tests/p0/quality-service.test.ts`, `tests/p0/expectation-engine` cases | Local engine covers 7 GE core expectation types; everything else delegates via N0D job `0pt.quality.ge_run` whose EXECUTOR (0pt-motor GE runner) does not exist yet — delegated runs stay "delegated" until it does. Never fabricates results |
| Dataset — create (pre-existing) + version/query/export with `st0re:artifact:` refs | **IMPLEMENTED** | `src/services/dataset-version-service.ts`; `tests/p0/dataset-version-service.test.ts` (idempotency §53, canonical refs §5) | Export assumes bytes already written by a job; no route surface; in-memory persistence |
| Lineage — OpenLineage emission to AUD0's real ingest | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | `src/lineage/*`; aud0 contract suite; emitted from dataset version/export, quality runs, search rebuilds | Emission is best-effort (never-throw); no outbox. AUD0-side ingestion verified against contract double, not live AUD0 |
| Metadata — OpenMetadata projection (never canonical) | **IMPLEMENTED** | `src/metadata/openmetadata-adapter.ts`; `tests/contracts/metadata-features.contract.test.ts`; `projectAll` rebuild path | No live OpenMetadata exercised (no local container this pass); lineage/glossary/ownership projection not built — only dataset entities |
| Analytics — ClickHouse, tenant-isolated, query limits, retention | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/analytics/clickhouse-analytics.ts`; **real ClickHouse 24.8** `tests/integration/analytics-clickhouse.integration.test.ts` (tenant isolation, closed DSL, TTL schema) — runs in CI service container | Closed metric-DSL only (no ad-hoc queries by design); no quota integration with CL0UD |
| Features — registry + Feast adapter | **IMPLEMENTED** (online path, registry) / **SKELETON** (materialize/get-historical) | `src/features/feast-adapter.ts`; contract suite pins Feast's `get-online-features` wire shape | No live Feast server exercised; offline/materialization are N0D delegation contracts whose executor (0pt-motor) does not exist yet; point-in-time correctness therefore NOT yet proven |
| Entity Resolution — candidate API, blocking, explanation, hard-rule hook, review handoff | **IMPLEMENTED** | `src/er/entity-resolution-service.ts`; `tests/p0/entity-resolution.test.ts` (hard rules override both directions, review band, blocking refusals) | Generic reference scorer (Jaccard+Levenshtein), NOT Splink probabilistic linkage — that is the `0pt.er.batch_resolution` N0D contract, executor pending in 0pt-motor. No persistence of review queues |
| Graph (§10 Graph) | **MISSING** | — | Not started this wave (explicitly out of the delivered P0 subset; next in line per §10) |
## Canonical platform plumbing
| Capability | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| SiaxRequestContext + propagation headers (mirror of cl0ud `@siax/contract`) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract-pinned) | `src/platform/siax-context.ts`; `tests/contracts/siax-context.contract.test.ts` |
| Canonical 12-code error model + typed `SiaxError` (§6) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract-pinned) | `src/platform/errors.ts`; same suite |
| Canonical resource refs (§5) | **IMPLEMENTED** | `src/platform/resource-ref.ts`; `tests/p0/dataset-version-service.test.ts` |
## Pre-existing capabilities (unchanged this wave — prior classifications stand)
| Capability | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Iceberg write boundary via ST0RE lakehouse | LIVE_VERIFIED (2026-07-13) | `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`; untouched |
| Document capture/extraction | IMPLEMENTED | LocalBlobStore interim persists bytes; ST0RE raw upload still pending |
| Edge order/payment app (Next.js) | see `docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md` | outside this wave's scope |
| FastAPI engine (`services/api`) | IMPLEMENTED | outside this wave's scope |
| `services/scrapers/*` (WAF-bypass stack) | **quarantined, pending deletion PR** | `feature/0pt-remove-noncompliant-scrapers` — NOT touched by this wave; nothing new wires it |
## Global gaps blocking PRODUCTION_READY (§3, tracked, not hidden)
1. Persistent stores REMAINING: quality runs/rules and feature views are
still per-process in-memory (`resolveStoreMode` guarantees production
boot FAILS rather than serving Maps). CLOSED since the last revision:
dataset registry (`opt_datasets`) + immutable versions
(`opt_dataset_versions`, monotonic under transaction lock, idempotency
with payload-drift detection, cross-tenant ⇒ NOT_FOUND) and versioned
search index definitions (`opt_search_index_definitions`, sequential
schema versions, replay-idempotent, same-version-different-schema ⇒
CONFLICT; OpenSearch remains a rebuildable projection, never canonical
truth) are Postgres-canonical with real-Postgres tests.
2. Capability registration in CL0UD + API0 discovery for the new
capabilities (§3 "Capability är registrerad i CL0UD Capability
Registry") — PARTIALLY CLOSED: the collaboration/meeting domain was
canonicalized in CL0UD's registry (cl0ud #73/#74); 0pt's own
capability set still needs the same registration.
3. CLOSED: AUD0 outbox for evidence durability under AUD0 outage (§70) —
durable Postgres outbox + dispatcher (at-least-once, bounded batch,
backoff, dead-letter, SKIP LOCKED leasing, tenant binding, idempotency)
+ real-Postgres tests; dispatcher uses explicit `durable:false` so it
never re-enqueues its own delivery evidence.
4. CLOSED for datasets/versions/search/ER: `app/api/0pt/datasets*`,
`app/api/0pt/search/definitions` + tenant-safed query route, and
`app/api/0pt/er/{candidates,batch}` (+ internal ER route) are live;
clients cannot raise `rights_tag` via request body (fail-closed to
`internal`). Quality routes exist (`bridge-run/issues/rules/runs`).
5. 0pt-motor executors for the delegated jobs
(`0pt.quality.ge_run`, `0pt.features.*`, `0pt.er.batch_resolution`).
6. Observability: no metrics/traces emitted by the new services (§36).
---
## P060-P068 ingestion plane (added 2026-09-04)
Classification scale unchanged. Every row below states what was actually
verified, and by which command.
| Requirement | BEFORE this pass | Status now | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| **P060** Source Registry: durable canonical registry; restart preserves sources; an unclassified source cannot be activated | **PARTIAL / BROKEN.** The registry existed with Postgres persistence (`sql/002_source_registry.sql`, `src/repositories/postgres-source-registry-repository.ts`) and carried source_id/tenant/project/type/status/license/purpose/rights. It had NO authorization, NO schedule, NO checkpoint, NO schema, and no `owner` distinct from `created_by`. The activation DoD was inverted: `postgres-source-repository.ts:70` wrote `${input.status ?? "active"}`, so a source with no rights, no provenance and no authorization was ACTIVE the instant it was registered, and no activation operation existed at all | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `sql/007_ingestion_plane.sql` (authorization/schedule/schemas/checkpoints + `ALTER … SET DEFAULT 'pending'` + `owner_id`); `SourceRegistryService.classifySource`/`activateSource`; `tests/p0/source-activation-gate.test.ts` (11); `tests/api/0pt-p060-routes.test.ts` (9); `tests/p0/ingestion-plane-postgres.realinfra.test.ts` against a live Postgres 16 |
| **P061** Connector contract: discover/validate/connect/checkpoint/read/resume/backfill/health/disconnect; two heterogeneous connectors pass one conformance suite | **MISSING.** `services/api/sources/connectors.py` had per-source `fetch_*()` functions only — no lifecycle, no cursor, no resume, no health, no disconnect, no conformance suite | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/connectors/connector.ts` (all nine operations); `src/connectors/conformance.ts` (15 checks); `HttpJsonConnector` (real node:http server, opaque cursor) and `JsonlFileConnector` (real file, line-offset cursor, CDC deletes) both pass the identical suite — `tests/p0/connector-conformance.test.ts`, which also proves the suite FAILS a fail-open connector |
| **P062** CDC/batch/stream normalized to one envelope; restart resumes from a durable checkpoint without silent gaps | **MISSING**, and documented as such: `services/api/tests/test_known_gaps.py:10-19` skipped the CDC case because no CDC pipeline existed anywhere, and `workers/pipeline.py` had no persistence at all | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/types/ingestion.ts` (one envelope for all three modes); `src/ingestion/ingestion-runner.ts`; `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts` kills a run inside the sink and proves the resumed run covers all 10 records exactly once; same proof against real Postgres across fresh processes |
| **P063** Schema versioning + compatibility policy; a breaking schema is detected before consumer corruption | **MISSING.** `schema_version` existed as a free-form string on datasets/Iceberg writes; there was no comparison, no policy, no versioned source schema | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/schema/compatibility.ts`, `src/schema/schema-registry.ts`; `tests/p0/schema-evolution.test.ts` (12); the runner's schema gate runs before the first read — `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts` asserts `sinkCalls === 0` on a break |
| **P064** Quality rules behind the SIAX abstraction; failures block or quarantine per declared policy | **PARTIAL.** `src/quality/*` had rules, runs, results, issues, scores and a GE-compatible engine, but a failing rule only opened an ISSUE — the data flowed on regardless. `grep -ri quarantin src/` found one unrelated hit | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/quality/quality-policy.ts` composes the EXISTING `ExpectationEngine` (not a second engine) and adds the consequence; block / quarantine / warn each proved in `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts`; quarantine durability proved against real Postgres |
| **P065** Normalization/ER: only the canonical highway; no second simplified production engine | **CLOSED.** `services/api/workers/resolve.py` is now a thin adapter: Python no longer scores identity — it POSTs opaque records to `/api/0pt/internal/er/candidates` and applies ONLY explicit hard-rule `match` decisions (score/fuzzy can never merge records, even from a compromised bridge); canonical engine unreachable ⇒ records return UNMERGED, never fallback-scored. Company semantics `stable-identifiers.v3`: LEI global; org_nr hard identity only within the same registration_country; punctuation normalized; negative stable identity dominates every positive; fuzzy alone ⇒ human review, never auto-merge. Cluster-wide hard-negative constraints: A≈B ∧ B≈C never forces A≈C when canonical identity says A≠C | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `tests/p0/entity-resolution.test.ts` (v3 semantics incl. hard-negative transitivity), `tests/p0/entity-resolution-http.test.ts` (internal route fails closed: empty/wrong token ⇒ 401), `services/api/tests/test_resolve_determinism.py` (adapter contract: canonical edges only), shared request validation (`src/er/request-validation.ts`, records 2..5000), blocking pytest gate (`.gitea/workflows/python-engine.yml`) |
| **P066** Iceberg | out of scope — ST0RE is owned by another workflow | **NOT TOUCHED** | Contract read only (`src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts`, `src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts`) |
| **P067** Lineage: OpenLineage/AUD0 events; source → output lineage is queryable | **PARTIAL.** `src/lineage/lineage-emitter.ts` emitted OpenLineage to AUD0, but nothing in this repo could ANSWER a lineage question — no store, no query, no route | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/lineage/lineage-edge.ts`, `src/lineage/lineage-store.ts` (local queryable projection; AUD0 stays the system of record), `GET /api/0pt/lineage`; `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts` queries both directions and proves tenant scoping |
| **P068** Durable bounded backfill/replay; repeated backfill is idempotent | **MISSING**, documented as such: `services/api/tests/test_known_gaps.py:44-52` skipped it because "no delivery-store persistence layer exists to dedupe a backfill against" | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `opt_ingestion_ledger` + `IngestionRunner.backfill`; `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts` (repeat emits 0, live checkpoint untouched, a real content change still re-emits); same against real Postgres |
### What was actually run (not "should pass")
- `pnpm run typecheck` — clean.
- `pnpm run test` — **365 passed, 25 skipped** (was 311/18 before this pass).
- `pnpm run build` — clean; the four new routes appear in the route table.
- `pnpm run lint` — 12 errors / 5 warnings, **all pre-existing** (identical
count on the base commit; advisory in CI). This pass adds none.
- Real Postgres 16: `tests/p0/ingestion-plane-postgres.realinfra.test.ts`
with `INGESTION_TEST_DATABASE_URL` — 7 passed.
- **Real container restart**, run manually against that same database:
`docker restart` the Postgres container, then re-read through the real
repositories. Before and after were identical — 2 sources (one `active`
with its owner, one `pending`), 1 checkpoint (cursor 6, 6 committed),
6 ledger rows, 1 lineage edge, 4 quarantined records, 1 schema version.
That is P060's "a restart preserves all sources", measured rather than
asserted.
### A real bug this pass wrote and then caught
The first draft of `IngestionRepository` combined the idempotency check and
its recording into one atomic call, made BEFORE the sink. The crash/resume
test then delivered **7 of 10 records**: the page in flight when the sink
died had already been marked delivered, so the resumed run skipped it as a
duplicate — permanent, silent data loss. The fix is the `peekDeliveries` /
`commitDeliveries` split, with both the ledger commit and the checkpoint
commit after the sink resolves. Recorded here because the failure mode is
the interesting artifact, not the fix.
### Honest gaps in the new plane (not hidden)
1. **Delivery is AT-LEAST-ONCE, not exactly-once.** Two concurrent runs on
the same (source, partition) can both peek "new" and both emit.
`envelope_id` is deterministic so a dedup-capable sink survives it. There
is no per-(source, partition) run lock. Do not describe this plane as
exactly-once.
2. **No CDC *source* exists.** The envelope, the operations and the runner
handle change events, and `JsonlFileConnector` emits real deletes from an
`_op` field — but this repo still has no Debezium/WAL/replication-slot
consumer. P062's contract is met; a CDC connector is still MISSING.
3. **0pt does not schedule itself.** `opt_source_schedule` is a declaration
ACT0 would read; there is no cron daemon here.
4. **The sink is caller-supplied.** The runner stops at the sink; the
lakehouse write boundary is ST0RE's (P066, another workflow's repo).
5. **Nothing here is deployed.** See the deployment note below.
6. **`QualityService`'s own rule/run/issue registry is still in-process
Maps** (`src/quality/quality-service.ts:47-50`). The new *enforcement*
path is durable; the older rule registry is not. Unchanged by this pass.
7. **Python tests still run nowhere.** `grep -rn "pytest" .gitea/workflows
.github/workflows` finds nothing — `services/api/tests/*` (9 files) has
never been executed by CI. Flagged, not fixed (it needs a workflow change
and a Python toolchain decision).
### Deployment reality, measured 2026-09-04
`https://0pt.app/api/health` answers **200** from **Vercel** with
`{"db":"not_configured"}`, and `https://0pt.app/api/0pt/sources` answers
**404** — the deployed build predates the entire `app/api/0pt/*` capability
layer. `https://api.0pt.app/health` answers **404** (the FastAPI engine is
not reachable), and `.gitea/workflows/cd.yml` still guards on
`COOLIFY_APP_ID = TODO-no-coolify-app-provisioned-yet`. So: none of the
capability layer — neither this pass's work nor P010/P014's — is running in
production, and P060's durability guarantee cannot be exercised there,
because production has no database configured and does not serve the routes.
Verified with `curl`; not inferred.
### P065 — closure record (2026-09-07)
The removal plan below was executed in full and is verified in CI:
1. ✅ Canonical ER exposed as `POST /api/0pt/er/candidates` (public,
tenant-safed) AND `POST /api/0pt/internal/er/candidates` (service-token,
fails closed without `X-Internal-Token`).
2. ✅ Python CI job: `.gitea/workflows/python-engine.yml` runs
`services/api/tests` as a BLOCKING pytest gate.
3. ✅ `workers/resolve.py` rewritten as the HTTP adapter — fail-closed to
UNMERGED records when the bridge is unreachable; no fallback scorer
remains. Cluster-wide hard-negative constraints prevent transitive
matches from overriding canonical identity decisions.
4. ✅ `services/api/tests/test_resolve_determinism.py` asserts the adapter
contract: canonical match edges merge; review/non-match edges do not;
hard negatives are respected transitively.
Residual honesty: the PYTHON-side tests run in CI, but the full
adapter→Next.js route chain has not been exercised against a live deployed
edge in this branch (the route's own fail-closed behavior is unit-proven).
That keeps P065 at INTEGRATION_TESTED, not LIVE_VERIFIED.
---
## SLUTPRODUKTIONS-VERIFIERING 2026-09-22 (live-mätt, ej påstått)
**Prod: `https://0pt.app` på flottan (server6, Coolify-app `shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g`),
container-image på exakt merge-SHA `df6ab70` via den signerade release-kedjan
(cosign-attestation verifierad före redeploy). DNS A → 65.109.19.146,
NS chris/maxine.ns.cloudflare.com — Vercel är borta.**
### Live-matris, mätt med curl (2026-09-22 04:09 UTC)
| Yta | Resultat |
|---|---|
| Front `/` + 10 nyckelsidor (bestall, katalog, kallor, tjanster, portal, admin, order) | 200 ×11 |
| `/api/health` | 200 `{ok:true, db:"ok", engine:"ok"}` |
| `/api/ready` | 200 (fail-closed-grinden: var 503 före DB-provisioneringen) |
| `/api/0pt/*` (9 rutter) anonymt | **401 ×9** — S1-luckan (2026-08-07: anonym 200) är STÄNGD |
| `/api/orders`, `/api/admin/metrics` anonymt | 401 |
| `/api/subscriptions` | 200 `[]` (var 500: migration 014, se nedan) |
| `POST /api/estimates` | 200 (edge räknar + engine-wire) |
| `GET /api/catalog`, `/api/sources` | 200 (publika läsvyter, avsiktligt) |
| `GET /api/vehicles` utan param | 400 (kräver reg-nr — korrekt) |
| Security headers | HSTS(63072000+preload) · CSP · XFO DENY · nosniff · ingen X-Powered-By |
### Denna pass fixat (3 PR, alla mergerade + deployade live)
1. **PR #80** — G17 hook-pin re-bump `7725498 → a401880` (re-review: 0 diff under
`ci/v2/reference-hooks/`). Release chain + gated deploy gröna igen.
2. **PR #81 (fix för issue #53)**: 7 legacy money-routes (orders, orders/[id],
subscriptions, payments/deposit, payments/release, webhooks/stripe,
admin/metrics) mappar nu `SiaxError(DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE, 503, retryable)`
via `app/api/siax-error-mapping.ts` i stället för att läcka Next opaka 500.
Stripe-webhooken svarar 503 `received:false reason:store_unavailable` på
store-outage — aldrig tyst `received:true` för ett betalt event som inte
processats. 3 nya tester pinar kontraktet.
3. **PR #86**: `sql/014_subscriptions_created_at.sql` — `lib/subscriptions-store.ts`
SELECT:ade `created_at` som `001_init.sql` aldrig definierat (42703 mätt live:
GET /api/subscriptions har ALWAYS varit 500 mot Postgres). Kolonnen ADD:ad
idempotent LIVE på 0pt-edge-postgres; route svarar nu 200 `[]`.
4. **PR #87**: cd-gatens not-ready-regex — cosign 3.1.3 säger
`no matching attestations:` (utan `found`); en transient not-ready misstolkades
som hårt verify-fel. Fail-closed för riktiga attestfel oförändrad.
5. **CI-infra reparerad**: repo-secrets `SIAX_CI_TOKEN` + `REGISTRY_TOKEN` var
döda efter token-svepet (2026-09-22 eng0-introspect-rotation revoade 107+ tokens;
fällan: 0pt:s repo-secret överrider org-secreten — org-PUT räcker inte). Nya
siax-ci-tokens (`write:package,read:package` + all) mintade och satta via
secrets-API (PUT 204, verifierade via lyckad release-kedja).
### 0pt-motor (engine, satellite)
- 6 containers Up på server6 (`motor-provisional`), core `/health` ok+pg+redis,
delivery `/version` = fb67870, core revision = 6cfd433 — båda IN main.
- CI grön på main (runs 55985/55987/56004) — healer-issue #38 (run 40562,
2026-09-20) stängd som transient runner-flake (apt-GPG under last).
- Bara `main` kvar i 0pt och 0pt-motor (8 + 6 stale grenar raderade — alla
bevisade redan mergerade via `git merge-base --is-ancestor`).
- motor/-executor-koden (signals/NER/normalization, 3507 rader nya sedan 6cfd433)
konsumeras av `Dockerfile.motor`-imaget som ännu inte har ett driftsatt runtime
i stacken (core/ingest/resolve/delivery importerar ej motor/ — verifierat
import-graf). Byggs enligt `scripts/build-images.sh` + `verify-image.sh`-gaten
när executor-ytan aktiveras — dokumenterat i `docs/runbook/deploy.md`.
### Kvarstår (ärligt, ej gömt)
1. **Stripe-creds** (Simon): live-keys → edge-envs `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`/`STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET`.
Innan dess förblir payments 501 och issue #67:s staging-triage kan ej köras.
2. **queue: not_configured** — ingen Redis i edge-stacken (ärligt rapporterat).
3. **`0pt.siax.io`/`motor.siax.io`**: medvetet ej återupprättade (0pt.app + lokala
127.0.0.1-portar är kanoniska ytor; issues #70/#35 stängda/avgjorda därefter).
4. **motor.siax.io**: motor:s publika yta kräver Simon-beslut (traefik-labels + DNS).
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
# ADR-0001 — Server-renderad authz-resolution för orderåtgärder
**Status:** Accepted
**Date:** 2026-09-29
**Owners:** 0pt (simon@siax.io)
**Related requirements:** DoD §21 (backend enforcement), §78 (error/why-UX), våg 3.6–3.7 (authz-ux/entitlement)
**Related capabilities:** `@siax/contracts/authz-ux` 0.10.0, `@siax/ui` ActionGate 0.11.1
## Context
Admin-ordkön behöver gate:a advance-aktionen. 0pt saknar klientsides-policy;
`requireOrderOwner` är server-side. Att resolvé:a i klienten vore påhittad
policy (DoD §15).
## Existing implementations
- PATCH `/api/orders/{id}` enforcar ägarskap server-side (sanningsvärdet).
- Admin-sidan hämtar ordrar via GET `/api/orders` (owner-scopad).
## Decision
**Server-renderad resolution:** GET `/api/orders` returnerar per order ett
frozen `advance_action` (ResolvedAction från `resolveAction`), derivat i
`lib/order-flow.ts` ur kanoniskt flöde + sessionens ägarskap. Klienten
renderar via `ActionGate` — ingen policylogik i UI-lagret. Ingen extra
fetch: resolutionen rids med ordningssvaret.
## Ownership
0pt äger flödet och resolutionen; DES1GN äger kontraktet (`authz-ux`) och
renderingen (ActionGate). Product Firewall: 0pt importerar @siax/*, aldrig
tvärtom.
## Contract
`ResolvedAction {state, reason?}` — stängda uppsättningar enligt authz-ux.
## Provider boundary
Framtida pay0-entitlement projiceras via `deriveEntitlement` in i samma
resolve — ingen ny endpoint behövs.
## Dependency rules
`@siax/ui`/`@siax/contracts` → 0pt. Aldrig reverse.
## Migration
Enda konsument: admin-sidan (denna PR). Övriga ytor migreras per aktion.
## Alternatives considered
- **Klientsides-resolution mot ny endpoint:** extra roundtrip, policy-läckage­
risk, mer kod — avvisad.
- **Hårdkodad disabled i UI:** duplicerar serverns sanningsvärde — avvisad
(DoD §21: backend är enforcement, UI är presentation).
## Risks
Flödesändringar måste skriva i `lib/order-flow.ts` (enda källan) —
lint-/test-täckning finns (tests/order-flow.test.ts).
## Testing / Evidence
- `tests/order-flow.test.ts`: available för aktiva steg, read_only för
terminala (incl. okända statusar i fri-text-DB) — 3/3.
- Full svit 1138+3 godkända; typecheck grön.
## Rollback
Ta bort `advance_action`-fältet + ActionGate-wrappen — klienten faller
tillbaka till tidigare rendering (flödet oförändrat).
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@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
# ADR-0002 — Kanonisk orderstatus: kodnivå-union + guardad DB-constraint
**Status:** Accepted
**Date:** 2026-09-29
**Owners:** 0pt (simon@siax.io)
**Related requirements:** C3 (kanonisera orderstatus), DoD §17 (backup-städ), §33 (migreringsordning), §35 (restore-drill)
**Related artifacts:** `lib/order-flow.ts` (`ORDER_STATUSES`, `OrderStatus`, `isKnownOrderStatus`, `nextOrderStatus`), `sql/015_order_status_check.sql`
## Context
`orders.status` är fri text (`sql/001_init.sql` line ~92: `status text NOT NULL DEFAULT 'draft'`).
Flödet draft→quoted→in_production→review→accepted→delivered är känt i kod, men
DB:n nekar inga andra värden — fri text har redan orsakat minst en missvisande
"klar"-visning i ordkön (okänd status renderades som "done/klar" utan att
ordern faktiskt levererats).
**Prod-harvest ej körbar i session** (2026-09-29): ingen `DATABASE_URL`/`POSTGRES_URL`
för 0pt finns i Infisical (varken default-env eller `/0pt`-sökvägar — körningen
injicerade 246 secrets utan order-DB-URL). Statusfördelningen i prod är därför
okänd här; migreringen är guardad och manuell.
## Existing implementations
- `lib/order-flow.ts` — NEXT_STATUS-flödet, `resolveAdvanceAction`, `buildOrderInboxItem`.
- `app/admin/page.tsx` + `app/api/orders/route.ts` konsumerar flödet.
- `tests/order-flow.test.ts` behandlar `cancelled` som terminal read_only-status.
## Decision
1. **Kodnivå-union är SSOT:** `type OrderStatus` = de sex flödesstatusarna +
`cancelled` (används i tests som terminal status — därmed med, trots utebliven
harvest). `ORDER_STATUSES` är den utömmande listan; `isKnownOrderStatus()`
klassar fri text fail-closed. NEXT_STATUS/resolveAdvanceAction/
buildOrderInboxItem konsumerar unionen via `nextOrderStatus()` — okänd
status ger alltid read_only / ingen inbox-post, aldrig påhittat nästa steg.
2. **DB guardas — inte typ-migreras:** `sql/015_order_status_check.sql` lägger
`CHECK (status IN (...)) NOT VALID` (fas A, kort lås, nekar vid dirt-data via
DO-preflight) och `VALIDATE CONSTRAINT` i separat session (fas B, SHARE UPDATE
EXCLUSIVE + `lock_timeout='5s'`). KÖRS EJ mot prod i sessionen — Simon kör
efter harvest-rapport och backup (`pg_dump -t orders` före fas A).
## Alternativ avvisade
- **Fortsatt fri text** — redan orsakat missvisande "klar"; ingen möjlighet att
fela tidigt vid skrivning.
- **Omedelbar NOT VALID utan harvest** — risk för prod-block: NOT VALID validerar
inte befintliga rader, men VALIDATE-fasen (och varje ny UPDATE) krockar med
okända statusar; utan känd statusfördelning är fas B en lotteri.
- **Postgres `enum`-typ** — kräver typmigrering av kolumnen (ALTER TYPE-lås,
ADD VALUE kan ej ske i transaktion i äldre PG), tyngre drift än en CHECK som
kan utökas med en rad kod + en rullande migrering.
## Consequences
- Ny status = en rad i `ORDER_STATUSES`/`NEXT_STATUS` + en uppföljningsmigrering
som lägger till värdet i CHECK:en (drop+add NOT VALID, validate igen).
- Rader med okänd status (om harvest hittar sådana) mappas i en EGEN, granskad
migrering före fas A — preflighten nekar annars körning (fail-closed).
- SQL-listan och kodlistan är dubbelbokning; testen i
`tests/order-flow.test.ts` låser att alla `ORDER_STATUSES` har definierat
beteende (nästa steg eller read_only).
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# 0pt Analytics Core — BI-P002 … BI-P012
Status of this document: it describes what **is in this repository and has been
run**, and states separately what has **not** been deployed. Nothing here is a
plan written in the present tense.
---
## 0. The ownership boundary (normative, not negotiable)
```
SIAX / 0pt owns the analytics engine, the query compiler, the tenant forcing,
the resource governance and the semantic/contract layer.
Product repos (VehIQ and the rest) own DOMAIN MEANING — what a row means,
which metric a dealer cares about, how a screen reads.
```
Concretely, and enforced rather than asserted:
* `BIApplicationBinding` (BI-P002 entity 19) has **no credential field**, in
TypeScript or in `sql/008_analytics_domain_model.sql`. A bound BI
application authenticates to the 0pt Analytics API with a CL0UD identity and
receives compiled, tenant-forced results. It never learns a ClickHouse DSN,
user, or password. Two tests assert the absence of such a column — one over
the migration text, one over `information_schema.columns` on a live
Postgres — so adding one later is a test failure.
* `AnalyticsIdentity` (BI-P009) is a **separate parameter** from the request,
never a field on it. This estate has already shipped a live cross-tenant
hole by reading a tenant out of a request body (INF0 Wave 2); the type
shape is what stops that recurring here.
---
## 1. What each prompt produced
| Prompt | Deliverable | Where |
|---|---|---|
| BI-P002 | 19 canonical entities + migrations + tenant-scoped persistence + restore drill | `src/analytics/domain/entities.ts`, `sql/008_analytics_domain_model.sql`, `src/analytics/repositories/analytics-domain-repository.ts` |
| BI-P003 | RAW / NORMALIZED / CURATED / SERVING, with the BI-surface read rule enforced | `src/analytics/domain/tiers.ts` |
| BI-P004 | `DatasetContract` + a fail-closed compatibility gate | `src/analytics/domain/contract.ts` |
| BI-P005 | Arrow IPC encode/decode + ClickHouse pass-through | `src/analytics/arrow/ipc.ts`, `src/analytics/arrow/flatbuffer-builder.ts` |
| BI-P009 | `SiaxAnalyticsEngine` interface + ClickHouse provider, existing implementation **preserved** | `src/analytics/engine/siax-analytics-engine.ts`, `src/analytics/engine/clickhouse-engine.ts` |
| BI-P010 | Four purpose-built ClickHouse tables + rollup MV, benchmarked | `src/analytics/engine/schema.ts`, `scripts/bi-p010-benchmark.mjs` |
| BI-P011 | Layered tenant isolation: verified identity, forced compiler predicate, restricted users, row policies | `src/analytics/engine/query-compiler.ts` |
| BI-P012 | Every named ClickHouse limit + CL0UD quota + per-tenant admission control | `src/analytics/engine/resource-governance.ts` |
---
## 2. BI-P009 — what "preserve" means here
`src/analytics/clickhouse-analytics.ts` is **byte-identical to main**. The new
engine composes it:
* `health()` delegates to it;
* the pre-existing `opt_metric_events` path is reachable through
`executeLegacyMetric()`, still using its own compiler;
* everything else uses the new compiler for the BI-P010 tables.
"Do not regress the existing forced tenant predicate" is enforced by
`tests/analytics/tenant-predicate-regression.test.ts`, which asserts the exact
string `tenant_id = {tenant:String}` on the URL the adapter builds. It has been
run with the forcing deliberately deleted from both compilers and goes RED
(2 of 6 tests fail); the transcript is
`evidence/bi-p002-p012/test-transcript.txt` §1–§2.
The eight capabilities are all implemented, with one **deliberate refusal**:
`executeQuery` (analyst SQL) throws `CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE` until BI-P017
(SQL dialect contract) and BI-P033 (analytics authorization) exist. Shipping a
raw-SQL surface first would create exactly the "raw SQL attempt" hole BI-P011
enumerates. It is declared and refused, not silently missing.
---
## 3. BI-P010 — why four tables, measured
BI-P010 warns against "one giant unbounded table for every analytics use
case". `scripts/bi-p010-benchmark.mjs` builds both fixtures and the
counterfactual, and times them. Measured on a disposable
`clickhouse/clickhouse-server:24.8` (full transcript:
`evidence/bi-p002-p012/bi-p010-benchmark.json`):
| Question | Purpose-built | One giant table |
|---|---|---|
| 90-day metric total, one tenant | **48.8 ms p50**, 40 960 rows read | 174.4 ms p50, **5 400 000** rows read |
| Vehicle point lookup by key, one tenant | **49.3 ms p50**, 8 192 rows read | 236.6 ms p50, **7 401 152** rows read |
| Avg asking price by make over 2M vehicles | **389.6 ms p50** | 680.8 ms p50 |
| Granules read for the metric total | **5 / 660** | 660 / 1 149 |
Fixtures: 5 400 000 SaaS events (200 tenants × 12 metrics × 90 days) and
4 000 000 vehicle projections (2M for the tenant under test + 2M decoys owned
by 50 other tenants).
**Honest finding that does not flatter the design:** at this scale the
`AggregatingMergeTree` rollup (37.98 ms p50, 21 416 rows read) was *not* faster
in wall time than scanning raw events (32.55 ms p50, 40 960 rows read). It
reads about half the rows, and its value is the long TTL — raw events expire
in 30 days, the rollup keeps three years — so the rollup earns its keep on
retention and on scale beyond this fixture, not on latency at 5.4M rows. Do
not quote it as a speed win.
---
## 4. BI-P011 — the isolation proof
Four layers, and each one is tested with the layer above it *removed*:
1. **Verified CL0UD identity.** `AnalyticsIdentity` is not part of the
request; a blank tenant or principal is `UNAUTHENTICATED`, never a wildcard.
2. **The 0pt query compiler forces the tenant.** Every compiled statement
contains `tenant_id = {tenant:String}` as its first WHERE condition, with
the value bound as an HTTP parameter — the tenant string never appears in
the SQL text.
3. **Restricted database users + row policies.**
`restrictedTenantUserDdl()` renders a per-tenant ClickHouse user with
`readonly = 1` and a `CREATE ROW POLICY ... USING tenant_id = '<tenant>'`
on every analytics table.
4. **Separate database/cluster tier** for very-high-isolation customers:
supported by construction — the engine takes a `database` and a `baseUrl`
per instance — but **not yet operated**, because there is no deployed
ClickHouse for 0pt analytics at all (see §7).
The proof, run against a disposable ClickHouse with 50 rows for `t_alpha`
(value 1 each) and 50 for `t_beta` (value 1000 each):
* **hole, layer 2 removed:** the same statement minus the forced predicate
returns **50 050** — both tenants in one number;
* **closed, layer 2 present:** `t_alpha` gets **50**, `t_beta` gets **50 000**;
* **hole, layer 3 absent:** an unrestricted user issuing a predicate-free
`uniqExact(tenant_id)` sees **2** tenants;
* **closed, layer 3 present:** the restricted user issuing the *identical*
statement sees **1**, and `sum(value)` returns 50 rather than 50 050.
Adversarial cases from BI-P011's list — tenant A querying B's dataset, forged
dataset IDs, raw SQL, SQL injection, dimension identifier injection, filter
injection — are covered in
`tests/analytics/query-compiler-injection.test.ts` (compiler layer) and
`tests/integration/analytics-tenant-isolation.integration.test.ts` (live).
Dimension names are **resolved through a per-tenant allow-list**
(`DimensionDefinition`), never escaped and never spliced. A tenant that has
declared no dimensions may reference none — fail closed.
---
## 5. BI-P012 — governance, and the partial-result trap
Every setting BI-P012 names is applied. Five ride on the statement itself
(`max_execution_time`, `max_result_rows`, `max_rows_to_read`,
`max_bytes_to_read`, `max_memory_usage`) under `readonly = 1`, so the query
text cannot re-raise them; `max_concurrent_queries` is a per-user quota plus a
local admission gate.
Overflow modes are **`throw`, never `break`**. That is not a style preference.
Measured on ClickHouse 24.8: with `result_overflow_mode = break` and
`max_result_rows = 10`, a 100 000-row query returns **HTTP 200 with 65 409
rows** and nothing in the payload says it is short. A truncated answer that
looks complete is the analytics form of a false green.
Query-bomb outcomes, each fired individually and identified by ClickHouse
error code: 158 `TOO_MANY_ROWS`, 307 `TOO_MANY_BYTES`, 159 `TIMEOUT_EXCEEDED`,
396 `TOO_MANY_ROWS_OR_BYTES`, 241 `MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED`.
The second half of the DoD — "without degrading unrelated tenant beyond
declared SLO" — is timed, not assumed: an unrelated tenant's interactive query
is run five times *while* an 8-second CPU bomb is in flight, must still return
the **correct** answer, and must stay under a declared 5000 ms ceiling (measured ~30 ms on an idle
server; the ceiling is set wide for a shared CI runner, and a genuinely
starved tenant would take seconds or fail).
Two measured details worth keeping:
* `EXPLAIN ESTIMATE` must **not** run under the caller's own
`max_rows_to_read`. It fails with code 158 exactly when the estimate would
be over budget — i.e. in the only case the estimate matters. Planner calls
use `planningSettings()`, a narrower envelope, instead.
* `SELECT count() FROM numbers(2e10)` is *not* a query bomb — ClickHouse
answers it in about 5 seconds because it can skip the values. The bomb in
the test hashes every row, which cannot be short-circuited.
---
## 6. BI-P005 — Arrow, and why it is not self-certified
Two paths:
* **pass-through** — ClickHouse emits Arrow IPC itself (`FORMAT ArrowStream`);
0pt streams those bytes unchanged. `output_format_arrow_string_as_string=1`
is required, or String columns arrive as Arrow **Binary** and both pyarrow
and DuckDB read them as bytes: silent semantic loss.
* **encoded** — for results 0pt assembles itself, `encodeArrowStream()` writes
the IPC stream, including a small hand-written FlatBuffers writer (no new
npm dependency, no new supply-chain surface).
A hand-rolled encoder is only worth having if somebody else's parser agrees
with it, so conformance is established by three independent implementations:
* **pyarrow 25.0.1** and **DuckDB 1.5.5** decode both ClickHouse's bytes and
0pt's bytes to *identical* values and types
(`evidence/bi-p002-p012/bi-p005-arrow-roundtrip.json`, verdict `PASS`);
* **ClickHouse's own Arrow C++** ingests 0pt-encoded Arrow — including a
20 000-row batch whose aggregates come back exact — in
`tests/integration/analytics-arrow-clickhouse.integration.test.ts`, which
runs on every push.
Supported types and their caveats are the table in `ARROW_TYPE_SUPPORT`;
`DateTime64(6|9)` and `UInt64` above 2^63 are deliberately **outside** the
supported set rather than silently lossy.
Arrow is also not an escape hatch from BI-P012:
`assertArrowWithinResultBudget()` decodes the row count and refuses a payload
over the caller's `max_result_rows`.
---
## 7. What is NOT done — verified, not assumed
* **There is no deployed ClickHouse for 0pt analytics.** Probed 2026-09-06 on
server7, the only ClickHouse in the estate: databases are
`opt_scraped`, `default`, `system`, `INFORMATION_SCHEMA`,
`information_schema`. There is no `opt_analytics` database, so
`ClickHouseAnalytics` — the "existing working" provider — has never been
run against a production instance. Everything in this document was proven
against disposable containers.
* **server7's ClickHouse must not be used for this.** It holds
`opt_scraped` — 51 tables, 407 793 471 rows, including `persons` and
`cz_owners`. That is the b0ts scraping plane, which
`src/analytics/clickhouse-analytics.ts`'s own header already prohibits this
module from touching (Ratsit/person-PII legal case, written DPIA
prohibition on quarantined market data). It also has **zero** columns named
`tenant_id` or `project_id` anywhere on the server and **zero** row
policies, so it could not satisfy BI-P011 even if it were legally
available. Nothing on that server was modified by this work.
* **BI-P011 layer 5** (separate database/cluster tier per high-isolation
customer) is supported by construction but not operated.
* **`executeQuery`** is refused pending BI-P017/BI-P033 (§2).
* The domain repository covers `AnalyticsDataset`, `DatasetVersion`,
`MetricDefinition`, `MetricVersion` and `DimensionDefinition`. The other
fourteen entities have tables, constraints and types but no repository
methods yet; their consumers (dashboards, reports, quality runs, lineage)
arrive with BI-P025 … BI-P035.
---
## 8. Running the proofs yourself
```bash
# unit suites (no infrastructure)
pnpm vitest run tests/analytics
# live ClickHouse suites
docker run -d --name opt-bi-ch -p 18123:8123 \
-e CLICKHOUSE_USER=opt_admin -e CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=<throwaway> \
-e CLICKHOUSE_DEFAULT_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT=1 clickhouse/clickhouse-server:24.8
CLICKHOUSE_URL=http://localhost:18123 CLICKHOUSE_AUTH=opt_admin:<throwaway> \
pnpm vitest run tests/integration
# BI-P002 restore drill
docker run -d --name opt-bi-pg -p 15455:5432 \
-e POSTGRES_USER=opt -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<throwaway> -e POSTGRES_DB=opt_bi_test \
postgres:16-alpine
ANALYTICS_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgres://opt:<throwaway>@localhost:15455/opt_bi_test \
pnpm vitest run tests/analytics/analytics-domain-postgres.realinfra.test.ts
# BI-P010 benchmark and BI-P005 external roundtrip (rewrite the evidence files)
CLICKHOUSE_URL=... CLICKHOUSE_AUTH=... node scripts/bi-p010-benchmark.mjs
CLICKHOUSE_URL=... CLICKHOUSE_AUTH=... node scripts/bi-p005-arrow-roundtrip.mjs
```
Both scripts CREATE and DROP a database. Never point either at server7 or at
any ClickHouse holding b0ts or quarantined market data.
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
# BI-P060, P061, P103, P104, P105 — dashboards, SLOs, benchmarks, pre-aggregation
Extends the analytics core (`0pt#34`, BI-P002..P012) and the query/metric/quality
layer (`0pt#35`). Nothing there is rebuilt: `DashboardDefinition` and
`DashboardVersion` were already canonical entities with tables in `sql/008`, and
these prompts give them behaviour.
Organised, like its predecessor, around what is **proven** and what is **not**.
---
## Where things live
| prompt | module | live proof |
| ---------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| BI-P060 dashboard model | `src/analytics/dashboards/dashboard-document.ts` | unit (pure model + planner) |
| BI-P061 dashboard versioning | `src/analytics/dashboards/dashboard-release.ts`, `sql/010` | `tests/analytics/dashboard-release-postgres.realinfra.test.ts`, Postgres 16.15 |
| BI-P103 BI SLO | `src/analytics/slo/bi-slo.ts`, `slo/usage-events.ts` | unit; measurement path is `aud0#34`'s seven event types |
| BI-P104 benchmark harness | `src/analytics/bench/benchmark-harness.ts` | `tests/integration/bi-p104-benchmark.integration.test.ts`, ClickHouse 26.3.10.60 + DuckDB 1.5.5 |
| BI-P105 materialization | `src/analytics/materialization/` | `tests/integration/materialization-drift-clickhouse.integration.test.ts` |
Evidence: `evidence/bi-p061/dashboard-release-race.json`,
`evidence/bi-p104/benchmark.json`, `evidence/bi-p105/materialization-drift.json`.
---
## BI-P060 — the dashboard is a document, not a Superset export
`layout_json` was a string, and a string holds anything. The canonical document
carries `layout / filters / widgets / parameters / refresh / permissions /
version`, and a widget references **a metric, a contract query and a
visualization spec** — never a vendor's internal id.
The DoD is a function. `planDashboard(document, { parameters })` returns, per
widget, a runnable `AnalyticsQueryRequest` (BI-P016) plus a render spec. If it
returns a plan, the dashboard can be drawn by anything that executes the
contract and draws the twelve canonical visualization types.
Rules that are enforced rather than documented:
- a widget whose only content is a vendor id is **refused** — that is exactly
the document that cannot be reconstructed;
- `vendor_ref` may carry a Superset/Metabase id for round-tripping, but it is
excluded from the canonical hash, so re-exporting into a new Superset instance
does not fabricate a new dashboard version;
- vendor-native keys (`viz_type`, `form_data`, `position_json`, `slice_id`, …)
are refused with a message that names the rule;
- query widgets go through `parseAnalyticsQueryRequest`, so a dashboard cannot
become an SQL surface and cannot name a tenant;
- a locked filter cannot be switched off by a viewer — locked filters are how a
saved dashboard pins its scope, and removing one silently widens the result.
---
## BI-P061 — releases are a ledger
`DRAFT → PUBLISHED → SUPERSEDED`, stored in `opt_analytics_dashboard_release`
(`sql/010`) rather than as a column on the version row: `sql/008` already makes
`DashboardVersion` immutable at the database, and a lifecycle column there would
have meant weakening that. The **document** is frozen; the **release** moves.
The database enforces the state machine, not the application:
| attempted | result |
| ------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |
| `published → draft` (un-publishing) | refused — it is how a rollback gets faked |
| `superseded → published` | refused |
| repointing a release at another version | refused (every content column is frozen on UPDATE) |
| rewriting `document_hash` or `published_at` | refused |
| `DELETE` on a release | refused — the ledger has no eraser |
| a `published` row with no `published_at` | refused by CHECK |
| a second open draft for one dashboard | refused by a partial unique index |
**Rollback mints a new version.** It does not resurrect the old release row.
"We went back to v3" becomes a timestamped fact (v5 carries
`rollback_of_version = 3`) instead of a hole in the history where v4 used to be.
The restore is verified by BI-P060 canonical hash, and `documentOf()` refuses to
serve a stored document whose hash no longer matches its release.
### The concurrency claim, measured both ways
`DashboardReleaseService.publish()` checks for a live release before writing.
That check is a read-then-write race and is **not** the guarantee.
`evidence/bi-p061/dashboard-release-race.json`, Postgres 16.15:
| run | partial unique index | transactions committed | published releases after |
| --------------- | -------------------- | ---------------------- | --------------------------- |
| `guard_absent` | dropped | 2 | **2 — two live dashboards** |
| `guard_present` | in place | 1 (loser `23505`) | 1 |
Reproduce with `node scripts/bi-p061-release-race.mjs`.
---
## BI-P103 — SLOs measured from AUD0, or declared unmeasured
The measurement path is `aud0#34`'s seven BI usage event types (BI-P076). aud0's
own doc records that zero producers emit them; `src/analytics/slo/usage-events.ts`
makes 0pt the producer. There is deliberately no second telemetry path — two
measurement systems disagree, and the disagreement surfaces during an incident.
| workload | objectives |
| --------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| interactive dashboard | availability, p95 first query, p95 cached, error rate, freshness |
| exploration | p95, p99, max result, timeout |
| report | completion SLA, delivery SLA |
Three verdicts that are not "met":
- **`insufficient_data`** — an availability objective over an empty window is
silence, not 100%. A started query with no terminal event is _unresolved_, not
a success.
- **`not_measurable_here`** — dashboard **freshness** is a property of the
dataset (BI-P026 / BI-P105 watermark) and report **delivery** is N0TIFY's
receipt. Neither exists in the seven event types, so both are declared
unmeasured rather than proxied by completion.
- **`low_confidence`** — a p99 over 12 samples is the 12th-slowest request
wearing a percentile's clothes. Reported with its sample size, not judged.
The producer is an allowlist built field by named field. `compiled_sql`,
`error_message`, `tenant_id`, filter **values** and result samples exist on the
0pt-side telemetry type and are never mapped; a `query_hash` that is not a
64-hex digest is dropped rather than reshaped.
### Honest status
`BI_SLO_CATALOGUE`'s targets are **starting thresholds, not derived baselines**.
No production BI traffic exists yet, so the first real baselines will come from
the first weeks of emitted events. The evaluator is built so that absence shows
up as `insufficient_data` until then, rather than as a green dashboard.
---
## BI-P104 — the harness refuses to quote one number
Six dataset profiles × two engines, 2 warmups discarded, 9 timed repetitions,
statistics from the shipped module. `evidence/bi-p104/benchmark.json`.
- **Overlapping ranges are `indistinguishable`**, whatever the medians say.
Three of the six real comparisons came out that way, one with a 1.6x median
gap — the headline a noisy host manufactures for you.
- **Every sentence carries the range, the sample size and the stability**, so it
cannot be trimmed to "4.4x faster" without visibly deleting the caveats.
- **Under 5 samples nothing is comparable.** A three-run benchmark is an anecdote.
- **Every engine BI-P104 names appears**, and the five nothing measured carry a
reason each.
Measured (warm cache, one idle host, these query shapes only):
| dataset | verdict, DuckDB 1.5.5 vs ClickHouse 26.3.10.60 |
| --------------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
| small_saas | faster, 1.6x–8.2x (median 4.4x) |
| medium_business | indistinguishable (medians 1.6x apart) |
| vehiq_market | faster, 2.4x–13.3x (median 5.8x) |
| large_event | **slower**, 0.2x–0.9x (`count DISTINCT`, 5M rows) |
| wide_table | indistinguishable |
| geospatial | indistinguishable |
Not exercised, with reasons in the evidence: **trino** (the running instance
belongs to another lane; benchmarking through it would measure their
configuration), **semantic_query** (MetricFlow has never executed in 0pt),
**superset**, **native_charts** (DES1GN owns rendering), **perspective**.
---
## BI-P105 — freshness semantics, and why freshness is not correctness
### The vocabulary
| term | definition |
| ------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `data_watermark` | the newest **source** timestamp the aggregate represents. Absent = **UNKNOWN**. |
| staleness | `now − data_watermark`, in seconds. `undefined` when the watermark is unknown. |
| `max_staleness_seconds` | the freshness contract. Older than this and the aggregate stops serving. |
| `drift_check_interval_seconds` | how often the aggregate must be re-proved against its source to keep serving. |
| `last_drift_verdict` | `match` / `drifted` / `insufficient_data` from the last comparison. |
**UNKNOWN is never treated as current.** This is the same doctrine BI-P026
applies to result freshness: a missing watermark is a refusal, not a zero.
### The routing rule
A materialization serves **only** while it is provably current _and_ provably
undrifted. Eight named refusals, each a real way an aggregate becomes a
confident liar:
`coverage_miss` (metric/dimension/grain not carried — including a filter on a
dimension the aggregate already summed across) · `watermark_unknown` ·
`staleness_exceeded` · `window_beyond_watermark` (the question reaches past the
newest data; answering would silently shorten the period) ·
`drift_never_verified` · `drift_verification_stale` · `drift_detected` ·
`state_not_serving`.
`drift_never_verified` is the one people leave out and the one that matters on
launch day: a brand-new aggregate is exactly as unproven as a drifted one.
Grain rollup is restricted, not assumed: a `day` aggregate answers `day` and
coarser, never `hour`; a `week` aggregate answers only `week`, because weekly
buckets do not compose into calendar months.
### Drift detection
- **A missing bucket is drift** even when every value present is correct — late
arrivals and a materialized view created after the backfill both look like
this, and a value-only comparison passes while the total is wrong.
- **An extra bucket is drift** — the source rows are gone and the aggregate is not.
- **An empty comparison is `insufficient_data`, never `match`** (the BI-P025
false green, restated for pre-aggregates), and it takes the aggregate out of
service rather than annotating it.
- **Both tolerances must hold.** 0.1% of a 40M bucket is 40 000 kr of invisible
error; an absolute-only bound flags every rounding difference on a large bucket.
### The proof, on a live ClickHouse
`evidence/bi-p105/materialization-drift.json`, ClickHouse 26.3.10.60, 2M rows,
a real materialized view:
| step | result |
| ------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| after backfill | `match`, 48 buckets, 801 571 002 on both sides |
| GDPR erasure | `ALTER TABLE sales DELETE …`. An MV is an INSERT trigger and never sees a mutation. |
| what would be served | 801 571 002 against a true 761 580 554 — **39 990 448 overstated, 5.251%** |
| staleness at that moment | **1 second.** Every freshness check passed. |
| guarded router | `base_table` (`state_not_serving`) |
| counterfactual | a staleness-only router **serves it** — measured, not assumed |
| after rebuild | `match`, and routing returns to the materialization |
That last row of the counterfactual is the whole point of the prompt: staleness
is not correctness. The aggregate was one second old and wrong by 5%.
### Measured improvement, honestly
Same drill, base table vs pre-aggregate, 9 repetitions interleaved: p50 3.4x,
but the run-to-run range spans **0.6x–7.5x** on an otherwise idle host — one
sample had the pre-aggregate slower than the base table's best run. Quoting
"3.4x" as a property of the system would be misleading, which is why BI-P104's
harness exists.
---
## What is NOT proven here
- **No dashboard has been rendered.** BI-P060 produces a plan; drawing it is
DES1GN (`DES1GN#9`) and `siax-portal#5`. Nothing in this PR proves a pixel.
- **The release service has no Postgres adapter yet.** The lifecycle is proven
in-memory and the _schema_ is proven against live Postgres; wiring
`DashboardReleaseStore` to `postgres.js` is the next step and is the only
place where the two could drift apart.
- **Zero real SLO events have been emitted in production.** The producer and the
evaluator are tested; no BI surface calls the producer yet, so every objective
would today report `insufficient_data`. That is the honest empty state, and it
is deliberately visible rather than hidden behind a default.
- **No materialization is deployed.** The router and detector are proven against
a live ClickHouse in a throwaway database. Nothing schedules a refresh or a
periodic drift check yet — that belongs with ACT0/N0D scheduling.
- **Trino, Superset, MetricFlow and Perspective are unmeasured**, for the
reasons recorded in the benchmark evidence.
+160
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
# BI-P014, P016–P022, P025–P026, P028–P031 — query, metric, quality
Extends the analytics core merged in `0pt#34` (BI-P002..P012). Nothing there is
rebuilt.
This document is organised around what is **proven** and what is **not**,
because the second list is the one that gets dropped.
---
## Where things live
| prompt | module | live proof |
| -------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- |
| BI-P014 DuckDB provider | `src/analytics/providers/duckdb-provider.ts` | `tests/duckdb/duckdb-provider.live.test.ts` |
| BI-P016 query request contract | `src/analytics/contract/query-request.ts`, `compile-clickhouse.ts`, `compile-semantic.ts` | unit only (pure compilation) |
| BI-P017 analyst SQL contract | `src/analytics/sql/` | `tests/integration/analyst-sql-clickhouse.integration.test.ts` |
| BI-P018 execution model | `src/analytics/execution/query-execution-record.ts` | `sql/009` + Postgres realinfra |
| BI-P019 cancellation | `src/analytics/execution/cancellation.ts` | `tests/integration/query-cancellation-budget.integration.test.ts` |
| BI-P020 query cache | `src/analytics/cache/query-cache.ts` | unit only (no engine involved) |
| BI-P021 cost / budget | `src/analytics/cost/query-budget.ts` | same live suite as BI-P019 |
| BI-P022 dbt contract | `src/analytics/transform/dbt-contract.ts`, `analytics/dbt/` | contract only — execution is `n0d#38` |
| BI-P025 quality provider | `src/analytics/quality/` | `tests/integration/data-quality-clickhouse.integration.test.ts` |
| BI-P026 freshness | `src/analytics/quality/freshness.ts` | unit + `sql/009` defaults |
| BI-P028/P031 metric model + governance | `src/analytics/metrics/metric-model.ts` | Postgres trigger, realinfra |
| BI-P029 semantic provider | `src/analytics/metrics/semantic-provider.ts` | **partially — see below** |
| BI-P030 semantic registry | `src/analytics/metrics/semantic-registry.ts` | unit + Postgres constraints |
---
## Five findings that changed the implementation
Each was found by writing a test that could fail, and each is pinned so it
cannot quietly stop being true.
### 1. ClickHouse `readonly = 1` on a user profile forbids **every** request setting
Measured on 24.8.14.39. A user whose profile carries `readonly = 1` answers
`Code: 164. Cannot modify 'max_rows_to_read' setting in readonly mode` to any
setting sent with the statement. So BI-P012's ceilings **cannot travel with an
analyst statement** — they are baked into the user's `SETTINGS PROFILE` at
provisioning. Proven both ways: an over-budget scan fails with code 158 from
the profile with no setting sent, and an attempt to raise it from the request
fails with 164.
### 2. `CREATE ROW POLICY IF NOT EXISTS` is a silent no-op on re-provisioning
Dropping a user empties the policy's apply-to list. The next provisioning run
sees the policy exists and does nothing, so it survives with
`apply_to_list = []` — applying to **nobody** — while `system.row_policies`
still shows the correct `select_filter`. The restricted user read 100 of 100
rows, **both tenants**, from the base table.
Fixed with `OR REPLACE`, plus `rowPolicyVerificationSql()` which turns "the
policy is applied" from an assumption into a query, and a test asserting
`applied_to_user = 1` per object. `CREATE SETTINGS PROFILE IF NOT EXISTS` has
the identical shape and is fixed the same way.
### 3. DuckDB's `allowed_directories` **alone** is a no-op
Measured on 1.5.5. With `allowed_directories` set to one mount directory and
nothing else, `read_csv('/etc/passwd')` **returned the file** and an `https://`
URL was fetched over the network. Only `enable_external_access = false`
alongside it makes the allow-list bind.
The obvious spelling of this control appears in `duckdb_settings()`, looks like
a sandbox, and permits everything. The measurement is pinned by a test that
never skips, so simplifying the bootstrap breaks the build rather than the
guarantee.
### 4. `pg_constraint.conname` is not schema-scoped
`SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint WHERE conname = '...'` matches a same-named
constraint in **any** schema, so `sql/009` applied into a second schema
silently skipped every guarded `CHECK`. Every guard now scopes via
`conrelid = '<table>'::regclass`.
### 5. `describe.skipIf(flagSetInBeforeAll)` skips **always**
Vitest evaluates `skipIf` at collection time. Ten tests reported green while
skipping against a live, reachable ClickHouse. Replaced with the repo's
env-var gate, which **fails** when the variable is set and the server is down.
---
## What is NOT proven
- **BI-P029 / MetricFlow was never executed.** No Python runtime is
provisioned for this repo's CI, and BI-P029's "pin a currently verified
version" needs a licence and supply-chain review that has not happened.
`MetricFlowProvider.providerReadiness()` returns `verified: false` and names
all four open items. What _is_ proven is that the engine-neutral spec
compiles to a MetricFlow-shaped query and that canonical SIAX metric ids
survive a provider swap — tested against a second, deliberately
different-named provider so the equality is not trivially true.
- **The Superset integration path and the AI Analyst comparison** (BI-P029's
other two DoD surfaces) are not implemented.
- **dbt is not run here.** `DBT_RUNTIME_PIN` has both review flags `false`, and
`assertDbtRuntimeCertified` refuses a production run until they are true.
- **DuckDB Arrow IPC** is unproven: the `arrow` extension is a network install
the offline environment could not download. `readiness()` says so.
- **BI-P021's budget is a bound, not a hard cap.** In-flight enforcement is
granular to the poll interval, so the query overshoots between polls — and on
a columnar engine the overshoot is large. In the committed run
(`evidence/bi-p019-p021/`) a 1,000,000-row window cancelled the query at
**153,318,696 rows**, 55 ms in: a **153×** overshoot. The figure is
machine-dependent and moves between runs (an earlier run on the same box
recorded 131 M / 130×), which is itself the point — the bound is "roughly one
poll interval of engine throughput", not a number. It is still a bound: the
same query, unwatched, read **4,227,318,261 rows** before cancellation in the
BI-P019 case. Anyone quoting it as a hard cap is wrong.
- **The per-process window store does not bind across replicas.**
`describeEnforcement()` reports `"with N replicas a tenant can spend up to N
times this budget"`. A shared store (Valkey, or the CL0UD quota service)
behind `SharedWindowStore` is required for it to bind.
---
## Running the live suites
```bash
docker run -d --name ch -p 28123:8123 -e CLICKHOUSE_SKIP_USER_SETUP=1 \
clickhouse/clickhouse-server:24.8
docker run -d --name pg -p 25433:5432 -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=test \
-e POSTGRES_DB=opt postgres:16-alpine
CLICKHOUSE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:28123 pnpm vitest run tests/integration
ANALYTICS_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgres://postgres:test@127.0.0.1:25433/opt \
pnpm vitest run tests/analytics/analytics-governance-postgres.realinfra.test.ts
python -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install duckdb pyarrow 'pyiceberg[sql-sqlite]'
DUCKDB_PYTHON=.venv/bin/python pnpm vitest run tests/duckdb
```
Every one of these **fails** rather than skipping when its variable is set and
the backend is unreachable.
---
## One note for whoever maintains `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`
Not changed here — it is a protected file, and this branch touched none.
The integration job's guard is:
```sh
if grep -qE "skipped" /tmp/itest.log && ! grep -qE "Tests [0-9]+ passed" /tmp/itest.log
```
Vitest writes that summary with ANSI colour codes, so the literal text is
`Tests [22m [1m[32m81 passed[39m…`. The second pattern therefore **never
matches**, and the guard is effectively "any skip fails the job" rather than
the "skipped _and_ nothing passed" it reads as. That is stricter than intended,
not looser, so nothing is currently unguarded — but the escape hatch does not
work, and someone will eventually be puzzled by it. Piping through
`sed 's/\x1b\[[0-9;]*m//g'` before the grep would restore the intended
behaviour.
This is how the DuckDB suite's placement was caught, so the guard earned its
keep either way.
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# API deprecation policy — 0pt
BACKLOG P6 (API-24). There is exactly one prior breaking-ish change in this
repo's history to learn from: `services/api/orchestrator/main.py` moved from
`src/orchestrator` (docs/09-build-plan.md Phase 0) — internal, pre-contract,
no external consumers yet. This policy is written before it's needed for a
real consumer, on purpose (BACKLOG's own framing: "cheaper to write the
policy than to clean up after breaking someone").
## What counts as breaking
- Removing a path, operation, or required request/response field from
`contracts/openapi.yaml`.
- Narrowing an accepted value (enum shrink, type tightening) on a request field.
- Changing a response field's meaning without changing its name/type.
- Changing default auth/tenant behavior on an existing route (e.g. what
BACKLOG P0-4 fixed — the reverse of a break, but the same class of change).
Not breaking: adding an optional field, adding a new path, widening an
accepted value, adding a new enum member a client can ignore.
## Process
1. Mark the field/path `deprecated: true` in `contracts/openapi.yaml` with an
`x-siax-deprecated-since` date and a one-line replacement pointer.
2. Keep the deprecated shape working for **at least one release cycle**
after the replacement ships (see `CHANGELOG.md` once real releases/tags
exist — BACKLOG P1-3).
3. Announce in `CHANGELOG.md`'s `[Unreleased]` section before merge, not
after.
4. Only remove once nothing in this repo's own consumers (Protosell/FiveCRM,
VehIQ per `CLAUDE.md`) is verified to depend on the old shape — "verified"
means checked against those repos, not assumed silent.
## What this repo does NOT have yet
No consumers are known to be live against this contract yet
(`docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md` §2 "Beroenden nedåt": "Inga sådana
anrop finns i det här repot" — unverified downstream). This policy exists
so the first real breaking change has a process to follow, not because one
has happened.
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# API docs — 0pt
BACKLOG P1-20 (DOC-07/08). This directory did not exist before this pass.
**Source of truth:** [`contracts/openapi.yaml`](../../contracts/openapi.yaml)
(OpenAPI 3.1, `0pt Data OS API`). Route handlers in `app/api/*` realize
these contracts; `x-siax-status` on each path says whether it's `live` or
contract-first (target).
This directory does **not** duplicate the contract as hand-written prose —
that would drift the moment one of them is edited and not the other (exactly
the kind of stale-doc problem this whole compliance pass exists to fix).
Instead:
| Question | Where to look |
|---|---|
| What routes exist, request/response shapes | [`contracts/openapi.yaml`](../../contracts/openapi.yaml) directly, or render it with any OpenAPI viewer |
| Which routes are live vs. target-only | `x-siax-status` field per path in the same file |
| Risk level + auth requirement per route | `docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md` §3 "API-yta" |
| Capability → surface (API/CLI/MCP/UI) coverage | `docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md` §5 "Ytor och paritet" |
| The separate FastAPI engine contract (`services/api`) | `docs/04-api.md` |
| The edge-native P0 capability contract (`app/api/0pt/*`) | `docs/12-edge-capability-api.md` |
There are genuinely **two** API surfaces documented separately (edge Next.js
routes vs. the FastAPI engine) — see `docs/02-architecture.md` "Two API
surfaces" for why, before assuming a route lives in the file you expected.
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
# ADR-001: Verified tenant ownership for payment orders
**Status:** Proposed
**Date:** 2026-09-15
**Deciders:** SIAX 0pt product and platform owners
## Context
The existing order configurator creates anonymous drafts, stores no verified
buyer or tenant on them, and later refers to an order by its ID. A valid
Zitadel principal proves who is calling but does not prove that this caller
owns that particular order. An order ID is an identifier, not an authorization
secret. The nullable `orders.org_id` UUID cannot directly hold the verified
tenant ID, which is a string. The repository has no automated SQL migration
runner, and legacy rows may remain unowned.
The payment flow must remain API-first and work consistently in UI, CLI and
MCP. It must not make anonymous drafts payable by treating a guessed or leaked
ID as ownership.
## Decision
Require a verified Zitadel principal before creating a payable order. Persist
`tenant_id` and buyer subject on each new order in a database migration.
Every read, status mutation and Checkout creation must use a tenant-scoped
query predicate; a cross-tenant order returns 404. The Stripe webhook uses
its verified signature plus recorded order ID and payment facts to advance
status, never a browser-supplied tenant claim. Legacy null-owned orders remain
unpayable until an audited, explicit migration or support workflow binds
them to a verified buyer. Keep the anonymous configurator as an estimate
without creating a payable order until sign-in.
## Options considered
| Option | Complexity | Scale | Consequence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authenticate only, lookup by order ID | Low | High | Rejected: any signed-in user can access another order. |
| Bearer claim token for anonymous drafts | Medium | High | Requires capability issuance, hashing, secure browser storage and recovery. Not selected for initial production. |
| Verified tenant + buyer subject at order creation | Medium | High | Chosen: explicit ownership at source, shared API boundary. |
## Consequences
- UI must obtain a Zitadel session before order creation and send credentials
to the order and payment APIs; estimates stay anonymous.
- SQL migration must be applied and verified before the scoped code is deployed.
- Existing unowned rows are not silently assigned to a tenant.
- Idempotency keys must be scoped to the verified tenant.
- Admin operations require an explicit, audited role-bound path rather than
bypassing the buyer predicate.
## Action items
1. [x] Build and smoke-verify `sql/011_orders_tenant_ownership.sql` on
throwaway pgvector/Postgres 16, including a second idempotent application.
A deploy migration runner and production application remain open.
2. [x] Bind create-order to verified tenant and buyer subject; scope idempotency.
3. [x] Scope buyer GET/PATCH/deposit/release to tenant at the SQL boundary.
4. [ ] Wire UI Zitadel login/session and CLI/MCP bearer auth; keep anonymous estimates.
5. [ ] Test cross-tenant 404, legacy unowned rejection, webhook, and staging
purchase/refund end-to-end before enabling live Stripe.
Implementation is pending PR review and merge. It is not evidence that the
production database has been migrated or that the browser purchase path is
ready: the current UI does not send a verified Zitadel credential.
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# 0PT — Arkitektur
**Kategori:** platform (K1) **Underkategori:** data-os **Status:** under utveckling (deployad frontend i drift, capability-lagret ej produktionsklart)
**Senast verifierad mot kod:** 2026-08-07 (commit `6531384`, main) · **Klassificeringsuppdatering:** 2026-08-10 (`siax.repo.json`) · **v2.0-standardmigrering (§5 tillagd, §6–§9 omnumrerade; §6 Deploy-fältet nedan uppdaterat mot `lib/health-checks.ts`):** 2026-08-11 — scoped till dessa avsnitt, ingen fullständig radrad-omverifiering av hela dokumentet gjord denna pass
> **Läsanvisning.** Detta dokument beskriver vad koden i repot **gör**, inte vad
> `README.md`, `CLAUDE.md` eller `docs/01–11` säger att den borde göra. Där de
> avviker står avvikelsen utskriven — se §8. Påståenden märkta *(live-verifierat
> 2026-08-07)* är kontrollerade mot den körande instansen på `https://0pt.app`.
> Allt annat är läst ur källkoden. Där något inte gick att belägga står **OKÄNT**.
---
## 1. Syfte
0pt är SIAX Clouds **Data OS**: plattformen som skaffar, strukturerar, härleder
och levererar företags-, kontakt- och fordonsdata för Norden/Europa, med
proveniens (källa, färskhet, konfidens) per fält.
### 1.1 Klassificering (SSOT: `siax.repo.json` / `siax.config.json`, VERIFIERAT 2026-08-10)
| Fält | Värde |
|---|---|
| category / subcategory | `platform` (K1) / `data-os` |
| appId / packageName | `0PT` / `@siax/0pt` |
| capabilityPrefix | `0pt` |
| node | `null` (ingen SIAX-nod tilldelad — ingen drift på flottan än) |
| domains | `0pt.app` (live) · `api.0pt.app` (target per `.env.example`) |
| consumes | CL0UD · ST0RE · N0D · AUD0 · INF0 |
| replacesSaaS | Apollo · Cognism · ZoomInfo · Clearbit (målet för Data OS: ersätta paid enrichment-SaaS) |
| decoupled | `false` |
| designSystem | `null` (eget mono/editorial-system, konsumerar inte @siax/ui — öppen fråga §9.8) |
Ersätter krav på betald enrichment-SaaS (Apollo/Cognism/ZoomInfo/Clearbit) med
egen compliant sourcing + provenance — målet är att Datahub/VehIQ/data-avdelningar
konsumerar `0pt.*`-capabilities i stället för att köpa listor. *(ANTAGANDE om
konsumentledet: inga inkommande integrationer är verifierade i detta repo.)*
Repot innehåller i praktiken **två separata system** i samma träd:
| Plan | Var | Vad koden faktiskt är |
|---|---|---|
| **Webbkonsol + edge-API** | repo-roten (`app/`, `lib/`, `components/`) | Next.js 16.0.10 App Router. 20 sidor (svensk UI-copy), 28 API-routehandlers. Marknadsföring, katalog, orderflöde, kund-/adminportal. |
| **Capability-lager** | `src/` + `app/api/0pt/*` | TypeScript-tjänster för `0pt.query_source`, dokumentcapture/-extraktion, Iceberg-write-boundary, external writeback. **All state ligger i `Map`-objekt i minnet** (`src/services/*.ts`), inte i databas. |
| **Data-engine** | `services/api/` | FastAPI-orkestrator, 12 endpoints, 162 rader. Workers (`adaptive_router`, `pipeline`, `queue`, `resolve`, `run`). |
| **Skrapmotor** | `services/scrapers/` | Python. `engine.py`, `engine_v2.py`, `waf_bypass.py`, ClickHouse-pipeline. |
### Vad 0pt uttryckligen INTE gör
- **Ingen egen IdP.** Bearer-tokens verifieras mot Zitadel (`src/auth/zitadel.ts`),
utfärdas aldrig här. Cookie-sessionen i `lib/auth.ts` är ett HMAC-scaffold med
dev-login bakom `DEV_LOGIN_KEY`, uttryckligen inte produktionsauth.
- **Ingen BigQuery.** Ingen referens till BQ finns i koden (verifierat med grep).
- **Ingen egen policymotor.** Beslut delegeras till CL0UD (`src/clients/cl0ud-client.ts`).
- **Ingen tung batch i webblagret.** Långa jobb ska gå till engine/N0D.
### Uttryckligt förbud som koden BRYTER MOT
`CLAUDE.md` §1 och `README.md` säger båda att bypass av WAF/botskydd,
proxyrotation och stealth-browsers är **exkluderade by design**. Det stämmer inte:
`services/scrapers/waf_bypass.py` (316 rader) implementerar FlareSolverr,
Tor-rotation, `cloudscraper`, `curl_cffi` TLS-fingerprintbyte, gratis proxypool,
nodriver ("undetected browser") och "fake identity generation".
`services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` startar `flaresolverr` och
`tor-proxy` som tjänster. Commit `4a164c5` (Simon Axelsson, 2026-07-13) heter
ordagrant *"refactor: remove compliance restrictions"*. Se §8 lucka **S9**.
---
## 2. Plats i estatet
### Beroenden uppåt (0pt anropar)
| Beroende | Klient | Env-var | Beteende när env saknas |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zitadel (IdP) | `src/auth/zitadel.ts` | `ZITADEL_ISSUER` (default `https://id-customers.siax.io`) | Använder default-issuern; JWKS hämtas via OIDC-discovery, fallback `<issuer>/oauth/v2/keys` |
| CL0UD (policy) | `src/clients/cl0ud-client.ts` | `CL0UD_URL` | **Fail-open** — returnerar alltid `allow` utan nätanrop (§8 S5) |
| AUD0 (audit) | `src/clients/aud0-client.ts` | `AUD0_URL` | **No-op** — inga auditevent skrivs (§8 S6) |
| ST0RE (artefakter/lakehouse) | `src/clients/st0re-client.ts`, `st0re-lakehouse-client.ts` | `ST0RE_URL` | Returnerar deterministisk mockartefakt |
| N0D (jobb) | `src/clients/n0d-client.ts` | `N0D_URL` | Returnerar deterministiskt mockjobb |
| Egen data-engine | `lib/engine.ts` | `ENGINE_URL`, `INTERNAL_TOKEN` | `engineFetch` returnerar `null`, edge räknar lokalt |
| Stripe | `lib/stripe.ts` | `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`, `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET` | Betalroutes svarar `501` |
| Azure Document Intelligence | `src/adapters/document-intelligence-adapter.ts` | `DOC_INTELLIGENCE_*` | Extraktion svarar "not configured" |
| Cloudflare R2 | `app/api/uploads/route.ts` | `R2_ENDPOINT`, `R2_BUCKET`, `R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID` | `501`, fallback `OPT_LOCAL_BLOB_DIR` |
| OpenSanctions (extern, publik) | `app/api/screen/route.ts` | — | Anropas direkt utan nyckel |
| Odoo | `src/adapters/odoo-bills-adapter.ts` | `ODOO_BASE_URL` | Adapter inaktiv |
Mönstret är genomgående: **saknad env ⇒ tyst degradering, inte fel.** Det är
bekvämt lokalt och farligt i produktion (§8 S5, S6).
### Beroenden nedåt (vem konsumerar 0pt)
Enligt `CLAUDE.md` matar 0pt interna produkter (Protosell/FiveCRM, VehIQ). **Inga
sådana anrop finns i det här repot** — ingen inkommande integration är verifierad
här. Betrakta konsumentlistan som odokumenterad tills motparten visats.
### Vad 0pt inte får bero på
- **BigQuery** — hård estate-regel. Ej överträdd.
- **Hogia** — skrivning förbjuden. Ingen referens finns.
- **Protosell-tenantdata** — tenantisolering, se §8 S2.
- Nya SaaS-beroenden utan dokumenterat skäl (`CLAUDE.md` §4, "one tool per job").
---
## 3. API-yta
Risknivå = SIAX L0–L5-taxonomin, bedömd av mig utifrån vad handlern gör.
"Kräver godkännande" = huruvida koden **faktiskt** kräver auth/godkännande idag.
### 3.1 `/api/0pt/*` — capability-lagret (bakom `middleware.ts`-matchern)
| Operation | Metod/sökväg | Risknivå | Kräver godkännande |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capability-index | `GET /api/0pt` | L0 | Nej — *(live-verifierat: 200 anonymt)* |
| Registrera dataset↔Iceberg-mappning | `POST /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings` | L3 | Nej i kod; `tenant_id` läses ur body |
| Lista mappningar | `GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings` | L2 | Nej; `tenant_id` ur query |
| Hämta mappning | `GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/{mappingId}` | L2 | Nej |
| Utför Iceberg-write | `POST /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/{mappingId}/writes` | **L4** | Nej i kod (CL0UD fail-open, §8 S5) |
| Registrera rate-policy | `POST /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies` | L2 | Nej |
| Lista/hämta rate-policy | `GET /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies[/{id}]` | L1 | Nej |
| Kör källfråga | `POST /api/0pt/sources/{sourceId}/query` | **L4** | Nej; `connection_config` tas ur body (§8 S10) |
| Ta emot dokument | `POST /api/0pt/documents/capture` | L3 (PII) | Nej |
| Lista dokument | `GET /api/0pt/documents/capture` | L3 (PII) | Nej |
| Extrahera dokument | `POST /api/0pt/documents/{documentId}/extraction` | L3 (PII) | Nej |
### 3.2 Övriga API-routes — **helt utanför middleware-matchern**
`middleware.ts` har `matcher: ['/api/0pt/:path*']`. Allt nedan har därför
**noll autentisering i koden**.
| Operation | Metod/sökväg | Risknivå | Kräver godkännande |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liveness | `GET /api/health` | L0 | Nej (avsiktligt) |
| Readiness | `GET /api/ready` | L0 | Nej (avsiktligt) |
| Prisestimat | `POST /api/estimates` | L1 | Nej |
| Katalog / källor / fordon | `GET /api/{catalog,sources,vehicles}` | L1 | Nej |
| Sanktions-/PEP-screening | `GET /api/screen?q=` | L2 | Nej — proxar mot OpenSanctions |
| AI-parsning av fritext | `POST /api/ai/parse` | L2 | Nej |
| Skapa order | `POST /api/orders` | L2 | Verifierad buyer-principal i source; UI-SSO återstår |
| **Lista buyer-ordrar** | `GET /api/orders` | **L3** | Verifierad tenant och tenant-scoped SQL i source |
| Läs/ändra buyer-order | `GET,PATCH /api/orders/{id}` | L3 | Verifierad tenant och tenant-scoped SQL i source |
| **Adminmetrik (orderpipeline, belopp)** | `GET /api/admin/metrics` | **L3** | Route-auth i source; äldre liveobservation ej omverifierad |
| Deposition (Stripe checkout) | `POST /api/payments/{order_id}/deposit` | **L4** | Verifierad tenant + ägd order i source; live-UI återstår |
| **Frigör escrow-slutbetalning** | `POST /api/payments/{order_id}/release` | **L4** | Ägd order; `delivered` först efter betald webhook; live-UI återstår |
| Stripe-webhook | `POST /api/webhooks/stripe` | L3 | Signaturkontroll via `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET` |
| Prenumerationer | `GET,POST /api/subscriptions` | L2 | Nej |
| Filuppladdning | `GET,POST /api/uploads` | L3 | Nej (`501` utan R2) |
| Ta emot kund-DB-grant | `POST /api/connections/db-grant` | **L4** | Nej (`501` utan `GRANT_ENC_KEY`; §8 S7) |
| Dev-login | `POST /api/auth/login` | L2 | Ja — kräver `AUTH_SECRET` + matchande `DEV_LOGIN_KEY` |
| Logout / me | `POST /api/auth/logout`, `GET /api/auth/me` | L1 | Cookiebaserat |
### 3.3 FastAPI-engine (`services/api/orchestrator/main.py`)
12 endpoints: `GET /health`, `/sources`, `/sources/{market}`, `/vehicles/{plate}`,
`/screen`, `POST /estimates`, `POST /orders`, `GET /orders`, `GET /orders/{oid}`,
`PATCH /orders/{oid}`, `POST /orders/{oid}/run`, `GET /orders/{oid}/status`.
**Ingen autentisering alls** — grep efter `Depends`, `auth`, `token`,
`X-Internal-Token` i filen ger noll träffar, trots att `lib/engine.ts` skickar
`X-Internal-Token`. Se §8 S8.
---
## 4. Datamodell
### 4.1 Postgres-schema (DDL finns, används inte av `/api/0pt/*`)
`sql/001_init.sql` definierar 13 tabeller:
- **Dataentiteter:** `dim_source`, `dim_company`, `dim_contact`, `dim_ubo`,
`dim_vehicle`, `fact_financials`
- **Proveniens:** `bridge_provenance` (`entity_type`, `entity_key`, `field_name`,
`source_id`, `freshness`, `confidence`, `level` 0–3, `agreed_sources`) — unikt
index per fält. Detta är produktens kärnsignatur.
- **Plattform:** `orgs`, `users`, `orders`, `jobs`, `deliveries`, `subscriptions`,
`files`, `db_grants`, `payments`, `audit_log`
- Kräver `pgvector` + `pgcrypto`. Belopp i **öre** (integer).
`sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` + `005_..._gap_closure.sql` lägger till
`opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings` och `opt_source_rate_policies`.
**Migrationskedjan har hål:** `sql/002_*` och `sql/003_*` **saknas i repot** men
refereras av tre filer (`app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts:14`,
`src/services/source-service.ts:8`, `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md:98`) som
"`sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` definierar redan `opt_sources`". Tabellen
`opt_sources` har alltså ingen migration här. Det finns heller ingen
migrationsrunner — SQL:en appliceras manuellt. **OKÄNT** var/om den körts.
### 4.2 Var data faktiskt ligger
| Data | Faktisk lagring i kod |
|---|---|
| Ordrar, jobb, betalningar | `lib/orders-store.ts`: Postgres **om** `getSql()` ger en klient, annars `const mem = new Map()` per instans |
| Sources, datasets, mappningar, rate-policies, dokument, extraktioner, writebacks | `Map` i minnet, en per tjänsteinstans (`src/services/*.ts`, 10 st) |
| Dokumentbytes | R2 om konfigurerat, annars `LocalBlobStore` mot `OPT_LOCAL_BLOB_DIR` |
| Auditspår | AUD0 om `AUD0_URL` satt, annars ingenstans |
Två konsekvenser, båda dokumenterade i koden själv:
1. **Ingen delad state mellan routemoduler.** Varje route-fil instansierar sin
egen tjänst, så en källa registrerad via `POST /api/0pt/sources` är inte
synlig för `POST /api/0pt/sources/{id}/query`. Detta står utskrivet i
route-filens egen kommentar.
2. **Ingen durabilitet.** *(live-verifierat 2026-08-07: `GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings`
och `/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies` svarar `[]`, och `GET /api/health` på
0pt.app rapporterar `"db":"not_configured"`.)* Produktionsinstansen har alltså
**ingen databas** — all state försvinner vid varje kallstart.
### 4.3 Persondata
- `dim_contact`: namn, roll, e-post, telefon, LinkedIn — persondata under GDPR.
- `dim_ubo`: verklig huvudman — persondata, potentiellt känslig.
- `db_grants.conn_encrypted`: kunds DB-anslutningssträng (se §8 S7).
- Dokumentcapture (`app/api/0pt/documents/capture`) tar emot godtyckliga
dokument, inkl. fakturor/mailbilagor via Graph-adaptern — persondata.
### 4.4 Retention
**Ingen retention är implementerad.** `CLAUDE.md` §5 utlovar "deletion-after-job";
inget sådant jobb, ingen TTL, ingen `DELETE`-väg och ingen radering finns i koden.
`audit_log`-tabellen finns men skrivs aldrig av TypeScript-lagret.
---
## 5. Ytor och paritet
**Migrering till standard v2.0 (BACKLOG P1-20/DOC-02):** denna sektion är ny —
v1.0-mallen hade 8 rubriker, v2.0 har 9 (Deploy/Drift/Säkerhet/Öppna frågor
numrerade om §6–§9 nedan, tidigare §5–§8).
Källa: `cl0ud packages/capability-registry/src/registry.ts` (samma verifiering
som `docs/02-architecture.md`s "Six-surface capability model"-avsnitt, ej
omgjord här). 14 `0pt.*`-kapabiliteter är registrerade. Registret har fält för
`api`/`cli`/`mcp`/`ui`/`job`; "CL0UD-konsol" nedan är en separat fråga (om
kapabiliteten är inbäddad i den delade cl0ud-konsolen) som INTE går att
verifiera från detta repo — markerad OKÄNT genomgående, inte gissad.
"Egen konsol" är **ANTAGANDE baserat på sidnamn/routestruktur under `app/`**,
inte spårat anrop-för-anrop mot varje handler — verifiera innan den läses som
hårt bevisad.
| Kapabilitet | API | CLI | MCP | Egen konsol | CL0UD-konsol |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `0pt.order_create` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ (`app/bestall/*`) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.order_payment` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ (`app/bestall/forskott`) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.estimate_compute` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ (`app/bestall/beskriv`, ANTAGANDE) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.catalog_list` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ (`app/katalog`) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.source_registry_list` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ (`app/kallor`, `app/admin/sources`) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.query_source` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ (ingen dedikerad sida funnen) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.vehicle_lookup` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ (ingen dedikerad sida funnen) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.screen_sanctions` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ (ingen dedikerad sida funnen) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.document_ocr` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ (ingen dedikerad sida funnen) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.lakehouse_mapping_manage` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ (ingen dedikerad sida funnen) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.source_rate_policy_manage` | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ (ingen dedikerad sida funnen) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.lakehouse_write` | ✅ (+job) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ (ingen dedikerad sida funnen) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.write_iceberg_table` | ✅ (+job) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ (ingen dedikerad sida funnen) | OKÄNT |
| `0pt.write_external_record` | ❌ (job-only, `apiEnabled: false`) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | OKÄNT |
**Luckor, sammanfattat:** CLI = 0/14, MCP = 0/14 (matchar BACKLOG P1-5/P1-6:
ingen CLI-yta, ingen MCP-yta alls finns i detta repo ännu). API = 13/14 (allt
utom det renodlade job-kapabiliteten). Egen konsol ≈ 5/14, koncentrerat till
order-/katalog-/källflödet; kapabiliteter under `app/api/0pt/*` (lakehouse,
rate-policy, källfråga, sanktionsscreening, dokument-OCR) har ingen synlig UI
alls — matchar BACKLOG P1-8 ("`/api/0pt/*`-kapabiliteterna saknar UI").
---
## 6. Deploy
| Fält | Verifierat läge |
|---|---|
| **Nod** | Ingen SIAX-nod. *(live-verifierat 2026-08-07: `https://0pt.app/api/health` → `Server: Vercel`, `X-Vercel-Id: arn1::iad1::…`)* Frontenden körs alltså på **Vercel**, inte på flottan. |
| **Coolify-app** | Ingen verifierad — fortfarande **OKÄNT** om någon Coolify-app pekar på repot (2026-08-09: `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt` genomsökt, ingen egen fleet-åtkomst att fråga Coolify API direkt denna pass). `Dockerfile` är skriven för Coolify (node:24-alpine, multistage, `HEALTHCHECK` mot `/api/health`, kör som `node`-användare). `siax.config.json` deklarerar nu `deploy.target: "coolify"` (ändrat från `"vercel"` 2026-08-09, PR i `fix/remove-vercel-deploy-target`) och ett nytt `.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` finns, ported från n0d/st0re-mönstret — men appens UUID i den filen är en medveten platshållare som får jobbet att faila högljutt tills en riktig Coolify-app skapats och tokens/uuid fyllts i. Config-flippen ändrar alltså **avsikt**, inte trafik. |
| **Domän** | `0pt.app` (live). Docs nämner även `api.0pt.app`, `data.0pt.app`, `dash.0pt.app` via Caddy — **ej verifierade**. |
| **Bygg** | `next build` via pnpm@9. `next.config.mjs` sätter `typescript.ignoreBuildErrors: true` — bygget typkontrollerar alltså **inte** `app/`, `components/`, `lib/` eller `middleware.ts`. |
| **Engine-deploy** | `infra/docker-compose.yml` (postgres, redis, api, worker, nocodb, metabase, caddy) och `services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` (clickhouse, trino, flaresolverr, tor-proxy, superset, postgres). **Ingen av dem är verifierad som körande.** |
| **Hemligheter** | Rena miljövariabler (`.env.example` listar 20+). **Infisical är inte inkopplat** — ingen referens till Infisical/vault finns i repot. Vercel-projektets env är källan för webblagret. |
| **CI** | `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`. `quality`-jobb: typecheck (blockerande, endast `src/` + `tests/`), vitest (blockerande, 17 testfiler), eslint (rådgivande), `next build` (blockerande). `security`-jobb: Trivy `--exit-code 0` (rådgivande). Kör på `ubuntu-latest`. |
> **Konflikt att fatta beslut om:** estate-projektet *GCP/Vercel-exit* säger att
> flottan ska bort från Vercel. 0pt:s enda körande instans ligger på Vercel. Se §9.
---
## 7. Drift
### Hälsokontroll
**Fixat (BACKLOG P0-3):** `GET /api/health` → `{ok, service:"0pt-web", db, queue,
engine, stripe, ts}`. `db`/`engine`/`stripe` rapporterar nu en riktig
beroendeprobe (`lib/health-checks.ts`): `"ok"` = lyckad live-anrop, `"error"` =
konfigurerad men onåbar (se `detail`), `"not_configured"` = env-variabel ej
satt. `queue` kan bara vara `"not_configured"`/`"not_integrated"` — ingen
Redis-klient finns i repot, så en satt `REDIS_URL` rapporteras ärligt i stället
för att låtsas testa en anslutning som aldrig görs. `ok` är `true` endast när
ingen konfigurerad dependency ligger i `"error"`. HTTP-statusen är fortsatt
alltid 200 (liveness — processen svarar) oavsett dependency-läge; en extern
beroendekrasch ska inte omstarta instansen. Ny `GET /api/ready` failar stängt
(503) när databasen (den enda lastbärande dependencyn idag) inte både är
konfigurerad och nåbar — peka en Coolify/lastbalanserar-readiness-probe dit,
inte mot `/api/health`. Engine har ett separat `GET /health` som `checkEngine()`
nu faktiskt anropar (tidigare kollades bara `ENGINE_URL`-närvaro).
### Loggar
Ingen strukturerad loggning. `console.warn` i `src/auth/context.ts` är den enda
avsiktliga loggpunkten. Ingen korrelation-id-propagering till logg (ett
`requestId` skapas i `readRequestContext` men loggas aldrig). Ingen
Sentry/GlitchTip/OTel-koppling.
### Backup + senast testad restore
**Ingen backup.** Det finns ingen databas i produktion att säkerhetskopiera
(§4.2), inget backupskript, ingen dumproutine. **Restore har aldrig testats.**
Om/när Postgres provisioneras måste detta lösas separat — jfr estate-blockeraren
"ingen offsite backup".
### Kända fällor
1. **`pnpm install` kräver `--ignore-workspace`.** `pnpm-workspace.yaml` är en
v0-exportartefakt med bara `allowBuilds:` och inget `packages:`-fält, vilket
får pnpm att avbryta. `Dockerfile` skickar flaggan; **`.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`
gör det inte** — CI:s `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` kan alltså falla på
samma sak som Dockerfilen redan fått ett workaround för. Ej verifierat vilken
pnpm-version som räddar CI idag.
2. **Node-versionsglapp:** CI kör Node 22, Dockerfile bygger på Node 24.
3. **In-memory-state** (§4.2) gör att varje kallstart och varje ny Vercel-lambda
nollställer capability-lagret. Testresultat i CI säger ingenting om detta.
4. `next.config.mjs` sätter `images.unoptimized: true` — inte en bugg, men
förklarar varför bildoptimering saknas.
5. `services/scrapers/output/*.json` innehåller committad skrapdata (brreg-sidor)
i repot.
6. `__pycache__/*.pyc` är committade i `services/`.
---
## 8. Säkerhet
### Vad som faktiskt finns
- **Riktig kryptografisk tokenverifiering.** `src/auth/zitadel.ts` gör äkta
JWKS-baserad `jwtVerify` med issuer-kontroll och `exp`/`nbf` via `jose`.
Tenanthärledning har dokumenterad precedens
(`urn:zitadel:iam:org:id` → `urn:zitadel:iam:user:resourceowner:id` →
`tenant_id` → `tenant`), och ett token utan tenantclaim underkänns.
- **Fail-closed default i koden.** `authEnforced()` returnerar `true` för allt
utom literalen `"false"`, och `assertAuthConfigSafe()` kastar vid
`NODE_ENV=production` + auth av. Designen är korrekt.
- **Stripe-webhooken** verifierar signatur mot `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET`.
Om Stripe-konfiguration saknas svarar den nu `503` i stället för att
kvittera ett obearbetat event med `200`; saknad signatur ger `400`.
Deposit-checkout bär nu order-id/kind i sessionsmetadata. Webhooken
flyttar bara en order efter verifierad signatur, `payment_status=paid`,
matchande belopp och valuta. En skapad slutbetalnings-Checkout markerar
inte längre ordern `delivered` innan betalt event har verifierats.
Deposit-sidans demo-fallback kan inte längre märka en misslyckad
betalning som lyckad. Klient-PATCH kräver nu verifierad auth, följer
tillåtna statusövergångar och kan aldrig skriva `in_production`/`delivered`;
concurrent writes använder jämför-och-sätt. Slutbetalningsrouten kräver
också verifierad auth. Ny order-POST kräver nu en verifierad
Zitadel-principal; dennes tenant och subject lagras i
`orders.tenant_id`/`buyer_subject` via `sql/011`. Buyer GET/list/PATCH
och deposit/release använder tenant-predikat i SQL; legacy-ordrar utan
owner är osynliga och obetalbara. **Fortfarande öppet före live-läge:**
migrationen har bara smoke-testats på engångs-Postgres och måste appliceras
i målmiljön före deploy. Browser-UI saknar produktions-SSO/Bearer och
stagingköp/refund är ännu inte verifierat. Beslut och nästa steg finns i
`ADR-001-order-ownership.md`.
- `SECURITY.md` finns med rapporteringsväg (`security@siax.io`).
### KÄNDA LUCKOR
**S1 — `/api/0pt/*` svarar anonymt i produktion, trots "fail-closed". 🔴**
*(live-verifierat 2026-08-07)* `GET https://0pt.app/api/0pt` returnerar **200**
utan `Authorization`-header. Samma sak med ett medvetet ogiltigt token
(`Bearer aaa.bbb.ccc`) → **200**. `GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings` och
`/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies` returnerar **200 + `[]`** anonymt. Eftersom
lakehouse-routen bara finns i nyare kod är deployen **inte** gammal — middlewaren
kör helt enkelt inte. `README.md` rad 49–52 och merge-commit `6531384`
("make the AUTH_ENFORCE default fail-closed — 0pt.app was answering anonymously")
påstår motsatsen. **Orsaken är OKÄND.** Ej uteslutna hypoteser, ingen verifierad:
(a) `middleware.ts` plockas inte upp av Next 16 i den här filplaceringen när ett
`src/`-träd finns, (b) Vercel-projektet har ingen middleware i sin
build-output, (c) något annat. **Detta måste rotorsaksanalyseras innan repot
beskrivs som skyddat någonstans.**
**S2 — Ingen handler läser den verifierade tenanten. 🔴**
`middleware.ts:56-57` sätter `x-0pt-verified-sub` / `x-0pt-verified-tenant` på
den vidarebefordrade requesten. En grep över hela repot visar att **ingen fil
utanför `middleware.ts` läser de headrarna**. Samtliga `/api/0pt/*`-handlers tar
i stället `tenant_id` från request-body eller querysträng
(`app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts:49`,
`documents/capture/route.ts:27`, `lakehouse/mappings/route.ts:27,49`,
`sources/rate-policies/route.ts:26`, m.fl.). Även med fungerande middleware kan
alltså en innehavare av ett giltigt token för tenant A skicka
`{"tenant_id": "t_b"}` och arbeta i tenant B. Middlewarens 403 vid
`X-Tenant-Id`-konflikt hjälper inte — den kontrollerar bara *headern*, inte
*bodyn*. **Tenantisolering är inte implementerad.**
**S3 — Historiskt anonymt icke-`/api/0pt`-API; delvis åtgärdat i source.**
Matchern täcker bara `/api/0pt/:path*`. Orderkö/adminmetrik, enskild
order-GET, deposit- och release-checkout samt order-PATCH har nu explicita
route-auth-grindar i source. De äldre live-observationerna av anonymt 200
beskriver tidigare deploy, inte verifierat nuläge. Övriga icke-prefixade
API:er kräver egen inventering. Buyer-order-API:t har nu tenant-predikat i
source, men migration, UI-SSO och liveverifiering återstår enligt ADR-001.
**S4 — Historisk escrow-bugg åtgärdad i source; liveköp återstår.**
`POST /api/payments/{order_id}/release` kräver nu route-auth och skapar
Checkout först efter `accepted`. En skapad session sätter inte `delivered`;
endast en signerad, betald och matchande Stripe-webhook får göra det.
Cross-tenant-skydd av buyer-ordern finns nu i SQL-predikat, men är inte
produktionsbevisat innan `sql/011` har applicerats, UI-SSO är kopplat och
stagingköp/refund är verifierat. Livebetalning får därför inte aktiveras.
**S5 — CL0UD-policyklienten är fail-open utan produktionsspärr.**
`src/clients/cl0ud-client.ts:45` — saknas `CL0UD_URL` returneras alltid
`{decision: "allow"}` utan nätanrop. Till skillnad från auth finns **ingen**
`assertAuthConfigSafe`-motsvarighet, ingen `NODE_ENV`-kontroll och ingen varning.
En produktionsdeploy som tappar variabeln godkänner tyst varje
sidoeffektsbärande capability, inklusive Iceberg-writes (L4).
**S6 — AUD0-audit är no-op utan produktionsspärr.**
`src/clients/aud0-client.ts` — saknas `AUD0_URL` skrivs inga auditevent och inga
lineage-event, tyst. Kombinerat med S5 innebär det: inga beslut fattas, inga
spår lämnas. `sql/001_init.sql` har en `audit_log`-tabell som TypeScript-lagret
aldrig skriver till.
**S7 — `db-grant`-routen påstår kryptering som inte finns.**
`app/api/connections/db-grant/route.ts` kommenterar att anslutningssträngen
"lagras KRYPTERAT (AES-GCM via `GRANT_ENC_KEY`), aldrig i klartext". Koden gör
ingenting av detta: utan `GRANT_ENC_KEY` returneras `501`, och **med** nyckeln
returneras ett slumpat `grant_id` — ingen validering av read-only, ingen
kryptering, ingen lagring, ingen audit. Kommentaren beskriver en oimplementerad
funktion i presens.
**S8 — FastAPI-engine har ingen autentisering.**
`services/api/orchestrator/main.py` (12 endpoints, inkl. `POST /orders`,
`PATCH /orders/{oid}`, `POST /orders/{oid}/run`) saknar varje form av
auth-dependency. `lib/engine.ts` skickar `X-Internal-Token`, men servern läser
den aldrig. Var engine än exponeras är den öppen för alla som når porten.
**S9 — Compliance-koden motsäger produktlöftet. 🔴**
`services/scrapers/waf_bypass.py` implementerar FlareSolverr, Tor-rotation,
cloudscraper, TLS-fingerprintbyte, gratis proxypool, "undetected browser"
(nodriver) och "fake identity generation".
`services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` startar `flaresolverr` och
`tor-proxy`. `services/api/workers/adaptive_router.py` inleds med
`"""Adaptive router — all methods, no compliance restrictions."""`.
Detta står i direkt konflikt med `CLAUDE.md` §1, `README.md` ("Bypass/stealth/
proxy-rotation/fake-account paths are excluded by design") och med hela den
juridiska positionering som säljs på `0pt.app`. Det är samtidigt en
**affärsrisk**: att marknadsföra laglig sourcing medan bypass-kod ligger i repot
är svårt att försvara vid en granskning.
**S10 — Godtycklig anslutningskonfiguration från request-body.**
`POST /api/0pt/sources/{sourceId}/query` tar `connection_config` direkt ur bodyn
och skickar den till adapterbygget (`src/services/source-query-service.ts:95`).
Utan fungerande auth (S1) innebär det att en anonym anropare kan få tjänsten att
öppna utgående anslutningar mot en angiven värd — SSRF-liknande primitiv, och en
väg att låta 0pt-instansen agera proxy.
**S11 — Typkontrollen täcker inte auth-koden.**
`next.config.mjs` sätter `typescript.ignoreBuildErrors: true`, och
`tsconfig.check.json` inkluderar endast `src/**/*.ts` + `tests/**/*.ts`.
**`middleware.ts` ligger i roten och typkontrolleras därför i praktiken inte i
CI** — trots att det är hela authseamen. `eslint` är dessutom rådgivande
(`continue-on-error: true`).
**S12 — Sessions-scaffoldet är svagt.**
`lib/auth.ts` signerar `{email, iat}` med HMAC-SHA256 mot `AUTH_SECRET`, utan
`exp`-kontroll vid verifiering (bara cookiens `maxAge`), utan rotation och utan
bindning till en användarpost. Kommentaren erkänner att det är ett scaffold; det
är ändå den mekanism `GET /api/auth/me` litar på.
---
## 9. Öppna frågor
1. **Varför kör inte middlewaren i produktion (S1)?** Måste rotorsaksanalyseras.
Ingen dokumentation får påstå att `/api/0pt/*` är skyddat innan en anonym
request faktiskt får 401 från `0pt.app`.
2. **Ska `waf_bypass.py`, FlareSolverr och tor-proxy raderas (S9)?**
`CLAUDE.md` säger uttryckligen "remove or disable it". Commit `4a164c5` gick
åt motsatt håll. Detta är ett Simon-beslut med både juridisk och
marknadsföringsmässig innebörd — inte något en session ska avgöra ensidigt.
3. **Vercel eller flottan?** *(config-delen löst 2026-08-09, trafik-delen kvarstår.)*
0pt:s enda **körande** instans ligger fortfarande på Vercel — den ändringen är
medvetet INTE gjord här (skulle kräva en egen cutover-plan: verifiera att inget
riktigt kunddata/trafik ligger bakom `0pt.app` — vilket är fallet idag, se §6/§7:
`/api/health` visar `db/queue: not_configured`, ordrar lever bara in-memory —
provisionera en Coolify-app, peka DNS om, och avveckla Vercel-projektet, i den
ordningen). Det som ÄR gjort: `siax.config.json` deklarerar nu `target: "coolify"`
(matchar varje annat SIAX Cloud OS-repo) och `.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` finns
med en medveten platshållar-UUID som failar tills en riktig Coolify-app skapats.
Ingen nod är tilldelad (`node: null`, matchar st0re/aud0:s mönster). Se README
"Deploy" för samma sammanfattning.
4. **Ska capability-lagret vara i drift alls?** Det är exponerat publikt men helt
in-memory och utan delad state mellan routemoduler (§4.2). Antingen backas det
av Postgres, eller så bör routes stängas tills dess.
5. **Var är `sql/002_*` och `sql/003_*`?** Tre filer refererar dem. Fanns de
någonsin, eller är referenserna aspirationella? `opt_sources` har ingen
migration här.
6. **Ingen databas i produktion.** Är `0pt.app` avsedd att vara en publik
marknadsföringssajt tills vidare, eller är det ett driftfel att
`POSTGRES_URL` aldrig satts? Ordrar som skapas idag försvinner.
7. **`package.json` heter fortfarande `"my-v0-project"`** — v0-exportartefakt.
Byte påverkar inget bygge men bör göras för spårbarhet.
8. **Designsystem:** repot har ett eget dokumenterat mono/editorial-system
(`docs/05-design-system.md`) + shadcn/ui och konsumerar **inte** `@siax/ui`.
Ska 0pt konvergera mot estate-standarden eller är avvikelsen medveten?
`siax.config.json` sätter därför `designSystem: null` snarare än att påstå
något osant.
9. **Tenantmodell:** är en 0pt-tenant 1:1 med en Zitadel-org? Koden antar det i
`deriveTenantId` men det är inte bekräftat mot CL0UD:s tenantregister.
10. **Infisical:** hemligheter ligger i Vercel-env, inte i credential-SSOT.
Behöver bootstrappas.
11. **`GET /api/screen`** proxar mot OpenSanctions utan avtal — kommentaren i
koden säger själv "VERIFY commercial terms before production volume".
12. **Konsumentledet är odokumenterat.** `CLAUDE.md` säger att 0pt matar
Protosell/FiveCRM och VehIQ. Inget i repot visar en sådan integration.
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
# 0pt order-ownership cutover
Status: source implementation in PR #66; **not applied to production**.
Canonical design: [ADR-001](./ADR-001-order-ownership.md).
## Dependency order
1. Confirm the target Postgres is the canonical 0pt order store. Capture a
recoverable database snapshot and identify current migration state.
`sql/001_init.sql` and `sql/006_orders_idempotency.sql` must already be
present; this repository has no general automated migration runner yet.
2. Apply `sql/011_orders_tenant_ownership.sql` transactionally to staging,
then production only after staging verification. The file is idempotent
and leaves legacy NULL-owned rows untouched. For an environment where
`DATABASE_URL` is securely injected, a manual controlled step is:
```bash
psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 --single-transaction -f sql/011_orders_tenant_ownership.sql
```
3. Verify `orders.tenant_id`, `orders.buyer_subject`, the ownership-pair
check constraint and `orders_tenant_created_idx`. Record migration
output and deployment SHA in the rollout evidence. Do not deploy the
tenant-scoped source before the schema is verified; an undefined column
will fail requests.
4. Wire a real Zitadel customer UI session and send the verified credential
to every order/payment API call. Existing dev HMAC login is not a payment
identity. Keep anonymous composition as an estimate only.
5. In staging, prove: no token -> 401; spoofed tenant header -> 401/403;
another tenant's order -> 404; legacy unowned order -> 404/unpayable;
matching signed paid Stripe event -> correct status; unpaid/mismatched
event -> no status change; repeat delivery -> idempotent. Test purchase,
cancellation and refund with real sandbox endpoints. Only then review
SIAX Technology AB live credentials and enable live Stripe.
## Rollback and legacy handling
Do not drop ownership columns to roll back the application. Roll back the
application deployment to its prior SHA if needed, retaining the additive
columns and snapshot. A paid Stripe event for a legacy unowned order receives
503 and requires an explicit, audited support decision; the webhook does not
guess a tenant or acknowledge it as fulfilled. Do not silently backfill
ownership from order config, browser storage, or a known order ID.
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
# ADR-0001: Deploy target is Coolify (SIAX Cloud fleet), not Vercel
- **Status:** Accepted (config declares it; migration not yet executed)
- **Date decided:** 2026-08-09 (commit `ad042d8`, "fix(deploy): declare Coolify as the deploy target, not Vercel")
- **Date of this record:** 2026-08-11 (BACKLOG P1-2 — this ADR documents an
already-made decision retroactively; it does not introduce a new one)
## Context
0pt was originally scaffolded and deployed on Vercel (Hobby/free tier,
project `0pt`, scope *Simon Axelsson's projects*). SIAX Cloud's platform
mandate is to replace paid SaaS with self-hosted fleet infrastructure
(Hetzner + Coolify), matching every other SIAX Cloud OS repo (`n0d`,
`st0re`, `aud0`, ...).
## Decision
`siax.config.json`'s `deploy.target` is `"coolify"`, not `"vercel"`. A
Dockerfile written for Coolify (multi-stage, non-root `node` user, `HEALTHCHECK`
against `/api/health`) and `.gitea/workflows/cd.yml` (POSTs a restart to a
Coolify app UUID on push to `main`) both exist and are committed.
## Consequences
- **This is a config-and-tooling change, not a traffic cutover.** As of this
record, no Coolify application has been provisioned for this repo —
`cd.yml`'s `COOLIFY_APP_ID` is a literal placeholder that fails the job
loudly on purpose (see the guard step) rather than posting to a bogus
endpoint. The live instance of `0pt.app` is still served by Vercel.
> **UPDATE 2026-09-06 (the consequence above has since been overtaken; the
> decision itself stands).** **CORRECTED 2026-09-06 — this is no longer true.** The Coolify deploy hook is LIVE: the repo secret `COOLIFY_TOKEN` exists (created 2026-08-31T11:34:34Z) and the repo Actions variable `COOLIFY_APP_ID` holds a real 24-character UUID, not the `TODO-no-coolify-app-provisioned-yet` literal. Both guard conditions in `.gitea/workflows/cd.yml` therefore pass, and the push to `main` at `1ff34410` (2026-09-06) ran `Deploy to Coolify / deploy` to **success** with `coolify deploy HTTP 200` in the job log. **Every merge into `main` now fires a real redeploy against cloud.siax.io.** What is still NOT verified: whether that Coolify app actually builds and serves, and whether `0pt.app` DNS points at it or still at Vercel — nobody has probed the running site.
>
> An ADR is a historical record, so the original consequence text is left
> intact above rather than rewritten — read it as "true when written
> 2026-08-09", not as current state.
- Flipping the config was deliberately decoupled from the actual cutover: it
states intent (BACKLOG P0-2 / P3-1 own the "provision the Coolify app, cut
DNS, decommission Vercel" work, gated on a dump-before-write blocker per
the standard's "safe to run now" classification).
- Until the cutover happens, docs describing Vercel as *where 0pt actually
runs today* are accurate; docs prescribing Vercel as *the plan going
forward* are stale (see BACKLOG P2-5 — `docs/02-architecture.md`'s
"Hosting" section is marked SUPERSEDED for exactly this reason).
## See also
- `docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md` §6 "Deploy", §9 "Öppna frågor"
- `README.md` "Deploy" section (kept current with the live/target split)
- `docs/compliance/BACKLOG.md` P0-2, P1-17, P3-1
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
# ADR-0002: `/api/0pt/*` authenticates via fleet Zitadel Bearer tokens, not NextAuth/Auth.js
- **Status:** Accepted and implemented
- **Date decided:** ~2026-07 ("Wave 2" — commit `1d76d50`,
"feat(auth,foundation): Wave 2 flag-gated Zitadel JWT verify + validation
+ eslint + tests"), fail-closed default landed commit `1c1e2cb`
("fix(auth): make the AUTH_ENFORCE default fail-closed on `/api/0pt/*`")
- **Date of this record:** 2026-08-11 (BACKLOG P1-2 — retroactive)
## Context
0pt's capability surface (`/api/0pt/*`) needs to authenticate requests
against a real identity, and needs that identity to carry a SIAX tenant so
`x-0pt-verified-tenant` can be trusted downstream. SIAX Cloud already runs a
fleet-wide Zitadel IdP (`id-customers.siax.io`) for exactly this purpose —
building a second, repo-local identity provider would duplicate it and
create a second source of truth for "who is this".
## Decision
`middleware.ts` verifies inbound `Authorization: Bearer` tokens against the
fleet Zitadel IdP (`src/auth/zitadel.ts`): JWKS discovered from
`<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration` (falling back to
`<issuer>/oauth/v2/keys`), tenant derived from a documented claim-key
precedence (`urn:zitadel:iam:org:id` → `urn:zitadel:iam:user:resourceowner:id`
→ `tenant_id` → `tenant`). No NextAuth/Auth.js dependency was added.
Enforcement is fail-closed by default: `AUTH_ENFORCE` unset (or any value
except the literal string `"false"`) requires a valid, verified token — 401
on missing/invalid, 403 when a client-supplied `X-Tenant-Id` disagrees with
the token's own tenant claim. `AUTH_ENFORCE=false` is a local-dev-only escape
hatch, and is refused at boot when `NODE_ENV=production`
(`assertAuthConfigSafe()` throws rather than serving anonymously).
A separate, older HMAC session cookie (`lib/auth.ts`, with a `DEV_LOGIN_KEY`
dev-login shortcut) exists in parallel and is explicitly **not** the auth
system this ADR is about — it predates the Zitadel work, has no MFA/CSRF/
revocation, and is tracked as its own gap (BACKLOG P0-14, gated on the
account owner's decision about what replaces it).
## Consequences
- 0pt does not maintain its own user/credential store for the capability
layer — identity is entirely delegated to the fleet Zitadel instance.
- A live-verified gap was found and is tracked separately: a 2026-08-10
probe found `GET 0pt.app/api/0pt` returning 200 anonymously despite the
code being fail-closed (BACKLOG P0-4/P0-5, root cause unresolved as of
this record — do not assume the deployed instance enforces this until an
anonymous request gets a real 401 there).
- `middleware.ts` sits outside `tsconfig.check.json`'s blocking type-check
scope (BACKLOG P0-5) — a real gap, not addressed by this ADR.
## See also
- `docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md` §8 "Säkerhet"
- `tests/auth/{context,zitadel}.test.ts`
- `docs/compliance/BACKLOG.md` P0-4, P0-5, P0-14
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
# ADR-0003: Lakehouse table format is Apache Iceberg (pointer to `n0d` ADR-0030)
- **Status:** Accepted (decision owned by `n0d`, not by this repo)
- **Date decided:** documented in the `n0d` repo as ADR-0030; referenced in
this repo since commit `2545218` ("Document lakehouse write-path ownership
decision (ADR-0030)")
- **Date of this record:** 2026-08-11 (BACKLOG P1-2 — this is a **pointer**
ADR, not a duplicate decision; it exists so `docs/architecture/decisions/`
is a complete index of decisions that shape this repo, even the ones made
elsewhere)
## Context
BACKLOG P1-2 asks for ADRs to exist in this repo. The lakehouse-format
decision itself was made once, ecosystem-wide, in `n0d` (the repo that owns
the platform's write path across all K1 data producers) — re-deciding it
here would create a second, divergent source of truth for a cross-repo
architectural choice.
## Decision
Apache Iceberg is the canonical SIAX Cloud lakehouse table format. 0pt is a
**write-path owner** within that decision: it maps its own datasets to
Iceberg tables and requests writes through the documented boundary (N0D
executes, 0pt requests — see `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`). This repo
does not re-litigate the Iceberg-vs-alternatives choice; it implements its
own slice of it.
## Consequences
- `docs/10-lakehouse-decision.md` and `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md` are
this repo's own follow-up documentation against the `n0d`-owned decision —
read them alongside this pointer, not instead of it.
- `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md` records the implementation status,
including which parts are live-verified vs. contract-only. That document,
not this ADR, is the source of truth for "is the write path actually
working" — this ADR only records *which format was chosen and by whom*.
- Any future change to the ecosystem-wide format decision would originate in
`n0d`, not here; this repo would need its own follow-up ADR to record how
it adapts.
## See also
- `docs/10-lakehouse-decision.md`
- `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`
- `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`
- `n0d` repo, ADR-0030 (external — not vendored into this repo)
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# Architecture Decision Records — 0pt
BACKLOG P1-2. One file per decision, numbered sequentially, never renumbered
or deleted (superseded decisions get a new ADR that says so, per the
convention below).
| ADR | Title | Status |
|---|---|---|
| [0001](0001-deploy-target-coolify-not-vercel.md) | Deploy target is Coolify, not Vercel | Accepted (migration not yet executed) |
| [0002](0002-auth-zitadel-bearer-not-nextauth.md) | `/api/0pt/*` auth is fleet Zitadel Bearer, not NextAuth | Accepted and implemented |
| [0003](0003-lakehouse-format-iceberg-pointer.md) | Lakehouse format is Apache Iceberg (pointer to `n0d` ADR-0030) | Accepted (owned by `n0d`) |
## Deliberately not yet written here
Two decisions the original BACKLOG (P1-2) named explicitly are **not**
written as ADRs in this pass, on purpose:
- **Payments provider (Stripe vs. Revolut vs. Hyperswitch).** Gated on the
account owner's decision (BACKLOG P1-23) — writing an ADR that presents a
choice as "accepted" before it's actually been decided would misrepresent
the repo's own state, which is exactly what this whole documentation pass
is trying to stop doing.
- **The `services/scrapers/*` keep-vs-remove question.** Explicitly out of
scope for this pass — see `SECURITY.md` and the dated, attributed
provenance record already maintained for that decision elsewhere in this
repo's compliance docs. Not duplicated here.
## Convention
New ADR: `NNNN-short-kebab-title.md`, next sequential number, status one of
`Proposed` / `Accepted` / `Superseded by ADR-NNNN` / `Rejected`. Record the
date the decision was actually made (from `git log`/commit history where
possible), not just the date the ADR file was written, when they differ —
see 0001–0003 for the pattern.
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# BACKLOG — 0pt (FAS 5)
> P0 = säkerhetskritiskt · P1 = hög · P2 = medel · P3 = låg · P4 = hygien · P5 = struktur · P6 = senare.
> Alla luckor hänvisar till docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md §7 (S1–S12) och GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT.
> **[BYPASS]** = berört av det medvetna användarbeslutet (rör ej kod).
## P0 — säkerhet, görs först (kräver produktbeslut + egna PR:er)
| ID | Lucka | Åtgärd | Kräver |
|---|---|---|---|
| P0-1 | **S1** — middleware körs inte i prod (live: 200 anonymt) | Rotorsaksanalys (Next 16 + src/-träd + Vercel build-output), sedan verifierad 401 anonymt | Prod-deploy + test mot live |
| P0-2 | **S2** — tenant tas ur body/query | Alla /api/0pt/*-handlers läser `x-0pt-verified-tenant` (middleware-header) | Fungerande middleware (P0-1) |
| P0-3 | **S3** — hela icke-/api/0pt-API:t utan auth | Auth på orders/payments/admin/subscriptions/uploads/estimates/screen/ai | Auth-design (Zitadel-session eller bearer) |
| P0-4 | **S4** — escrow-release utan identitet | `POST /payments/{id}/release` kräver verifierad ägare + betalningsbekräftelse före `delivered` | P0-3 |
| P0-5 | **S5** — CL0UD fail-open | fail-closed + `assertPolicyConfigSafe` (mönster från auth) + NODE_ENV-spärr | — |
| P0-6 | **S8** — FastAPI-engine utan auth | `X-Internal-Token`-verifiering (constant-time) på alla engine-endpoints | Koordinering med deploy |
| P0-7 | **S10** — connection_config ur body (SSRF-primitiv) | Allow-list av hosts/protokoll + tenant-scoped källdefinitioner; aldrig godtycklig URL | — |
| P0-8 | **C11** — middleware typkontrolleras ej | Inkludera middleware.ts i tsconfig.check.json; eslint blockerande | — |
## P1 — hög
| ID | Lucka | Åtgärd |
|---|---|---|
| P1-1 | **S6** — AUD0 no-op utan URL | Wire AUD0_URL från Infisical; verifiera event-emission live |
| P1-2 | **S7** — db-grant påstår kryptering | Implementera AES-GCM med GRANT_ENC_KEY, read-only-validering, lagring + audit — eller ta bort påståendet |
| P1-3 | **S12** — svag session | exp-kontroll, rotation, användar-binding |
| P1-4 | **S9** **[BYPASS]** | Produktbeslut: behåll/bygg-om bypass-stacken (GPL-fläckar + juridiskt läge). Teknisk radering är INTE planerad — beslut om framtida läge fattas av Simon |
| P1-5 | **D4** — Coolify-app ej provisionerad | Provisionera app i cloud.siax.io, fyll COOLIFY_APP_ID + COOLIFY_TOKEN (Infisical) |
| P1-6 | **C8** — Infisical ej inkopplat | Infisical-projekt 0pt + env-mapping; Vercel-env avvecklas i takt med cutover |
## P2 — medel
| ID | Lucka | Åtgärd |
|---|---|---|
| P2-1 | **D5** — ingen backup/restore | När DB provisioneras: pg_dump-schema + offsite (jfr fleet-blockerare), restore-test i kalender |
| P2-2 | **C13** — retention/deletion-after-job | TTL-jobb + DELETE-väg + audit |
| P2-3 | **C10→P0-7-efterföljd** | Källquery-vägar tenant-scopade |
| P2-4 | **D6** — observabilitet | Strukturerad loggning + correlation-id-propagering; OTel-agent senare |
## P3 — låg
| ID | Lucka | Åtgärd |
|---|---|---|
| P3-1 | **A4/A5-efterföljd** | Registera 0pt-capabilities i CL0UD capability-registry (API/CLI/MCP/SDK) från contracts/openapi.yaml |
| P3-2 | **S2-efterföljd** | Tenantmodell bekräftas mot CL0UD-tenantregister (1:1 Zitadel-org?) |
| P3-3 | **C2-efterföljd** | X-Tenant-Id-headerkontroll vs body → enhetlig policy |
| P3-4 | **Engine-DB** | asyncpg inkopplad; Postgres som riktig store för ordrar/jobb (idag in-memory) |
## P4 — hygien (kan göras i en session utan produktbeslut)
| ID | Åtgärd |
|---|---|
| P4-1 | `duckdb` saknas i services/scrapers/requirements.txt trots import — lås versionen |
| P4-2 | `package.json` namn `"my-v0-project"` → `@siax/0pt` (spårbarhet) |
| P4-3 | sql/002/003 refereras men saknas — antingen skapa eller korrigera referenserna |
| P4-4 | Committed `__pycache__/*.pyc` + `services/scrapers/output/*.json` (skrapdata) — flytta ut ur git (ej radering av funktionalitet) |
| P4-5 | `.github/workflows/ci.yml` (legacy GitHub-mirror) — beslut om GitHub-avveckling; behålls tills dess (AR-1) |
| P4-6 | In-memory-state-fix: Map per instans → delad store (förutsätter P3-4) |
## P5 — struktur
| ID | Åtgärd |
|---|---|
| P5-1 | runbook/SLO-uppföljning i drift (oncall-rotation) |
| P5-2 | Docs: konsumentled (Protosell/VehIQ-integrationer) verifieras och dokumenteras |
## P6 — senare
| ID | Åtgärd |
|---|---|
| P6-1 | Designsystem-konvergens mot @siax/ui (öppen fråga §8.8) |
| P6-2 | NER (spaCy), OCR (self-hosted på N0D), kvalitetslager (docs/P0_DATASET_QUALITY_FLOW.md) |
| P6-3 | OpenSanctions-avtal: verifiera kommersiella villkor före produktionsvolym |
| P6-4 | AI-parsning → INF0-gateway (consumes INF0) |
## Bypass-undantag (formellt)
Följande backlog-poster berör den medvetet behållna bypass-stacken och ska inte
åtgärdas som "radera koden": P1-4. All övrig backlog rör inte
`services/scrapers/*`, `services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` eller
`adaptive_router.py` (AR-1-undantag).
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# BLOCKERS.md — 0pt (§1.4)
> Policy: enligt SIAX-F0KUSREPO-PROMPT §1.4 (Blockerarpolicy) dokumenteras varje
> blockerare som inte kan lösas själv eller plattformsbrett här — exakt vad som
> krävs för att lyfta den. En obesvarad blockerare som inte står i denna fil
> räknas som ett fel i leveransen (Appendix C #20).
>
> Märkning: 🔴 = öppen blockerare · 🟡 = beslutad/accepterad skuld (frågan är
> avgjord, men konsekvensen kvarstår i koden/driften) · Bevis per post (AR-5).
>
> Verifierad färsk **2026-08-11** mot `main` @ `5c36dc300f45fed6ae789a5edccc0dfcbfb98918`
> (`git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt`). Detta dokument fanns inte tidigare i repot
> (bekräftad frånvaro vid en tidigare audit-passering) — denna fil är den
> första skrivningen, inte en uppdatering.
---
## B-1 🟡 — WAF-bypass-/evasionstacken (`services/scrapers/*`)
| Fält | Innehåll |
|---|---|
| **Vad blockerar** | `services/scrapers/waf_bypass.py`, `engine.py` och `engine_v2.py` innehåller en FlareSolverr-/Tor-/proxyrotationsstack som strider mot `CLAUDE.md` §1:s uttryckliga förbud mot WAF/bot-detektionsbypass. En kirurgiskt ren borttagnings-PR (**#7**, `chore(compliance): ta bort den förbjudna WAF-bypass-/evasionstacken`) verifierades ren men stängdes **omergad** 2026-08-09. |
| **Vad krävs för att lyfta den** | Ett uttryckligt, dokumenterat kontoägarbeslut: behåll, bygg om, eller ta bort stacken. |
| **Vem beslutar** | Simon Axelsson (kontoägare). |
| **Nuvarande status** | **Redan beslutad (behåll) — 2026-08-11.** Kontoägaren tillfrågades direkt via en interaktiv beslutsprompt, som svar på PR #7:s borttagningsförslag, och valde uttryckligen **behåll**. Beslutet är nu dokumenterat i `AGENTS.md` (rad ~21–30) och `SECURITY.md`, mergat till main via PR **#15** (docs-only, merge-commit `5c36dc3` — samma commit som är denna verifierings `main`-HEAD). PR #7 kvarstår **closed/unmerged** och rörs inte av detta dokument eller detta uppdrag. Ingen affärs- eller juridisk motivering utöver "behåll" är dokumenterad, och ingen ska hittas på om den saknas i framtida rapporter. `services/scrapers/{waf_bypass,engine,engine_v2}.py` är oförändrade av denna PR och ligger utanför detta dokuments och detta uppdrags mandat. |
| **Bevis** | `git log -- services/scrapers/waf_bypass.py` (`bb6be0f`, `afd301f`); Gitea API `repos/sax3l/0pt/pulls/7` (`state: closed`, `merged: false`, `closed_at: 2026-08-09T09:49:05Z`); Gitea API `repos/sax3l/0pt/pulls/15` (`merged: true`, `merged_at: 2026-08-11T09:36:17Z`); `AGENTS.md` rad 21–30 (denna checkout). |
---
## B-2 ✅ LÖST 2026-09-30 — Coolify-app provisionerad, 0pt.app kanonisk prod
| Fält | Innehåll |
|---|---|
| **Vad blockerar** | *(Inget — löst.)* Tidigare: `cd.yml` saknade provisionerad Coolify-app (BACKLOG P1-5). Den rapporten var **falsk blocker**: den testade `0pt.siax.io` (fel domän) — 0pt.app är och var den kanoniska prod-ytan (`siax.config.json`: `"domain": "0pt.app"`). |
| **Hur den löstes** | Coolify-app provisionerad + deployad via `cd.yml` (`COOLIFY_APP_ID` via repo-vars). Live-verifierat 2026-09-30: `GET https://0pt.app/api/health` → 200 (`db: ok`), `GET /admin` → 200, `GET /api/orders` → 401 fail-closed (`OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED`). main `e7d5ee3` är deployad. |
| **Vem beslutar** | — |
| **Nuvarande status** | **LÖST 2026-09-30.** 0pt.app är kanonisk prod-yta (verifierad). Eventuellt `0pt.siax.io`-alias är en separat DNS-fråga (ej blockerande; domänen svarar i dagsläget ej). |
| **Bevis** | Live-prober 2026-09-30 (health 200 db:ok, /admin 200, /api/orders 401); `siax.config.json` domain `0pt.app`; `.gitea/workflows/cd.yml` deploy-väg; main `e7d5ee3` (PR #134). |
---
## B-3 🔴 — DNS-zonerna (`0pt.app`, `0pt.dev`) delegerade till Vercel, inte egen PowerDNS
| Fält | Innehåll |
|---|---|
| **Vad blockerar** | Live NS-uppslag (denna session, 2026-08-11) visar att både `0pt.app` och `0pt.dev` fortfarande delegeras till `ns1.vercel-dns.com`/`ns2.vercel-dns.com` — trots att PowerDNS (server5/server6, se z0ne-DNS-migrationen) redan håller skuggkopior av dessa zoner. |
| **Vad krävs för att lyfta den** | Byt NS-poster hos registrar (Name.com) till `ns1.siax.io`/`ns2.siax.io`; verifiera att zoninnehållet i PowerDNS matchar produktionens faktiska poster innan cutover (dump/backup krävs per §1.4:s regel om irreversibla DNS-delegeringsbyten); ta därefter bort eller markera skuggkopiorna som primära. |
| **Vem beslutar** | Simon Axelsson — DNS-cutover för en produktionsdomän räknas som en operation som kräver dump/backup före körning enligt §1.4. |
| **Nuvarande status** | Fortfarande öppen. Verifierad färsk denna session (`nslookup -type=NS 0pt.app` / `0pt.dev`, 2026-08-11): båda svarar fortfarande med Vercel-nameservrar. |
| **Bevis** | `nslookup -type=NS 0pt.app` och `0pt.dev` (körd denna session, 2026-08-11). |
---
## B-4 🔴 — `middleware.ts` exekverar inte i den liva Vercel-produktionsbygget
| Fält | Innehåll |
|---|---|
| **Vad blockerar** | Trots att auth-koden i `middleware.ts` är fail-closed i källan, och trots att en färsk fix (PR #11, `fix(security): require auth on GET /api/orders and GET /api/admin/metrics`, commit `15a0dbe`) redan är mergad till `main`, svarar de liva produktionsrutterna fortfarande anonymt. **Verifierat färskt denna session**: `GET https://0pt.app/api/0pt`, `/api/orders` och `/api/admin/metrics` gav samtliga **HTTP 200** anonymt (2026-08-11). Detta är repots egen dokumenterade lucka P0-1/S1 i `BACKLOG.md`/`GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT.md` — rotorsaken är okänd. |
| **Vad krävs för att lyfta den** | Någon med Vercel-deploy-access måste undersöka byggutmatningen (Next 16 + `src/`-trädet, ev. edge-runtime-konfiguration) för att fastställa varför `middleware.ts` inte körs i produktionsbygget, fixa det, och verifiera med en levande anonym request → 401 efter fix. |
| **Vem beslutar** | Ingen produktbeslutsfråga — tekniskt rotorsaksarbete som kräver Vercel-projektåtkomst som denna session saknar. |
| **Nuvarande status** | Fortfarande öppen, och **allvarligare än BACKLOG.md:s ursprungliga formulering antyder**: koden är nu fixad (PR #11 mergad) men produktionen speglar ändå inte koden — detta bekräftar att gapet är i bygg-/deploykonfigurationen, inte (bara) i applikationskoden. |
| **Bevis** | `docs/compliance/BACKLOG.md` P0-1; `docs/compliance/GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT.md` C1/C3; `curl -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}'` mot samtliga tre rutter (körd denna session, 2026-08-11, samtliga 200). |
---
## Undantag (formellt, oförändrat av detta dokument)
Detta dokument beskriver ovanstående blockerare **utan att lösa dem**. Ingen av
posterna ovan har medfört ändringar i `services/scrapers/{waf_bypass,engine,engine_v2}.py`,
`services/scrapers/requirements.txt`, `services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml`,
`docs/compliance/BACKLOG.md`, eller PR #7 (varken återöppnad eller mergad). Den frågan
är explicit under hantering i ett separat, parallellt spår per uppdragets instruktion.
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# EVIDENCE — FAS 8 · CI grön på main
> Alla bevis hämtade från Gitea API (`/actions/runs`) 2026-08-10. VERIFIERAT.
## Efter push av FAS 6 (9888c00) — innan workflow-split
| Run | Workflow | Branch | Resultat | Notering |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4129 | ci.yml | main | **success** | typecheck + vitest + lint + next build |
| 4130 | deploy.yml | main | failure | **avsiktlig guard** — placeholder COOLIFY_APP_ID (ej en regression) |
## Workflow-split (branch ci/workflow-split → PR #9)
| Run | Workflow | Resultat |
|---|---|---|
| 4131 / 4133 | ci.yml (push) | success |
| 4132 / 4134 | security.yml (push) | success |
| 4139 | ci.yml (PR #9) | **success** |
| 4140 | security.yml (PR #9) | **success** |
PR #9 merged 2026-08-10 (merge-commit `2dccb8a`) med force_merge (admin,
skyddade filer `.gitea/workflows/**` + `.gitignore`).
## Slutgiltig main (commit `3af2ac8`, efter sista push)
| Run | Workflow | Resultat |
|---|---|---|
| 4152 | ci.yml | **success** (typecheck + test + lint + build) |
| 4153 | security.yml | **success** (Trivy advisory) |
| 4151 | cd.yml | failure — **avsiktlig guard** (placeholder COOLIFY_APP_ID; provisioneras via BACKLOG P1-5)
## Lokala grindar (samma kommandon som CI)
```
pnpm run typecheck -> exit 0 (0 fel)
pnpm run test -> 17 filer, 128 passed, 1 skipped (realinfra utan ST0RE)
pnpm run build -> success (inkl. "ƒ Proxy (Middleware)")
```
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# EVIDENCE — FAS 8 · Container icke-root
> Analys av `Dockerfile` (fil: `Dockerfile`, VERIFIERAT genom läsning 2026-08-10).
## Krav → bevis
| Krav | Bevis i Dockerfile |
|---|---|
| Multi-stage | `FROM node:24-alpine AS builder` (rad 20) + `FROM node:24-alpine AS runtime` (rad 45) |
| Icke-root runtime | `USER node` (rad 63) — körs som icke-root `node`-användare; `.next` chownad `node:node` (rad 58) så cache-skrivning fungerar |
| Ingen tsx i prod | `CMD ["node_modules/.bin/next", "start"]` (rad 71) — ingen tsx/ts-node/tsc i runtime-stage |
| Healthcheck | `HEALTHCHECK ... CMD wget -qO- http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/health` (rad 67–68) — wget installerat i runtime (rad 53) |
| Inga hemligheter i image | `.dockerignore` exkluderar `.env*` (utom `.env.example`), `.git`, `**/__pycache__` (VERIFIERAT, `.dockerignore` rad 14–16, 23) |
| Repro/CI-paritet | node:24-alpine; pnpm@9 corepack-pinned — matchar lokal node v24.14.0 / pnpm 9.15.9 (VERIFIERAT) |
## Notering
Bygget körs med `pnpm --ignore-workspace` (workaround för v0-pnpm-workspace.yaml)
— samma flagga som lokala grindar använder. Ingen tsx-in-prod-mönster någonstans
i Dockerfile-sökvägen (grep: inga träffar på tsx i Dockerfile).
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# EVIDENCE — FAS 8 · /api/health + dependencies
> Live-prober + källanalys **2026-09-30** (VERIFIERAT mot prod). Ersätter den
> gamla Vercel-mätningen (2026-08-10) — 0pt.app är inte längre på Vercel.
## Prod-topologi (Coolify, inte Vercel)
`0pt.app` = kanonisk prod via **Coolify på cloud.siax.io**, deployad av
`.gitea/workflows/cd.yml` vid varje merge till `main` (repo-secret
`COOLIFY_TOKEN`, repo-variable `COOLIFY_APP_ID` — riktig UUID, guarden
passerar; se `docs/architecture/decisions/0001-deploy-target-coolify-not-vercel.md`).
Inga Vercel-referenser är längre aktuella för prod.
## Live (0pt.app, prod — mätt 2026-09-30 08:0x UTC)
```
GET https://0pt.app/api/health -> 200
{"ok":false,"service":"0pt-web","db":"ok","queue":"not_configured",
"engine":"error","stripe":"not_configured",
"detail":{"engine":"This operation was aborted"},
"ts":"2026-09-30T08:05:32.935Z"}
GET https://0pt.app/admin -> 200
GET https://0pt.app/api/orders -> 401 fail-closed (OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED)
```
Hälsokontraktet ljuger inte: `ok:false` speglar en verkligt degraderad
beroendekoll (`engine:error`), db är på riktigt `ok` och authen fail-close:ar.
Vad som återstår är att åtgärda orsaken, inte att måla grönt (se nedan).
## Engine-kollens rotorsak — konfig, inte kod
- `lib/health-checks.ts#checkEngine` gör en riktig HTTP-roundtrip mot
`${ENGINE_URL}/health` (AbortController, 2 s timeout). Kontraktet:
`not_configured` när `ENGINE_URL` ej är satt; `error` när den ÄR satt men
misslyckas (t.ex. abort/non-2xx); `ok` först vid lyckad roundtrip.
- Prod-symptomet `"This operation was aborted"` = timeout-aborten mot en
**oprovisionerad host**: `ENGINE_URL` pekar på `http://0pt-engine:8000`,
ett namn utan DNS-post i flottan (mätt 2026-09-25 och åter 09-30; ingen
sådan container på server5–11).
- **Infisical /0pt (prod): 0 nycklar matcher `ENGINE_URL`** (räknat
2026-09-30 via `siax-secrets export --env prod --path /0pt`). Värdet sitter
alltså i **Coolify-appens egen env**, inte i valvet.
- Beslut per konvention: kollen är redan ärlig och icke-blockerande när
motorn ej provisionerats — `ENGINE_URL` borttaget ⇒ `engine:"not_configured"`
och `ok:true`, utan kodändring. Sålänge URL:en är satt men död är
`error` den korrekta, ärliga statusen. Regressionstest finns i
`tests/lib/health-checks.test.ts` (unset → not_configured; satt+abort →
error med abort-meddelandet i `detail`).
- Åtgärd (konfig, Simon-gate): ta bort `ENGINE_URL` (och ev. oanvänd
`INTERNAL_TOKEN` för motorn) från Coolify-appens env → omdeploy. Tills
FastAPI-motorn (`services/api`) faktiskt provisioneras ska ingen
`ENGINE_URL` finnas i prod.
## Källkod (app/api/health/route.ts + lib/health-checks.ts)
- Routen är **liveness**: alltid 200 så länge processen svarar. Bodyns `ok`
är den ärliga signalen: `false` när en konfigurerad dependency fail:ar.
- Per-dependency: `ok` | `error` (med `detail`) | `not_configured` |
`not_integrated` (endast `queue`/REDIS_URL — ingen Redis-klient wired i
repot; aldrig fabricerad `ok`).
- Readiness (`/api/ready`) fail-close:ar på `db != ok` och på varje
`error` — konfigurerad-men-död räknas inte som "valfri".
## Simon-gates (ej agent-verifierbara)
Inloggad journey (admin-portalens E2E) och kanarie-identitet (beställd
kanarieorder spårad end-to-end) kräver Simons inloggning och stäms separat —
omfattas ej av denna mätning.
## Historik
2026-08-10 mättes 0pt.app på Vercel (`{"ok":true,"db":"not_configured",...}`
hardcoded-grönt — BACKLOG P0-3, sedan fixat). Den deploymenten är inaktuell; alla prod-utsagor i denna fil gäller Coolify-cutovern.
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# GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT — 0pt (FAS 4)
> Bedömning mot SIAX Cloud K1-golden-standard (plattformsrepo). Verifierad 2026-08-10;
> kontroll C6:s attribuering uppdaterad och korrigerad 2026-08-11 (se C6-raden och
> "Bypass-undantag" nedan).
> Märkning: ✅ uppfylld · ⚠️ delvis/gap · ❌ ej uppfylld · ➖ ej tillämplig/blockerad (med motivering).
> Bevis per kontroll (AR-5). Poäng: ✅=1, ⚠️=0.5, ❌=0, ➖ exkluderas ur nämnaren.
---
## A. Plattformsidentitet & kontrakt
| # | Kontroll | Status | Bevis |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | Korrekt klassificering (category=platform K1, subcategory=data-os, appId=0PT, prefix=0pt, @siax/0pt) | ✅ | `siax.config.json` + ny `siax.repo.json` (FAS 1, VERIFIERAT) |
| A2 | consumes ⊆ tillåtna K1-OS (CL0UD/ST0RE/N0D/AUD0/INF0) | ✅ | siax.repo.json consumes-lista; klienterna finns i `src/clients/*` |
| A3 | replacesSaaS-dokumenterat (Apollo/Cognism/ZoomInfo/Clearbit) | ✅ | siax.repo.json + ARCHITECTURE §1.1 |
| A4 | OpenAPI 3.1-kontrakt som SSOT (/orders, /estimates, enrich, resolve, provenance) | ❌ | `contracts/openapi.yaml` finns inte — byggs FAS 6 |
| A5 | Capability på sex ytor (API/CLI/MCP/UI/Job/SDK) | ⚠️ | API (app/api/0pt/*) + UI (admin/kallor) + Job-signaler (n0d-client) finns; CLI/MCP/SDK delegeras till cl0ud — ej verifierat registrerat i capability-registret (ANTAGANDE) |
## B. Beroenden & arkitektur (hårda regler)
| # | Kontroll | Status | Bevis |
|---|---|---|---|
| B1 | AR-4: inga Vercel/Google Fonts/next/font/google i körbar kod | ❌ | `@vercel/analytics` (package.json:48, app/layout.tsx:4,64) + `next/font/google` (app/layout.tsx:3,11-12) — åtgärdas FAS 6 |
| B2 | AR-4: inga betald-SaaS-beroenden som driftkrav (Stripe är kundval, env-guardad — ej plattformsberoende) | ⚠️ | Stripe env-guardad ✅; Azure Doc Intelligence + Cloudflare R2-adapter env-guardade, behållna per AR-1 (migration → backlog) |
| B3 | AR-8: beroenden pekar bara nedåt (inga K2–K5) | ✅ | Ingen referens till kundrepon (contentroom/v0-datahub/prt-*) i koden (grep) |
| B4 | AR-2: inga frysta kundrepon berörs | ✅ | Denna session rör endast sax3l/0pt |
| B5 | AR-3: ärvd licens ej ersatt | ✅ | 0pt är ingen fork; egen proprietär kod (LICENSE) |
| B6 | OSS-disciplin (licenskompatibilitet, låsningar) | ⚠️ | duckdb används i kod men saknas i requirements.txt; GPL-komponenter (FlareSolverr/NocoDB/Metabase) containeriserade — medvetet |
| B7 | Testbarhet: tester gröna i CI | ✅ | Gitea run 3759 (ci.yml, main) success 2026-08-09; lokalt omverifieras FAS 8 |
## C. Säkerhet (SEC-kontroller)
| # | Kontroll | Status | Bevis |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | Auth på /api/0pt/* (fail-closed) | ⚠️ | Koden fail-closed (middleware.ts + assertAuthConfigSafe) men live-probe 2026-08-10: `GET 0pt.app/api/0pt` → **200 anonymt** (lucka S1, orsak OKÄND) |
| C2 | Tenant bundet till session, aldrig från body | ❌ | S2: ingen handler läser x-0pt-verified-tenant; tenant_id tas ur body/query (grep) |
| C3 | Auth på övriga routes (orders/payments/admin/estimates) | ❌ | S3+S4: live 200 anonymt på /api/orders + /api/admin/metrics; escrow-release utan identitet |
| C4 | Policy-klient (CL0UD) fail-closed | ❌ | S5: `cl0ud-client.ts` returnerar allow utan CL0UD_URL, ingen prod-spärr |
| C5 | Audit (AUD0) inkopplad som system of record | ⚠️ | Klient + 10 event-typer emitteras (grep) men no-op utan AUD0_URL (S6); ingen live-endpoint verifierad |
| C6 | WAF-bypass-stack (waf_bypass.py, FlareSolverr, Tor) | ➖ | **Kontoägarens daterade beslut (AR-1-undantag): Simon Axelsson, 2026-08-11, via interaktiv beslutsprompt — se "Bypass-undantag" nedan för fullständig attribuering; ersätter det tidigare oattribuerade "medvetet användarbeslut".** Bypass-adapter/produktionskod rörs inte. Stacken behålls intakt. Berörda SEC-risker (S9) överförs till backlog för produktbeslut, ej radering. |
| C7 | Inga hårdkodade hemligheter i repo | ✅ | Grep-skannat (sk_*/AKIA/ghp_/privkey/xox*/AIza/whsec/postgres-url): 0 träffar; .env.example placeholders |
| C8 | Secrets via Infisical (ej Vercel-env/kommitterade) | ❌ | Infisical ej inkopplat (0 referenser i repo); live-env på Vercel-projektet |
| C9 | Engine (FastAPI) autentiserad | ❌ | S8: 12 endpoints utan auth; X-Internal-Token skickas men läses aldrig |
| C10 | SSRF-skydd (connection_config ur body) | ❌ | S10: POST /api/0pt/sources/{id}/query tar anslutningskonfig ur body → utgående anslutningar mot godtycklig host |
| C11 | Middleware/kritisk seam typkontrolleras i CI | ❌ | S11: middleware.ts i roten, utanför tsconfig.check.json; eslint rådgivande |
| C12 | Stripe-webhook signaturverifiering | ✅ | app/api/webhooks/stripe verifierar mot STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET |
| C13 | GDPR: retention/deletion-after-job implementerad | ❌ | Ingen retention/TTL/DELETE-väg (ARCHITECTURE §4.4) |
| C14 | db-grant-route krypterar verkligen | ❌ | S7: kommentar lovar AES-GCM, kod returnerar random grant_id |
## D. Drift & runtime
| # | Kontroll | Status | Bevis |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | Container icke-root, multi-stage, utan tsx i prod | ✅ | Dockerfile: node:24-alpine, builder+runtime, `USER node`, `CMD next start` (ingen tsx) |
| D2 | /health verifierar beroenden | ⚠️ | /api/health rapporterar db/queue lägen men alltid `ok:true` — liveness ej readiness; "alltid grönt för en döende instans" (ARCHITECTURE §6) |
| D3 | CI grön på main | ✅ | Gitea Actions run 3759 success; deploy.yml röd men avsiktligt (guard) |
| D4 | Deploy till Coolify provisionerad | ⚠️ **(uppdaterad 2026-09-06, var ❌)** | Coolify-app ÄR provisionerad: repo-variabeln `COOLIFY_APP_ID` innehåller en riktig 24-teckens-UUID och repo-secreten `COOLIFY_TOKEN` finns (skapad 2026-08-31). Guarden i `cd.yml` passerar och deployen körde `coolify deploy HTTP 200` på push `1ff34410`. Kvarstår ⚠️ och inte ✅: probe 2026-09-06 08:00 UTC visar att `0pt.app` fortfarande svarar från **Vercel** med **HTTP 402 `DEPLOYMENT_DISABLED`** — publika domänen är nere, DNS är inte omlagd, och Coolify-appen serverar ingen `0pt.app`-trafik. Att webhooken accepteras (HTTP 200) betyder inte att en container kommer upp frisk |
| D5 | Backup + testad restore | ❌ | Ingen backup, ingen DB i prod, restore aldrig testat (ARCHITECTURE §6) |
| D6 | Loggning/observabilitet | ⚠️ | Ingen strukturerad loggning/OTel; endast console.warn (ARCHITECTURE §6) |
| D7 | Infisical-projekt + token tillgängligt för denna session | ➖ | **Blockerare:** ingen Infisical-token tillhandahållen — projekt/secret-bootstrap kan inte verifieras (se SLUTRAPPORT) |
## E. Dokumentation & compliance
| # | Kontroll | Status | Bevis |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | INVENTORY.md (FAS 0) | ✅ | docs/compliance/INVENTORY.md |
| E2 | RELATIONS.md + Mermaid (FAS 2) | ✅ | docs/compliance/RELATIONS.md |
| E3 | OSS-INVENTORY.md (FAS 3) | ✅ | docs/compliance/OSS-INVENTORY.md |
| E4 | GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT (denna) | ✅ | — |
| E5 | BACKLOG P0–P6 (FAS 5) | ✅ | docs/compliance/BACKLOG.md |
| E6 | SLO + runbooks + säkerhetsdokumentation (FAS 9) | ⚠️ | SECURITY.md finns; SLO/runbook/oncall saknas → FAS 9 |
| E7 | Sanning-ärlighet: inga fabricerade påståenden | ✅ | Repot är exceptionellt ärligt (ARKITEKTUR-dok korrigerar README-systematiskt, t.ex. S1–S12, "fabricated, not built"-callouts) |
---
## Poäng
**Före denna session (FAS 0–4), 41 kontroller, 2 ➖ exkluderade:**
| Markering | Antal |
|---|---|
| ✅ | 18 |
| ⚠️ | 8 |
| ❌ | 13 |
| ➖ | 2 (C6 bypass, D7 Infisical-token) |
**Poäng före: (18×1 + 8×0.5) / 39 = 22/39 ≈ 56 %**
**Efter FAS 6–9:** A4 (OpenAPI SSOT) ✅ · B1 (AR-4: Vercel/Google Fonts borttagna) ✅ ·
E6 (SLO + runbooks) ✅ → **✅ 21 · ⚠️ 8 · ❌ 10 · ➖ 2**
**Poäng efter: (21×1 + 8×0.5) / 39 = 25/39 ≈ 64 %** (verifierat i SLUTRAPPORT)
## Bypass-undantag (formell notering)
`services/scrapers/waf_bypass.py` (FlareSolverr, Tor, cloudscraper, curl_cffi,
nodriver, fake-identity), `services/scrapers/engine*.py`,
`services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` och `adaptive_router.py` behålls
intakt och orörda. Kontoägaren Simon Axelsson fattade detta beslut explicit via
en interaktiv beslutsprompt **2026-08-11**, som direkt svar på ett
compliance-uppdrags förslag att ta bort stacken (den städade
borttagnings-PR:en #7 verifierades ren, 128/128 test, men stängdes omergad av
kontoägaren). Beslutet saknar en dokumenterad affärs-/juridisk motivering
utöver "behåll" — hitta inte på en sådan om den dyker upp i framtida
compliance-rapporter. Detta är ett specifikt, avgränsat undantag för den
befintliga 0PT/0pt-motor-sourcingmotorn: `CLAUDE.md` §1:s generella
anti-evasion-policy ändras INTE av detta beslut och gäller som skriven, om
inte kontoägaren säger annat.
Kontroll **C6** markeras ➖ med denna attribuerade, daterade motivering —
**ersätter det tidigare oattribuerade påståendet "medvetet användarbeslut"**
som en tidigare audit flaggade som overifierbart (ingen känd författare,
inget datum). Se `AGENTS.md`/`SECURITY.md` för identisk attribuering.
Motsvarande SEC-risker (S9 + GPL-fläckar) är överförda till BACKLOG P1 som
produktbeslut, inte teknisk radering.
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# INVENTORY — 0pt (sax3l/0pt) — FAS 0
> Kategori: **platform (K1)** · Subkategori: **data-os** · Repo: `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt`
> Kartlagd: 2026-08-10 · Metod: klon (git) + Gitea API (v1, token admin) + grep + live-prober
> Alla påståenden märkta **VERIFIERAT** / **ANTAGANDE** / **EJ VERIFIERAT** per AR-5.
---
## 1. Repo-identitet (VERIFIERAT — Gitea API)
| Fält | Värde |
|---|---|
| full_name | `sax3l/0pt` (id 21) |
| visibility | private |
| default_branch | `main` |
| HEAD (main) | `1346e868bf5c55c6771377c60a3ab7d3dd789ffc` (2026-08-09) |
| branches | 8 (main, fix/remove-vercel-deploy-target, unify/github-main-2026-07-28, docs/1p-egress-measurement-point, compliance/remove-evasion-stack, renovate/configure, foundation/hardening, feature/0pt-remove-noncompliant-scrapers) |
| språk | TypeScript (dominerande) + Python (engine + scrapers) |
| storlek | ~22 MB (inkl. committed skrapdata `services/scrapers/output/*.json` + `__pycache__/*.pyc`) |
| licens | egen (proprietär, SIAX Technology AB — LICENSE-fil finns) |
| Gitea | 1.26.4; Actions aktiverade (`has_actions: true`) |
**Historik:** Repot har haft två remotes (github.com/sax3l/0pt + git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt)
som divergerade; unifierades 2026-07-28 i Gitea main (merge `a714668`). Gitea main
är nu det gemensamma trädet. VERIFIERAT via merge-commits + CLAUDE.md-dokumentation.
## 2. Filträd (VERIFIERAT — git ls-files)
```
0pt/
├─ app/ # Next.js 16 App Router: 20 sidor (sv UI-copy) + 28 API-routehandlers
│ └─ api/ # health, orders, estimates, 0pt/*, auth/*, payments/*, admin/metrics,
│ # screen, uploads, vehicles, subscriptions, connections, webhooks/stripe, ai/parse
├─ components/ # shadcn/ui + sections + DataArtifact/ProvenanceBadge
├─ lib/ # db, engine, auth, stripe, orders-store, subscriptions-store, data, services
├─ src/ # capability-lagret (TS): clients (cl0ud, n0d, aud0, st0re, st0re-lakehouse),
│ │ # services (dataset, source, source-query, iceberg-write, document-capture/-extraction,
│ │ # external-writeback, source-rate-policy, dataset-iceberg-mapping), adapters, auth, types
├─ services/
│ ├─ api/ # FastAPI-engine: orchestrator/main.py (12 endpoints) + workers (adaptive_router,
│ │ # pipeline, queue, resolve, run) + sources (sources.yaml, connectors, financials)
│ ├─ scrapers/ # Skrapmotor Python: engine.py, engine_v2.py, waf_bypass.py, clickhouse_pipeline.py,
│ │ # s3_sync.py + committed output/*.json + __pycache__/*.pyc
│ └─ infra/ # docker-compose.data-stack.yml (clickhouse, trino, flaresolverr, tor-proxy, superset, postgres)
├─ infra/ # docker-compose.yml (postgres+pgvector, redis, api, worker, nocodb, metabase, caddy) + Caddyfile
├─ sql/ # 001_init.sql, 004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql, 005_..._gap_closure.sql
│ # (002/003 saknas — refereras av 3 filer, se GAP-1)
├─ packages/schemas/ # JSON Schemas 0pt.* (dataset_iceberg_mapping, iceberg_table, lineage_event, signal, source_rate_policy)
├─ tests/ # vitest: auth/ + p0/ + validation/ (17+ testfiler)
├─ docs/ # 01–12 + architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md (S1–S12-luckor) + P0_*-flöden
├─ .gitea/workflows/ # ci.yml, deploy.yml, health-check.yml
├─ .github/workflows/ # ci.yml (arv från GitHub-linjen, kvar efter unifiering)
├─ Dockerfile # Coolify, multi-stage, icke-root (node), HEALTHCHECK /api/health
└─ root: package.json, pnpm-workspace.yaml, pnpm-lock.yaml, siax.config.json, renovate.json,
.npmrc, .env.example, .gitignore, .dockerignore, middleware.ts, next.config.mjs, vitest.config.ts,
tsconfig{,.check}.json, eslint.config.mjs, CLAUDE.md, README.md, SECURITY.md, LICENSE
```
## 3. Beroenden
### 3.1 JS/TS (VERIFIERAT — package.json + pnpm-lock.yaml)
- **next@16.0.10, react@19.2.0** (App Router), tailwindcss@4, shadcn/ui (Radix-primitiver),
zod@3.25.76, jose (JWT-verifiering), stripe@22, postgres@3, recharts, sonner, vaul m.fl.
- devDeps: vitest@3, typescript@5, eslint@9, prettier@3.
- packageManager: `pnpm@9.15.9` (lockfile v9.0).
- **Namnet i package.json är fortfarande `"my-v0-project"`** (v0-exportartefakt, GAP-2).
- **Förbjudet beroende enligt AR-4 (VERIFIERAT):**
- `@vercel/analytics@1.3.1` (package.json rad 48) — används i `app/layout.tsx` rad 4/64.
- `next/font/google` (Inter + JetBrains Mono) — `app/layout.tsx` rad 3/11-12. Google Fonts hämtas
vid byggtid → AR-4-brott.
- Azure Document Intelligence (`DOC_INTELLIGENCE_*`) — env-guardad adapter
`src/adapters/document-intelligence-adapter.ts` (befintlig funktionalitet, AR-1 behåller).
- Cloudflare R2 (`app/api/uploads`) — env-guardad stub (AR-4: pågående migrering noteras).
### 3.2 Python engine (VERIFIERAT — services/api/requirements.txt)
fastapi, uvicorn, pydantic, httpx, asyncpg (oanvänd), python-dotenv, pyyaml,
rapidfuzz (enda matching-engine, `workers/resolve.py`), tenacity.
**saknas (plan i docs/07):** spaCy/transformers (NER), dedupe-paket (rapidfuzz täcker dedup),
DuckDB/polars, Playwright (kompliant, ej installerat), unstructured, OCR.
### 3.3 Python scrapers (VERIFIERAT — services/scrapers/requirements.txt)
curl_cffi, cloudscraper, httpx, aiohttp, requests, beautifulsoup4, lxml, boto3.
→ **Bypass-stacken.** BEHÅLLS INTACT per explicit användarbeslut (AR-1-undantag):
`waf_bypass.py` (FlareSolverr, Tor, cloudscraper, TLS-fingerprintbyte, proxypool, nodriver,
fake-identity) + `services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` (flaresolverr, tor-proxy) +
`workers/adaptive_router.py` ("all methods, no compliance restrictions").
Dokumenteras i GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT som medvetet val (SEC-kontroller ➖/⚠️).
### 3.4 Beroenden uppåt (VERIFIERAT — src/clients/*)
| OS/klient | Env | Fail-beteende |
|---|---|---|
| Zitadel (IdP) | `ZITADEL_ISSUER` (default id-customers.siax.io) | Fail-closed (401/403), `assertAuthConfigSafe` |
| CL0UD | `CL0UD_URL` | **Fail-open** → `allow` (lucka S5) |
| AUD0 | `AUD0_URL` | No-op (lucka S6) |
| ST0RE | `ST0RE_URL` | Mock-artefakt |
| N0D | `N0D_URL` | Mock-jobb |
| Stripe | `STRIPE_*` | 501 |
AR-8 (beroenden bara nedåt, K1 får inte bero på K2–K5): alla OS-beroenden är plattformsinternta
(CL0UD/ST0RE/N0D/AUD0/INF0 = K1). VERIFIERAT: inget beroende på kundrepon (contentroom,
v0-datahub, prt-* etc.) finns i 0pt.
## 4. Drift (VERIFIERAT 2026-08-10)
| Fråga | Läge | Bevis |
|---|---|---|
| Live-instans | **Vercel** (0pt.app) — Coolify avsett, ej provisionerat | README §Deploy + ARCHITECTURE §5 |
| Nod (flotta) | `siax.config.json` → `deploy.node: null` — ingen nod tilldelad | siax.config.json |
| Domän | `0pt.app` (live). `api.0pt.app`/`data.0pt.app`/`dash.0pt.app` (Caddy) EJ VERIFIERAT | README + ARCHITECTURE §5 |
| /api/health | 200, `{"ok":true,"db":"not_configured","queue":"not_configured"}` | live-probe 2026-08-10 |
| /api/0pt (anonym) | **200 anonymt** — middleware fail-closed verkar INTE köra i prod (lucka S1) | live-probe 2026-08-10 |
| /api/orders (anonym) | **200 anonymt** — inget skyddat (lucka S3) | live-probe 2026-08-10 |
| CI (Gitea Actions) | senaste ci.yml på main: **success** (run 3759, 2026-08-09). ~~deploy.yml: röd men **avsiktligt** (guard: placeholder-app-ID)~~ **korrigerat 2026-09-06:** cd.yml är **grön** och deployar på riktigt — `COOLIFY_APP_ID` är en riktig UUID, guarden passerar, `coolify deploy HTTP 200` (run 11695, jobb 26295, head `1ff34410`). 48 runs totalt vid ursprungsmätningen | Gitea API `/actions/runs`, `/actions/variables`, `/actions/secrets` |
| Secrets | Inga hårdkodade hemligheter hittade (grep-skannat). **Infisical ej inkopplat** — inga referenser i repot | grep + ARCHITECTURE §5 |
| Backup | Ingen (ingen DB i prod att backa upp) | ARCHITECTURE §6 |
## 5. Förbjudna beroenden — sammanfattning (AR-4)
| Träff | Fil | Åtgärd FAS |
|---|---|---|
| `@vercel/analytics` | package.json + app/layout.tsx | FAS 6: ta bort (ersättning saknas — ej betald SaaS) |
| `next/font/google` | app/layout.tsx | FAS 6: ersätt med självhämtade fonter (fontsource) |
| Azure Doc Intelligence | src/adapters/document-intelligence-adapter.ts (env-guardad) | FAS 6: behåll (AR-1) — dokumenteras ⚠️, migration → backlog |
| Cloudflare R2 | app/api/uploads/route.ts (env-guardad stub) | FAS 6: behåll (AR-1 + pågående migrering) — dokumenteras |
## 6. Kända luckor (arv från docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md §7, verifierade)
S1 (middleware körs ej i prod — live-bekräftat 2026-08-10), S2 (tenant från body, ej session),
S3 (icke-/api/0pt-API saknar auth — live-bekräftat), S4 (escrow-release utan identitet),
S5 (CL0UD fail-open), S6 (AUD0 no-op), S7 (db-grant påstår kryptering som inte finns),
S8 (engine utan auth), S9 (bypass-kod — **medvetet behållen per kontoägarens
daterade beslut, Simon Axelsson 2026-08-11, se SECURITY.md**),
S10 (connection_config ur body → SSRF-primitiv), S11 (middleware typkontrolleras ej),
S12 (svag sessions-scaffold). + GAP-1 (sql/002–003 saknas), GAP-2 (package.json-namn).
## 7. Utfallsfil FAS 0
✅ `docs/compliance/INVENTORY.md` skapad. Redo för FAS 1.
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# OSS-INVENTORY — 0pt (FAS 3)
> Kartlagd 2026-08-10. Status per manifest/läsning: **INSTALLERAD** (i requirements.txt/package.json)
> vs **PLANAD** (docs/07-dependencies.md, ej installerad) vs **REFERENS** (nämnd i kod/docs).
> Licens-URLer och licenser är välkända, ej individuellt omverifierade denna pass (ANTAGANDE där annat ej anges).
## 1. Python — engine (services/api/requirements.txt)
| Paket | Roll | Licens | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| fastapi | API-ramverk | MIT | INSTALLERAD |
| uvicorn | ASGI-server | BSD-3-Clause | INSTALLERAD |
| pydantic | validering | MIT | INSTALLERAD |
| httpx | HTTP (kompliant, identifierar sig) | BSD-3-Clause | INSTALLERAD, aktivt använd |
| asyncpg | Postgres-driver | Apache-2.0 | INSTALLERAD men oanvänd (grep) |
| python-dotenv | env | BSD-3-Clause | INSTALLERAD |
| pyyaml | sources.yaml | MIT | INSTALLERAD, använd |
| rapidfuzz | fuzzy matching / entity resolution (Levenshtein-familjen) | MIT | INSTALLERAD, enda matching-engine (workers/resolve.py) |
| tenacity | retry | Apache-2.0 | INSTALLERAD |
| **spaCy** (+modeller) | NER / entity resolution | MIT (modeller: CC-BY-SA-3.0) | **PLANAD** (docs/07), EJ installerad — NER saknas helt i kod |
| **dedupe** | record linkage / dedupe | MIT | **PLANAD/ERSATT** — rapidfuzz fyller dedup-rollen idag; dedupe ej installerat |
| **DuckDB** | kolumnanalys | MIT | **REFERENS + kodanvändning** — lazy-import i `services/scrapers/clickhouse_pipeline.py:220` (DuckDBWriter), men **SAKNAS i requirements.txt** (GAP: låsas om den ska vara del av stacken) |
| **Playwright** | kompliant JS-rendering (public pages) | Apache-2.0 | **PLANAD** (docs/07 rad 45) — ej installerad; klart skild från bypass |
| **python-Levenshtein** | Levenshtein | GPL-2.0-or-later | **UNDVIK medvetet** — rapidfuzz (MIT) ersätter (GPL-kompatibilitetsskäl, docs/07-rad 39) |
| polars | tabular | MIT | PLANAD, ej installerad |
| unstructured | PDF/HTML→element | Apache-2.0 | PLANAD, ej installerad |
| paddleocr/pytesseract | OCR | Apache-2.0 | PLANAD, ej installerad |
## 2. Python — scrapers (services/scrapers/requirements.txt) — medvetet behållen stack
> ⚠️ AR-1-undantag (användarbeslut): hela `services/scrapers/*` + `services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml`
> behålls intakt. OSS-inventeringen listar dem ärligt; compliance-bedömning sker i GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT.
| Paket/komponent | Roll | Licens | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| curl_cffi | TLS-fingerprintbyte | MIT | INSTALLERAD, använd i engine.py/engine_v2.py/waf_bypass.py |
| cloudscraper | Cloudflare-bypass (basic) | MIT | INSTALLERAD, använd |
| httpx / aiohttp / requests | HTTP | BSD-3-Clause / Apache-2.0 / Apache-2.0 | INSTALLERAD |
| beautifulsoup4 + lxml | HTML-parsing | MIT | INSTALLERAD |
| boto3 | S3-sync (MinIO/R2) | Apache-2.0 | INSTALLERAD, använd i s3_sync.py |
| **FlareSolverr** | CF-bypass (tung) | **GPL-3.0** | REFERENS — container i docker-compose.data-stack.yml + waf_bypass.py |
| **Tor** | proxy-rotation | BSD-3-Clause | REFERENS — tor-proxy-container i docker-compose.data-stack.yml |
| **nodriver** | undetected browser | Apache-2.0 | REFERENS (waf_bypass.py) — ej i requirements |
| **DuckDB** | alternativ lagring | MIT | KODANVÄND (clickhouse_pipeline.py) men ej i requirements.txt — GAP |
## 3. JS/TS (package.json, urval) — OSS + proprietär
| Paket | Roll | Licens | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| next / react / react-dom | App Router | MIT | INSTALLERAD |
| zod | schema-validering | MIT | INSTALLERAD |
| jose | JWT/JWKS | MIT | INSTALLERAD |
| stripe | betalningar | Apache-2.0 | INSTALLERAD |
| postgres (pg) | DB-driver | Unlicense | INSTALLERAD |
| tailwindcss / shadcn-ui-komponenter | styling | MIT | INSTALLERAD |
| Radix-primitiver (react-*)| a11y-komponenter | MIT | INSTALLERAD |
| vitest | testrunner | MIT | INSTALLERAD |
| recharts | diagram | MIT | INSTALLERAD |
| @vercel/analytics | **FÖRBJUDET (AR-4)** | MIT | INSTALLERAD → tas bort FAS 6 |
## 4. Self-hosted containers (infra/, services/infra/)
| Komponent | Licens | Status |
|---|---|---|
| postgres pgvector (pg16) | PostgreSQL | infra/docker-compose.yml (ej verifierat körande) |
| redis:7 | BSD-3-Clause | infra/docker-compose.yml |
| nocodb/nocodb | AGPL-3.0 | infra/docker-compose.yml |
| metabase/metabase | AGPL-3.0 | infra/docker-compose.yml |
| caddy | Apache-2.0 | infra/Caddyfile |
| clickhouse | Apache-2.0 | services/infra/data-stack (ej verifierat körande) |
| trino | Apache-2.0 | services/infra/data-stack |
| **flaresolverr** | **GPL-3.0** | services/infra/data-stack — medvetet behållen |
| **tor-proxy** | BSD-3-Clause | services/infra/data-stack — medvetet behållen |
| superset | Apache-2.0 | services/infra/data-stack |
## 5. Noteringar
- **AR-3 (ärvd licens):** 0pt är ingen fork — egen proprietär kod. Inga ärvda
licenser att ersätta. ✔
- **GPL-fläckar:** FlareSolverr (GPL-3.0) och NocoDB/Metabase (AGPL-3.0) är
containeriserade, ej inlänkade bibliotek — GPL-eksponeringen begränsad men bör
hållas i åtanke vid byte av BI-verktyg.
- **Låsnings-GAP:** `duckdb` används i kod (scrapers) men saknas i
requirements.txt — se BACKLOG (P4).
- Playwright/FlareSolverr radas som referens i samma dokumentfamilj men är varandras
motsatser: Playwright = kompliant hämtning (docs/07, ej installerad), FlareSolverr =
bypass (medvetet behållen).
## 6. Utfallsfil FAS 3
✅ `docs/compliance/OSS-INVENTORY.md` skapad.
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# PII Guardrail — GDPR requirement for personal-data sources (0pt)
Status: **enforced, fail-closed.** No 0pt pipeline is crawling personuppgifter
today; the `PiiGateService` ships so that any future source that touches
personal data (Ratsit, Merinfo, Hitta, …) is **technically GDPR-OK before the
first byte is stored**.
## The rule
1. **Classify.** A source is personal-data if it self-flags
(`touches_personal_data`) or is a known directory domain (ratsit.se,
merinfo.se, hitta.se, mrkoll.se, eniro.se, birthday.se, upplysning.se).
2. **No policy → no processing.** `assertCanStore()` throws unless a
`PiiPolicy` with a valid `legal_basis` + `basis_ref` is on record.
3. **Everything is evidenced.** Each decision is emitted to AUD0 at risk L3
(`0pt.pii_policy_created | pii_data_retained | pii_erased |
pii_retention_purged`).
## Recorded legitimate-interest stance (Simon, 2026-08-31)
> "Vi får lagra dem om dem är kopplade till företagen i affärssyfte."
Personal data may be stored under **legitimate interest (art. 6(1)(f))** ONLY
as **business contacts bound to a company/org entity** (`entity_linked_only`).
The gate enforces this mechanically:
- `legal_basis: legitimate_interest` ⇒ `purpose` MUST be `business_contact` and
`entity_linked_only` MUST be `true`. A lazily-written policy is rejected.
- `recordStored()` refuses person-only rows for such policies: an `entity_id`
(orgnr/rgs-nummer/LEI) is REQUIRED; only its hash is ever stored.
- Stand-alone personal records (no backing company) are not permitted under LI.
This is the recorded business-policy decision — a written LIA should be kept
and its id referenced in `basis_ref` (`lia-YYYY-MM-b2b-NN` naming is fine).
## GDPR article mapping
| Requirement | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Legal basis — art. 6 | `legal_basis` ∈ legitimate_interest/consent/contract/legal_obligation + `basis_ref` (LIA doc id, consent record id, contract clause, provision). Cannot be empty. |
| Data minimisation — art. 5(1)(c) | `field_allowlist`; storing any other field throws `PiiMinimisationError`. Empty allowlist = nothing stored. |
| Storage limitation — art. 5(1)(e) | `retention_days`; `enforceRetention()` purges expired rows. `0` = fetch-and-drop, nothing persisted. |
| Integrity/confidentiality — art. 32 | Only sha256 hashes of identity keys stored (`recordStored`); plaintext identity never written; log/trace redaction (`redact()`) for personnummer/e-mail/phone. |
| Right of access — art. 15 | `accessStatement(subjectHash)` — what is held on a subject, across sources. |
| Right to erasure — art. 17 | `erase({ subject_hash, reason })` tombstones every stored value for the subject. |
| Data protection by design — art. 25 | Gate defaults ON in `SourceQueryService`; no bypass knobs. |
## When someone requests a personal-data source (e.g. Ratsit)
- [x] Confirm the source is actually needed and no anonymised/official
alternative exists (official register > directory listing).
- [x] Write the **Legitimate Interest Assessment** (or record consent /
contract / legal obligation) and store its id in `basis_ref`.
LIA minimum: purpose, necessity, individuals' rights impact, mitigations.
For LI: purpose `business_contact` + `entity_linked_only` (see recorded
stance above — an LIA referencing `lia-YYYY-MM-b2b-NN` is good practice).
- [x] **VERIFY current terms + robots.txt + availability** on the live site.
Do not hardcode "catsit.com allows" — re-check each enable.
- [x] Set `robots_and_rate_confirmed: true` + a `SourceRatePolicy` matching
the source's own limits (legacy N0D default for `ratsit.se` was `1/min` —
treat that as a ceiling, not a target).
- [x] Define the minimum `field_allowlist` (e.g. only `street_address`, not
`phone`).
- [x] Invoke `recordStored` for every stored value and run `enforceRetention`
on a schedule (e.g. daily cron).
- [x] Record a DPIA note if processing is "large scale" (art. 35) — bulk
directory scraping of living persons is large-scale by default.
## Never
- Pretend a source has a legal basis it does not have; `basis_ref` must point
to a real artifact.
- Store identity keys in plaintext (`pseudonymize_keys` defaults to true).
- Use stealth/bot-bypass/rate-evasion — excluded by CLAUDE.md §1 regardless of
GDPR.
- Claim compliance on a source we have not re-verified this season (`VERIFY`
markers are intentional).
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# RELATIONS — 0pt relationskarta (FAS 2)
> Verifierad mot kod 2026-08-10. Alla relationer är grep-/läs-verifierade (AR-5).
> Legenden: **sources.yaml** = kompliant källregistret · **bypass-stacken** = medvetet behållen
> per användarbeslut (se GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT), visas grått.
## 1. Router → källor
`services/api/workers/adaptive_router.py` bygger sourcingplan per marknad;
`services/api/sources/sources.yaml` är källregistret (kompliant sida). Skrapmotorn
(`services/scrapers/`) är den medvetet behållna bypass-sidan.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
subgraph Router["adaptive_router.py (workers)"]
R["plan_for_market(market) -> source_id-lista"]
end
subgraph Registry["sources.yaml (kompliant, 8 källor)"]
S1[gleif · global · api CC0]
S2[brreg · NO · api NLOD]
S3[companies_house · GB · api nyckel]
S4[prh · FI · api CC-BY]
S5[cvr · DK · api Virk]
S6[bolagsverket · SE · licensed]
S7[rdw · NL · bulk fordon]
S8[opensanctions · global · bulk screening]
end
subgraph Scraper["services/scrapers (medvetet behållen bypass)"]
W[waf_bypass.py: FlareSolverr/Tor/cloudscraper/curl_cffi]
E2[engine_v2.py]
C[clickhouse_pipeline.py]
end
R -->|NO| S2
R -->|GB| S3
R -->|FI| S4
R -->|DK| S5
R -->|SE| S6
R -->|NL| S7
R -->|global| S1
R -->|screening| S8
R -.->|"deep scraping (b0ts/legacy)"| E2
E2 --> W
E2 --> C
```
## 2. ST0RE-artefakter (lakehouse-write-vägen)
Enda skrivväg för Iceberg-state: `src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts` →
`/v1/st0re/lakehouse/*` (namespace → table → snapshot). Live-verifierad 2026-07-13.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
API["POST /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/{id}/writes"] --> WRITE[IcebergWriteService]
WRITE --> NS[registerNamespace<br/>X-Tenant-Id/X-Actor-Id]
NS --> T[registerTable<br/>IcebergTableInput]
T --> SNAP[createSnapshot<br/>manifestUri, aud0EventId]
SNAP --> MANI["Iceberg-manifest (bytes)<br/>N0D skriver faktiska filer"]
WRITE --> N0D[createJob /v1/n0d/jobs<br/>job_type=0pt.* heavy]
WRITE --> MAP["DatasetIcebergMapping (0pt, in-memory/Postgres mål)"]
MAP -.->|"mappingId->tableId"| T
```
## 3. N0D-jobb
`src/clients/n0d-client.ts` → `POST /v1/n0d/jobs`. 0pt begär jobb, äger aldrig
scheduling/GPU. Mock (`mock_job_*`) utan `N0D_URL` — testbar, inte verklig.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant S as Service (0pt)
participant N as N0D (POST /v1/n0d/jobs)
participant R as N0D-Runner
S->>N: createJob {tenant_id, project_id, job_type, input_artifact_ids, risk_level}
N-->>S: job_id (status=queued)
N->>R: scheduler -> worker
R-->>S: (0pt följer ej upp — poll/hook saknas, backlog)
```
## 4. AUD0-events (system of record)
`src/clients/aud0-client.ts` → `POST /v1/aud0/events` + `/v1/aud0/lineage/events`.
Event-typer som emiteteras i kod (grep-verifierat):
| event_type | Källa (service) | Linjage-event |
|---|---|---|
| `0pt.dataset_registered` | dataset-service.ts | — |
| `0pt.source_created` | source-service.ts | — |
| `0pt.source_rate_policy_created` | source-rate-policy-service.ts | — |
| `0pt.source_queried` | source-query-service.ts | — |
| `0pt.dataset_iceberg_table_mapped` | dataset-iceberg-mapping-service.ts | `lineage_0pt_dataset_iceberg_*` |
| `0pt.iceberg_write_requested` | iceberg-write-service.ts | — |
| `0pt.iceberg_snapshot_created` | iceberg-write-service.ts | `lineage_0pt_iceberg_snapshot_*` |
| `0pt.document_captured` | document-capture-service.ts | `lineage_0pt_document_captured_*` |
| `0pt.document_extracted` | document-extraction-service.ts | `lineage_0pt_document_extracted_*` |
| `0pt.external_record_written` | external-writeback-service.ts | `lineage_0pt_external_write_*` |
> ⚠️ Utan `AUD0_URL` är emissionen **no-op** (klientkontraktet) — lucka S6.
> Ingen live-AUD0-endpoint verifierad för 0pt ännu (klientdokkommentar).
## 5. Beroendepilar (AR-8, nedåt endast)
```mermaid
flowchart TD
UI[0pt.app UI] --> API[Next.js API-routes]
API --> CAP[src/ capability-lagret]
CAP --> CL[CL0UD policy · fail-open]
CAP --> ST[ST0RE artefakter/lakehouse]
CAP --> ND[N0D jobb]
CAP --> AU[AUD0 audit · no-op utan URL]
CAP --> EN[FastAPI-engine services/api]
EN --> SRC[Komplienta källor + bypass-stack]
CL -.->|K1| SAX[SIAX Cloud (K1) - endast nedåt, inga K2-K5]
ST -.->|K1| SAX
ND -.->|K1| SAX
AU -.->|K1| SAX
```
AR-8-status: **VERIFIERAT** — 0pt beror endast på K1-tjänster (CL0UD/ST0RE/N0D/AUD0/INF0)
+ externa data-/betalningskällor; inga kundrepon (K2–K5) refereras i koden.
## 6. Utfallsfil FAS 2
✅ `docs/compliance/RELATIONS.md` skapad med 4 Mermaid-diagram.
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# SCAFFOLD-TODO — vad som är härlett och vad som måste verifieras
**Genererad:** 2026-11-10 av `siax-scaffold` (siax-standard,
`packages/scaffold`) mot Golden Standard v2.0.
Den här filen finns för att en mall inte får låtsas veta saker. Varje rad nedan
är antingen **härledd ur repot** (källan står i kolumn 3) eller ett
**konservativt defaultvärde** som en människa måste bekräfta. Radera raden när
den är verifierad — filen ska till slut kunna tas bort helt.
## Härledda värden i `siax.repo.json`
| Fält | Värde | Härlett ur |
|---|---|---|
| `repo` | `0PT` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` (VERSALER per REPO-08) |
| `codeowners` | `["@sax3l"]` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
| `category` | `platform` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
| `subcategory` | `data-os` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
| `operationalState` | `running` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
| `domains` | `2 st` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
| `children` | `4 st` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
| `packageName` | `@siax/0pt` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
## Måste verifieras av människa
- [ ] Rätta den BEFINTLIGA `siax.repo.json` — den validerar inte mot schemat (REPO-03/04) och scaffolden skriver inte över den (AR-1): (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: tier; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: runtime; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: canonical; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: parentRepo; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: capabilities; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: surfaces; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: identity; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: persistence; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: deployment; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: observability; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: reliability; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: engines; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: licenses; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: productionEvidence; /standardVersion: måste vara "3.0", är "2.0"; (roten): okänt fält "codeowners" (additionalProperties: false); (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: canonical
## Kontroller som scaffolden AVSIKTLIGT lämnar röda
Inga — de tre fall den här sektionen annars varnar för (`appId` satt till `null`, ett genererat kontraktsskelett, ett nyskrivet `backup-restore.md` utan datum) gäller inte i denna körning. Se "Måste verifieras" ovan för vad som faktiskt återstår.
---
_Genererad av `siax-scaffold` (siax-standard). Varje `TODO:` i filen måste
fyllas i av en människa. Samlad lista: `docs/compliance/SCAFFOLD-TODO.md`._
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# SLUTRAPPORT — 0pt (FAS 0–10)
> Session 2026-08-10 · Plattformsarkitekt + exekverande ingenjör (K1, platform).
> Repo: `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt` · Gitea 1.26.4 · Gitea Actions aktiverade.
## 1. Poäng före/efter
| | ✅ | ⚠️ | ❌ | ➖ | Poäng |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Före (FAS 0–4)** | 18 | 8 | 13 | 2 | **56 %** (22/39) |
| **Efter (FAS 6–9)** | 21 | 8 | 10 | 2 | **64 %** (25/39) |
Förbättrade kontroller: **A4** (OpenAPI 3.1 SSOT — `contracts/openapi.yaml`),
**B1** (AR-4: `@vercel/analytics` + `next/font/google` borttagna → självhämtade
fontsource), **E6** (SLO + 4 runbooks + prompts). Oförändrade ❌-kontroller är
backlog-P0 (auth/tenant/escrow/engine-auth) — kräver produktbeslut, se BACKLOG.
Bypass-stacken (C6) och Infisical-token (D7) är ➖ per motivering.
## 2. Filer skapade/ändrade (diff mot 1346e86)
**Skapade (17):** `siax.repo.json` · `contracts/openapi.yaml` · `.gitattributes` ·
`.gitea/workflows/security.yml` · `.gitea/workflows/nightly.yml` · `CONTRIBUTING.md` ·
`AGENTS.md` · `docs/slo.md` · `docs/runbook/{deploy,incident,backup-restore,oncall}.md` ·
`prompts/{000-INDEX,001-repo-health,002-compliance-audit,003-security-review,004-deploy-cutover}.md` ·
`docs/compliance/{INVENTORY,RELATIONS,OSS-INVENTORY,GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT,BACKLOG,SLUTRAPPORT}.md` ·
`docs/compliance/EVIDENCE/{ci-main,container,health}.md`
**Ändrade (12):** `siax.config.json` (platform/data-os, appId 0PT, consumes +INF0,
replacesSaaS) · `docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md` (§1.1 klassificering) ·
`app/layout.tsx` + `app/globals.css` (AR-4: fontsource, ingen Google/Vercel) ·
`package.json` (namn `@siax/0pt`, fontsource, bort `@vercel/analytics`) ·
`pnpm-lock.yaml` · `.npmrc` (`@siax:registry`) · `.env.example` (`INF0_URL`) ·
`.gitignore` (hygiene) · `renovate.json` (gitea-platform, semcommits, scraper-frys) ·
`services/scrapers/requirements.txt` (duckdb-pin) · `.gitea/workflows/{ci,cd}.yml`
(split + status-check-kontext bevarade) · `README.md` + `SECURITY.md` (ärliga
uppdateringar, S1-kaveat)
## 3. Commits på main (chronologiskt)
| SHA | Innehåll |
|---|---|
| `d2b5ec8` | docs(compliance): FAS 0–5 + siax.repo.json + klassificering |
| `9888c00` | feat(contract): OpenAPI SSOT + AR-4-fixes + hygiene |
| `2dccb8a` | **merge PR #9** ci(workflows): split CD/security/nightly (skyddade filer) |
| `8db56f1` | docs: FAS 9 (runbooks, SLO, prompts, README/SECURITY) |
| *(nästa)* | docs(compliance): EVIDENCE + SLUTRAPPORT (denna) |
Slut-SHA rapporteras efter sista push.
## 4. Blockerare (inget löst denna session)
1. **Ingen Infisical-token tillhandahållen** → Infisical-projekt/secret-bootstrap
ej utfört (D7 ➖, FAS 7-delen "Infisical-projekt" blockerade).
2. **Ingen Coolify-app provisionerad** → `cd.yml` förblir röd avsiktligt;
Vercel-cutover kräver separat beslut + DNS-arbete (BACKLOG P1-5, D4).
3. **S1-livegap** (0pt.app svarar 200 anonymt på /api/0pt) — rotorsak ej
fastställd; kräver tillgång till Vercel/Coolify-deploymiljö.
4. **Bypass-stacken** — vid denna sessions skrivande (2026-08-10) citerad som
oattribuerat "medvetet användarbeslut"; GPL-/juridiskt läge kvar som
produktbeslut (P1-4). **Uppdaterat 2026-08-11:** kontoägaren Simon Axelsson
tillfrågades direkt och valde explicit att behålla stacken (interaktiv
beslutsprompt, ingen motivering utöver "behåll" given) — se
AGENTS.md/SECURITY.md/GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT.md kontroll C6 för
fullständig, attribuerad text. Denna notering ersätter det tidigare
oattribuerade påståendet ovan.
## 5. Exakt restmängd (BACKLOG)
- **P0 (8):** P0-1..P0-8 — middleware i prod, tenant från session, auth på hela
API:et, escrow-release, CL0UD fail-closed, engine-auth, SSRF, typcheck-middleware.
- **P1 (6):** AUD0-wiring, db-grant-kryptering, session, bypass-produktbeslut,
Coolify-provisionering, Infisical.
- **P2 (4):** backup/restore, retention, tenant-scopade källfrågor, observabilitet.
- **P3 (4):** capability-register, tenantmodell, header-policy, engine-Postgres.
- **P4 (6):** duckdb låst ✅(gjord), package.json-namn ✅(gjord), sql/002-003,
pycache/output-hygiene, .github-workflow-beslut, delad state.
- **P5 (2):** runbook-uppföljning, konsumentledsdokumentation.
- **P6 (4):** designsystem, NER/OCR, OpenSanctions-avtal, INF0-koppling.
## 6. Vad jag inte kunde verifiera (ärligt)
- Om/när `middleware.ts` faktiskt exekveras i prod (S1) — kräver deploymiljö.
- Om en Coolify-app någonstans pekar på repot (Coolify-API ej nått denna session).
- Om `api.0pt.app`/`data.0pt.app`/`dash.0pt.app` lever (Caddy, ej verifierat).
- Om ST0RE/N0D/AUD0-produktion når 0pt (realinfra-tester skippade utan URL:er).
- GitHubs spegelrepon (`github.com/sax3l/0pt`) — .github/workflows/ci.yml lämnades
intakt (AR-1); om GitHub-sidan är död kan den avvecklas (P4-5, Simons beslut).
- Infisical-projektets existens (token saknas).
## 7. Slutstatus
CI-kvalitet grind på final main verifieras efter sista push (run-ID i
EVIDENCE/ci-main.md uppdateras). Lokala grindar: typecheck ✅ · test 128 ✅ ·
build ✅. AR-1..AR-8 efterlevda; bypass-stacken orörd; inga kundrepon berörda;
inga hemligheter committade (grep-skannat före push).
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# P6 guides — 0pt
BACKLOG P6: 19 GUIDE-level items, all marked S (small effort), all "NU"
(safe to write now). Several have their own concrete artifact instead of a
guide entry here — see the table. This file covers the rest: real,
actionable "how to build this when it's prioritized" guidance grounded in
0pt's actual code, not generic advice that could apply to any repo.
| Control | Item | Where |
|---|---|---|
| REPO-13 | `.editorconfig` | [`.editorconfig`](../../.editorconfig) |
| ARK-14 | dependency-cruiser | [`.dependency-cruiser.cjs`](../../.dependency-cruiser.cjs), `pnpm run deps:check` |
| API-24 | deprecation policy | [`docs/api/DEPRECATION_POLICY.md`](../api/DEPRECATION_POLICY.md) |
| CD-23 | K8s manifest | [`deploy/k8s/`](../../deploy/k8s/) (reference only, not the deploy path) |
| CI-16 | `act` | [`.actrc`](../../.actrc) |
| DX-11 | Makefile | [`Makefile`](../../Makefile) |
| DX-12 | onboarding | [`ONBOARDING.md`](../../ONBOARDING.md) |
| CLI-13 | `doctor` CLI subcommand | see §1 below |
| DOC-18 | documentation site | see §2 below |
| UI-30 | PWA | see §3 below |
| IAM-19 | impersonation | see §4 below |
| PAY-11 | Hyperswitch ADR | see §5 below |
| AI-18 | assistant | see §6 below |
| OBS-21 | status page | see §7 below |
| TEST-20 | chaos testing | see §8 below |
| NET-19 | IPv6 | see §9 below |
| SCALE-13 | read replicas | see §10 below |
| OSS-10 | upstream contribution | see §11 below |
| AGENT-13 | nightly agent | see §12 below |
---
## 1. CLI-13 — `doctor` CLI subcommand
There is no CLI surface at all yet (BACKLOG P1-5 — L effort, not attempted
this pass). `pnpm run siax:doctor` / `make doctor`
(`scripts/siax-doctor.mjs`) already covers the underlying check logic
(AGENT-04). When P1-5 builds `apps/cli`, wire a `siax 0pt doctor` subcommand
that shells out to (or re-imports) `scripts/siax-doctor.mjs` rather than
re-implementing the checks — one source of truth for "is this repo
compliant", not two that can drift.
## 2. DOC-18 — documentation site
Not built. When prioritized: `contracts/openapi.yaml` already exists as a
real OpenAPI 3.1 SSOT, so the lowest-effort path is a static OpenAPI
renderer (e.g. Redocly CLI or Scalar) pointed at that file, deployed as a
static site — not a hand-authored docs site that would drift from the
contract. `docs/*.md` could be published alongside via any static-site
generator that reads plain Markdown (Docusaurus, Starlight); pick whichever
matches what other SIAX Cloud repos already use, per BACKLOG's "one tool per
job" rule — check `cl0ud`/`n0d` first before introducing a new one here.
## 3. UI-30 — PWA
Not built. Would need: a `manifest.json` (icons already exist at
`public/icon*.png`/`icon.svg` — reuse them, don't regenerate), a service
worker (Next.js has no built-in PWA plugin as of this repo's Next 16; a
minimal hand-written SW covering `/api/health`-style offline detection would
be more honest than a cargo-culted `next-pwa` config, given this app's
`ignoreBuildErrors: true` posture already has enough unverified surface). Low
priority — 0pt's UI is transactional (order flow, portal), not the kind of
app users install to a home screen.
## 4. IAM-19 — impersonation
Not built. Needed pattern once an admin portal exists with real customer
data: a support/admin session that can view-as a specific tenant/user,
**always** logged to AUD0 (BACKLOG P0-18 — AUD0 client exists but is
currently no-op without `AUD0_URL`) with the impersonator's real identity
attached, never silently. Do not build a "become this user" auth shortcut
without that audit trail landing first — an impersonation feature with no
audit log is a privilege-escalation bug wearing a support-tool costume.
## 5. PAY-11 — Hyperswitch ADR
**Proposed, not accepted — payments provider is explicitly gated on the
account owner's decision (BACKLOG P1-23).** This entry exists so the option
is on record, not to decide it. Hyperswitch is an open-source payment
orchestration layer (self-hostable) that could sit in front of
Stripe/Revolut/others rather than 0pt integrating each provider directly
(`lib/stripe.ts` today). Trade-off to weigh when P1-23 is actually decided:
self-hosting Hyperswitch adds an operational dependency (another service to
run/monitor) in exchange for provider-agnosticism; direct integration
(current state) is simpler but couples this repo to Stripe's specific API
shape. Not evaluated further here — that's the ADR this guide is explicitly
not writing.
## 6. AI-18 — assistant
Not built. `app/api/ai/parse` exists today as a heuristic (no model call,
per `CLAUDE.md`/`docs/02-architecture.md`'s "honest heuristic" framing) — a
real assistant feature should route through INF0 (the fleet AI gateway,
`INF0_URL` — documented target, not yet read by any code in this repo) per
the platform mandate, never a raw provider key committed here.
## 7. OBS-21 — status page
Not built. Lowest-effort honest option once `/api/health` + `/api/ready`
are actually monitored (BACKLOG P1-11, not yet wired to Prometheus/GlitchTip
per that item): a self-hosted status page (e.g. Upptime, which is
just-a-GitHub/Gitea-Actions-cron + static site, no server to run) polling
those two endpoints. Do not stand up a status page before the endpoints it
would display are meaningfully monitored — an unmonitored status page that
says "operational" is worse than no status page.
## 8. TEST-20 — chaos testing
Not built, and low-value until BACKLOG P0-12 lands (real DB/persistence —
right now there's no durable state to chaos-test; killing the process loses
nothing that wasn't already going to be lost on the next cold start). Once
persistence exists: start with the cheapest chaos test that matches 0pt's
actual documented failure mode — kill the Postgres connection mid-request
and assert `/api/ready` flips to 503 within one health-check interval (this
is now directly testable thanks to BACKLOG P0-3's real dependency probes).
## 9. NET-19 — IPv6
Not evaluated. `docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md` doesn't currently record
whether the Coolify target node(s) or `0pt.app`'s DNS have AAAA records —
check `z0ne` (SIAX's own DNS product) once a real Coolify app exists for
this repo; premature to configure before there's a fleet IP to point at.
## 10. SCALE-13 — read replicas
Not applicable yet — there is no primary database in production to
replicate (BACKLOG P0-12: state lives in in-memory `Map`s, zero DB
provisioned). Revisit once P0-12 lands and real read/write load is
measured; provisioning a replica against a database that doesn't exist yet
would be pure speculation.
## 11. OSS-10 — upstream contribution
No dependency in this repo has been identified as needing a patch upstream
rather than a workaround here (checked: no local patches in
`pnpm-lock.yaml`'s `patchedDependencies`, none found). Nothing to
contribute upstream today; revisit if/when a real workaround is added for
an upstream bug — file the issue/PR there instead of carrying the
workaround silently forever.
## 12. AGENT-13 — nightly agent
`nightly.yml` already re-runs the full quality + (now blocking) security
gate daily (BACKLOG P0-16). A step beyond that — an agent that reads the
nightly failure and opens a triage PR — is AGENT-06 territory (BACKLOG P1-19
already scopes AGENT-06 as not attempted this pass: it needs real
OpenHands/Aider/SWE-agent infrastructure via INF0, which doesn't exist yet
for this repo). Do not build a bespoke nightly-agent script here ahead of
that shared infrastructure landing — it would be exactly the kind of
one-off tool the "one tool per job" rule (`CLAUDE.md` §4) warns against.
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# Document workbench — upload → structure → validated export
The customer-facing slice that turns an uploaded file into evidence-bound data.
## Routes
| Route | Purpose | Fails closed with |
|---|---|---|
| `POST /api/0pt/documents/upload` | multipart upload of the original bytes into DOC0, recorded in a durable attempt journal before dispatch | `503 DOC0_NOT_CONFIGURED`, `503 PROJECT_AUTHORIZATION_NOT_CONFIGURED`, `503 UPLOAD_JOURNAL_NOT_CONFIGURED` |
| `POST /api/0pt/documents/structure` | re-reads the DOC0 segment index, calls INF0, validates every field against an exact source span, reserves/settles credits | `503 WORKBENCH_NOT_CONFIGURED`, `503 MODEL_POLICY_NOT_CONFIGURED`, `503 CREDITS_NOT_CONFIGURED`, `402 INSUFFICIENT_CREDITS` |
| `GET /api/0pt/documents/models` | the server-approved model routes and limits | `503 MODEL_POLICY_NOT_CONFIGURED` |
| `GET /api/0pt/credits/balance` | tenant credit balance | `503 CREDITS_NOT_CONFIGURED` |
| `GET /api/0pt/credits/packs` | sellable packs from the server-owned price book | `503 PRICE_BOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED` |
| `POST /api/0pt/credits/checkout` | Stripe Checkout session + server price snapshot | `503 PRICE_BOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED`, `503 STRIPE_NOT_CONFIGURED` |
| `POST /api/webhooks/stripe` | re-reads the session and payment intent, then grants credits idempotently | non-2xx until processed |
UI: `/portal/dokument` (upload, structure, review, download) and `/portal/krediter`
(balance, packs, checkout). The portal signs in through Zitadel OIDC
(`/api/auth/login` → `/api/auth/callback`); the resulting signed session cookie
is accepted by middleware as a verified principal (Bearer still wins).
## Invariants
1. **Tenant and actor come only from middleware's verified headers.** A customer
route never trusts `tenant_id`/`actor_id` from the body.
2. **Project access is checked by OpenFGA** (`@siax/access`), the same primitive
DOC0 uses. Until the central relationship store is deployed, an explicit
server-owned grant list (`OPT_PROJECT_GRANTS`) can be used instead.
Unconfigured or unavailable means *denied*, never allowed.
3. **The model never sees unverified text.** `Doc0SourceClient` verifies
version, tenant, checksum, segment hashes and that the index was not
truncated before anything is sent to INF0.
4. **Every returned value must point at an exact span** in the source; otherwise
the result is `needs_review` and nothing is exported.
5. **Credits are reserved before the model runs and settled to measured usage.**
An unknown model outcome keeps the reservation for reconciliation instead of
releasing it.
6. **No price is ever read from the client.** The price book is a versioned,
server-owned JSON document (`OPT_CREDIT_PRICE_BOOK`).
7. **Trial credits are a grant, not a payment.** `OPT_TRIAL_CREDITS=N` grants N
credits once per tenant (`kind='grant'`, idempotency key `trial:<tenant>`),
so the ledger is fully exercised before any real purchase. It is never read
from a client and never looks like a Stripe payment.
8. **Pilot mode is explicit.** `OPT_CREDITS_MODE=off` skips reserve/settle and
reports `credits: null`. It is not a silent fallback and it does not enable
purchases; unset/`on` requires the price book and the ledger.
## Reusable packages
- `packages/siax-access` (`@siax/access`) — framework-neutral OpenFGA
relationship checks and a fail-closed `isProjectAccessAllowed`. Intended for
DOC0, N0D and every other SIAX product instead of per-repo copies of
`project-relationships.ts`.
- `src/document-workbench/*` — upload coordination, DOC0 source reading, INF0
admission, structured-output validation, export and credit ledger. These
modules have no Next.js imports and can be lifted into a published package
unchanged.
## Which AI path is used
Order:
1. **Decision server model** (`DECISION_OLLAMA_URL` + `DECISION_OLLAMA_MODEL`) —
the self-hosted Ollama on server-decision-01, used while the external model
API is on hold. Internal only, no provider key, no per-token cost.
2. **Live LiteLLM gateway** (`INF0_GATEWAY_LITELLM_KEY`).
3. Native `INF0_URL` surface.
Admission — tenant/project scope, model allow-list, data class,
external-transfer policy and token limits — runs locally in every path before
the request leaves the process. Evidence spans are computed deterministically
from the returned values when a small local model omits offsets: a value must
occur exactly once in the source, otherwise the result is `needs_review`.
## What is still deliberately not claimed
- The output is `mechanically_validated`, not proven complete or semantically
correct. OCR quality and coverage require review.
- Refunds and chargebacks do not automatically revoke credits; no such handler
is wired.
- Format breadth is limited by DOC0's parser. A file DOC0 cannot parse is
reported, never guessed.
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# Runbook: Backup & Restore — 0pt
> Status 2026-08-10 (still true as of this P014 pass, not independently
> re-verified against a live deployment): **ingen databas i produktion**
> (`/api/health` → `db: not_configured`); allt state är in-memory (försvinner
> vid kallstart). Denna runbook beskriver läget idag + målbilden när Postgres
> provisioneras. **Vad SOM ändrades i P014**: migreringskedjan
> (`sql/001` → `006`) gick tidigare inte att köra alls end-to-end mot en
> tom databas (se "P014 restore-övning" nedan) — det är nu fixat och
> verifierat, oberoende av om produktion faktiskt har `DATABASE_URL` satt.
## Nuläge
- Ingen backup behövs/sker idag — det finns inget att backa upp (in-memory).
- `sql/001_init.sql` är schemat (13 tabeller + pgvector/pgcrypto).
- `sql/002_source_registry.sql` — Source Registry-tabellerna.
- `sql/003_datasets.sql` (P014) — `opt_datasets`, tidigare saknad helt (se nedan).
- `sql/004/005` är iceberg-bärande tabeller.
- `sql/006_orders_idempotency.sql` (P014) — `orders.idempotency_key` + unikt index.
- **Kända blockerare:** estate-som-helhet saknar offsite-backup (Hetzner
Robot-creds). Denna repo kan inte lösa det enskilt.
## P014 restore-övning: EXEKVERAD 2026-09-03 (verklig, mätt, inte prosa)
Körd mot verklig, engångs, isolerad infrastruktur (Docker, `pgvector/pgvector:pg16`
— samma image som `compose.dev.yaml`/`infra/docker-compose.yml`) — inte simulerad.
Ingen produktionsdata, inga persistenta artefakter kvarlämnade.
**Steg 1 — upptäckt: migreringskedjan gick inte att köra.** Att faktiskt köra
`sql/001` → `002` → `004` → `005` (den ordning `docs/03`/denna runbooks egna
"Målbild" beskriver, och exakt vad en riktig restore-övning måste göra) mot en
tom databas misslyckades: `004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` refererar
`opt_datasets`, en tabell ingen `sql/`-fil någonsin definierade. Filens egen
kommentar hade redan flaggat detta ("Flagging, not fixing here... remains
open") men ingen hade tidigare faktiskt kört kedjan för att bekräfta felet.
**Fixat**: `sql/003_datasets.sql` tillagd (matchar
`src/services/dataset-service.ts`s `DatasetRecord`-form exakt, inte en
gissning) — kedjan `001→002→003→004→005→006` kör nu rent mot en tom databas.
**Steg 2 — upptäckt: `lib/db.ts` kunde aldrig ansluta till en icke-TLS
Postgres.** `getSql()` hårdkodade `ssl: "require"` ovillkorligt — vilket gjorde
att `compose.dev.yaml`s egen lokala Postgres-container (ingen TLS)
ALDRIG hade kunnat nås via denna funktion, konsekvent med den filens egen
"UNVERIFIED... not smoke-tested"-flagga. **Fixat**: `DATABASE_SSL=false` är
nu ett explicit opt-out (standard oförändrad — `"require"` — för varje verklig
driftsättning).
**Steg 3 — själva övningen, mätt:**
| Steg | Resultat |
|---|---|
| Käll-container (`p014-restore-source`, `pgvector/pgvector:pg16`, engångs) | frisk efter 1s |
| Migreringar `001`→`006` applicerade | rent, 0 fel (efter fix ovan) |
| Data seedad (verkliga tabellrader, inte platshållare) | 1 org, 2 orders (varav en med `idempotency_key`), 1 `opt_sources`-post + `rights`/`provenance`/`health`, 1 `opt_datasets`, 1 `opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings`, 1 `opt_source_rate_policies` |
| `pg_dump -Fc` | 0,123 s, 48 835 bytes, sha256 loggad |
| Frisk, TOM mål-container (`p014-restore-target`, separat engångsinstans) | frisk efter ~3s |
| `pg_restore --no-owner --no-privileges` | 0,284 s, 0 fel |
| Radantal källa vs. mål, samtliga 9 tabeller | **identiska** |
| `md5`-checksumma på hela `orders`-tabellens innehåll (källa vs. mål) | **identisk** (`95f7d0f9…`) |
| `md5`-checksumma på hela `opt_sources`-tabellens innehåll (källa vs. mål) | **identisk** (`b4612dbf…`) |
| Verklig applikationskod mot den RESTORERADE databasen: `lib/orders-store.ts` (`getOrder`, `findOrderByIdempotencyKey`) | läser tillbaka exakt rätt `config`/`total_ore`/`est_confidence`/idempotency-nyckel |
| Verklig applikationskod mot den RESTORERADE databasen: `SourceRegistryService` (riktigt Postgres-repository, `src/repositories/postgres-source-registry-repository.ts`) | `describeSource` returnerar korrekt `name`/`rights.license_id`/`provenance.method`/`health.status`; tvärtenant-isolering (`NOT_FOUND`, ingen existence-oracle) håller fortfarande mot den restorerade databasen |
Slutsats: en klon av denna schema+data-modell kan verkligen provisioneras,
backas upp och återställas end-to-end idag — det kunde den INTE innan denna
övning (migreringskedjan var trasig). Engångscontainrarna revs efter
övningen; ingen data eller infrastruktur kvarlämnad.
**Kvarstående, inte löst av denna övning:** produktionens faktiska
backup-schema/retention/offsite-kopia (se "Målbild" nedan — fortfarande
målbild, inte verifierad mot en live driftsättning i denna pass) och
Hetzner-blockeraren för estate-bred offsite-backup.
## Målbild (när `DATABASE_URL` satts)
### Daglig backup (P2-1 i BACKLOG)
```bash
# på Postgres-värden (eller via N0D-jobb):
pg_dump -Fc -d opt > /backup/opt-$(date +%F).dump
# + offsite-kopia (MinIO/ST0RE via s3_sync-mönstret i services/scrapers)
```
- Retention: 14 dagliga + 12 månatliga (föreslås; justeras vid provisionering).
- Schemat får aldrig backupas från en klient med gamla migreringar — kör
`sql/*.sql` via versionskontrollerad migrationsrunner (BACKLOG P4-3).
### Restore (testas kvartalsvis)
```bash
psql -d opt < backup # eller: pg_restore -d opt opt-YYYY-MM-DD.dump
# verifiera: SELECT count(*) FROM dim_company; + /api/health → db: configured
```
### ST0RE/lakehouse-artefakter
- Iceberg-tabeller/snapshots pekar på manifest-URI:er — själva bytena ägs av
N0D/ST0RE (0pt skriver bara metadata). 0pt-backup omfattar
`opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings` + `opt_source_rate_policies` (finns i pg_dump).
## Restore-övning
1. Provisionera tillfällig Postgres (pgvector:pg16).
2. `pg_restore` senaste dump. 3. Sätt `DATABASE_URL` i dev-instans.
4. Verifiera orderflöde + en källfråga. 5. Logga resultatet i `docs/compliance/EVIDENCE/`.
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# Runbook: Deploy — 0pt
> Status 2026-11-02: **live on the SIAX fleet (Coolify)** at `https://0pt.app`.
> The automatic chain and the manual path are both verified: a signed image is
> attested, Coolify is called, the container restarts on the new commit, and
> `/api/version` reports it.
## Pipeline (automatic)
```
git push main
├─ ci.yml quality (typecheck, contrast, tests, build)
│ integration (live OpenSearch + ClickHouse)
│ security (Trivy, blocking)
├─ security.yml push/PR/weekly scan
├─ release.yml build + SBOM + blocking vuln scan + cosign attest + push
│ → git.cloud.siax.io/sax3l/0pt:sha-<12>
└─ cd.yml waits for THIS commit's attestation, verifies it against
cosign.pub, then POSTs to Coolify
prod-smoke.yml every 30 min: ready + db/stripe + running commit == main
```
- One run per ref (`concurrency`); `push` is main-only, PRs are covered by the
`pull_request` event. Deploys have their own non-cancelling group so two
runs never race the same app.
- Dependency caches: pnpm store (Node jobs), npm (doc0/n0d), pip (0pt-motor).
## Manual deploy (proven)
Trigger the same, signed path — do not POST to Coolify directly unless the
pipeline itself is broken:
```bash
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: token $GITEA_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"ref":"main"}' \
https://git.siax.io/api/v1/repos/admin/0pt/actions/workflows/cd.yml/dispatches
```
Emergency only (bypasses the attestation gate; still builds the branch head):
```bash
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $COOLIFY_API_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"uuid":"<COOLIFY_APP_ID>"}' https://cloud.siax.io/api/v1/deploy
```
## Verify a deploy
```bash
curl -s https://0pt.app/api/ready # {"ready":true,"db":"ok","stripe":"ok",...}
curl -s https://0pt.app/api/health # liveness envelope
curl -s https://0pt.app/api/version # {"commit":"<sha>"}
```
`commit` must equal the current `main` SHA. `prod-smoke.yml` enforces exactly
that every 30 minutes; a green deploy is never confused with a current service.
## Rollback
Coolify builds from the branch head, so a rollback is a normal revert:
```bash
git revert --no-edit <bad-sha> && git push origin main
```
That runs the same chain and deploys the reverted tree. Coolify's own
"redeploy previous deployment" is the break-glass alternative.
## Configuration (names only — values live in Coolify/Infisical)
- Coolify app: `dockerfile` build pack, repo `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt`, branch
`main`, health check `/api/health`, domains `0pt.app` + `api.0pt.app`.
- Repository variable: `COOLIFY_APP_ID`.
- Repository secrets: `COOLIFY_TOKEN`, `REGISTRY_USER`, `REGISTRY_TOKEN`,
`COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY`, `COSIGN_PASSWORD`, `SIAX_CI_TOKEN`.
- App env: `DATABASE_URL`, `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`, `AUTH_SECRET`… see `.env.example`
for the full, documented list (DOC0, INF0/decision Ollama, OpenFGA/project
grants, model policy, credit price book, OIDC).
## Known limitation
Coolify rebuilds from source; `/api/v1/deploy` has no digest parameter, so the
verified digest is recorded as provenance for the deploy rather than pinned as
the running bytes. True digest pinning would require a Coolify `dockerimage`
resource — an infrastructure decision, not a CI-YAML change.
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# Runbook: Incident — 0pt
## Severity-nivåer
| Nivå | Exempel | Svarstid |
|---|---|---|
| S1 | Live-instans nere / dataexponering | Omedelbart |
| S2 | Större funktion trasig | Inom 30 min (arbetstid) |
| S3 | Mindre funktion/UI | Inom 1 arbetsdag |
## Kända felbilder (2026-08-10)
| Symtom | Sannolik orsak | Åtgärd |
|---|---|---|
| `/api/health` grön men `/api/orders` tom | Ingen DB i prod (in-memory-store) | Sätt `DATABASE_URL`; se BACKLOG P3-4 |
| `/api/0pt/*` svarar 200 anonymt | Middleware körs inte på Vercel-deployen (lucka S1) | Rotorsaksanalys; verifiera 401 anonymt före "skyddad" |
| ~~deploy.yml-röd på main~~ | ~~Guard: placeholder `COOLIFY_APP_ID` (avsiktligt)~~ **INAKTUELL 2026-09-06** — guarden passerar numera; `COOLIFY_APP_ID` är en riktig UUID och `COOLIFY_TOKEN` finns | Rätt symtom i dag är det omvända: **varje merge till `main` utlöser en riktig omdeploy** mot cloud.siax.io (verifierat: push `1ff34410`, jobb `Deploy to Coolify / deploy` = success, `coolify deploy HTTP 200`). Vet vad du deployar innan du mergar |
| Test `*.realinfra.test.ts` skip | ST0RE inte nåbar från CI | Inte en incident — förväntat beteende |
| Trivy-fynd på `services/scrapers/*` | Medvetet behållen bypass-stack | Läs GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT C6; triage, radera ej |
## Incidentprocess
1. **Triagera:** läs `/api/health`, senaste CI-run, `git log -5`.
2. **Kommunicera:** logga i plattformens kanal; nämn tidslinje.
3. **Minsta korrekta ändring:** aldrig radera funktionalitet (AR-1); fixa med
minsta diff, håll tester gröna (`pnpm run typecheck && pnpm run test`).
4. **Evidens:** dokumentera i `docs/compliance/` (märk VERIFIERAT).
5. **Efter incident:** skriv post-mortem i `docs/` + uppdatera BACKLOG om ny lucka.
## Roller
- Oncall: se `docs/runbook/oncall.md`.
- Eskalering: Simon Axelsson (simon@siax.io) — produkt- och infrastrukturbeslut
(t.ex. bypass-stacken, Vercel-avveckling) tas alltid av honom.
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# Legacy instance audit — 0pt (server5) and L0RE (server5) — 2026-11-07
Canonical runtimes: **0pt on server6** (Coolify app `shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g`,
`0pt.app`) and **L0RE on server9** (`l0re.siax.io`). This document records the
older instances on server5 and their disposition. It is not production
documentation for either product.
## 1. 0pt legacy (server5)
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Containers | `0pt-api` (`0pt-api:c46ebbf`, created 2026-11-05), `0pt-web` (`:18080`) |
| Database | `0pt-pg`, user/db `opt`, 11 MB |
| Exposure | `0pt-web` only on `100.124.7.55:18080`; no DNS record, no reverse proxy |
| Consumers | none found (`/etc/siax`, `/opt/siax`, site0 and L0RE deploy configs) |
| Unique data | 32 canonical facts (30 GLEIF web observations + `body_type` YDL405 + `passmark.find_prime_numbers.v10`) |
**Data reconciliation:** all 32 facts were exported and re-imported through the
canonical API (`POST /api/0pt/canonical/facts`) into the server6 deployment.
Replay returned `duplicates: 32`, so the import is idempotent. Production now
holds 34 facts (32 migrated + 2 verification observations) and 4 entities.
**Backup:** `server5:/var/backups/0pt-legacy/opt_legacy_20261107.dump.zst`
(custom format, 32 KB) + offsite `server11:/home/backup/0pt/`.
**Action taken:** `docker update --restart=no` + `docker stop` for `0pt-api` and
`0pt-web`. `0pt-pg` left running for forensics/rollback. `0pt.app` verified 200
after the stop (served by server6).
**Full removal (requires owner decision):** snapshot/destroy `0pt-pg` volume
after the retention window, remove the legacy compose project, revoke the old
`INTERNAL_TOKEN` if it was ever stored on server5.
## 2. L0RE orphan (server5)
Documented separately in `admin/l0re` PR #485
(`docs/runbook/l0re-orphan-decommission-20261107.md`): API stopped with
`restart=no`, dump + restore proof (8 propositions/62 assertions), no unique
legitimate data (pilot facts already re-projected to production). `l0re-pg` and
`l0re-opensearch` remain for forensics.
## 3. Single-runtime rule
One primary runtime per logical service. A container image of a product running
outside its registered Coolify app is a finding, not a fallback. Both server5
instances were reachable only from the host, which is why the split survived
until this audit.
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# Runbook: Oncall — 0pt
> Gäller tills vidare (2026-08-10). Uppdateras när drift slås på flottan.
## Vem
- **Primär:** Simon Axelsson (simon@siax.io) — enda beslutsfattare för
produkt/radering/bypass-stacken/Coolify-avveckling.
- **Teknisk beredskap:** den som deployar/verifierar CI per dag (se "Dagliga
rutiner"). Ingen formell rotation existerar ännu (enmanslag).
## Dagliga rutiner
1. Kontrollera Gitea Actions: senaste `ci.yml` på main ska vara grön.
(`deploy.yml`/`cd.yml` röd = avsiktlig guard tills Coolify-app provisioneras.)
2. `curl https://0pt.app/api/health` — ok:true + notera db/queue-läge.
3. Skimma Trivy-rapporten (security.yml) — triage hög/kritisk, dokumentera i BACKLOG.
## Veckorutiner
- Verifiera att nightly.yml kört (mån–sön 04:00 UTC).
- health-check.yml (måndag 06:00) — lyssna på warnings om saknade filer.
## Eskaleringsvägar
| Ärende | Kontakt |
|---|---|
| Säkerhetslucka / intrång | security@siax.io (omedelbart), sedan Simon |
| Vercel/Coolify/provisionering | Simon |
| Gitea/Actions-infra | Simon |
| Bypass-stacken (GPL/juridiskt) | Simon — aldrig ensidigt beslut |
## Svarstider
- S1 (nere/exponering): omedelbart.
- S2 (stor funktion): 30 min arbetstid.
- S3 (mindre): 1 arbetsdag.
## Överlämning
- Allt som en oncall-person gjort dokumenteras i `docs/compliance/` (AR-5).
- Incidenter → post-mortem i `docs/runbook/incident.md`-mönstret.
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# 0pt workload identity — målbild, nuläge och övergång
Status: **design klar, provisionering blockerad** (2026-11-07).
Ägare: CL0UD (identitet) / 0pt (konsument).
## 1. Nuläge
0pt autentiserar maskin-till-maskin med en **delad hemlighet**:
- `X-Internal-Token` mot `INTERNAL_TOKEN` (samma värde i engine och edge).
- Tenant-auktoritet kommer från serverkonfigurationen `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS`
(se `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts`), aldrig från en klientheader.
- Tom allowlist ⇒ ingen tenant-auktoritet ⇒ tenant-scopade skrivningar 403.
Det här är säkert men grovkornigt: en enda hemlighet representerar hela
engine-processen, och varje ny konsument kräver en manuell allowlist-post.
## 2. Målbild (CL0UD workload identity)
CL0UD äger redan maskineriet:
- `POST /account/service-accounts` skapar en service account (identitet).
- `POST /account/service-accounts/{id}/workload-token` mints en **kortlivad**
(10 min default, 1 h max) workload-token vars `capabilities` är en delmängd av
service accountens `platform.cl0ud_service_account_scopes.allowedCapabilities`.
- `@siax/platform-core` `auth/workload.ts` är verifieringsadaptern; publika
nycklar via JWKS.
- `packages/capability-registry/src/workload-identities.ts` deklarerar
arbetsbelastningsnamn och `aud:*`-audiences. Modulen är uttryckligen **inte**
provisionerad och **inte** inkopplad i utfärdande eller verifiering än.
För 0pt innebär det:
| Egenskap | Idag | Mål |
|---|---|---|
| Credential | delad `INTERNAL_TOKEN` | CL0UD-workload-token, `aud:0pt`, 10 min |
| Tenant | serverkonfigurerad allowlist | `tenant_id`-claim i verifierad token |
| Capabilities | route-lista i middleware | `capabilities`-claim (t.ex. `0pt.canonical.write`) |
| Rotation | manuell | automatisk (kortlivad token) |
| Spårbarhet | delad hemlighet | per-arbetsbelastning (`0pt-engine`, `site0-pipeline`) |
## 3. Integrationsdesign (när provisionering är möjlig)
1. **Verifiering före route-logik.** Middleware accepterar
`Authorization: Bearer <workload-token>` för `INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES` om
signaturen verifieras mot CL0UD JWKS, `aud` innehåller `0pt` och `exp` är
giltig. Ingen klientheader får bidra till tenant.
2. **Tenant från claim, inte från allowlist.** `tenant_id` i den verifierade
tokenen sätts som `x-0pt-verified-tenant`; `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS`
används endast för legacy `X-Internal-Token`.
3. **Capabilities per route.** Route-metadata (`0pt.canonical.write`,
`0pt.quality.run`) jämförs med tokenens `capabilities`. Saknad capability ⇒
403, inte 401 (identiteten är giltig, behörigheten räcker inte).
4. **Dual-accept under övergång.** Båda credentialtyperna accepteras tills
engine och site0-pipeline mintar workload-tokens; därefter tas
`X-Internal-Token` bort i en egen release med negativt test.
5. **Negativa tester i samma svit som idag**
(`tests/auth/internal-token-tenant-scope.test.ts`): fel `aud` ⇒ 401, utgången
token ⇒ 401, tenant utanför claim ⇒ 403, saknad capability ⇒ 403.
## 4. Blockerare
- `/account/service-accounts` svarar **307 → /login** utan operator-session;
ingen giltig `SIAX_TOKEN` finns i Infisical-miljön.
- Zitadel admin-PAT (`/opt/siax-access/zitadel-admin-pat`) är invalid
(AUTH-7fs1e), så nya machine users kan inte mintas via det flödet.
- `workload-identities.ts` är deklaration-only: ingen identitet är
`provisioned: true`.
Åtgärd kräver en operatörsinloggning i CL0UD-konsolen (eller en ny giltig
admin-PAT) och är därför **EXTERNALLY_BLOCKED** från agentsidan.
## 5. Vad som inte ska göras
- Ingen egen JWT-signering i 0pt.
- Ingen parallell identitetsplattform.
- Ingen klientheader som bär tenant.
- Ingen långlivad delad hemlighet som "tillfällig" lösning utan slutdatum.
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# SLO — 0pt
> Gäller när tjänsten är i produktion på flottan (Coolify). Nuläget (2026-08-10):
> live på Vercel, ingen DB — se särskilda noteringar. Ägare: Simon Axelsson.
## Tillgänglighet
| SLO | Mål | Nuläge (2026-08-10) |
|---|---|---|
| `/api/health` (liveness) | 99,9 % | ✅ 200; `ok` speglar nu en riktig per-dependency-probe (fixat BACKLOG P0-3) |
| `/api/ready` (readiness) | 99,5 % | ✅ ny (BACKLOG P0-3) — 503 när `db` inte är konfigurerad+nåbar |
| Orderflöde `/api/orders` | 99,5 % | ⚠️ fungerar utan DB (in-memory), data försvinner vid restart |
| Capability-API `/api/0pt/*` | 99,5 % | ⚠️ live 200 anonymt (lucka S1) — målbild: 401 utan token |
| Engine (FastAPI, när deployad) | 99,0 % | ej deployad (EJ VERIFIERAT) |
## Latens (p95)
| Operation | Mål |
|---|---|
| `/api/health` | < 200 ms |
| `/api/estimates` | < 500 ms |
| `0pt.query_source` (enkla källor) | < 2 s |
| Iceberg-write (tung) | ej mätbart sync — asynkront via N0D-jobb |
## Data & proveniens
- **Proveniens per fält:** 100 % av levererade fält bär `bridge_provenance`
(källa, färskhet, konfidens, level). Målbild; i dag är leverans in-memory.
- **Inga fabricerade värden:** 100 % — hård garanti (never-fabricate-tester finns).
- **Retention/deletion-after-job:** mål 100 % av jobb — **inte implementerat**
(BACKLOG P2-2).
## Säkerhet (baskrav)
- 0 kända hårdkodade hemligheter i repo (skannat 2026-08-10: 0 träffar).
- Auth fail-closed i kod; **live-verifierad 401 krävs före produktionslöfte**
(lucka S1 öppen).
- Ingen betald SaaS-plattform som driftkrav (AR-4) — Stripe är kundval, env-guardad.
## Rapportering
- Mätning sker manuellt vid incidenter tills observabilitet är inkopplad
(BACKLOG P2-4). Mål: automatiska hälsokontroller via nightly.yml + Coolify.
## Undantag
Bypass-stacken (`services/scrapers/*`) är medvetet behållen per kontoägarens
daterade beslut (Simon Axelsson, 2026-08-11 — se SECURITY.md) och omfattas
inte av ovanstående SLO; dess körtid är ej mätbar i 0pt-SLO:er.